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Ever since the Latin term omnipotentia announced that God could do everything, the 
inevitable question was raised about the things God could not do. Manuscript, Vat. Lat. 
1086 contains the reportationes of student Prosper taken from a disputatio in which his 
accomplished teacher, Meister Eckhart, considers whether the potentia of God should be 
considered as ordinata or absoluta. Through his astute mind and efficient administrative 
skills, Eckhart was re-appointed to the Dominican Chair of theology at the University of 
Paris circa 1312, and following his Commentary on Exodus and Latin Sermon XXVIII, 
this was the third occasion, that we know of, to expand his thoughts on how God 
actualises power, and the perceived power distinction. This previously unexplored 
treatment is in the middle of a series of questions which present a developing image of 
the thinking of this Meister who stretched notions of God beyond any boundaries.  
The first part of this thesis issue reviews how the question of a power distinction reached 
Eckhart. The all-powerfulness of the one God had seen anthropomorphic Hebrew roots 
adapted to incorporate Greek aspects of a more abstract, sustaining and emanating 
oneness. The 13th Century, saw turbulent times in Paris with disputes between the 
university, its students, the church, and not only between mendicant orders but also within 
them, meanwhile, with scholarly advances, the terms of the distinction were refined to 
become a sharp issue for debate in the classroom and an available tool for refining the 
increasingly powerful canon law.  
The second part reviews the codex with a new transcription and English translation. From 
this, a commentary of the text presents how the Meister considers earlier treatments on 
the power of God by notables such as Augustine and Thomas, and challenges them with 
a striking modification to the conception of the potentia absoluta. Through these notes 
which are substantiated by his other works, Eckhart forwards his own radical view, that 
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Part I. The background to Parisian Question six  
Introduction 
 
This chapter begins the exploration of Parisian Question six, the first of the recently re-
discovered questions of Meister Eckhart by considering how the issue raised by the 
question had reached the Meister. Question six can be recognised as Eckhart taking the 
opportunity to engage in an ongoing debate that had featured repeatedly as the Church 
developed its doctrine of the omnipotence of God.  
The term omnipotentia literally declares the power to be able to do everything and 
although we cannot question the magnitude of the power of God, there remains the 
question of how God exercises his power in the world. Being all-powerful clearly does 
not mean the same as being able to do everything. A distinction, between the things God 
is able to do and the things God actually does, generated a debate that reached far wider 
than this initial question of omnipotence.  
When moving through the history of the debate, it is important to recognise that issues 
raised by the question are recorded and received with contemporary understanding. 
Eckhart's treatment is specific to his situation and so provides a contextual development 
that builds on the historical amendments already made. Progressive coverage of one 
particular issue can lead to its crystallisation as well as to an off-shoot of new tangents 
and each historical development of this debate presents a refinement rather than just 
repetition of the same argument. Tracing the key modifications from a theological and 
philosophical as well as historical perspective reveals why Eckhart was addressing a point 
of doctrine with contemporary significance. This question on power held different strands 
as Eckhart was not just dealing with an on-going theological debate using philosophy as 
a tool to develop a solution. The Meister was also addressing the practical issue of 
decision-making power within the Church concerning who held the power to do certain 
things and, even more, the unsolved arguments between the pope and the state leaders 
such as emperor Ludovicus Bavarus and various kings of France and England.  
The precise wording of the power distinction in a specific instance is often less important 
than the issue being discussed because terms sometimes even veil what is emerging when 
contexts have changed and the theological, philosophical or juridical discussions have 
moved on. This account, therefore, will not only focus on the derivation of the term 
‘omnipotence’, but will follow the moving contexts as the concepts evolved in a debate 
that modified before they reached the Meister in early 14th century Paris.  
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I begin by considering the earlier Jewish and Graeco-Roman foundations that impacted 
on people’s understanding of divine attributes, and more specifically of the almighty 
nature of God. Historical modifications occurred to the idea of the omnipotence of God 
from the Jewish scriptures through to the New Testament and especially as Christian 
doctrine was refined by creeds and other Patristic and philosophical writings which still 
resonate in Eckhart. The form of Question six developed during a time when emerging 
universities, mendicant orders and the Church were the key players in both the advance 
of education and the battleground for power. As the mediaeval period progressed, the 
nature of omnipotence became pertinent because the focus on the things God could or 
could not do would also be used to consider the will of God and authority within the 
Church. What began as an ascription of ultimate dominion was modified to incorporate 
the sustaining of everything created and, by the time of Eckhart, was to become a 
mechanism for the debate of delegated authority not just from God, but from the pope 
downwards.  
 
The Sovereign God of Israel 
 
As this discussion begins, it should be acknowledged that the aim is not to introduce a 
temporal understanding or point to a precise start of the discourse on omnipotence. 
Instead, this is an exploration into the God of Israel from the great variety of 
anthropomorphic and non-anthropomorphic attributes that are given to the Divine, from 
the Jewish scriptures, often even in auctorial self-descriptions. In particular, that God is 
what his creatures are not, namely that he is all powerful. Although the formal conception 
of the notion of omnipotence is not found, divine names convey might.1 This 
powerfulness is declared in the narrative of God making a covenant with Abram that 
would be established through his almighty power, and this was sealed with the 
distinguishing mark of circumcision. At this moment the revelation of God as almighty, 
El Shaddai,2 was given to Abram with the promise that he would become not only the 
                                                 
1 Gerardus van der Leeuw shows how the ‘object’ of any religion is a highly exceptional 
and extremely impressive ‘other’, a departure from the usual, and this is the consequence 
of the ‘power’ it generates. See G. van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence and Manifestation, 
repr. from 1938 (Princeton, N.J., 1986), 23.   
2 Gen. 17:1: ‘postquam vero nonaginta et novem annorum esse coeperat apparuit ei 
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father of an heir but also the father of the nation that would be the people of God. This 
covenant is then duly established, by God’s almighty power, through the events of history 
beginning with the birth of Isaac and continuing through slavery before subsequent 
miraculous, significant and symbolic rescue from the hand of Pharaoh in Egypt.3 The 
experience is one that shows God is all powerful, in extension of his creation, the reliable 
saviour of a cosmos which by its very nature is not an endless abyss, and, although a lost, 
is still a recoverable paradise.  
The revelation to Moses through the burning bush was treated extensively by Eckhart in 
his Exodus Commentary.4 Further revelations in the Jewish scriptures affirm God as the 
one who can do anything, especially the things that man cannot do. In securing his 
promise to Abram, he is even able to grant a baby for Sarah.5 Likewise just before 
Nebuchadnezzar destroyed Jerusalem in 598 BC, God told Jeremiah to buy a field in 
Anathoth. With the army of Babylon holding siege, this was not the time to invest in land, 
but it was a prophetic pointer towards what could be seen as an unlikely return in the 
future. In his prayer Jeremiah proclaimed the Sovereign Lord saying, ‘You have made the 
heavens and the earth by your great power and outstretched arm. Nothing is too difficult 
for you.’6 Following Jeremiah’s plea, God began His reply, ‘I am the Lord, the God of all 
                                                 
Dominus dixitque ad eum ego Deus omnipotens ambula coram me et esto perfectus.’ 
Bible quotes are given in Latin because an edition of the Vulgate would be the one 
available to Meister Eckhart, and also to his predecessors considered in this background. 
Edition used: Biblia Sacra iuxta Vulgatam Versionem, … recensuit et brevi apparatu 
critico instruxit Robertus Weber … editionem quartam emendatam … praeparavit Roger 
Gryson (Stuttgart 1994) (Sigle: v). For an overview of divine names in the Jewish 
scriptures see C.H. Powell, The Biblical Concept of Power (London, 1963), 41-5, 72f; 
also for background on the term ‘El’ see M.S. Smith, EL in Eerdmans Dictionary of the 
Bible (Grand Rapids, 2000), 384-6.  
3 See Exod. 6:1-8.  
4 See Exod. 3:14, Eckhart, In Ex. n. 14-26 (LW II 20,2 – 31,14).  
5 Gen. 18:14: ‘numquid Deo est quicquam difficile iuxta condictum revertar ad te hoc 
eodem tempore vita comite et habebit Sarra filium.’ NIV, ‘Is anything too hard for the 
Lord? I will return to you at the appointed time next year, and Sarah will have a son.’ 
6 Jer. 32:17: ‘heu heu heu Domine Deus ecce tu fecisti caelum et terram in fortitudine tua 
magna et in brachio tuo extento non erit tibi difficile omne verbum.’ 
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mankind; is anything too difficult for me?’7 God promised to restore his people to that 
land and, after Cyrus of Persia conquered Babylon in 538 BC, the Jewish exiles were 
allowed to begin to return and rebuild Jerusalem.8 Throughout the scriptures, God has 
superior power in any situation and the ‘arm of God’ is mighty to triumph against any 
enemy so that, within the context of human existence, this is all that could be experienced 
or known.    
It is no surprise, therefore, that especially in his Commentary on Exodus, Eckhart presents 
a lengthy treatment of God’s self-revelation as the one who is. The Meister considers 
Israel’s questioning of the name and nature of God before moving into his discourse on 
the omnipotence of God. This discussion on omnipotence includes his thoughts on the 
things that God can and cannot do and so compares directly with Question six of the re-
discovered questions.  
The key event of Exodus is the deliverance of God's people from slavery in Egypt and 
this was wrought and to be remembered as the demonstration of the power of God active 
in this world. As with other recorded occasions when God’s power is encountered, there 
is the sense of comparison with human powers. God triumphed over Pharaoh as later he 
did when humbling Dagon in the Philistine temple9 and humiliating Baal on Mount 
Carmel.10  
This type of experience is conceptualised by the term Sabaoth which occurs 283 times in 
the Jewish scriptures, together with Yahweh or Elohim, and for example, in the prophecy 
of Amos the three terms are juxtaposed to attribute this name to God as the one who is 
powerful over all, yet present to rescue his people.11 The AV translates YHWH Sabaoth 
as the ‘Lord of Hosts’ with the hosts being everything earthly or heavenly, human or 
                                                 
7 Jer. 32:27: ‘ecce ego Dominus Deus universae carnis numquid mihi difficile erit omne 
verbum.’ 
8 See Ezra 1:1-3. 
9 See 1Sam. 5: 2-7. 
10 See 1Kgs. 18: 19-39. 
11 Amos 4:13: ‘quia ecce formans montes et creans ventum et adnuntians homini eloquium 
suum faciens matutinam nebulam et gradiens super excelsa terrae Dominus Deus 
exercituum nomen eius.’ Masoretic text, ה ו  ָה  ָי (YHWH), ־י  ָה ל  ָא (Elohim), ת וֹ א  ָב  ָצ 
(Sabaoth).    
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spirit,12 but more recent versions such as the NIV tend to speak of the ‘Lord Almighty’ 
and the NLT restores the idea commanding over all things military by referring to the 
‘armies of Heaven’. Whoever is referred to by this term, is above and lord over the hosts 
of heaven and the citizens of the earth. Lordship means he is able to accomplish what he 
desires.13 The prominence of ascribing absolute power to God within Judaism and early 
Christianity leads Powell to conclude that, ‘The God of the Bible is the God of power.’14 
This is ultimate power and dominion and everyone and everything is subject to it because 
no one has the power to compare.  
 
The permeation of Hellenism 
 
Throughout history, political events have been accompanied by cultural change and so 
concepts modify while the terms used to describe them are introduced and adapted. 
Neither God nor his power may change but our concept of this power and the terms used 
to describe it, do. The conquests of Alexander, (356–323 BC), were accompanied by the 
ideas and practices of Hellenistic culture although there is archaeological, epigraphic 
and literary evidence to suggest that this was already well advanced before political 
dominance.  
One consequence of Greek domination was the spread of the Greek language and the 
production of Greek translations of the Jewish scriptures such as the Septuagint, known 
as the LXX from the seventy, or maybe seventy-two, scholars doing the translating. The 
history of the origin of this translation is embellished with various fables so that accurate 
dates to locate this endeavour are not known other than within the 3rd century BC.15 In 
transferring from Hebrew to Greek, LXX translators would be well aware of the concepts 
presented by terms like Sabaoth and Shaddai as well as the contemporary terms and ideas, 
                                                 
12 Ps. 24:10, YHWH Sabaoth, KJB, NASB, RSV, ‘The Lord of Hosts’. 
13 Ps. 24:10, YHWH Sabaoth, NIV, ‘The Lord Almighty’, NLT, ‘The Lord of Heaven’s 
armies’.  
14 C.H. Powell, The Biblical Concept of Power (London: 1963), 5.  
15 An English translation of the LXX by Sir Lancelot Charles Lee Brenton was published 
by Samuel Bagster and Sons of London in 1844. In his preface, Brenton presents 
something of the issues around the dating and production in the 3rd century BC. For a 
more modern account see J.M. Dines, The Septuagint (London, 2004). 
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but, in the words of the Greek translator of The Wisdom of Jesus Ben Sira: 
Things originally spoken in Hebrew have not the same force in them 
when they are translated into another tongue, and not only this, but the 
law itself  (the Torah) and the prophecies and the rest of the books have 
no small difference when they are spoken in their original language.16  
From this writer’s angle there was something being lost in translation, and maybe this 
indicates the awareness of the detrimentally changing nature of concepts from their 
traditional Jewish understanding. To express the idea of possessing the power to do all 
things, the Greek term dunamis could have been used, however, this was not the moment 
to present potential power, but active dominance, and so the LXX used the term 
pantokrator, formed by combining pas (all) with kratos (might). This was the adaption 
of a Greek term that had also been used, according to Feldmeier, ‘In the pagan sphere … 
as an attribute of deities such as Hermes, Eriunios Hermes, Isis and the Egyptian sun-god 
Mandulis.17  
The LXX records the term pantokrator 170 times, confirming the desire to align the 
Sovereign God with the all-conquering Alexander who presented himself as the sole 
power in his empire and the executive decision maker. It is not that the term pantokrator 
was used contemporaneously for Alexander but that his conquest and dominion provided 
a pointer towards the idea comprehended by the term. The ruler was the supreme power 
in the empire but one who had to impose this power in order to retain it.  
The extent to which Hellenistic culture should be embraced found a mixed response from 
Jewish society, and in religious circles, tradition needed to be protected. In Alexandria the 
LXX facilitated the introduction of Greek philosophy into the interpretation of Scripture 
as a way to Hellenise Hebrew concepts but in Judea it was initially a document of betrayal 
and the old Italian proverb, ‘Traduttori, traditori!, Translators are traitors!’ might be an 
appropriate way to describe its reception.18 Whether translators in Alexandria were from 
                                                 
16 Sir. prologue. See O. Wischmeyer, ‘Die Kulture des Buches Jesus Sirach’, Beihefte zur 
Zeitschrift für die neutestamentlische Wissenschaft, 77 (Berlin, 1995). 
17 R. Feldmeier, ‘Almighty’ in K. van Der Toorn, B. Becking and P.W. van Der Horst 
(eds), Dictionary of Deities and Demons in the Bible (Leiden, 1999), 20-3. 
18 Catherine Porter explains the difficulty of accurate translating using the LXX as an 
example for this maxim, probably from the 19th century. See C. Porter, ‘Translation as 
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a Jewish or Greek background could account for opposing views but mystery surrounding 
the production means no definitive view can be guaranteed.  
Feldmeier believes the extensive use of pantokrator in the LXX was a Jewish response to 
Greek domination in a bid to emphasise that God is sovereign over worldly political 
powers, and in apocryphal literature likewise, there was a looking to the pantokrator to 
overcome invading infidels. Although the historicity is uncertain, dramatic events 
occurred in 168 BC, when the Temple in Jerusalem was seized by Seleucid soldiers and 
dedicated to the worship of Zeus. In the following year, the Seleucid emperor, Antiochus 
Epiphanes IV, made the observances of Judaism, such as circumcision, illegal. He also 
ordered all Jews to worship Greek gods and defiled the temple by offering a sow upon 
the altar and scattering its juices over all the sanctuary.19 What seems like a violent 
incursion was in fact encouraged by the party of Jews keen on Hellenisation and as 
Oesterley records, ‘Emphasis needs to be laid on the fact that the desire to Hellenise the 
Jewish State was expressed by the Jewish political leaders’ years before Antiochus 
Epiphanes took a hand in this.’20 Alternatively Schäfer suggests that the Hellenisers were 
very much the minority compared with the faithful adherents of the Torah. The 
Maccabean revolt in 166 BC reclaimed the temple for appropriate sacrifice with the re-
dedication of the temple taking place in 164 BC, on the third anniversary of the day on 
which the heathen sacrifice had been offered.21 The name Maccabee has been taken for 
the dissident army but should more specifically relate as an epithet to the leader of the 
revolt, Judah. The origin of the name Maccabee is uncertain although one explanation is 
that it is from the Aramaic makkaba for ‘hammer’ because a hammer blow struck the 
                                                 
Scholarship’, in E. Allen and S. Bernofsky (eds), In Translation: Translators on their 
work and what it means (New York, 2013), 60. 
19 For a detailed Jewish description of atrocities against the Jews by Antiochus in Judea 
see 1Macc. 1:20-8 and 2Macc. 5:11-7. 
20 W.O.E. Oesterley, A History of Israel, vol. II (London, 1932), 217. 
21 See P. Schäfer, The History of the Jews in the Greco-Roman World (London, 2003), 
44-58. This ceremony of consecration of the Temple is celebrated as the feast of 
Hanukkah on the 25th of Kislev. 
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enemy.22 Another theory is that the word stems from the same root of the verb, yikavenu 
used in Isaiah and meaning, ‘shall be named [by the Lord]’.23 Pearlman also provides a 
traditional Talmudic explanation, that Maccabee ( י ב ק מ ) is an acronym for the Torah 
verse that was the battle-cry of the Maccabees, ‘Mi chamocha ba'elim YHWH’, ‘Who is 
like You among the Elohim, Yahweh’. This exclamation, taken from ‘The Song of 
Moses’24, recorded after the defeat of Pharaoh, is one of God as the victor in battle, 
rescuing his people to settle them in their own land. This song coincidently happens to 
provide the backdrop to the key passage in Meister Eckhart’s Commentary on Exodus in 
which he discusses omnipotence in the context of the names of God.25   
The book of Judith, written between 150 and 100 BC with the earliest copies being in 
Greek rather than Hebrew, mentions kyrios pantokrator five times always in the context 
of inimical threat either still existing or having been repelled. Significantly, the final 
‘Song of Judith’ ends with the prospect of the ultimate victory of kyrios pantokrator 
against all the enemies of God’s people saying, ‘Woe to the nations that rise up against 
my people. The Lord Almighty will punish them on the day of judgement.’26 This is a 
record of a Jewish writer using a Greek term, pantokrator, to refer to the almighty God 
of Israel who had the power to overthrow any enemy and would ultimately hold dominion.  
                                                 
22 See M. Pearlman, The Maccabees (London and Jerusalem, 1973), 87-8, W.O.E. 
Oesterley, A History of Israel, vol. II (1932), 229, P. Schäfer, The History of the Jews in 
the Greco-Roman World (2003), 46. 
23 Isa. 62: 2: ‘et vocabitur tibi nomen novum quod os Domini nominabit’. 
24 Exod. 15:11: ‘quis similis tui in fortibus Domine’, NIV: ‘Who among the Gods is like 
you, Lord?’ 
25 Eckhart, In Ex. 27-78 (LW II 32,2-82,8), see B. McGinn, Meister Eckhart, Teacher and 
Preacher (London and New York, 1987), 50-70.  
26 Jdt. 16:17: ‘vae genti insurgenti super genus meum Dominus enim omnipotens 
vindicabit in eis in die iudicii visitabit illos.’ Carey notes how the eschatological nature 
of this verse supports the view that Judith was composed during the Hasmonean period. 
See C.A. Moore, ‘Judith, a New Translation with Introduction and Commentary’, The 
Anchor Bible (New York, 1985). Also R. Feldmeier, ‘Almighty’ in Dictionary of Deities 
and Demons (1999), 20-3. Other verses in Judith referring to omnipotence: 4:13, 8:13, 
15:10, 16:5, 16:20. 
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As well as overpowering dominance, a vital key to a successful period of rule is to bring 
order. The idea of bringing order can be traced back to the Genesis 1 account of creation 
which reveals chaos27 being replaced by meaning and purpose. In Greek writings, one 
from about 250 BC., the De mundo, a work attributed to an anonymous ‘Pseudo-
Aristotle’, contains a comparison between god and the ‘Great King of Persia who both 
possess powers, dunameis, and are likened as bringing law through a delegated 
hierarchical system. In a tribute to Greek supremacy it is explained that god exercises 
order from the highest place in the Cosmos and does not directly involve himself in the 
affairs of the world. The writer states: 
Now the authority of the Great King compared to that of God who has 
power over the cosmos must be considered just as much weaker as the 
authority of the most inferior and weakest creature compared to that of 
the King, so that, if it would be undignified for Xerxes to appear to do 
all things himself and to complete what he wanted to be done and to 
oversee and administer all things [everywhere], it would be much more 
unbecoming for god. 28  
The De mundo goes on to reveal more on the nature of god who is described as 
kosmokrator rather than pantokrator presenting the connection between power and order. 
The Greeks had conquered and sought to secure their gains through delegation but history 
shows it was the Romans who brought peace and order to replace, what was for them 
Greek chaos and, while this involved delegation, it never aimed to achieve a democratic 
society. Especially with the Roman Empire, the supremely powerful emperor held 
absolute authority and his rule was exercised by the state with a delegated structure at 
                                                 
27 The tohu and bohu of Gen. 1:2 also appear together in Isaiah and Jeremiah and are 
pictured variously as without form and void, an unformed lump, (Geneva Bible), a 
formless, lifeless mass, (Karl and Delitzsch Biblical Commentary on the Old Testament). 
On the balance of regional opinion, Phoenician, Egyptian and Babylonian ideas all speak 
of a dark, windy chaos, (J.S. Exell, H.D.M. Spence-Jones, Pulpit Commentary, 1884).     
28 Pseudo-Aristotle, De Mundo, 6, 398b, 1-6, in J.C. Thom (ed.), Cosmic order and 
Divine Power (Tübingen, 2014), 45.   
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work providing organisation.29 Roman dominance allowed for the Jewish political system 
to function, but Josephus highlights the tension this created especially leading to revolt 
and destruction of the second temple in 70 AD. As Sarah Pearce points out, Josephus 
provides the most accurate, if not objective, portrait of the situation in Judea during this 
period, because his selection and organisation of details emphasise turbulent times and 
the almost inevitability of revolt and catastrophe.30 The reception to Roman power was 
clearly mixed and often challenged.  
One way the ruler could enforce his presence on his subjects was through the issue of 
coins31 and it was during the Hellenistic period that coins were standardised by having a 
portrait, name and possibly emblem representing the king carved on to all coins. They 
symbolised the power of the ruler acting as a reminder to anyone using money that they 
were subject to his dominion. The Greeks used coins to symbolise their great empire but 
it was the Romans who advanced the connotation of governing power, and by the 4th 
century AD, during the time of Diocletian, the portrait became a stern caricature to 
emphasise the power of the emperor. Inscriptions would include the emperor’s name, and 
maybe some titles to give honour or some reference to victories in battle. They were a 
reminder of the presence of a powerful leader and even deity or, for instance, a Roman 
coin from the time of Jesus showed the likeness of former emperor Caesar Augustus and 
the Latin inscription, “Augustus, Son of the Divinised Caesar”, which would be 
provocative to both Jewish tradition and Christian thinking.32        
                                                 
29 See J.W. Marshall and R. Martin, ‘Government and Public Law in Galilee, Judea, 
Hellenistic Cities and the Roman Empire’ in A.J. Blasi, J. Duhaime and P. Turcotte (eds), 
Handbook of Early Christianity (Walnut Creek, 2002), 409-30.  
30 See S. Pearce, ‘Judea under Roman Rule: 63 BCE-135 CE’ in J. Barton (ed.), The 
Biblical World, vol. 1 (London and New York, 2002), 458-91. Also J.S. McLaren, 
Turbulent Times, Josephus and Scholarship on Judea in the First Century CE (Sheffield, 
1998); T. Rajak, Josephus: The Historian and His society (London, 1983). 
31 Karsten Dahmen presents how the portrayal of Alexander the Great on Greek and 
Roman coins immortalises the legend of Alexander’s military virtue, fame and place in 
history. See K. Dahmen, The Legend of Alexander the Great on Greek and Roman Coins 
(Abingdon, 2007).  
32 See B.D. Ehrman, The New Testament. A Historical Introduction to the Early Christian 
Writings, 2nd edition (Oxford, 2000), 16-54. 
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The gospel writers referred to this purpose of coins by recording the event when the 
Pharisees aimed to trap Jesus by asking if it was right to pay tax, which may, at the later 
time of writing, have been the Fiscus Iudaicus,33 instituted by Vespasian after the fall of 
the temple in Jerusalem. Originally the self-imposed tax by the Jews, to fund the temple, 
tax was not just payable by the men aged between 20 and 50 but all Jews regardless of 
age or gender. To add insult to injury, the tax may well have been sent to Rome to fund 
the newly built temple of Jupiter.34 The question was dealing with the issue of giving 
honour to God and not to any man, not even the emperor. Jesus responded by asking 
whose head was on a coin to show that it was right to give Caesar what was due to Caesar. 
In doing this Jesus acknowledged the power of Caesar, but by adding that it was proper 
to give to God what is due to God, sovereignty over Caesar, whether displayed as divine 
on a coin, or otherwise, was maintained. 
Another medium used to portray power thorough an image can be seen in the striking 
example of Byzantine art in the mosaic displayed in the apse of the Basilica of San Vitale 
in Ravenna, which dates between 526 and 547 AD.35 The mosaic is displayed close to one 
depicting the East Roman Emperor Justinian so that a comparison is made between Christ 
and Justinian to show Justinian’s right to rule. Of even more interest is that this image, of 
the young, clean-shaven, short-haired Christ sitting above the sphere of the earth, is a 
depiction in direct association with Alexander as the youthful pantokrator. A more 
standardised icon of ‘Christ the Pantokrator’, with his left hand holding the gospels and 
the right hand giving a blessing, became widespread later in the 6th century; examples of 
which can be seen in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem and the Hagia Sophia 
in Istanbul. 
While the Romans provided structure and mobility it was Greek thinking that permeated 
contemporary culture and progressive developments in philosophy continued to mould 
the changing society and its language. The early Christian writers could blend ideas from 
                                                 
33 See M. Heemstra, The Fiscus Judiacus and the Parting of the Ways, WUNT, 2 
(Tübingen, 2010), 1-84. (The issue of the dating of gospel accounts and historicity is not 
significant to this thesis).  
34 See C.B. Zeichmann, ‘Martial and the fiscus Iudaicus Once More’, in Journal for the 
Study of the Pseudepigrapha, 25 (2015), 111-7. 
35 The Basilica of San Vitale, Ravenna, photography Paolo Robino (Modena, 1997), 248-
54. Christ Cosmocrator, 251. 
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Roman order and Greek thinking into Hebrew tradition to frame their concept of God’s 
sovereignty using developing flexible, Greek terminology.  
The idea of an all-powerful, but distant God was modifying such that to impute God as 
pankratès would be to extol the one who was both almighty and all-sustaining. The root 
verb, krateo, is found from Homer onwards to signify possessing might and the term 
kratein was used later for the actions of seizing power and holding on to something. For 
instance, from the LXX, the men (angels) grasped the hands36 of Lot, his wife and 
daughters when fleeing Sodom. The emphasis of either dominion or sustaining power is 
presented by the way the noun is declined. The idea of power as dominion was expressed 
by using kratein with the genitive case, however, when considering God’s power as 
providentially sustaining the universe, kratein was followed by the accusative case 
because that was used to express ‘holding’ rather than ‘reigning’. Use of kratein with the 
accusative occurs in Revelation when the Lord is the one who holds the seven stars, (ὁ 
κρατῶν τοὺς ἑπτὰ ἀστέρας).37 In Rev. 1:16 the Lord ‘had’ (ἔχων) the seven stars in his 
hand but, according to the ‘Pulpit Commentary’ this use of kratein in Rev. 2:1, represents 
a stronger symbolic expression of seizing hold, holding fast and having control.38 
Hommel’s etymology of pantokrator shows that verbs like sozein, sunechein, periechein 
and diakratein in combination with accusatives like ta panta and ta hola were used 
abundantly in Greek philosophy to indicate the sustaining function of the divine 
providence.39 He traces this terminology back to the great Milesian philosophers 
Anaximander and Anaximenes, then later on, to Plato’s Timaeus which promoted the idea 
of god’s (the demiurge’s) preservation of his creation, before noting the term kratein was 
                                                 
36 Gen. 19:16: ‘dissimulante illo adprehenderunt manum eius et manum uxoris ac duarum 
filiarum eius eo quod parceret Dominus illi.’ LXX, ‘ἐκράτησαν οἱ ἄγγελοι τῆς χειρὸς 
αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς χειρὸς τῆς γυναικὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν χειρῶν τῶν δύο θυγατέρων αὐτοῦ.’  
37 Rev. 2:1: ‘angelo Ephesi ecclesiae scribe haec dicit qui tenet septem stellas in dextera 
sua qui ambulat in medio septem candelabrorum aureorum.’ 
38 See Pulpit Commentary, Rev. 2:1. See also Rev. 2:25, 3:11. 
39 H. Hommel, Schöpfer und Erhalter (1956), 81-137, also see H. Hommel, ‘Pantokrator’ 
in: H. Kruska (ed.), Theologia Viatorum: Jahrbuch der kirchlichen Hochschule Berlin, 
vol. V (1954), 322-78; G. van den Brink, Almighty God, A Study of the Doctrine of Divine 
Omnipotence (Kampen, 1993), 51-2.  
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found in the works of Stoic thinker, Posidonius (c.135–51 BC), who would later influence 
Philo. 
 
The Hebrew / Greek synthesis of Philo   
 
A fusion of Jewish and Hellenistic thought is seen in the works of Philo (c.20 BC–40 
AD), who reflects a typical 1st century BC and AD mixture of the gods and transcendent 
powers of Stoic and Platonic thought with monotheistic Hebrew tradition. Philo resisted 
any anthropomorphic ideas of God within Jewish tradition by distancing the singular God 
from the plural powers in action. He spoke of God as one40 but also of many gods41 and 
this is a typical example showing the difficulty of ascertaining a clear synopsis of Philo’s 
thinking.  
When speaking of God, Philo preferred the term dunamis to refer to the potentiality of 
power rather than the active power of kratein. He uses krateo in the sense of seizing hold 
(of the reins of a chariot),42 and also to become the master (of a new art)43 but these do 
not associate with the divine. The term pantokrator could point to the person activating 
power and so was avoided. His writings about powers are not totally consistent but they 
do present God as surrounded by a number of powers. Grundmann suggests Philo has 
built his ideas on those of Posidonius and so, ‘The world is to be regarded as a great nexus 
of divine powers which create and sustain its life and being.’44 Describing the occasion 
when there was a revelation of God’s glory to Moses, Philo says,  
And I look upon thy glory to be the powers which attend thee as thy 
guards.45  
In this case God is distinct from his powers. The nature of God is unknowable but we 
perceive God’s existence through the actions of these powers which both emanate from, 
and yet are distinct from the divine person.  
                                                 
40 Philo, Legum allegoriarum, Liber III, 82.   
41 Philo, De Specialibus legibus, 2.164. 
42 Philo, Leg. Alleg., Liber I, 73: ‘ἀδικία κρατεῖ’. 
43 Philo, Leg. Alleg., Liber III, 92: ‘περικρατήσαι’.  
44 W. Grundmann, ‘Dynami ktl’ in G. Kittel and G. Friedrich (eds), Theological 
Dictionary to the New Testament vol. 2, trans. G.W. Bromiley (1965), 299. 
45 Philo, De Spec, 1.45.  
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The monotheism of Judaism is seen in Philo’s transcendent God while Hellenistic thought 
is seen in the immanence of these powers as hypostases from God. This tension is further 
revealed when he writes of the eternal and temporal aspects of God in Quis Rerum 
Divinarum Heres Sit: 
For thus God allotted three days to eternity before the appearance of 
the sun, and those which came after the sun he allotted to time; the sun 
being an imitation of eternity, and time and eternity being the two 
primary powers of the living God; the one his beneficent power, in 
accordance with which he made the world, and in respect of which he 
is called God; the other his chastening power, according to which he 
rules and governs what he has created, in respect of which he is further 
denominated Lord, and these two he here states to be divided in the 
middle by him standing above them both.46  
The elements of the main two ideas of kratein are present as extensions of the supreme 
God in that there is dominion and preservation. As dunamis charistike, (elsewhere 
poiètike) there is God, Theos, who is the good and boundless power by which all things 
were ordered and created. This is beneficent power permeating the world. The other 
power, dunamis kolastiken, (elsewhere basilike) is the regent power and also the punitive 
power known as logos, or lord, kurios, of all. In this case the logos is one of two key 
powers coming from God directing and chastening the world. In other examples the logos 
seems to exist between God and the active powers:  
In the first place [there is] he who is elder than the one and the monad 
and the beginning. Then [comes] the logos of the existent one the truly 
seminal substance of existing things. And from the divine logos, as 
from a spring, there divide and break forth two powers. One is the 
creative [power] through which the artificer placed and ordered all 
                                                 
46 Philo, Quis Rerum Divinarum Heres Sit, 165-6: ‘αἵ γε μὴν πρὸ ἡλίου τρεῖς ἡμέραι ταῖς 
μεθ’ ἥλιον ἰσάριθμοι γεγόνασιν, ἑξάδος τμηθείσης ἰσότητι πρὸς αἰῶνος καὶ χρόνου 
δήλωσιν· αἰῶνι μὲν γὰρ τὰς πρὸ ἡλίου τρεῖς ἀνατέθεικε, χρόνῳ δὲ τὰς μεθ’ ἥλιον, ὅς ἐστι 
μίμημα αἰῶνος. τὰς δὲ τοῦ ὄντος πρώτας δυνάμεις, τήν τε χαριστική, καθ’ ἣν 
ἐκοσμοπλάστει, ἣ προσαγορεύεται θεός, καὶ τὴν κολαστικήν, καθ’ ἣν ἄρχει καὶ ἐπιστατεῖ 




things this is named ‘God’. And [the other is] the royal [power] since 
through it the creator rules over created things; this is called the ‘lord’.47  
The ordering of this seems to place the logos as a mediator between God and the world 
such that to God the logos connects with creation and to creation the logos connects with 
God. The logos is: 
Neither unbegotten as God nor begotten as you but midway between 
the two extremes serving as a pledge for both; to the creator as 
assurance that the creature should never completely shake off the reins 
and rebel, choosing disorder rather than order; to the creature 
warranting his hopefulness that the gracious God will never disregard 
his own work.48    
Here the logos is divine reason, the eternal manifestation of God’s thinking, standing 
above the two active powers and so there is the strong relationship to God but not the 
indistinction of Christian theology.49 Philo used the term logos more than 1300 times with 
reflections of Jewish tradition,50 as word, and the Hellenistic concept of reason,51 but as 
these passages show, although there is a development of the idea of a logos, there is also 
a lack of consistency in the nature of this logos.  
Philo’s determination to live out his beliefs presented a practical way to respond to 
philosophical thinking by exercising an ascetic lifestyle and Runia believes that this 
spiritual approach with his method of exegesis was influential saying, ‘Philo stands at the 
beginning of a new era. The Church fathers took over many of his ideas, not only various 
                                                 
47 See Philo, Quaes Ex, 2:68 (extant in a Greek fragment). 
48 Philo, Heres, 206 trans. D. Winston, Selections 94: ‘οὔτε ἀγένητος ὡς ὁ θεὸς ὢν οὔτε 
γενητὸς ὡς ὑμεῖς, ἀλλὰ μέσος τῶν ἄκρων, ἀμφοτέροις ὁμηρεύων, παρὰ μὲν τῷ 
φυτεύσαντι πρὸς πίστιν τοῦ μὴ σύμπαν ἀφηνιάσαι ποτὲ καὶ ἀποστῆναι τὸ γεγονὸς 
ἀκοσμίαν ἀντὶ κόσμου ἑλόμενον, παρὰ δὲ τῷ φύντι πρὸς εὐελπιστίαν τοῦ μήποτε τὸν 
ἵλεω θεὸν περιιδεῖν τὸ ἴδιον ἔργον.’ 
49 John 1:1, ‘in principio erat Verbum et Verbum erat apud Deum et Deus erat Verbum’. 
‘Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος.’ 
50 Philo, De Sacrific de Abel et Cain, 65: ‘ὁ λόγος ἔργον ἦν αὐτοῦ’. 
51 Philo, De Opif Mundi, 25: ‘τὸ παράδειγμα, ἀρχέτυπος ἰδέα τῶν ἰδεῶν ὁ θεοῦ λόγος’. 
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fundamental philosophical themes, but also the insight that philosophy is not just an affair 
of the intellectually, but engages one’s entire religious or spiritual life.’52 
The Early Church would not be able to adhere too closely to all of Philo’s ideas but his 
blend of Jewish and Hellenistic ideas led the way for Christian thinking to adopt Platonic 
and Stoic thought especially in Alexandria. Elements of Philo can be seen in the works 
of Justin Martyr and Clement of Alexandria and even more so in the Athanasian 
Discourses against the Arians, written to express the relation of the Father to Son.53 Philo 
is interesting for this discussion, not just for his thoughts on God and power, but also for 
forging the links between Hebrew, Greek and Christian ideas and highlighting aspects 
both of similarity and contrast.    
 
Greek influence in early Christian writings  
 
The extent to which Stoic and Platonic ideas were embraced is not easy to measure but 
their influence on the shaping of Christian theology is unquestionable although the 
revelation of God as the one who sustains his creation was neither a new idea, nor one 
peculiar to Stoicism. God declares himself as sustainer when speaking through Isaiah, 
‘Even to your old age and grey hairs I am he, I am he who will sustain you. I have made 
you and I will carry you; I will sustain you and I will rescue you.’54 Stoicism provided a 
means to express this view of God as a sustainer, already present in the Hebrew Bible, to 
be developed and explained in relevant cultural terms by intellectuals, including Philo of 
Alexandria, who was in some places more Platonist than Stoic, as well as early Christian 
thinkers. Stoicism borrowed much from Semite sources fuelling a bitter rivalry between 
Hebrew and Stoic thinkers which, in turn, led to a persecution of the Jews in Alexandria.55     
                                                 
52 D.T. Runia, Philo and the Church Fathers (1995): 9, for the influence of Philo on how 
the Church Fathers adopted Platonism see also C.J. De Vogel, ‘Platonism and 
Christianity: A Mere Antagonism or a Profound Common Ground?’ Vigiliae Christianae 
39: 1-62, (1985), 7-18. 
53 See C.J. De Vogel, Platonism and Christianity (1995), 12.  
54 Isa. 46:4: ‘usque ad senectam ego ipse et usque ad canos ego portabo ego feci et ego 
feram et ego portabo et salvabo.’ 
55 See Philo, De Confusione Linguarum, De Legatione ad Gaium, 27 and 28, In Flaccum 
10, Josephus, Contra Apionem, intro. 
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In New Testament writings, the word dunamis was used in the general sense for the power 
to do something, for example when Mary questioned how she could have a baby since 
she was a virgin the angel replied, ‘Nothing is impossible (ἀδυνατήσει) with God’,56 and 
in the gospels, it is Jesus who often demonstrates the power of God by miraculously 
changing the course of events. When the Sadducees disputingly enquired about the 
resurrection, Jesus explained that they were in error because they neither knew the 
scriptures nor the power (δύναμις) of God.57 On the question of salvation Jesus explained 
to the disciples, ‘With man this is impossible (ἀδύνατον), but with God all things are 
possible (δυνατά).’58 When presenting the humanity of Jesus, the gospels also show the 
aspects that might be deemed to show a lack of power such that he was hungry59 and 
tired60 but, these have generally been taken as representing the fullness of humanity rather 
than any deficiency in divinity. In the epistles, Jesus is described as the power (δύναμις) 
of God, able to save both Jews and Greeks.61 The active power of God was conveyed by 
dunamis while pantokrator was used for the one who possesses sovereign power. In 
John's apocalyptic vision, the pantokrator is Jesus, the Lord God Almighty (ὁ Κύριος 
Θεὸς Παντοκράτωρ), the one who is the Alpha and Omega.62 Pantokrator is used 
throughout the Book of Revelation to present Jesus exercising the power of the Lord God 
                                                 
56 Luke 1:37: ‘quia non erit inpossibile apud Deum omne verbum.’  
57 Matt. 22:29: ‘respondens autem Iesus ait illis erratis nescientes scripturas neque 
virtutem Dei.’ 
58 Matt. 19:26: ‘apud homines hoc inpossibile est apud Deum autem omnia possibilia 
sunt.’ 
59 Mark 11:12: ‘et alia die cum exirent a Bethania esuriit.’ 
60 John 4:6: ‘erat autem ibi fons Iacob Iesus ergo fatigatus ex itinere sedebat sic super 
fontem.’ 
61 1Cor. 1:24: ‘ipsis autem vocatis Iudaeis atque Graecis Christum Dei virtutem et Dei 
sapientiam.’ 
62 Rev. 1:8: ‘ego sum Alpha et Omega principium et finis dicit Dominus Deus qui est et 
qui erat et qui venturus est Omnipotens;’ ‘ Ἐγώ εἰμι τὸ Ἄλφα καὶ τὸ Ὦ, λέγει Κύριος ὁ 
Θεός, ὁ ὢν καὶ ὁ ἦν καὶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος, ὁ Παντοκράτωρ.’ 
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Almighty as the, ‘One who was, who is and is to come,’63 and as the King who reigns.64   
The term pantokrator bridged Hebrew to Christian writings and the absorption of 
Hellenism into Christian thinking can be seen through the development of what was 
inferred by the idea of God as pantokrator and the grammatical use of the term from its 
root kratein and the verb form krateo. Use of kratein by early Church writers suggests a 
source within Judaeo-Christian tradition, and research by Montevecchi and Capizzi 
concurs that virtually all non-Christian uses of kratein are later than the LXX, and so the 
connotation of the term was possibly influenced by the LXX.65 The Jewish-Hellenistic 
idea of a pantokrator pointed to domination by Greek and then Roman emperors and 
enforced the need for God to be the one with the power to triumph over these enemies. 
The concept of the all-mightiness of God continued to portray all-conquering dominion 
but the Hellenizing influence meant that the pantokrator was also increasingly the one 
‘involved’, not just in dealing with enemies, but as the ever-present sustainer, actively 
preserving his world. Philosophical and religious concepts for the nature of God 
developed according to historical events, and ensuing cultural adaptions, and the eloquent 
                                                 
63 Rev. 4:8: ‘et requiem non habent die et nocte dicentia sanctus sanctus sanctus Dominus 
Deus omnipotens qui erat et qui est et qui venturus est.’, ‘καὶ ἀνάπαυσιν οὐκ ἔχουσιν 
ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτὸς λέγοντες Ἅγιος ἅγιος ἅγιος Κύριος ὁ Θεός ὁ Παντοκράτωρ, ὁ ἦν καὶ 
ὁ ὢν καὶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος.’ 
64 Rev. 11:17: ‘dicentes gratias agimus tibi Domine Deus omnipotens qui es et qui eras 
quia accepisti virtutem tuam magnam et regnasti.’, ‘ λέγοντες Εὐχαριστοῦμέν σοι, Κύριε 
ὁ Θεός ὁ Παντοκράτωρ, ὁ ὢν καὶ ὁ ἦν, ὅτι εἴληφας τὴν δύναμίν σου τὴν μεγάλην καὶ 
ἐβασίλευσας;’ 15:3: ‘et cantant canticum Mosi servi Dei et canticum agni dicentes magna 
et mirabilia opera tua Domine Deus omnipotens iustae et verae viae tuae rex 
saeculorum;’ ‘καὶ ᾄδουσιν τὴν ᾠδὴν Μωϋσέως τοῦ δούλου τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ τὴν ᾠδὴν τοῦ 
Ἀρνίου, λέγοντες Μεγάλα καὶ θαυμαστὰ τὰ ἔργα σου, Κύριε ὁ Θεός ὁ Παντοκράτωρ· 
δίκαιαι καὶ ἀληθιναὶ αἱ ὁδοί σου, ὁ Βασιλεὺς τῶν ἐθνῶν;’ 19:6, ‘alleluia quoniam 
regnavit Dominus Deus noster omnipotens;’ Καὶ ἤκουσα ὡς φωνὴν ὄχλου πολλοῦ καὶ ὡς 
φωνὴν ὑδάτων πολλῶν καὶ ὡς φωνὴν βροντῶν ἰσχυρῶν, λεγόντων Ἁλληλουϊά, ὅτι 
ἐβασίλευσεν Κύριος ὁ Θεός ἡμῶν ὁ Παντοκράτωρ.’ 
65 O. Montevecci, ‘Pantokrator’ in: Studii in onore di A. Chalderini et R. Paribeni (1957), 
418; C. Capizzi, Pantokrator (1964), 70, see G. van den Brink, Almighty God (1993), 51. 
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Greek language was adopted and adapted to provide the means to express these Early 
Church developments. 
Among early Christian writings, in the Epistle to Diognetus, from an unknown author 
around the mid-2nd century, it is declared:  
Truly God Himself, the almighty (pantokrator), the creator of all things 
(pantoktistès), [is the one who sent his son.]66 
By using the two different terms together, the idea that God is both almighty and the 
creator are both distinct and yet connected in being the Father of Jesus. Clarifying the 
fatherhood of God in relation to the Son was to become an issue of growing importance 
as recognised by creeds during the 4th century. The context to this chapter of the epistle 
is the manifestation of the Son of God who is also described as the creator and fashioner 
(demiurge),67 and so this passage adapts philosophical language to identify God as Father, 
and as the almighty creator, and sustainer. In the following paragraph, God the Father is 
the demiurge and so the term is used, though not specifically, as representative of either 
the Father or the Son. It should be noted that in classical Neoplatonism, as well as in 
Arianism the “demiurge” is different from God but the significance of this passage is the 
early designation of God as ‘pantokrator’, and that because of the use of the other 
predicates, there is no suggestion that this term was used to imply the sustaining rather 
than sovereign power of God.  
Later in the 2nd century Theophilus, Bishop of Antioch, in his ‘Apology to Autolycus’, 
gives a strikingly descriptive proclamation of God using philosophical terms to explain 
the divine actions. God is: 
Lord, (kurios), because He rules over the universe; Father, because he 
is before all things; fashioner (demiurge) and maker (poietès) because 
He Himself is the creator (ktistès) and maker of the universe; the 
Highest, (anoteron), because of His being above all. But He is called 
almighty (pantokrator), because He Himself holds (ta panta kratei i.e. 
with acc.) and embraces all things. The heights of heavens, the depths 
                                                 
66 Diognetus, Epistula ad Diognetum, 7, 2: ‘αὐτὸς ἀληθῶς ὁ παντοκράτωρ καὶ 
παντοκτίστης’. 
67 Diognetus, Epistula ad Diognetum, 7, 2: ‘τεχνίτην καὶ δημιουργόν’. 
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of the abysses and the extremities of the earth are in His hand; there is 
no place withdrawn from His action.68 
Theophilus begins this quote with acknowledgment that God is Lord. Kurios was used 
widely in Graeco-Roman culture to describe such as the owner of a vineyard, master of a 
slave or also the parent to child or husband to wife relationship. The LXX translated 
YHWH as Kurios while it had also been used earlier by Plato for lesser gods. To hold 
dominion implies there is something under dominion and in this instance, God is Lord 
over the universe. Secondly God is Father because he is the origin of all things. The 
implication is that the Father is before the Son, although there is no mention of such here, 
but this inference is seen in Philo,69 who built on Plato’s demiurge as the source of forms. 
Theophilus records thirdly the idea of God as the fashioner, maker and creator who is 
above all creation, and so he is beyond all which, in Platonic terms, would mean above 
creatures, spiritual powers and lower gods.     
Following these Judaist and Platonic terms and concepts, Theophilus presents the term 
‘almighty’, indicated by the ‘but’ which sets all-mightiness in a certain contrast to the 
terms already mentioned. Theophilus finds the term pantokrator so important that he also 
sees the need to define it, in order not to misread it in the Platonic sense of the previous 
terms. He derives pantokrator etymologically from ‘ta panta kratei’, i.e. using the 
accusative case to infer holding, a use which as shown above can be also traced back to 
earlier times, but was certainly not the predominant interpretation in the time of 
Theophilus and in contrast with the above Epistle to Diognetus. It seems that Theophilus, 
                                                 
68 Theophilus, Ad Autolycum, 1, 4 in: The Early Church Fathers and Other Works, trans. 
Rev. M. Dods, A.M. (1867), also G. Bardy (ed.), Trois livres à Autolycus, SC 20 (1948): 
‘κύριος δέ ἐστιν διὰ τὸ κυριεύειν αὐτὸν τῶν ὅλων, πατὴρ δὲ διὰ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν πρὸ τῶν 
ὅλων, δημιουργὸς δὲ καὶ ποιητὴς διὰ τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι κτίστην καὶ ποιητὴν τῶν ὅλων, 
ὕψιστος δὲ διὰ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν ἀνώτερον τῶν πάντων, παντοκράτωρ δὲ ὅτι αὐτὸς τὰ πάντα 
κρατεῖ καὶ ἐμπεριέχει.’ Dods translates kratei as rules but ta panta is accusative and the 
meaning is one of holding. See Isa. 46:4, footnote 54.                           
69 Philo, Spec, 2. 165: ‘But if he is, whom all Greeks together with all barbarians 
acknowledge with one judgment, the highest Father of both gods and humans and the 
Maker of the entire cosmos.’ ‘ἐ δ’ἔστιν, ὅν μιᾷ γνώμῃ πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν ἕλληνες ὁμοῦ 




from his perspective as a Christian author who not only uses a form of a Gospel-harmony, 
but sees the Jewish scriptures as his reference works, elaborated the idea of pantokrator 
in the light of quotes such as the one given from Isaiah, where God was understood as 
the all-powerful creator, because he was the one who holds and sustains his creatures.  
Further than this, like Philo before, Theophilus reads the Jewish Scripture in a Stoic way 
by pointing to this idea of the sustainer of everything.70 This God holds and sustains his 
creation, and by holding everything in his hand he encompasses everything, meaning 
there is ‘no place withdrawn from His action’, there is no outside of God. Rather than just 
actively sustaining his chosen people, God is sustaining the whole of everything that 
exists. 
The embracing of philosophy within theology during these first three hundred years of 
the Church could be characterised by two famous quotes that declare opposing opinions. 
While Tertullian was asking, ‘What does Athens have to do with Jerusalem’,71 Clement 
of Alexandria (c.150–c.215 AD) simultaneously claims to be quoting Numenius, the 
Pythagorean philosopher when asking, ‘What is Plato, but Moses speaking in Attic 
Greek?’72 Clement asserted that Moses provided the essentials of Plato's Ideas, and the 
best of Greek philosophy was an elucidation of Judeo-Christian theology. Barrett explains 
how this tension between Hebrew tradition and Greek thinking is blended by the ideas 
associated with the term logos and particularising it to present the incarnated word of 
God.73 In the Jewish scriptures, God’s spoken word was regarded as the power of God, 
because God spoke things into action, such as creation,74 and the longest Psalm comprises 
176 verses explaining man’s need of God’s written word.75 One powerful New Testament 
                                                 
70 See G. van den Brink, Almighty God (1993), 52-3; C. Capizzi, Pantokrator (1964), 76. 
71 Tertullian, De Praescriptione, vii. ANF, 1 (1885). 
72 Clement of Alexandria, Stromata I.22, ANF, 2 (1885). 
73 See John 1:1-18; C.K. Barrett, The Gospel according to St John (London, 1978), 27-
41; A. Lincoln, The Gospel according to Saint John (London, 2005), 94-9; D. Moody 
Smith, The Theology of the Gospel of John (Cambridge, 1995), 11-3.  
74 Gen. 1:3: ‘dixitque Deus fiat lux et facta est lux.’ That ‘God spoke’ is repeated as a 
command ten times; see the Pulpit Commentary.  
75 See Ps. 119. Dahood opens his comments, ‘This great “Psalm of the Law”, the longest 
poem in the Psalter, is the literary composition of a psalmist whose earnest desire is to 
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illustration of the power of the word of God is given in the dialogue between the Roman 
centurion and Jesus.76 The centurion’s servant was elsewhere yet healed by the power in 
the spoken word (εἰπὲ λόγῳ) of Jesus. In Greek usage, the term logos was used by 
Heraclitus (c.500 BC) to denote reason and then adapted by Plato who added the wise 
man should move according to the logos, imitating and conforming himself to this 
reason.77 Hellenistic influences led men to seek a universal law, which governed all men, 
and the Stoics, according to Laertius, believed this law to be the Logos and identified this 
as the right way to live like Zeus.78   
The challenge faced by Judaism, of what extent to embrace philosophy, was now also the 
challenge for Christianity. Philo, as shown above, picked up the idea of the logos in his 
blend of Judaism and Hellenism and he was followed in Alexandria by Christian scholars 
Clement, who wrote a detailed synthesis of Platonism and Christianity, and later Origen 
(c.185–c.254 AD). Origen was taught in Alexandria by Ammonius Saccas who also 
taught Plotinus (c.204–270 AD), although scholars disagree about the degree to which he 
                                                 
make God’s law the governing principle of his conduct.’ See M. Dahood, Psalms III (New 
York, 1970), 161-93. 
76 Luke 7:7-9: ‘propter quod et me ipsum non sum dignum arbitratus ut venirem ad te sed 
dic verbo et sanabitur puer meus. Nam et ego homo sum sub potestate constitutus habens 
sub me milites et dico huic vade et vadit et alio veni et venit et servo meo fac hoc et facit. 
Quo audito Iesus miratus est et conversus sequentibus se turbis dixit amen dico vobis nec 
in Israhel tantam fidem inveni.’ Bock’s treatment of Luke 7:1-10 deals with the sources 
and historicity of the account, the parallel between the authority of the Roman centurion 
and that of Jesus and the invitation to faith. See D.L. Bock, Luke (Grand Rapids, 1994), 
630-45; R. Bultmann, The History of the Synoptic Tradition, trans. J. Marsh (New York, 
1963), 38-9. 
77 Plato, Republic, Vi, 500d, in The Dialogues of Plato, trans. B. Jowett (1952), 122. 
78 Diogenes Laertius, in trans. R.D. Hicks, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 7 (1925), 88: 
‘And this is why the end may be defined as life in accordance with nature, or, in other 
words, in accordance with our own human nature as well as that of the universe, a life in 
which we refrain from every action forbidden by the law common to all things, that is to 
say, the right reason (logos) which pervades all things, and is identical with this Zeus, 
lord and ruler of all that is.’ 
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embraced Platonism.79 In a passage developing his Christology, Origen explains how the 
Father and the Son hold the same omnipotence and that therefore they are both called 
‘Omnipotent’, but this title reflects active power as an ‘efflux’ of God: 
I deem it necessary to give warning, however briefly, to prevent anyone 
from thinking that the title of Almighty belonged to God before the 
birth of wisdom, through which he is called Father for wisdom, which 
is the Son of God, is said to be a ‘pure effluence of the glory of the 
Almighty’. Let him who is inclined to believe this hear what the 
scriptures plainly proclaim; for it says that ‘thou hast made all things in 
wisdom’, and the Gospel teaches that ‘all things were made by him and 
without him was not anything made’; and let him understand from this 
that the title of Almighty cannot be older in God than that of Father, for 
it is through the Son that the Father is almighty… For it is through 
wisdom, which is Christ, that God holds power over all things, not only 
by his own authority as Master, but also by the voluntary service of his 
subjects.80 
Origen explains that God has power over all things and yet it is as an efflusion from God 
(the best if a somewhat unpleasant translation!), and so this is a good example of the 
merging of the all-conquering Hebrew Sabaoth with Greek thought. Likewise adopting 
                                                 
79 Tzamalikos is ‘baffled’ by the claim that De Principiis is labelled Platonic but Jacobsen 
acknowledges Origen is diverse although essentially an idealising Platonist. See P. 
Tzamalikos, Origen: Philosophy of History and Eschatology (Leiden, 2007); A. Jacobsen, 
Christ-The Teacher of Salvation. A Study on Origen’s Christology and Soteriology 
(Münster, 2015), 14. 
80 Origen, On First Principles, I, 2, (ed.) P. Koetschau (1913), 42,22-43,10; English trans. 
G. W. Butterworth (1936 [repr. 1973]), 24: ‘ne videatur alicui anterior esse in deo 
omnipotentis appellatio nativitate sapientiae, per quam pater vocatur; quoniam dicta est 
‘aporrhoea omnipotentis gloriae purissima’ esse sapientia, quae est filius dei, ‘omnia in 
sapientia fecisti omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil’ et intellegat ex 
hoc quia non potest antiquior esse in deo omnipotentis appellatio quam patris; per filium 
etenim omnipotens est pater … Per sapientiam enim, quae est Christus, tenet deus 




philosophical terms in his work ‘Contra Celsum’, Origen states that Celsus, who thinks 
Zeno was wiser than Jesus, 
 talks like one who does not understand in what sense God can do 
everything when he says, “He will not want to do anything unrighteous, 
and when he allows that he could even do what is unrighteous, but does 
not wish to do so.” … For the power to do wrong contradicts his 
divinity and all his divine power … For he himself is the reason of 
everything that exists; therefore, he is not able to do anything contrary 
to reason or to his own character … We know that we may not 
understand the word “anything” of things which do not exist or which 
are inconceivable. But we do say that God cannot do what is shameful, 
since then God could not possibly be God.81   
As well as speaking of omnipotence to develop his Christology, Origen here is stepping 
into the discussion about the thought of what God can or cannot do. This is an early 
reflection on the hypothetical capacity of God’s power and although he refutes the Stoics 
in dismissing Celsus, van Den Brink suggests Origen was clearly influenced by Greek 
ideas in the very fact that he entered this field of philosophical debate.82     
Other notable figures who incorporated philosophy to Christian thinking include Eusebius 
of Caesarea (c.260–339 AD),83 whose authority as a bishop was probably due to his skill 
as a statesman. He also wrote prolifically, including an ‘Ecclesiastical History’, and 
overall, his synthesis of theology and philosophy was received with respect, if a somewhat 
mixed response. In his eulogy, ‘In Praise of Constantine’ Eusebius says much about 
Constantine, and through this, the contemporary concept of the nature of God. Eusebius 
tells of how Constantine prayed and in a dream Christ told him to make a cross and this 
would be his safeguard against the enemies. In an unlikely victory of 312 AD, Constantine 
defeated and killed Maxentius in the battle of Mulvian Bridge, and then, ‘Sung his praises 
                                                 
81 Origen, Contra Celsum, 3,70 (SC 136, 158-61); 5,14; 5,23; See Origen: Contra Celsum, 
H. Chadwick (Cambridge, 1953), 175, 274-5, 281-2.   
82 G. van den Brink, Almighty God (1993), 63. 
83 For a background to Eusebius and his ‘Life of Constantine’ see A. Cameron and S.G. 
Hall, Life of Constantine (Oxford, 1999), 1-53. Also H.W. Attridge and G. Hata, 
Eusebius, Christianity and Judaism (Leiden, 1992); G. Bardy, Historia ecclesiastica, 
Eusèbe de Césareé, Histoire Ecclésiastique (Paris, 1952). 
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to God, the Ruler of all and the Author of Victory.’84 The following year he issued the 
‘Edict of Milan’, granting Christianity legal status and forbidding the persecution of 
religion. The shift made by Constantine from a western understanding of politics to the 
eastern political philosophy of the East Roman State, and thereby incorporating 
Hellenistic thought, was recognised by the physical shift of the capital from Rome to the 
city posthumously taking his name, Constantinopolis. Constantine identified his position 
as protector of the Church, and in this role, he convened the Council of Nicaea in 325 
AD. The proceedings were started after an introduction from a prominent bishop, 
(probably Eusebius of Caesarea),85 and a grand speech from Constantine.  
‘In praise of Constantine’ recognised his achievement as if he had brought the kingdom 
of God to earth through the Roman Empire. Eusebius heaped praise on Constantine and 
divine actions and attributes were bestowed such that Constantine became a type of 
Christ. Constantine was said to imitate the Logos, as given by Plato, to be holding 
Supreme dominion over the whole world’ (σύμπαντος καθηγεμών κόσμου),86 bringing 
harmony and caring for the souls of the people.87 Eusebius also stepped near the line of 
Arius occasionally, and did so when saying that the emperor is, ‘like the radiant sun, 
illuminating the empire’ (through his sons), ‘the Caesars, who reflect the light, which 
proceeds from himself.’88 Eusebius goes further to say that the emperor is thus extended 
(διασκοπούμενος) throughout the world, directing the course of the empire... with 
harmony (συμφωνίας) and concord (ὁμονοίας),89 which resonates with Philo’s idea of the 
Logos as an emanation.  
As all-conquering emperors, Alexander and Constantine had a significant impact on the 
development of the concept of the power of God and the contrast between these two 
                                                 
84 Eusebius of Caesarea, Vita Constantini, I 29-38 Greek text in I.A. Heikel (ed.), 
Eusebius’s Werke, vol.1. (1902), trans. here and following E.C. Richardson, NPNF, 
Series 2, vol. 1 (1890). 
85 Eusebius does not identify himself as the speaker, but Sozomen does. See NPNF 
(1890), vol. 1, 522, notes 1 and 2.  
86 Eusebius of Caesarea, ‘Oratio de Laudibus Constantini’, Greek text (ed.) I.A. Heikel, 
in Eusebius’s Werke, vol. 1 (1902), vol. 1, 1. 6.  
87 Eusebius, ‘Oratio de Laudibus Constantini’, (1902), 5. 1. 
88 Eusebius, ‘Oratio de Laudibus Constantini’, (1902), 3. 4. 
89 Eusebius, ‘Oratio de Laudibus Constantini’ (1902), 3. 4, 5. 
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dynamic and influential emperors is seen in how Hellenistic ideas were received. 
Alexander entrenched the idea that God is the sovereign power able to overcome any 
enemy. However, by legalising and promoting Christianity, the robust practice of law and 
order increased the sense of on-going preservation and it was Eusebius who expressed 
the benevolence of Constantine as if he were God’s active power on earth. Alexander had 
accelerated the Hellenisation process but it was Constantine whose order directed the 
Hellenised development of the sustaining God into action. With the emphasis of order 
and harmony through the law, the application of the legal system as well as God’s holy 
law, were now aspects to be included in the omnipotence of God debate. What were at 
one time distinct; i.e. power, the state, the legal system and the Church had now, to some 
extent, become embroiled, and this pattern thickened as the power and wealth of the 
Church grew.  
Later in the 4th century Gregory of Nyssa (c.335–c.395 AD) expanded on the idea of 
pantokrator as a title attributed to God in his writings against Eunomius, who he says, 
believes the Son does not share in the high office of Almighty. Gregory moves through 
the names of God given by the Bible to show that when an office is presented, it is done 
so in respect of the ones who are in receipt of God’s action in exercising that office. 
Names or titles express position but this reveals God’s immanent power and contains the 
declaration of the operations of the divine loving-kindness in the creation. The term 
‘Almighty’ is relative and 
those then who enquire precisely into the meaning of the term Almighty 
(παντοκράτορος) will find that it declares nothing else concerning the 
Divine power than that operation which controls created things and is 
indicated by the word Almighty (παντοκράτορος), stands in a certain 
relation to something... He is Almighty (παντοκράτωρ) over one who 
has need of being ruled... Accordingly, when we hear the name 
Almighty (παντοκράτωρ), our conception is this, that God sustains in 
being all intelligible things as well as all things of a material nature. For 
this cause, He sits upon the circle of the earth, for this cause He holds 
the ends of the earth in His hand, for this cause He metes out leaven 
with the span, and measures the waters in the hollow of His hand; for 
this cause, He comprehends in Himself all the intelligible creation, that 
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all things may remain in existence controlled by His encompassing 
power.90  
Gregory begins by asserting that God holds dominion. The pantokrator is the one who 
performs the actions that establish control of all things. The verbs to sustain, hold and 
measure are intellectualised, even further than in Philo, to emphasise the Jewish-Stoic 
view of a powerful protector who orders what he contains and who measures and 
comprehends everything in Himself. The divine power in operation is described as being 
in relation to the ones under dominion and again, as in Theophilus, there is no outside, 
there is no abyss; there is no falling away from the one whose power (dunamis) surrounds 
everything. The anthropomorphic metaphor of the hand of God appears as the container 
of everything created. The Jewish scriptures portrayed this hand as more powerful than 
anything so that it is able to defeat anyone or anything and save the people of God. Jesus 
declared that those saved could not be plucked from God’s hand91 and so this is a 
containing hand, able to save and hold on to the lost. The hand of God not only strikes 
opponents down, it serves as the means of God declaring and executing his purposes,92 
and following the text from Revelation 2:1 quoted earlier and into these early Christian 
                                                 
90 Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium, 2/11, in  P. Schaff and H. Wace (eds), trans. by 
H.C. Ogle and H.A. Wilson, NPNF, Series 2, vol. 5 (1893), ‘τὸ τοίνυν τοῦ παντοκράτορος 
ὄνομα τοῖς ἀκριβῶς ἐξετάζουσιν εὑρίσκεται, μὴ ἄλλο τι σημαῖνον ἐπὶ τῆς θείασ 
δυνάμεως, ἢ τὸ πρός τι πως ἔχειν τὴν κρατητικὴν τῶν ἐν τῇ κτίσει θεωρουμένων 
ἐνέργειαν, ἥν ἡ τοῦ παντοκράτορος ἔμφασις ὑποδείκνυσιν... οὕτω καὶ παντοκράτορ τῷ 
χρῄζοντι τοῦ κρατεῖσθαι... οὐκοῦν ὅταν τῆς παντοκράτορ φωνῆς ἀκούσωμεν, τοῦτο 
νοοῦμεν, τὸ πάντα τὸν θεὸν ἐν τῷ εἶναι συνέχειν, ὅσα τε νοητὰ και ὅσα τῆς ὑλικῆς ἐστι 
φύσεως. Διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ κατέχει τὸν γύρον τῆς γῆς, διὰ τοῦτο ἔχει ἐν τῇ χειρὶ τῆς γῆς τὰ 
πέρατα, διὰ τοῦτο περιλαμβάνει τὸν οὐρανὸν τῇ σπιθαμῇ, διὰ τοῦτο περιμετρεῖ τῇ χειρὶ 
τὸ ὕδωρ, διὰ τοῦτο τἠν νοητἠν πᾶσαν κτίσιν ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιέχει, ἵνα πάντα ἐν τῷ εἶναι 
μένῃ τῇ περιεκτικῇ δυνάμει περικρατούμενα.’    
91 John 10:28: ‘et ego vitam aeternam do eis et non peribunt in aeternum et non rapiet 
eas quisquam de manu mea.’ 
92 Dan. 5:5, ‘in eadem hora apparuerunt digiti quasi manus hominis scribentes contra 




writings, the hand is now the containing vessel of the universe. God himself is the 
container, the vessel, and as such, is himself the containing boundary of everything.  
As we have already seen the term krateo implied to rule and then also to seize hold of to 
present both dominion and sustaining power. From these another use developed which is 
very significant to the development of this concept of pantokrator. The root of krat also 
formed the term kratera which was the word used for a mixing bowl that in particular 
was used for mixing water with wine. The LXX speaks of the bowl used to blend wine93 
although the Vulgate and Masoretic texts refer to the act of mixing rather than the bowl 
being used. The concept of God as the container and sustainer of all that exists can be 
pictured as the kratera with this thought of being the containing vessel. Instead of 
exercising and needing to exercise irresistible power to retain dominion, there is still the 
sense of being impregnable, but as the one who contains, and controls everything.  
 
94 
                                                 
93 Prov. 9:5, ‘venite comedite panem meum et bibite vinum quod miscui vobis’; LXX, 9:3: 
‘ἀπέστειλεν τούς ἑαυτῆς δούλους συγκαλοῦσα μετὰ ὑψηλοῦ κηρύγματος ἐπὶ κρατῆρα 
λέγουσα.’ ἀπέστειλεν τοὺς ἑαυτῆς δούλους; 9:4: ‘ ῞Ος ἐστιν ἄφρων, ἐκκλινάτω πρός με· 
καὶ τοῖς ἐνδεέσι φρενῶν εἶπεν; 9:5: ‘ ῎Ελθατε φάγετε τῶν ἐμῶν ἄρτων καὶ πίετε οἶνον, ὃν 
ἐκέρασα ὑμῖν.’ 
94 © Musée du Louvre, dist. RMN / Philippe Fuzeau. For bibliographical information see 
Illustration 1: Red Calyx-Krater 
This red calyx-krater by Euphronios, 
known as the "Krater of Antaeus," 
appeared in Attica in around 530 BC. 
The rear shows a music competition, 
with a young man holding an aulos 
mounting a platform amid his seated 
companions, while on the front, the 
battle between Heracles and the giant 




From this idea of a vessel used to mix wine Gregory of Nazianzus took the small step for 
the kratera to become a chalice used in the Eucharist,95 to hold, mix with water and serve 
the wine. Water, in the Jewish scriptures symbolises salvation by cleansing as 
demonstrated in the flood96 and rescue from Egypt97 and this is taken up in the New 
Testament with baptism98 and the piercing of Jesus’ body.99 Also there is the connection 
made between the flow of water and the presence of God in passages when water flowed 
from the rock100 and Jesus spoke of living water as an indwelling presence.101 Psalm 22 
is seen as prophetically pointing to the crucifixion and in this, ‘I am poured out like water 
and all my bones are out of joint,’102 there is the picture of God pouring out for the sake 
of creation. The most significant image of the Christian life portrays the life received 
because of the sacrifice of Christ and the kratera emblematically depicts both the 
containing of everything and the pouring out for the healing of everything. Emphasis of 
the requirements for serving the Eucharist are given in writings such as the 63rd Letter of 
Cyprian from about 371 AD, but the language used is Latin and so the cup is referred to 
                                                 
‘Euphonius’.  
95 See Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration 5, 2.  
96 1Pet. 3:20: ‘qui increduli fuerant aliquando quando expectabat Dei patientia in diebus 
Noe cum fabricaretur arca in qua pauci id est octo animae salvae factae sunt per aquam.’ 
97 Exod. 14:30: ‘liberavitque Dominus in die illo Israhel de manu Aegyptiorum.’ 
98 Rom. 6:4: ‘consepulti enim sumus cum illo per baptismum in mortem ut quomodo 
surrexit Christus a mortuis per gloriam Patris ita et nos in novitate vitae ambulemus.’ 
99 John 19:34: ‘sed unus militum lancea latus eius aperuit et continuo exivit sanguis et 
aqua.’  
100 Exod. 17:6: ‘en ego stabo coram te ibi super petram Horeb percutiesque petram et 
exibit ex ea aqua ut bibat populus fecit Moses ita coram senibus Israhel.’ 1Cor. 10:2-4: 
‘et omnes in Mose baptizati sunt in nube et in mari, et omnes eandem escam spiritalem 
manducaverunt, et omnes eundem potum spiritalem biberunt bibebant autem de spiritali 
consequenti eos petra petra autem erat Christus.’ 
101 John 4:14: ‘sed aqua quam dabo ei fiet in eo fons aquae salientis in vitam aeternam.’ 
John 7:38: ‘qui credit in me sicut dixit scriptura flumina de ventre eius fluent aquae 
vivae.’ 
102 Ps. 22:14: ‘sicut aqua effusus sum et separata sunt omnia ossa.’ 
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as a calix.103      
This thread was picked up by Pseudo-Dionysius, probably around the 6th century, who 
begins with the mixing bowl from Proverbs and connects this with the actions of God and 
then God Himself: 
Placing a mystical bowl, and pouring forth its sacred drink... Now the 
bowl being spherical and open, let it be a symbol of the providence over 
the whole, which at once expands itself and encircles all, without 
beginning and without end.104 
Dionysius continues to describe the bowl both as unmoved and yet there is a flowing out, 
an overflow from the bowl. Paradoxically the bowl goes forth yet remains in itself. In 
advancing out to embrace:   
He overtops the whole... never becoming outside himself... and whilst 
going forth to all, remaining by himself alone... The liquid [in the bowl] 
is suggestive of the stream at once flowing through and to all.105  
In a typically Dionysian blast of imagery there is the bowl, (kratera) and this is the 
fullness of God, yet the contents of the bowl spill over as God’s actions in the world. God 
is unchanging, in himself, while outpouring himself. Again the link easily stretches to 
become a Eucharistic picture with the blood of Christ contained and being poured out. 
God is both the vessel and its contents. God is the entirety and yet the going beyond as 
well, which is a theme presented by Eckhart using the terms bullitio and ebullitio.106   
Stoic and Neo-Platonic thought could be seen in the use of pantokrator as the one, active 
and transcendent power in preserving the world, sustaining life and working through the 
Holy Spirit empowering the Church. God as sovereign was not replaced but refined to 
include a developing emphasis on his on-going sustaining activity. It is in the developing 
meaning of the term pantokrator that this shift is displayed, although, there are early 
                                                 
103 Cyprian, Epistle 63, PL 4 (1841-55): ‘ut in calice offerendo’.  
104 Pseudo-Dionysius, Epistle ΙX, 3, Epistle ΙX, Pseudo Dionysius: The Complete Works, 
trans. Colm Luibheid (New York, 1987). 
105 Pseudo-Dionysius, Epistle ΙX, 3-4, Pseudo Dionysius: The Complete Works, C. 
Luibheid (1987): ‘ἐξήπηται τῶν ὅλων... καὶ οὐδαμῶσ ἔξω αὐτοῦ γιγνόμενος... καὶ 
προϊών ἐπὶ πάντα, καὶ μἐνων ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ... τήν δέ ὑγράν, τῆς διαχυτικῆς ἅμα καὶ ἐπὶ πάντα 
προϊέναι σπεθδούσησ ἐπιρροῆς.’ 
106 See Eckhart, Sermo XXV n. 258 (LW IV 236). 
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Christian authors who share the emphasis with the aspect of dominion, as for example 
Cyril of Jerusalem (c.313–386 AD) who writes, ‘Pantokrator is He who supports all 
things, who has authority over all things.’107 In this statement, dominion and preservation 
are effectively interwoven showing that the Jewish-Stoic shift was prevalent, but not 
universal.    
Church Councils, such as Nicaea in 325 AD and following ones took on the mantle of 
establishing orthodox doctrine and this was validated by a creed produced to be 
disseminated for such a purpose. Creeds were often a compilation of small statements of 
doctrine that could derive from professions of faith, or baptismal questions. The 
importance to early Christian writers of the attribute of all-mightiness is shown by it being 
the only divine property to be explicitly referred to in both the ‘Nicene’ and ‘Apostles’ 
Creeds’.108 Although the Apostles’ Creed contains elements that could date a couple of 
centuries earlier, it is first recorded as a creedal statement around 340 AD.109 The pressing 
need was not just to present truth but to draw demarcation lines that would expose heresy. 
It was vital to repudiate Arianism and any other Christological heresies and so a clear 
proposition of the person of Jesus was increasingly essential. Whereas in Arianism only 
the Father was pantokrator and the Son was one of the powers (dunamis) emanating from 
God, Athanasius, (c.296-73 AD), now proclaimed Jesus also to be pantokrator. In a letter 
to Serapion he stated: 
                                                 
107 Cyril of Jerusalem, Catecheses 8, 3 in: PG 33, 628A: ‘Παντοκράτωρ γάρ ἐστιν ὁ 
πάντων κράτωρν, ὁ πάντων ἐξουσιάζων’. 
108 See P. Schaff, Creeds of Christendom, with a History and Critical notes, 3 vols., CCEL 
(1876), Apostles: I, 8, 14-23; Nicene: I 24-9. E. Ferguson, ‘Creeds, Councils and Canons’ 
in The Oxford Handbook of Early Christian Studies (Oxford, 2008), 427-45; J.N.D. Kelly, 
Early Christian Creeds (1972). 
109 See M. Vinzent, ‘Die Entstehung des römischen Glaubensbekenntnisses’, in: W. 
Kinzig, C. Markschies and M. Vinzent, Tauffragen und Bekenntnis. Studien zur 
sogenannten Traditio Apostolica, zu den Interrogationes de fide und zum Römischen 
Glaubensbekenntnis, AzK 74 (1999), 185-410; id., Der Ursprung des Apostolikums im 
Urteil der kritischen Forschung, FKDG 89 (2006). 
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pantokrator is the Father and pantokrator is the Son as John said, that 
which was and is and is to come, the pantokrator.110 
 Athanasius proclaimed the universal authority and dominion of the Lord Jesus by 
emphasising the oneness between Father and Son with this turn of phrase, used by the 
creed attributed to him, which also includes the Holy Spirit. The Athanasian Creed, which 
is dated probably in the 5th century states, ‘The Father is almighty, Son almighty and Holy 
Spirit almighty, and yet they are not three almighties but one almighty.’111 The immense 
greatness of God as ‘pantokrator’ was therefore fundamental to Christian understanding, 
but as the Church proceeded, the Old Testament notion of God as supreme power 
developed to incorporate, or in some cases almost be replaced by the idea that God is also 
the sustaining power. God is not just the distant sovereign but the one actively exercising 
his will on the earth. Kelly considers evidence to show pantokrator was used to present 
either sovereign or sustaining power and concludes that sometimes both are inferred. He 
proposes to combine both strands to form an Early Church definition of pantokrator as 
being, ‘In the first place an active word, conveying the idea not just of capacity but of 
actualisation of capacity.’112 This is not the thought of distant potency but power in 
observed activity.  
In the Nicene and Apostles’ Creeds, ‘pantokrator’ appears following the term ‘pater’113 
and De Halleux 114 emphasises the rarity of this juxtaposition in pre-Nicene literature to 
                                                 
110 Athanasius, Epistula ad Serapionem, 2 (PG 26, 609), ‘Παντοκράτωρ ἐστὶν ὁ Πατήρ· 
παντοκράτωρ ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ Υἱὸς, λέγοντος τοῦ Ἰωάννου· ‘Ὁ ὢν, ὁ ἦν, ὁ ἐρχόμενος, ὁ 
παντοκράτωρ.’ Rev. 1:8: ‘ego sum Alpha et Omega principium et finis dicit Dominus 
Deus qui est et qui erat et qui venturus est Omnipotens.’ 
111 From the Creed of Athanasius, Creeds of Christendom, with a History and Critical 
notes, vol. II. The History of Creeds, IV Symbolum Quicunque, CCEL (1876): ‘Similiter 
omnipotens Pater, omnipotens Filius, omnipotens Spiritus Sanctus. Et tamen non tres 
omnipotentes, sed unus omnipotens.’ 
112 J.N.D. Kelly, Early Christian Creeds (1972), 137. 
113 Nicene and Apostles Creeds: ‘Πιστεύομεν εἰς ἕνα θεὸν Πατέρα παντοκράτορα’, 
(‘Credo in Deum patrem potentem’). 
114 De Halleux, Dieu le Père tout-puissant, Revue Théologique de Louvain 8 (1977), 401-
22. J.N.D. Kelly, Early Christian Creeds (1972), 132; D.L. Holland, ‘Pantokrator in New 
Testament and Creed’, in E.A. Livingstone (ed.), Studia Evangelica 6 (1973), 264. 
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propose it was not accidental. Kelly argues against taking the two words together but this 
is refuted by Holland and this raises the question of whether the first term is connoting 
the second, or the second is connoting the first. If God is the Father who happens to be 
almighty, then this might lend itself to a Platonic notion of originator. Alternatively, the 
Almighty who is also Father could infer that the almighty God incorporates a Father/Son 
relationship. The combination of pater and pantokrator acknowledges, that for 2nd 
century Christians, the relationship between God and his creation was inferred by the idea 
of fatherhood and this was a belief shared with Hellenism and the intellectual Judaism of 
Philo. However, the increasing need for orthodoxy during the 4th century could have had 
an impact on the reasoning behind pater and pantokrator being placed together.  
Questionably earlier, but definitely during the 4th century, ‘God as the Father of Jesus’ 
became the most significant meaning of fatherhood. An example of this emphasis is given 
when Cyril of Jerusalem stated that, 
as soon as one thinks of the Father, one also thinks of the Son.’115 
Evidence suggests that focus on the term pantokrator had changed because of the more 
pressing need to consider the implications of the preceding pater. In the first two centuries 
of the Church, writings present the need to relate to the philosophical culture of Stoicism, 
but in the following centuries, as demand to define Christological doctrine increased, the 
divine Father to Son relationship became of paramount significance.   
 
The contribution of Augustine  
 
Roman domination presided the early developments of Christianity and consequently 
writers adopted the prevalent language of the empire. The transfer from Greek to Latin, 
pantokrator to omnipotens, activated a theological discussion that continued through to 
Eckhart and beyond. Whereas pantokrator points to the all defeating conqueror and the 
one holding dominion over, and preserving the world, Latin translators chose to use 
omnipotens which describes the more abstract idea of the almighty power of God. 
Omnipotens reflects the potential to act and the ability to do all things so it is closer in 
meaning to pantadunamos rather than pantokrator, and in contrast with omnitenens which 
                                                 
115 Cyril of Jerusalem, Catecheses 7, 4 (PG 33, 609A; NPNF, Series 2, 8, 45): ‘ἵνα ἄμα 
τῷ νοεῖν Πατέρα νοήσωμεν καὶ τὸν Υἱοῦ’. 
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describes the actualisation of capacity. Augustine (354–430 AD)116 broke the term into 
its components declaring,  
but who is omnipotent, then He who can do all things.117 
 He also highlighted the difference in possible terms by describing God as, 
 The all-powerful (omnipotentem), all-creating (omnicreantem) and all-
sustaining (omnitenentem) maker of heaven and earth.118  
It may be that omnipotens was the preferred option because that was the term used for 
Roman gods in their capacity of holding dominion over their subjects and it was important 
for God to be above all other gods.   
With the almightiness of God being framed in terms of the things God can do, it becomes 
almost inevitable to question if there is anything that God cannot do. Out of the 
‘everything’ that could be done, are there certain specific things that God cannot do? The 
notion that there are things that God could not do was not new, for example, it had been 
noted towards the end of the 1st century AD Clement of Rome had noted that nothing is 
impossible with God except to lie.119 Clement was starting from the biblical phrase that, 
nothing is impossible for God, but then showing how there are exceptions to this rule. 
Augustine, after presenting the things God can do, began to list the things God cannot do 
in his advice on the creed to the catechumens: 
I can tell you the sort of things He could not do. He cannot die, He 
cannot sin, He cannot lie, He cannot be deceived. Such things He 
cannot. If He could, He would not be omnipotent... He does whatsoever 
He will: that is Omnipotence. He does whatsoever He rightly will, 
whatsoever He justly will: but whatsoever is evil to do, He wills not. 
                                                 
116 See S. Knuuttila, ‘Time and Creation in Augustine’ in E. Stump and N. Kretzmann 
(eds), The Cambridge Companion to Augustine (Cambridge, 2001), 107-9.  
117 Augustine, De Trinitate, IV 20, 27 (CChr.SL 50, 197): ‘Quis est autem omnipotens, 
nisi qui omnia potest.’ See G. van den Brink, Almighty God (1993), 61. 
118 Augustine, Confessiones, XI 13, 15 (CSEL 33, 290): ‘te deum omnipotentem et 
omnicreantem et omnitenentem coeli et terrae artificem’. See G. van den Brink, Almighty 
God (1993), 60; De Halleux, Dieu le Père (Louvain, 1977), 420. 
119 1Clemens 27, 2, trans. K. Lake, the Apostolic Fathers, 1 (1975), 55: ‘ὁ παραγγείλας 
μὴ ψεύεσθαι, πολλῷ μᾶλλον αὐτὸς οὐ ψεύσεται· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀδύνατον παρὰ τῷ θεῷ εἰ μὴ 
τὸ ψεύσασθαι.’  
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There is no resisting one who is Almighty, that He should not do what 
He will.120 
From this sermon using the text from Paul to Timothy, ‘He (God) cannot disown (negate) 
Himself,’121 it seems there are numerous things God cannot do, and if he could, then he 
would not be almighty. All-mightiness does not then mean ‘can do everything’ because 
there are certain things the almighty God cannot do. Augustine presented how God does 
only what it is right for him to do because those are the things that are within his will to 
do, and in this passage above the omnipotence and will of God are closely linked. Any 
thought that the will of God is a restriction on his capacity as the omnipotent one is not 
suggested here.  
In what is probably from the same sermon although recorded differently Augustine stated: 
 If God can be what he does not will to be, He is not omnipotent... 
Therefore, God wills whatever he is; He wills to be eternal, 
unchangeable, true, beautiful and insuperable.122  
The language of being and doing are related in these words again with willing to show 
that God acts according to not only who he is, but what he wants to do, and so does not 
do what is not right for him, being God, not to do. For example, God could not be unwise 
because he is wisdom, or false because he is true to himself. Doing any action not within 
his will would mean God doing something he does not wish to do which is incompatible 
with being all-powerful. There is no reference to the idea of a power distinction and the 
                                                 
120 Augustine, Sermo de symbolo ad catechumenos 2 (CChr.SL 46, 185-6, PL 40, 627), 
trans. H. Browne, NPNF (1887): ‘Quam multa non potest, et omnipotens est: et ideo 
omnipotens est, quia ista non potest … Nam ego dico quanta non possit. Non potest mori, 
non potest peccare, non potest mentiri, non potest falli. Tanta non potest: quae si posset, 
non esset omnipotens ... Facit quidquid vult: ipsa est omnipotentia. Facit quidquid bene 
vult, quidquid juste vult: quidquid autem male fit, non vult. Nemo resistit omnipotenti, ut 
non quod vult faciat.’   
121 2Tim. 2:13: ‘si non credimus ille fidelis manet negare se ipsum non potest.’ See Titus 
2:1, ‘in spem vitae aeternae quam promisit qui non mentitur Deus ante tempora 
saecularia.’ 
122 Augustine, Sermo CCXIV (PL 38, 1068): ‘Si ergo potest esse quod non vult, 
omnipotens non est ... Volens enim est deus quidquid est; aeternus ergo et incommutabilis, 
et verax, et beatus, et insuperabilis volens est.’ Trans. van den Brink (1993). 
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emphasis is simply that God acts according to his omnipotent nature and so is able to do 
everything that he wills to do. However, the notions that God acts according to his nature 
and his will became fundamental to the future debate over the omnipotence of God.  
The question of omnipotence surfaced when Augustine dealt with the thoughts of 
Pelagius in his work, Of Nature and Grace, written in 415 AD. He wrote several pieces 
against Pelagius from 412 AD onwards, though on this occasion never mentioned 
Pelagius by name or the 'Pelagians', in his measured desire to correct heretical ideas 
without fuelling division. Augustine presents the distinction between what might be and 
what is, saying:  
For he (Pelagius) first of all makes a distinction: ‘It is one thing (says 
he) to inquire whether a thing can be, which has respect to its possibility 
only; and another thing, whether or not it is.’ This distinction, nobody 
doubts, is true enough; for it follows that whatever is, was able to be; 
but it does not therefore follow that what is able to be, also is. Our Lord, 
for instance, raised Lazarus; (John 11:1-44) He unquestionably was 
able to do so. But inasmuch as He did not raise up Judas must we 
therefore contend that He was unable to do so? He certainly was able, 
but He would not. For if He had been willing, He could have effected 
this too. ‘For the Son gives life to whom He will.’ (John 5:21)123  
Augustine explained how Jesus raised Lazarus from the dead and so could have raised 
Judas by the same power but chose not to. By mentioning what can be, Augustine is 
referring to all that is possible and all that is possible for God to do. A distinction is 
highlighted with the case of Judas, as the difference between the things that could be, and 
the things that in fact are. This distinction, between everything possible, and everything 
                                                 
123 Augustine, De Natura et Gratia, 8 (PL 44, 250-1; CSEL 60, 237), trans. Peter Holmes 
and Robert Ernest Wallis, and revised by Benjamin B. Warfield, in Philip Schaff (ed.), 
NPNF, First Series, vol. 5 (1887): ‘Nam prius distinguit: aliud esse quaerere an possit 
aliquid esse, quod ad solam possibilitatem pertinet, aliud, utrumne sit. Hanc 
distinctionem veram esse nemo ambigit; consequens enimest, ut quod est esse potuerit, 
non est autem consequens, ut quod esse potest etiam sit. Quia enim Dominus Lazarum 
susctavit, sine dubio potuit; quia vero Iudam non suscisavit, numquid dicendum est: Non 
potuit? Potuit ergo, sed noluit. Nam si voluisset, eadam etiam hoc potestate fecisset, quia, 
“et Filius quos vult vivificat.”’   
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God actually does, features all the way through to Question six of Eckhart. Augustine uses 
this incident which involves God making a choice, given by the phrase, ‘He would not’, 
to introduce his fundamental concept of the will. God did not choose to raise Lazarus out 
of neglect for Judas, nor by necessity, nor out of ontological conditioning, for example, 
because him being good, he can only and solely do good things, but not raise a traitor. 
Jesus could only raise Lazarus, but not Judas instead, because this was God’s choice, as 
emphasised by using the words of Jesus declaring that God only ‘gives life to whom he 
will.’124 This so-called choice makes this giving of life an act of wilful decision making 
by God. On this foundation of God’s will, the ‘all-good’ God’s actions are not necessarily 
always immediately perceivable as good. On the contrary, in his work, On the Trinity 
Augustine spoke of the power of God to deliver a means of salvation, but the manner that 
God chose, was by the death of Christ Jesus. So, while the death of his own Son, in its 
perpetration was a permitted act of evil under the sovereign will of God, it was essentially 
the most powerful demonstration of the fullness of his love. He writes to those who 
question if 
God had no other way by which He might free men from the misery of 
this mortality, that He should will the only-begotten Son, God co-
eternal with Himself, to become man, by putting on a human soul and 
flesh, and being made mortal to endure death?... For what was so 
necessary for the building up of our hope, and for the freeing the minds 
of mortals cast down by the condition of mortality itself, from despair 
of immortality, than that it should be demonstrated to us at how great a 
price God rated us, and how greatly He loved us.125     
                                                 
124 John 5:21, ‘sicut enim Pater susctiat mortuos et vivificat sic et Filius quos vult 
vivificat.’  
125 Augustine De Trinitate, 13, 10 (PL 42, 1024), trans. Arthur West Haddan, in Philip 
Schaff (ed.), NPNF, First Series, vol. 3 (1887): ‘Itane defuit deo modus alius quo liberaret 
homines a miseria mortalitatis huius ut unigenitum filium deum sibi coaeternum hominem 
fieri uellet induendo humanam animam et carnem mortalemque factum mortem perpeti?” 
... parum est sic refellere ut istum modum quo nos per mediatorem dei et hominum 
hominem Christum Iesum Deus liberare dignatur asseramus bonum et diuinae congruum 
dignitati; uerum etiam ut ostendamus non alium modum possibilem deo defuisse cuius 
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There is no disparity between what is good for man and the will of God. The passion of 
Christ occurred because it was permitted by God, and this was because it was ordained 
by God as the only way to redeem fallen man. As Augustine says in the passage above 
there neither was, nor needs to have been any other mode more appropriate for curing our 
misery. The brutal crucifixion of Jesus was first of all an act of love, and this was the 
choice of God, made within the will of God, and therefore revealing the nature of God. 
What was perceived as desperate weakness was in fact the ultimate demonstration of 
divine power.  
The problem of evil in the first place is also dealt with as an issue that considers God’s 
omnipotence alongside his will. Augustine uses the account of creation in Genesis to 
present his view that the sin of Adam instigated the entrance of sin to the human race and 
hence the need for Christ’s act of redemption. Augustine reflected on the thought that 
God in his goodness could have prevented the entrance of evil, writing: 
Whence is evil? Or was there some evil matter of which He made and 
formed and ordered it, but left something in it which He did not convert 
into good? But why was this? Was He powerless to change the whole 
lump, so that no evil should remain in it, seeing that He is omnipotent? 
Lastly, why would He make anything at all of it, and not rather by the 
same omnipotency cause it not to be at all? Or could it indeed exist 
contrary to His will? ... Or if He wished now all of a sudden to do 
something, this rather should the Omnipotent have accomplished, that 
this evil matter should not be at all.126  
                                                 
potestati cuncta aequaliter subiacent, sed sanandae nostrae miseriae convenientiorem 
modum alium non fuisse nec esse oportuisse.’  
126 Augustine, Confessiones, 7, 5, trans. J.G. Pilkington, in Philip Schaff (ed.), NPNF, 
First Series, vol. 1 (1887): ‘unde est malum? an unde fecit ea, materies aliqua mala erat, 
et formavit atque ordinavit eam, sed reliquit aliquid in illa, quod in bonum non 
converteret? cur et hoc? an inpotens erat totam vertere et conmutare, ut nihil mali 
remaneret, cum sit omnipotens? postremo cur inde aliquid facere voluit, ac non potius 
eadem omnipotentia fecit, ut nulla esset omnino? aut vero exsistere poterat contra eius 
voluntatem? aut si non erat bene, ut non aliquid boni etiam fabricaretur et conderet qui 
bonus erat, illa sublata et ad nihilum redacta materie, quae mala erat, bonam ipse 
institueret, unde omnia crearet?’ 
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Augustine asks why God, who is good, would create something that became evil if he is 
omnipotent. The question touches at the core of what Christian thinking and western 
philosophy had built as an intellectual framework over centuries, especially in response 
to the problem of evil. Without providing a clinical answer in this text, he points out that 
the fall and God’s act of sacrificial love could not have happened contrary to God’s will. 
It might have seemed in keeping with the goodness of God to prevent sin from happening, 
or at least banish it before it took any foothold, but God must have permitted this entrance 
of sin although its ruinous effects would pervade all creation. Augustine states that there 
was no necessity to make anything bad, and he had the power to destroy it at any stage. 
However, because God is all-powerful, he is able to do as he wills and so it must have 
been within God’s will to allow evil to enter the world. The distinction between what God 
could possibly do out of power and what he is able to do out of will is seen in that God 
had the power to prevent evil but chose not to.  
God has permitted evil in the world but this is balanced by the effects of justice and 
Augustine distinguishes between what God could do because of his power (potentia), but 
would not do out of justice (iustitia).127 It is therefore within this permissive will of God 
that evil exists and so even this is good in that it reveals the omnipotence of God who has 
enough power to do anything that is real, including to permit sin. The choices made by 
God are within his will which is governed by his nature incorporating not just love but 
justice. This is why Job, Paul and Peter were refined to be saved but, 
Judas was damned so that he should hang himself.128 When, therefore, 
through the power which He has given the Devil, God Himself shall 
have done all things righteously, nevertheless punishment shall at last 
be rendered to the Devil not for these things justly done, but for the 
unrighteous willing to be hurtful, which belonged to himself, when it 
shall be said to the impious who persevered in consenting to his 
wickedness, ‘Go ye into everlasting fire which my God has prepared 
for the Devil and his angels.129 
                                                 
127 See Augustine, Contra Gaudentium Donatistarum Episcopum, Book 1, 30, 35 (PL 43, 
727; CSEL 53, 233). 
128 Matt. 27:5: ‘et proiectis argenteis in templo recessit et abiens laqueo se suspendit.’ 
129 Matt. 25:41: ‘tunc dicet et his qui a sinistris erunt discedite a me maledicti in ignem 
aeternum qui paratus est diabolo et angelis eius.’ Augustine, On the nature of Good: 
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God could have prevented evil or saved Judas but did not do so, not because he was not 
able, but because of choice. This is ‘absolute power’ but with ‘self-imposed limitation’. 
To illustrate this Augustine refers to the account of the dialogue between Lot and the 
angel as Lot and his family were fleeing Sodom. The angel, acting on behalf of God, said 
that he would wait until Lot and his family arrived in Zoar before destroying Sodom 
because, ‘I can do nothing until you arrive there.’130 Clearly, as God was about to rain 
down burning sulphur on Sodom and Gomorrah he could do so at the time of his choosing, 
but in the narrative God would wait, mercifully, for Lot and family to complete their 
actions of scrambling to Zoar. While this passage includes the element of God making 
himself subject to man, the sovereignty of God is even more strikingly emphasised by the 
way Lot's wife disobeyed the instruction not to look back and received the due 
punishment of being turned into a pillar of salt. This fatal sting in the tail for Lot’s wife 
is maybe a reminder that although God chooses to impose restrictions on himself, he is 
still able to exercise justice as well as mercy.  
Augustine presents how what God chooses to permit effects creation and thereby alludes 
to ideas of predestination and election that were picked up by the reformed theology of 
Calvin in the 16th century. He wrote books entitled ‘On Free Will’ and ‘On the 
predestination of the Saints’ and by taking isolated pieces of text it could be claimed 
Augustine maybe changed his mind or at least modified his thinking. God’s saving action 
towards Job, Peter, Paul and Lazarus contrasts with the damnation of Judas and these 
actions may have been predestined to happen such that God had effected their lives 
without any freedom of choice. Alternatively, the men acted out of choice and, out of 
justice, they were predestined to receive what God had willed accorded to his justice. In 
this case God’s actions follow his foreknowledge rather than his will being fatalistically 
executed by puppet-like men. Augustine stated:  
                                                 
Against the Manichaeans, 32, CSEL 25, 871, ‘Iudas damnatus ut se suspenderet. Cum 
ergo per potestatem quam diabolo dedit, omnia iuste ipse Deus fecerit; non tamen pro his 
iuste factis sed pro iniqua nocendi voluntate, quae ipsius diaboli fuit, ei reddetur in fine 
supplicium, cum dicetur impiis qui eius nequitiae consentire perseveraverint: Ite in ignem 
aeternum quem paravit Pater meus diabolo et angelis eius.’  
130 Gen. 19:22: ‘festina et salvare ibi quia non potero facere quicquam donec ingrediaris 
illuc idcirco vocatum est nomen urbis illius Segor.’ See Gen. 18-23. 
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Wherefore, God would have been willing to preserve even the first man 
in that state of salvation in which he was created, and after he had 
begotten sons to remove him at a fit time, without the intervention of 
death, to a better place, where he should have been not only free from 
sin, but free even from the desire of sinning, if He had foreseen that 
man would have the steadfast will to persist in the state of innocence in 
which he was created. But as He foresaw that man would make a bad 
use of his free-will, that is, would sin, God arranged His own designs 
rather with a view to do good to man even in his sinfulness, that thus 
the good will of the Omnipotent might not be made void by the evil 
will of man, but might be fulfilled in spite of it.131 
It is not that God is not able to do all the things that we might perceive as good, such as 
prevent sin and save the life of everyone, but that God’s will be in line with his plans and 
it is these plans that happen because God has sovereign power. The notion that it does not 
conflict with God’s omnipotence to allow evil and it is indeed good that evil exists is 
presented a few chapters earlier by Augustine and incorporated by Eckhart into his 
treatment on omnipotence in Question six.132 Augustine could reconcile God’s 
omnipotence with man’s freedom by this view that God has allowed bad things to happen 
but predestined events such that his will is not compromised. The power of God is 
revealed through the actions of man, who in his freedom of choice from his human 
perspective, has been fulfilling the will of God.  
                                                 
131 Augustine, Enchiridion, c. XXVIII, n. 104, trans. J.F. Shaw in Philip Schaff (ed.), 
NPNF, vol. 3 (1887), ch. 104, ‘Quapropter etiam primum hominem Deus in ea salute in 
qua conditus erat custodire voluisset, eumque opportuno tempore post genitos filios sine 
interpositione mortis ad meliora perducere, ubi iam non solum peccatum committere sed 
nec voluntatem posset habere peccandi, si ad permanendum sine peccato, sicut factus 
erat, perpetuam voluntatem habiturum esse praescisset. Quia vero eum male usurum 
libero arbitrio, hoc est peccaturum esse, praesciebat, ad hoc potius praeparavit 
voluntatem suam ut bene ipse faceret etiam de male faciente, ac sic hominis voluntate 
mala non evacuaretur sed nihilo minus impleretur omnipotentis bona.’ 
132 See Augustine, Enchiridion, c. XXIV, n. 96 (CChr.SL 46, 100, 40-1): ‘Neque enim ob 
aliud veraciter vocatur omnipotens nisi quoniam quidquid vult potest’. 
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The omnipotence debate had been opened and now the distinction exposed between what 
God is able to do in theory and what he actually does in practice because of his will. 
Augustine proposed that there are things that God cannot do because of a self-imposed 
limitation in accordance with his will. The decisions made about the action to take, such 
as who to save, are based on God’s love and justice, and are the choices that reveal God’s 
nature through his power. The almighty nature of God had not changed but focus on the 
concept of all-mightiness now included the things that God could not do, because it was 
not within his will to do them. 
 
The ‘Fallen Virgin’ 
 
If Augustine delivered fuel for the mediaeval debate on the power distinction, the 
unmistakeable catalyst used to spark the flames was provided by his distinguished Latin 
Church contemporary, Jerome. Both were saddened and anxious about events in Rome.133 
Augustine, from Hippo, expressed his consolation to the victims of rape in 410 AD, when 
the Goths were ruthlessly ravaging a capital of a far-reaching empire which once was 
praised for its invincible walls and eternal destiny. Jerome wrote at that time from 
Bethlehem to offer sympathy, however, it was an earlier letter of 384 AD, to Julia 
Eustochium in Rome, extoling her devotion to virginity in the promiscuous and declining 
city, that was behind the mediaeval stir.  
From God’s word through Amos describing the plight of ‘fallen virgin Israel’, Jerome 
gave a warning that the good can go astray but God would rescue those who seek him.134 
With the exhortation for Eustochium to persevere came this thought on God’s action:  
I will say it boldly, though God can do all things He cannot raise up a 
virgin when once she has fallen. He may indeed free her from the 
penalty of her sin, but He will not crown the corrupted.135   
                                                 
133 See F. Oakley, Omnipotence, Covenant and Order (1984), 41-2 summarising Jerome, 
Ezechielem prophetam, Lib. 1; in PL 25:15-6, Augustine, De civitate dei, I, c. 16-9, 28 
(CChr.SL 47:17-22, 28-30). 
134 Amos 5:2: ‘Virgo Israhel proiecta est in terram suam non est qui suscitet eam.’ 
135 Jerome, Epistula 22, 5 (CSEL 54, 150): ‘Audenter loquor: Cum omnia Deus possit, 




By saying that this was to be a bold statement, Jerome was aware that he was about to 
make his point in a controversial manner. The message to Eustochium was more to 
express sadness at the devastating loss, with an admonishment to hold on to her virginal 
vow in such troubled times, rather than what the power of God can or can’t do. However, 
by using the word vult, a platform was created to discuss the idea that what God actually 
does is connected with what he is willing to do and it was this quote by Jerome that 
triggered the debate in mediaeval times between potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata. 
Reports record a dining encounter at the abbey of Monte Cassino in Southern Italy around 
1066 AD, between the abbot of the monastery, Desiderius, and his friend and fellow 
cardinal, Peter Damian, (1007–1072 AD).136  The meal would have been held in silence 
apart from a reading by a monk from a spiritual book, and it could be that the letter from 
Jerome was the reading on this occasion. Contemporary treatment of the issue was 
focussing on the things God could not do and Courtenay frames a question from Damian 
such that, ‘in light of the Christian affirmation of divine omnipotence expressed in the 
opening line of the creed, how should one understand an authoritative statement of 
scripture or of one of the fathers that seems to speak about things God cannot do.’137 
Whereas Desiderius had no problem with the view that God could only do what was 
within his will, Damian was perturbed by Jerome’s issue of the fallen virgin and later 
admitted that he wrote not 
in order to disparage the blessed Jerome, who spoke with pious 
devotion, but to confute by the invincible reasoning of the faith those 
                                                 
136 For recent discussion on this meeting see J. Yolles, ‘Divine Omnipotence and the 
Liberal Arts in Peter Damain and Peter Abelard’ in Rethinking Abelard (Leiden, 2014), 
60-83. See also H.E.J. Cowdrey, The Age of Abbot Desiderius (Oxford, 1983). 
137 W.J. Courtenay, Capacity and Volition (1990), 25. Courtenay dates the events at 
Monte Cassino as occurring in 1066 AD and Cantin suggests the letter would be read at 
the vigil on the feast of St Jerome Day in 1066, although Oakley suggests 1067 and Yolles 
1065. See Peter Damian, Disputatio cap. 5, in Pierre Damien: Lettre sur la toute-
puissance divine, in André Cantin (ed.), SC 191 (Paris, 1972), 31-2; Peter Damien 
“Epistulae” in K. Reindel (ed.), Die Briefe des Petrus Damiani (Munich, 1983-93), 3, 
Epistula 119, 354. 
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who made of his words an occasion for imputing a lack of power to 
God.138    
Damian, was concerned that the idea of God doing whatever he wills could become God 
could do only what he wills and therefore not do anything he does not do. In his treatise, 
De divina omnipotentia Damian maintained that God had indeed infinite capacities and 
could do things, even if he did not wish to do them. The contrary would, indeed, entail 
that ‘all the things God is not doing on a particular day, such as bringing rain, curing the 
feeble, opposing the unjust, or protecting the just, would lie outside the power of God.’139 
This does however suggest that God has some un-deployed capacity and therefore raises 
the question, ‘Why God did not do more of what appeared good from a human 
perspective?’140  
Courtenay suggests that, ‘in his discussion of the things God supposedly could not do 
(non posse), Damian saw a parallel between those things God does not will (nolle) and 
those things God does not know (nescire). Certain things, namely things that are evil or 
inappropriate for God, do not come into the mind of God, even before willing or acting, 
such as to lie, perjure or act unjustly. But for God to be said not to be able to do or know 
anything evil, such statements do not refer to impossibility or ignorance but to the 
rectitude of his unchanging will.’141 
This was a development from the thoughts of Boethius, who in his fourth book, Of the 
Consolation of Philosophy, explained why,  
                                                 
138 Peter Damien, Disputatio, cap. 5, in A. Cantin (ed.), Lettre (1972), 406, trans. F. 
Oakley, Omnipotence, Covenant and Order (1984), 43: ‘Haec autem dixi, non ut B 
Hieronymo, qui pio studio locutus est, detraham; sed ut eos illius occasione Deum 
astruunt impotentem, invicta fidei ratione refellam.’ Also (a different version) to be found 
in Opusculum 36, De Divina Omnipotentia in Repartione Corruptae (PL 145, cap. 3, 
619).   
139 W.J. Courtenay, Capacity and Volition (1990), 26 summarising Peter Damian, 
Disputatio (PL 145, 597AB; SC 191, 388-90), see here and following, this and other Latin 
texts referenced and included in appendix ii, listed according to their corresponding 
footnote in main text. See also PL 145, 610. 
140 W.J. Courtenay, Capacity and Volition (1990), 27. 
141 W.J. Courtenay, Capacity and Volition (1990), 26; see Peter Damian, Disputatio, (PL 
145, 598D-599A; SC 191, 396), see appendix ii.     
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Supreme goodness cannot do evil.142 
Accordingly, the reason why God is more limited in his actions, compared with human 
beings, has to do with the categorical understanding of limit. As evil has no being and is 
nothing, God’s inability to do nothing is only a circumscription of him being omnipotent, 
or conversely, omnipotence ‘is defined as power to do the good, not the power to do 
anything’, and especially not idleness to do nothing.143 The fact that God cannot do some 
things is therefore not a case of un-deployed capacity, because doing the wrong things 
are not within God’s nature and knowledge. This is because to be able to do something 
that is evil, is to be able to do something that is not, and so would in fact be a challenge 
to God’s omnipotence, not be a necessary part of it. Evil has no being, and is not a 
‘something’, therefore it is not a ‘something’ that he cannot do. If it were part of the 
definition of omnipotence, it would be to introduce privation or absence, and so 
undermine omnipotence. 
Damian proposed that restoring the purity of the fallen virgin was possible because God 
knows only of good and this would be an act of good, and so because he knows of it, he 
could do it. God is able to effect, and go beyond, what we see as the laws of nature as he 
did when he delivered the three friends of Daniel from the fiery furnace.144 Therefore God 
could restore a virgin’s moral and legal status, and, through a miracle, even her body, 
because he is able to ‘arrange things such that an undesirable past event never happened, 
                                                 
142 see Boethius, De consolation philosophiae IV, prosa 2 (CSEL 67, 84; CChr.SL 94, 69): 
‘Summo bono nihil potentius esse Paulo ante definivimus… Sed idem, inquit, facere 
malum nequit.’ Trans. here and following W.J. Courtenay, (1990), 30. Boethius, ‘Last of 
the Romans, first of the scholastics’, wrote his Consolation while awaiting execution in 
prison c.525 AD, lamenting his premature old age, see H. Chadwick, Boethius (Oxford, 
1981), 1; N.H. Kaylor, Jr., introduction: The Times, Life and Work of Boethius in ‘A 
Companion to Boethius in the Middle Ages’, in C. M. Bellitto (ed.), Brill’s Companion to 
the Christian Tradition, 30 (Leiden and Boston, 2012), 1-46. 
143 Boethius, De consolation philosophiae IV, prosa 2 (CSEL 67, 84; CChr.SL 94,69): 
‘cum igitur bonorum tantummodo potens possit omnia, non vero queant omnia potentes 
etiam malorem, eosdemqui mala possunt, minus posse manifestum est.’ 
144 See Dan. 3:19-27. 
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that is, change the content of the past.’145 These thoughts of Damian exploring the notion 
of the omnipotence of God, stray not too far from Augustine’s required constraint of the 
will of God, and also present the contrast between God as creator and his creation: 
For he who has given birth to nature easily removes the necessity of 
nature when he wills.146  
This reflects his eagerness to propose a notion of unlimited omnipotence, and so connects 
all the way back to the Hebrew concept of power, while presenting the idea that God is 
able to make choices and thereby pointing forward to the debate rooted in a theoretical 
power distinction. 
 
Early Scholastic treatment 
 
Peter Damian did not want God to be restricted by his own will but this proposal that God 
has the capacity to alter the past was rejected by Anselm of Canterbury (c.1033–1109 
AD), who maintained that God could not make true what is false or make false what is 
true. In his thoughts on omnipotence in Proslogion Anselm lines up alongside Desiderius 
in proposing God’s power is as extensive as his will, however there is the qualifier that 
the ability to do evil is not ability, but the inability to do good. For example, the idea that 
something cannot be done, such as that God cannot lie, should be taken as a confirmation 
not denial of ability.147 Later, in Cur Deus Homo, Anselm modified his view by 
acknowledging that God, in Christ, did have the capacity to sin otherwise he would not 
have been human. However, Christ did not have the will to sin, and more than that, he did 
not have the ability to will to sin. Anselm shows how God acts out of necessity, in that 
his actions are determined by his own choice to give himself to man by grace. God, having 
                                                 
145 Peter Damian, Disputatio (PL 145, 601C-620C; SC 191, 448), Ibid., 474-6, see 
appendix ii, trans. W.J. Courtenay, (1990), 26.    
146 Peter Damian, De Divina Omnipotentia, PL 145, col. 612A-B, trans. Toivo J. 
Holopainen, Dialectic and Theology in the 11th Century (1996), 7: ‘Qui enim naturae 
dedit originem, facile, cum vult, naturae tollit necessitatem.’  
147 See W.J. Courtenay, Capacity and Volition (1990), 43., see ‘Necessity and Freedom 
in Anselm’s conception of God’ in Covenant and Causality in Medieval Thought 
(London, 1984), 39-64; Anselm, Proslogion 7 in: Opera Omnia, (ed.) F.S. Schmitt (1946-
1961), I, 105. 
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made a covenant with man, has promised to act in a way that fulfils his obligation. This 
promise was freely made and it is freely kept although this is a choice of self-limitation. 
God does not have the power to contradict his own nature and so he cannot make false 
what is true and change the past, but his actions deal with the past for our good. Leftow 
presents Anselm’s struggle with the thought that impossibility suggests powerlessness 
and necessity suggests compulsion, and concludes this idea means that God acts 
necessarily because of his own promises and so has bound himself to act in certain ways. 
Therefore, for Anselm, while the possibility for God to do other than he does remains 
open, what he actually does is bound by the self-imposed restriction of his will.148  
Clearly God acts according to his will and nature, or he wouldn’t be God, but this implies 
limitations because, for instance, he cannot do bad things or be lazy, and so omnipotence 
is refined as the power to do some things but not anything. With Anselm following the 
line of Augustine such that all of God’s actions are encompassed by his will, Peter 
Abelard (1079–1142 AD)149 was concerned that this self-imposed restriction on his 
actions could be seen to diminish God’s omnipotence. The notion that God only does 
what is befitting for God to do is added to by what might seem a logical conclusion that 
because these things are the only things God does and it would be unbefitting to do 
anything else, then there is the question of whether God holds this unusable power. In 
essence Abelard was asking such questions as, ‘Could God do anything other than he is 
doing? Could he discontinue what he is doing? Could he do better than he is doing? If 
God can only do what he does, then what about the good things he chooses not to do?’ 
The idea that the things God can do is restricted to the things he does, led Abelard to 
conclude that,  
                                                 
148 See B. Leftow, ‘Anselm’s perfect-being theology’ in B. Davies and B. Leftow (eds), 
The Cambridge Companion to Anselm (Cambridge, 2004), 150-1. See Anselm, Cur Deus 
Homo II, (Opera Omnia II, 100), trans. E.R. Fairweather in W.J. Courtenay (1990), 34-5, 
see appendix ii. See also Anselm, Philosophica Fragmentum, Exordium, in J. Hopkins 
and H. Richardson (eds), Anselm of Canterbury, vol. II (New York, 1976).  
149 See J. Yolles, Divine Omnipotence and the Liberal Arts in Peter Damian and Peter 
Abelard in Rethinking Abelard (Leiden, 2014), 60-83; M. Perkams, Divine Omnipotence 
and Moral Theory in Abelard’s Theology, Mediaeval Studies 65 (2003), 99-116; W.J. 
Courtenay, Capacity and Volition (1990), 44-54. 
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‘God cannot do anything but what he does, neither forgive what he 
forgives.’150  
Similarly strict was his definition that became known as the principle, Opinio 
Nominalium, proposing that whatever God at one time knew, willed, or was able to do, 
he always knows, wills, or is able to do which was later reduced to the axiom: once it is 
true, it is always true (semel est verum, semper est verum).151 If there was a time when 
God could not do something he has done before, then that would be a lack of power and 
inconsistency in the unchanging God. The knowledge of God like his power could not 
change with time. Hence, ‘God cannot only do whatever he wills; he can do only what he 
wills. There is no sphere of un-deployed capacity, no process of divine deliberation in 
which choices are made from a larger range of possibilities. Consequently, it is 
meaningless in light of the simplicity and atemporality of God to speculate about whether 
God has the power to act in ways other than he does, or to have acted otherwise.’152 
 For Abelard, any description of God’s actions reflects the constraints known to humans, 
and although these do not effect God’s ability to act, from this human perspective, the 
actions of God are contained within his will. Abelard acknowledged using Platonic ideas 
to present a ‘necessitarianistic’ world in which all genuine possibility is actualised.153 
Everything that happens is what was necessarily going to happen and so God is in control 
and his all-powerfulness remains safeguarded, however, in attempting to extend the 
potential of God to act, Abelard effectively ‘boxed himself into a corner’154 and installed 
a limit on the actions of God.  
Damian’s idea that God could change the past was dealt with, but not without suggesting 
that divine activity is restricted by time. Containing what God is able to do in this way 
                                                 
150 Abelard, as reported by Odo of Soissons, Quaestiones, Pt. II, n. 298: ‘Deus non potest 
facere nisi quod facit, nec dimittere nisi quod dimittit’, trans. W.J. Courtenay, (1990), 44. 
151 Abelard, Ad Theologiam ‘scholarium’ III, c. 5 (PL 178, 1103; CCCM 13, 526), see 
appendix ii, summarised by W.J. Courtenay, Capacity and Volition (1990), 46. 
152 W.J. Courtenay, Capacity and Volition (1990), 50, summarising Abelard, Theologia 
Christiana V (PL 178, 1324). See also (PL 178, 1329-30; CCCM 12, 366,   
153 See A.O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (New York, 1960), 70-3. 
154 A turn of phrase used in the translation of Lombard’s Sentences, L.1, d. 44, c. 1, (188): 
‘Quaestio qua illi arctantur.’ English translation, The Sentences, trans. Giulio Silano 
(Toronto, 2007-10), 238.     
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could be construed as seeming to place limitations on God, as well as proposing there are 
things that humans can do that God cannot do. This apparent restraining of God was 
countered by Hugh of St. Victor who argued that, 
divine providence and foreknowledge do not preclude an indeterminate 
future, since any changes which remain possible, would have been 
foreseen and foreordained by God.155 
And, in dealing with the issue if God could do better, Hugh proposed that God could not 
do better than he does, not because of a lack of power but that he does not have the will 
to do so.156 For Hugh, exercising his will is not a restriction for God who has done 
everything in the best way possible, and this is not different from his will. The distinction 
is made between capacity and volition although any difference does not exist in practice. 
Hugh modified Abelard with the suggestion that God did have the power to do differently, 
but Abelard’s idea that God is not able to do other than he does met with more serious 
opposition when William of St. Thierry wrote to Bernard of Clairvaux and Geoffrey, 
Bishop of Chartres, in 1136 AD suggesting Abelard’s teaching should be declared 
heretical. As the dispute gathered momentum, in 1140 AD, ‘what was to have been a 
debate at Sens between Bernard and Abelard quickly turned into a trial, presided over by 
the papal legate Conon and attended by Louis VII and most of the French bishops. Among 
the nineteen propositions submitted by Bernard for condemnation was one that God is 
able to do only what he does, or not do what he only does not do, in no other way and at 
no other time.’157 To Bernard, Abelard was proposing that if God’s power is fully 
actualised in doing the good he does, then he would lack the power to do better. Although 
Abelard’s views were condemned in 1140 AD for the second time following an initial 
appeal, his intellectual approach bridged the gap between the cloister and the university 
and, according to Gilson, ‘Abelard’s influence was momentous... the illustrious disciples 
                                                 
155 Hugh of St. Victor, De Sacramentis, I, 2, 22 (PL 176, 215), see appendix ii. 
summarised by W.J. Courtenay, Capacity and Volition (1990), 50. For background on 
Hugh see P. Rorem, Hugh of Saint Victor (Oxford, 2009).   
156 See Hugh of St. Victor, De Sacramentis, I, 2, 22 (PL 176, 216): ‘Ergo ipse melior esse 
non potest. Sed quod fecit omne melius esse potest, si tamen voluerit qui potest.’ Also 
P.S. Dillard, Foundation and Restoration in Hugh of St Victor’s De sacramentis (New 
York, 2014), 191. 
157 W.J. Courtenay, Capacity and Volition (1990), 52. 
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who took up and continued his work witness to the fecundity of the new spirit he had 
brought to it.’158 Specifically, rather than provide an acceptable solution, he stirred others 
to realise there was a need to elucidate the power distinction, and Abelard is often more 
generally credited with paving the way towards raising scholastic standards rather than 
achieving them himself.  
Among those influenced by Abelard was Peter Lombard (1095–1160 AD),159 whose 
famous Libri Sententiarum became the text book for the following decades and indeed 
centuries.160 Book 1 of these Sentences contains a section of distinctions which pick up 
the threads of the power distinction. In distinction 42 Lombard rhetorically asks, ‘Why, 
is God called Omnipotent?’161 In his response, Lombard recalls the sermon of Augustine 
to the catechumens which acknowledged that, while God can certainly do all things, he 
only does those which are in accordance with his truth and justice. He does what is 
reasonable for him to do. God can only act in consistency with his nature. His power 
reveals who he is. And so there must be things that God cannot do. The fact that God 
cannot sin is not due to a lack of power. It is an act of power not to sin and God is not 
subject to the failings of man. God cannot lose, his power is more than any power 
imaginable. As Lombard explains, God does not walk or do human things because he 
does not possess the human organs needed to do them... but he has empowered man to do 
them, so he has the power to walk, otherwise he could not bestow it. Lombard states: 
God is powerful from himself and through himself; but a man or angel, 
however blessed, is not powerful from himself and through himself.162   
Omnipotence, according to Lombard, is defined as self-empowering capacity. Men or 
angels can be powerful, but they do not have power within themselves and are created 
                                                 
158 E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (1955), 163. 
159 See I. Brady, ‘Peter Lombard: Canon of Notre Dame’, Recherches de Théologie 
Ancienne et Médiévale 32 (1965), 277-95; M.L. Colish, Peter Lombard (Leiden, 1994). 
160 See I. Boh, ‘Divine Omnipotence in the Early sentences’ in T. Rudavsky (ed.), Divine 
Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy, Synthese Historical Library vol. 
25 (New York, 1984), 185-211.  
161 Lombard, I Sent., d. 42, c. 1 (184): ‘De omnipotentia Dei: quare dicatur omnipotens.’ 
Trans. here and following G. Silano (2007-10).  
162 Lombard, I Sent., d. 42, c. 3, 4 (186): ‘Et Deus quidem ex se, et per se potest; homo 
autem vel angelus, quantum que beatus est, non est potens ex se vel per se.’  
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with certain powers. God, however, is omnipotent from and through himself. This power 
needs to conform to his nature, and restrictions, like those mentioned by Augustine 
before, come with his nature and, as Augustine developed, his will, and are not limitations 
on his capacity, and nothing that should be done is left unaccomplished. Doing any action 
not within his will, would mean God doing something he therefore would not wish to do, 
which is incompatible with being all-powerful. And so, because God is all-powerful, his 
will is done, as Lombard emphasised: 
If he willed it, it would be done, because nothing can resist his will.163 
God can do whatever he wills through himself or through a creature and so because God 
is almighty, God’s will is done... nothing can resist it. God is called omnipotent because 
he can do whatever he wills. 
The question of whether God’s capacity to act exceeds the actions determined by his will 
is set out in distinction 43:  
Some say [and he certainly thinks of Abelard] that God is able to do 
nothing other than what he does. Nor could he do better or omit 
anything.164  
Of concern is the issue that led to the trial and condemnation of Abelard. It does not fit 
comfortably within the scope of omnipotence for there to be anything that could not be 
done. Lombard rejected Abelard’s Platonic view of divine power being fully actualised 
and stressed that if there is anything that God cannot do, it is not due to a lack of power 
but a matter of choice, stating,   
God can leave undone whatever he chooses. He is able to do many 
things he does not will to do, and is able not to do what he does.165  
He explains that, neither God’s power nor His will change, whether he does things or not. 
For instance, Jesus could have called for more support in Gethsemane but this was not 
the way the scriptures had prophesied things would happen. He also recalls the incident, 
often referred to in the power debate, when the angel explained that God’s wrath on 
                                                 
163 Lombard, I Sent., d. 42, c. 3, 6 (186): ‘Si enim vellet, fieret, quia voluntati eius nihil 
resistere possit.’       
164 Lombard, I Sent., d. 43, c. 1, 1 (187): ‘Aiunt enim: Non potest Deus aliud facere quam 
facit, nec melius facere id quod facit, nec aliquid praetermittere de his quae facit.      
165 Lombard, I Sent., d. 43, c. 1, 8 (187): ‘Fateamur itaque Deum plura posse facere quae 
non vult et posse dimittere quae facit.’  
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Sodom had to wait until Lot had arrived in Zoar.166 God had done the deal with Abraham 
and so any delay was a matter of justice rather than any lack of power. God can only do 
what he ought, and yet the idea of ought is a human perspective that Lombard describes 
as poisonous.167 As people, we must think about what we ought to do, but to God, choice 
is automatic because of who he is. Lombard explains, this is not questioning what God 
ought to do, such that there could be something he does not do, that he should do. Rather 
the questioning implied by asking, what if... God were to do something is not about power 
but suitability. As humans, we are in no position to question what God ought to do, but if 
we could see from God’s perspective, neither does he, and so if God leaves something 
undone, he does so for a reason. It is not a question of concern for ability, or number, or 
the nature of items willed. There are many things done and many undone but this is a 
reflection of choice, not the extent of power. Lombard continues with the statement that:  
His (God’s) will is not greater than his power, nor his power than his 
will, because his power and his will is one and the same thing, namely 
God himself.168  
The actions of God are the same as his will because they are God himself. Abelard had 
been perceived as limiting the power of God according to divine will, a position 
comparable with Desiderius such that ‘not able’ could be understood as ‘not willing’ but 
this is insufficient for Lombard as it was for Anselm, who indeed modified his view to 
align with the motto associated with Augustine, ‘Potuit, sed noluit’, (able, but not 
willing).169  
                                                 
166 Gen. 19:22, see footnote 130. 
167 Lombard, I Sent., d. 43, c. 1, 3 (187): ‘hoc verbum debet venenum habere’.       
168 Lombard, I Sent., d. 43, c. 1, 8 (187): ‘qu nec voluntas potentia, nec potentia voluntate 
major est, quia una et eadem res est potentia, voluntas, scilicet ipse Deus, qui esset maior 
se ipso, si voluntas esset maior potentia vel potentia voluntate.’       
169 Marcia Colish works through the Aristotelian and Boethian influences of Abelard and 
presents how Lombard focuses more on Augustine in order to free God from the logical 
necessitarianism with which Abelard encumbers him and ‘liberate God simultaneously 
from an economic theology and from the limits of logic understood purely as a science of 
discourse.’ M.L. Colish, Peter Lombard and Abelard: The Opinio Nominalium and 
Divine Transcendence, Vivarium 30 (1992), 154. Also W.J. Courtenay, ‘The Dialectic of 
Divine Omnipotence’ in Covenant and Causality (1984), 4.  
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Having established that God could do other than he does, in distinction 44 Lombard 
sharpens the dilemma by asking:  
Whether God can do anything better than he does?170 
Lombard explains, God could not do better, and uses the generation of the Son as his 
illustration, assuming with the Platonic tradition that offspring are always slightly less 
than the generators, or, as in the tradition, at best equal to the one that generates. Lombard, 
playing on the assumed equality between Father and Son, said 
God could not generate someone better than himself, for there is 
nothing better than God,171 
Likewise, the question is raised if it would be better that God had made man such that he 
did not sin, i.e. would it be better if man is only good? If man were only good then he 
would not be in need of atonement, and yet the crucifixion of Jesus was God’s plan for 
the redemption of fallen man and not an afterthought following the collapse of ‘plan A’ 
in which man never sinned.  
Having resolved that God could neither do different nor better, the question becomes one 
of action within time, and therefore power as Lombard posed: 
Whether God can always do what he was once able to do?172  
Lombard’s proposal moves away from being an issue of the extent of power and uses 
human ideas of time and language to leave the thought that God is not always able to do 
all that which he was at some time able to do. Lombard continues with the response: 
Well he was once able to become incarnate. So, because God can 
always do what he once did, and he does not lose knowledge or power. 
As he was able to become incarnate he is now able to have been 
incarnate which is by the same power.173  
                                                 
170 Lombard, I Sent., d. 44, c. 1, 1 (188): ‘Utrum Deus possit facere aliquid melius quam 
facit.’      
171 Lombard, I Sent., d. 44, c. 1, 1 (188): ‘Deus quem genuit quoniam meliorem se 
generare non potuit (nihil enim Deo meleus) debuit aequalem’.       
172 Lombard, I Sent., d. 44, c. 2, 1 (189): ‘Utrum Deus semper possit omne quod olim 
potuit.’       
173 Lombard, I Sent., d. 44, c. 2, 2 (189): ‘Ad quod dicimus quia, sicut omnia semper scit 
quae aliqu ando scivit, et semper vult quae aliquando voluit, nec unquam aliquam 
scientiam amittit vel voluntatem mutat quam habuit, ita omnia semper potest quae 
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Lombard accepted but adapted the nominalist idea of Abelard with regards to the 
immutability of knowledge. The formula ‘semel scit Deus, semper sciat et semper scierit’ 
(What God knows, he always knows and always has known), in distinction 41,174 
proposes that God knows simultaneously and unchangeably all things that were, are and 
will be, both good and evil and he also foreknows all future things, both good and evil. It 
has been suggested that it must be difficult for God to know about everything as it 
happens. Lombard reasons, as he swats a particular fly, many other flies are being swatted 
around the globe, and yet many, in some parts, are hatching to the despair of humans but 
delight of the hungry spider population. Therefore, how could anyone know how many 
there are at any given moment or likewise fish in the sea for instance. God knows, and 
always has done, how many hairs there are on my head because his knowledge is not like 
his creation that changes. While the idea of God’s knowledge being constant helps to 
comprehend his omniscience, it opens the question of whether or not God deliberates over 
decision making, even if only for an instant. Issues of time are known by God, but are of 
concern only from a human perspective. As temporal beings, our world and our 
knowledge of it changes. As eternal, God can know or foreknow all that he is able to do, 
and he is able to do what he will never do; and so he is able to know or foreknow that 
which he will never do, and which neither is, nor was. It is from our perspective and 
through our appropriation of language using tenses that knowledge advances. God can do 
or can have done, what he could at some time do. Therefore, all actions that we can think 
of do not change who God is. Because the incarnation was within time, the content of 
God’s knowledge and power is expressed differently, but God’s will is eternal and his 
actual knowledge and effective power remain constant. We have been given questioning 
minds but questioning God is not the best use of this God-given talent because at best all 
we contemplate is a human perspective from within our temporal limitation. When we 
act, it involves decision making and timing and so it is difficult to grasp what is taking 
place when God acts. Our actions change the person we are but God effects causes and 
exercises power without undergoing change.  
                                                 
aliquando potuit, nec unquam aliqua potentia sua privatur. Non est ergo privatus potentia 
incarnandi vel resurgendi, licet non possit modo incarni vel resurgere. Sicut enim potuit 
olim incarnari, ita et potest modo esse incarnatus; in quo eiusdem rei potentia 
monstratur.’      






Whereas Abelard had been questioned and condemned, Lombard was widely respected 
and so the nominalist position from the ‘semel scit Deus, semper sciat et semper scierit’ 
principle retained some credence until the early 13th century, although with some 
modifications needed to deal with issues such as time. As seen above in distinction 44, 
he acknowledged that:   
God is always able to do what he once could, that is to have all the 
power which he once had… But he is not always able to do (or make) 
all that at some time he was able to do.175   
Lombard’s qualifier here testifies that it seems impossible to consider God as all-powerful 
without applying some constraint as a limitation, and time is acknowledged as a factor in 
what it is possible for God to do. Commentaries on the Sentences on this issue of time 
were likewise presented by Bandinus and also Peter of Poitiers who said that while the 
extent of God’s power remained constant, God was not always able to repeat what he had 
once done, such as create the world or become incarnate.176 Another idea that became a 
key to further modifications was to consider the standpoint from which knowledge is 
understood. Bonaventure (c.1221–1274 AD),177 introduced this notion which might be 
regarded as representative of treatments bridging this issue from the early scholastic 
period through the time of Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. 
God in his divine intellect possesses a knowledge that is immutable, and in this sense 
semel est verum, semper est verum, in agreement with Lombard. However, when 
knowledge is understood from the standpoint of creation then things change and so 
knowledge changes. As Courtenay writes, ‘in a parallel way Bonaventure held the 
immutability of divine power, while acknowledging the changes in things that come 
                                                 
175 Lombard, I Sent., d. 44, c. 2, 4 (189), see appendix ii. 
176 W.J. Courtenay, Capacity and Volition (1990), 66, summarising Peter of Poitiers, 
Sentientiae I, 8 (I, 69). See also for a commentary on this, Bandinus, De sacrosancta 
Trinitate sive Liber primus sententiarum, d. 41 (PL 192, 1023-4). 
177 For background on Bonaventure see C.M. Cullen Bonaventure, Great Medieval 




under God’s power, so that God cannot now do all that he once could do.’178 It is not that 
God is changing but that creation is subject to time and so the past must remain past and 
the future, although new, can only move on from what is past. The next moment in time 
exists in consequence of the current one, which was moulded by the previous one.179  
The 13th century also saw the development of the terms used to present the developing 
concept of God’s omnipotence. One-time student of Paris, Stephen Langton (c.1150–
1228 AD)180 is noted for several achievements including dividing the scriptures into 
chapters and providing the first commentary on Lombard's Sentences. The background of 
Langton's situation proves that Eckhart was not the first occupying a high position within 
the Church to use the omnipotence debate at a time when there was intense scrutiny into 
the nature of papal power. Langton was a focal point in a dispute between Pope Innocent 
III and King John of England. Papal powers had reached what was to be their peak when 
Innocent nominated Langton for the see of Canterbury but John, aware of the power now 
being flexed across Europe by Innocent, resisted the appointment. Innocent responded 
with an interdict of 1208 AD that deprived John's subjects of taking part in the spiritual 
life of the Church. Earlier, in 1200 AD Innocent had used this weapon effectively against 
Philip Augustus of France. John was excommunicated and eventually the English 
monarch, like the French, was forced to succumb to papal power and in 1213 AD Langton 
was installed at Canterbury. Combining Church and political duties, Langton was one of 
the leading mediators in negotiations at Runnymede between the King and his barons to 
produce the Magna Carta of 1215 AD. His influence is reflected in the first clause of the 
Magna Carta stating that, ‘The English Church shall be free and shall have its rights 
undiminished and its liberties unimpaired.’181 The power of the Church was established 
                                                 
178 W.J. Courtenay, Capacity and Volition (1990), 68, see Bonaventure, Sentences I, d. 
41, a. 2, q. 2 (I, 739) and d. 44, a. 2, q. un. (I, 791). 
179 See T. Kim, “Ez wære allez éin lieht’ an Artist’s Advance’ in Advance’ in Jutta 
Vinzent and Chistopher M. Wojtulewicz (eds), Performing Bodies: Time and space in 
Meister Eckhart and Taery Kim, Eckhart: Texts and Studies, vol. 6 (Leuven, 2016), 31-
7. 
180 For background on Langton see A.M. Landgraf, Introduction à l’histoire de la 
littérature théologique de la scolastique naissante, A. Landry (ed.), L. Geiger trans. 
(Montreal, 1973), 167-72. 
181 Magna Carta, third revision issued 11th February 1225 AD, see appendix ii. 
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but not without resentment.  
Lawrence Moonan notes that in his commentary on the Sentences, Langton responds to 
the question of whether or not God can do everything by saying that 'Deus omnia potest,' 
is true if taken as a complete proposition. However, if it is taken as incomplete then it 
could be true or false depending on what is supplemented.182 If the infinitive agere, to act, 
is added then the proposition is false. However, by adding facere, to do or make, then this 
completes what may be a true proposition because God, in theory, is able to bring about 
anything. The difference seems to be made by the actual deed being done and so also 
there is an openness to the thought of a restriction to omnipotence. Treatment of the debate 
here shows the need for careful wording and the distinction between a proposition and a 
propositional function. The open propositional function, or expression gave scope for 
discussions of the nature increasingly prevalent in the growing universities. Langton’s 
comments here though represent an early contribution to the omnipotence debate by 
showing that to say that God can do everything, needs qualification.  
Langton also commented on the Genesis account when the angel told Lot that he could 
not do anything until Lot had reached Zoar.183 He considers Augustine's link between the 
power and the will of God, and points out that it is a matter of the justice of Lot rather 
than God.184 However if the justness of God is to be questioned, then he can only act 
within this justness. While God’s justness is not dependent on Lot, his action was bound 
by the arrangement made between Lot and the angel so the power for God to act is being 
connected with the rightness of God to act.  
A notable student of Langton was Godfrey, (also known as Geoffrey or Godefridus) of 
Poitiers whose major work was his Summa Theologiae, probably compiled between 1213 
                                                 
182 L. Moonan, Divine Power. The Medieval Power Distinction up to its Adoption by 
Albert, Bonaventure and Aquinas (Oxford, 1994), 54-5. Moonan summarises Langton in 
Der Sentenzenkommentar des Kardinals Stephan Langton, in Artur M. Landgraf (ed.), 
Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologied des Mittelalters, 37/1, 
distinction 42 (1952), 58-9, see appendix ii.  
183 Gen. 19: 22, see footnote 130.  
184 See L. Moonan, Divine Power, (1994), 55-6, summarising Der Sentenzenkommentar 
des Kardinals Stephan Langton, A.M. Landgraf (ed.), distinction 43 (1952), 60, see 
appendix ii.  
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and 1215 AD.185 This included a section on the different ways the noun ‘potentia’ might 
be understood and is summarised here because these Latin terms are helpful in seeing 
how the concept of omnipotence was evolving: 
1) Habilitas: The potential or ability to do something. Such as to walk 
although bound at the moment. 
2) Facultas: A resource as in, ‘I cannot give you silver or gold, but what I 
have I give you’. Acts 3:6. 
3) Facultas gratiae: An endowment of grace as in, ‘He gave them power to 
become sons of God’, John 1: 12, or ‘No one can come to me [unless the 
Father draws him]’. John 6:44. 
4) Dignitas preeminentie: A dignity of pre-eminence as in, ‘Let every soul 
be subject unto the higher powers [for there is no power but of God: the 
powers that be are ordained of God]’. Rom. 13:1. 
5) Dignitas officii: A dignity tied with office, as in any priest has the power 
to bind or loose. (Taken from Matt. 18:18).   
6) Debitum: What is due, as in potuit quidem de potentia set non de iustitia, 
(able to act in power but not in justice). 
7) Voluntas: The will to do something, as in ‘They could not believe (the 
prophet Isaiah), John 12:39. Or in ‘God is faithful, he will not let you be 
tempted [beyond what you can bear]. 1Cor. 10:13. 
8) Officium copule: The power to bind as in the power to believe. (Maybe 
from Mark 9:23-24). 
9)  Possibilitatem: To believe things are possible such as the being of Anti-
Christ.186   
                                                 
185 For background on Godfrey see R. Aubert, s.v., ‘Godefroy de Poitiers’ in Dictionnaire 
d’histoire et de géographie ecclésiastiques (Paris, 1912). 
186 See L. Moonan, Divine Power (1994), 59-60, summarising Godfrey of Poitiers, 
Summa Theologiae, MS Bruges Stadb. Cod. Lat. 220, fol. 35, cit. A.M. Landgraf, 
Dogmengeschicte, I/1 (1954), 245: ‘Nota, quod hoc nomen potentia multiplicter 
accipitur: Potentia est habilitas, que disponet hominem ad actum, que copulatur, cum 
dicitur: iste non potest gradi, demonstrato ligato. Facultas, cum dicitur: non possum tibi 
dare. Facultas gratie: dedit ei potestatem filios Dei fieri; nemo potest venire ad me. 
Dignitas preeminentie: ut: Omnia potestatibus subdita sint. Dignitas officii: ut quilibet 
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Godfrey presents a wide range of suggestions but elsewhere in his Summa, he also 
approached the question of power more narrowly by considering the nature of the power 
given to Christ and refers to power in its immensity as de potentia absoluta that is 
constrained to be appropriate as de potentia conditionali. 187 He seems to express concern 
that if any delegated power meant that Christ were not able to do everything then this 
would mean being limited and imply weakness and so delegated power is out of absolute 
power and of absolute power. Then there is the mention of ‘conditional power’ as a 
defined amount of power that might have been delegated to Christ in order to complete 
his earthly mission. Godfrey states that Christ could not receive conditional power 
because then, on Christ’s action as a man, people would be putting their trust in man. The 
idea of Neoplatonic flow and return is brought into consideration by mention that if man 
held power then his hope would be in man and so he would not return to his source.  
Clearly from New Testament texts, Jesus possessed miraculous powers, and this power 
came from God, and he delegated it to his disciples.188 The disciples could use the power 
of God to perform miracles but this was not absolute power. Although the nature of 
conditional power and the absolute power delegated to Christ are not clearly defined there 
                                                 
sacerdos habet potestatem ligandi atque solvendi. Debitum: potuit quidem de potentia, 
set non de iustitia. Voluntas: Non poterant credere Ysai; fidelis Deus, qui non patietur vos 
temptari etc. Quandoque tantum habet officium copule: ut: potest credere. Quandoque 
possibilitatem, ut cum dicitur: antichristus potest esse.’ I have added the Latin key term 
and text references to this re-wording of Moonan’s translation which does not include 
mention of the last two points that appear in Landgraf. 
187 See W.J. Courtenay, The Dialectic of Divine Omnipotence (1984), and L. Moonan, 
Divine Power (1994), 60-1 summarising Godfrey of Poitiers, Summa Theologiae, from 
MS Avranches, Bibliotèque de la ville, Cod. Lat. 121, fol. 137r, in A.M. Landgraf, 
Dogmengeschicte, II/2 (1954), 103, see appendix ii. 
188 Matt. 13:54: ‘et veniens in patriam suam docebat eos in synagogis eorum ita ut 
mirarentur et dicerent unde huic sapischabelentia haec et virtutes.’ Matt. 28:18-19: ‘et 
accedens Iesus locutus est eis dicens data est mihi omnis potestas in caelo et in terra, 
euntes ergo docete omnes gentes baptizantes eos in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus 
Sancti.’ Luke 9:1: ‘convocatis autem duodecim apostolis dedit illis virtutem et potestatem 
super omnia daemonia et ut languores curarent.’ John 13:3: ‘sciens quia omnia dedit ei 
Pater in manus et quia a Deo exivit et ad Deum vadit.’  
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is the notion of a distinction between the two with the ‘potentia conditionali’ being used 
to describe power from God that could possibly be less than absolute. The conditionali 
could relate to the idea of ordinata but the ambiguity of this reference to conditionali 
makes the link tenuous beyond acknowledging some aspect of power contained within 
the absoluta. Also innovative, and a reason why Godfrey is credited as the first to apply 
the power distinction in the way that became standard, is that this is an early occasion 
(not after 1219 AD) of using absoluta as an adjective modifying the divine power rather 
than just the adverbial absolute suggesting a distinction between what God is potentially 
able to do and what he wills to do.189  
Comparable with Godfrey in reflecting the theological thinking of this period is William 
of Auxerre190 who was a noted disputant at the University of Paris before being sent, along 
with Godfrey, by the King of France to Rome to argue his case. He was however more 
successful in promoting the cause of his University than the King by securing the bull of 
1231 AD which became the University’s charter. William has been credited with the first 
commentary on Lombard’s Sentences to incorporate questions from disputationes, 
reflecting his passion for the quodlibet sessions. He refers to an unknown group who are 
considering Augustine’s question of whether God had other means of salvation available 
and suggests that out of the pure power of God another manner was possible. However, 
it was necessary by the terms of the promise which had already been made, that the Son 
of God should suffer, and that the human race should be redeemed in this way.191 Mention 
here of the ‘pura potentia dei’, suggests this is an unrestricted power in contrast with 
power exercised by the choice of God for the means for salvation. Within this pure power 
there could be any manner of ways God could work salvation but he chose to do this in a 
specific way implying that the things that God does are limited because of who God is, 
although any limitation is self-imposed. This is distinction between what could be done 
                                                 
189 See G. van den Brink, Almighty God (1993), 72. 
190 For background on William see J. Ribailler, Summa Aurea (of William of Auxerre), 
Introduction Générale (Paris, 1980-7), 3-24.  
191 See William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea, (ed.) J. Ribailler, 3 (1986), 96. ‘quasi diceret 
Augustinus: si respiciamus ad puram potentiam dei, alius modus possibilis fuit deo, 
scilicet quantum ad puram potentiam dei; sed propter promissionem quae iam facta erat, 
necessarium erat. Filium Dei passarum, et sic redimendum genus humanum.’ Trans. here 
and following L. Moonan, Divine Power (1994), 63. 
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and what God chooses to do. 
William also engaged with the omnipotence debate by referring to another focal point 
brought by Augustine when using the de iustitia constraint from the account of Lot to 
explain why God could not damn Peter and save Judas. He modifies the treatment of 
Augustine as referred to above when he said there were many things de potentia which 
God cannot do de iustitia.192 
William’s responds: 
We say that God ‘de potentia pura considerata’ can damn Peter, with 
respect to the power of God and the natural power of Peter by which he 
was able to sin and not sin. But ‘therefore he can damn Peter’ does not 
follow, because this verb ‘potest’ in the conclusion has reference to 
merits.193 
The potentia pura considerata is the declaration that it is possible for God to do anything. 
The de iustitia limitation is found in habito respectu... merita because Peter could not 
possibly be damned because of the merit earned by his actions. Whether William’s 
portrayal of a merit system to gain salvation is acceptable, there is distinction between 
that which God is potentially able to do and what he is able to do based on choice which 
on this occasion is given as a matter of justice.  
Another example of the debate in William’s Summa also has its root in the thoughts of 
Augustine194 who, in his Commentary on John, presents the case of a servant to whom 
                                                 
192 See Augustine, Augustine, Contra Gaudentium Donatistarum Episcopum, Book 1, 30, 
35 (PL 43, 727; CSEL 53, 233), footnote 127. 
193 William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea, (ed.) J. Ribailler, 1 (1980), 212: ‘dicimus quod 
deus de potentia pura considerata potest damnare petrum habito respectu ad potentiam 
Petri naturalem qua potuit pecarre et non pecarre. Sed non sequitur: ergo potuit damnare 
petrum; quia hoc verbum ‘potest’ in conclusione respicit merita.’  
194 Augustine, In Johannem PL 35, col. 1417: ‘Et potuit hanc potestam servis dare, et 
noluit.’; Commentary on John 1:33, tr. V, 7, in P. Schaff (ed.), NPNF, First Series, vol. 7 
(1888): ‘But the Lord Jesus Christ could, if He wished, have given power to one of His 
servants to give a baptism of his own, as it were, in His stead, and have transferred from 
Himself the power of baptising, and assigned it to one of His servants, and have given the 
same power to the baptism transferred to the servant as it had when bestowed by the Lord. 
67 
 
Christ could have given the power to baptise but chose not to. So, in this case, notions of 
power, that were to become understood later through the terms potentia absoluta and 
potentia ordinata, can be seen in the action in which God has the power to choose. 
William lists three ways in which the power could not possibly be delegated: The 
‘potestas primae auctoritatis’ belongs to God alone, the ‘potestas invocationis’ because 
baptism could only be invoked by the name of Jesus and the ‘potestas ministerii’ as power 
would not be given just to a select group. These are followed by two ways in which Christ 
could have delegated power but was unwilling: The ‘potestas excellentiae’ because of the 
virtue of the servant although the idea of receiving our virtue is likely to lead to questions 
of the nature of the virtue and the one possessing it and secondly the ‘potestas 
cooperationis’ as a ministry of cooperation in activity with Christ.195  
The power of God according to justice or mercy is the same as power according to his 
will. God chooses to show justice and mercy according to his will196 and in this case God 
chooses who should receive the power to baptise. The cooperationis, iusta and 
misericordi potentia are given as examples of the restricted power of God. 
William uses the term potentia ordinata to express what Godfrey of Poitiers had called 
the potentia conditionali and these were generally used synonymously. However, whereas 
Godfrey spoke of the potestas absoluta, William did not add to the idea of potentia when 
describing God’s unlimited power in this discussion considering the nature of the power 
God might delegate to his servants in the Church and precisely who might receive such 
power. The potestas primae auctoritatis is solely God’s and God cannot even de potentia 
ordinata communicate this to human beings (as little as God can make a simple human 
being to be God), except to Christ.197 The gospel texts suggest Jesus was pleased to pass 
on the authority that had been given to him, certainly to his disciples, and so the purpose 
for this specific treatment points to the growing question of delegated powers arising in 
the historical context. The delegation of power was to remain an important issue in the 
                                                 
This He would not do, in order that the hope of the baptised might be in him by whom 
they acknowledged themselves to have been baptised.’  
195 L. Moonan, Divine Power (1994), 72-5, summarising William of Auxerre, Summa 
Aurea, (ed.) J. Ribailler, 4 tr. 5, ch. 2, qu. 2 (1985), 90-1. 
196 Rom. 9:18: ‘ergo cuius vult miseretur et quem vult indurat.’ 
197 See William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea, lib. 4, tr. 3, c. 3 (Paris, F. Regnault [1500], 
fol. 9v-10v f.), A.M. Landgraf, Dogmengeschichte, III/1 (1954), 205. 
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power distinction through to the time of Eckhart.  
William, along with Godfrey and Stephen Langton represent the connection between 
scholasticism with the emerging University in Paris and the growing mendicant orders, 
who led the push for Paris to become the key seat and cutting edge for the development 
of theology at the University and in the Church. The terms absoluta and ordinata were 
now part of scholastic thinking although it is less certain just when these two were first 
used precisely to present the omnipotence debate that would become such a major feature 
in future debates.  
 
The developing university 
 
The University of Paris emerged from the Cathedral Schools which had grown during the 
12th century as scholars joined together to form guilds in order to gain rights, legal 
standing and privileges.198 At this stage, there was just a developing institute of learning 
or studium generale, as the term universitas was used more generally for any corporate 
body with legal rights. With institutional growth came the need for leadership capable of 
appreciating the need for diplomacy as well as academic progress within ecclesiastical 
requirements. Initially the Church appointed a chancellor who licensed masters to teach, 
a process traceable in Paris from about 1170 AD, and these masters led the Studium 
Generale in Paris to become an internationally recognised centre for the arts and theology 
by the early 13th century. The masters were the most learned of scholars and above that 
the ‘regent’ held the position of chair in a particular establishment which was a rare and 
greatly honoured position.  
Three key events moulded the character of the university in Paris as it began to take shape 
as an institution and the roles for teaching, learning and administration were established. 
Firstly, as Wei records, ‘the crisis of 1200 AD began when a German student sent a 
servant to buy wine and the innkeeper tried to overcharge him. The student and some of 
his friends assaulted the innkeeper and trashed the inn. The innkeeper went to the royal 
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provost of Paris, who led an attack on the hostel in which a number of German students 
were residing. Several students were killed. The Paris masters immediately went on 
strike, suspending all lectures and threatening to leave unless the king punished the 
provost and his men.’199 The king imprisoned the provost and his men for life and issued 
a charter protecting the rights of students and recognising masters and students as a 
distinct group with a special status in relation to the people of Paris. Secondly, following 
this recognition from the king, statutes shaping university life, are known to have been 
issued although now lost, following a bull sent by Pope Innocent III around 1208 AD, but 
primarily by Robert of Courson as a papal legate in 1215 AD. As well as providing papal 
recognition to the regulations for staff and students that helped to identify the institution, 
relations between the university, chancellor and townspeople were also articulated along 
with sanctions for any transgressions.  
The third set of defining events of this period began in 1229 AD and involved student 
disturbances and a staff strike, in what became known as the événements. Rashdall records 
the killing of student protesters by what he describes as the savage police of a savage city. 
The account reads, ‘The soldiers fell upon the offenders... a party of perfectly innocent 
students... and several of them were killed.’200 A stand-off between the chancellor, Philip, 
and masters who felt unprotected led to an exodus of masters. On this occasion the 
chancellor was aligned with the authorities of the city and the Church, but the papal bull, 
Parens Scientiarum, of 1231 AD, established the university as a place with legal status 
and legislation repositioning the chancellor within the auspices of the university rather 
than the Church or legal system. The newly stated aim of the university was to serve the 
Church by transforming the men who studied there into worthy preachers201 and so, with 
papal and royal privileges, this freedom to pursue academic study led to the return of 
masters and growth of the university.  
During these formative years the Church remained strongly influential, and while the 
secular priest-professors would use their sometimes quite considerable income from ‘sine 
curae’ ecclesiastical positions for their own profit, often for private luxury, the money of 
                                                 
199 I.P. Wei, Intellectual Culture (2012), 92.   
200 H. Rashdall, The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages (1936), 334-6.   
201 See I.P. Wei, Intellectual Culture (2012), 104-6. Wei shows how the opening passages 
of the bull draw from Gregory the Great’s treatment of Job in Moralia in Job libri XI-
XXII, M. Adriaen (ed.), CChr.SL 143A (1979).  
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the mendicant orders was channelled directly into their studies, which meant they 
increasingly both provided the better resources and filled the more prestigious positions. 
At first this would seem detrimental to academic progress with monastic credentials 
coming ahead of educational ones. In practice, however, the friars got on with the task of 
progressing the university along the same track as the secular theologians, but with their 
added experience of teaching theological matters, along with papal clout and mendicant 
finance to support the cause.  
The turbulent times of the événements had shown the need to structure the learning 
environment and, while these appointments were certainly political as well as theological, 
they also marked a new scholarly emphasis. Whereas secular priests retained their priestly 
duties, friars from mendicant orders could devote themselves to learning, although the 
chair obviously needed to engage with university, Church and court business. The 
university re-emerged as the key centre for learning and the Dominicans and Franciscans 
were keen to procure magisterial chairs to mark this as a prestigious seat of learning. The 
conferring of a license to Roland of Cremona (1178-1259 AD), by Philip in 1229 AD, to 
become the first Dominican teaching master marks the entry of mendicant orders to key 
offices within the university.202  
The influences around the Paris University in this first half of the 13th century are reflected 
in significant developments brought to the power distinction by Philip the Chancellor, 
Hugh of St Cher and Alexander of Hales who held various positions in the emerging 
institution. Philip an administrator and theologian, represents the gathering momentum 
of the institution as a centre for education, embracing wider influences such as Arabic 
philosophy. Hugh, a lawyer and theologian, reflects the growing legal status of the 
university and development of canon law following the Concordia discordantium 
canonum, which became known as the Decretum Gratiani from about 1140 AD produced 
in Bologna. Alexander, as a diplomat, dealt with issues between the Church, state and 
university, and as a theologian considered ways of expanding the distinction by 
considering the nature of the potentia absoluta. 
Philip (c.1160-1236 AD), was the illegitimate son of a priest and archdeacon of Paris and 
was appointed to the office of Chancellor of the Cathedral of Notre Dame and thereby the 
                                                 
202 See L. Moonan, Divine Power (1994), 77. 
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University of Paris in 1217 AD.203 He would have been responsible for the material 
property of the diocese as well as ensuring the theology faculty was upholding Church 
tradition on behalf of the bishop. Initially an ecclesiastical appointment, he remarkably 
retained office while the university grew as an educational establishment, although this 
could be due to his shrewdness in manoeuvring between political camps. He initially 
opposed the appointment of William of Auvergne as Bishop of Paris and yet later gained 
William’s favour in his developing role at the university, probably by being instrumental 
in the introduction of friars. Philip was well respected in his day as evidenced by Callus 
who noted that several Franciscans copied his work including Alexander of Hales, though 
it should be mentioned that he also copied extensively from Alexander and others.204 
Callus concludes, ‘Perhaps no other work of the first half of the 13th century exercised 
such a wide influence upon the theologians of the time as the Summa de Bono of Philip 
the Chancellor.’205  
Like Meister Eckhart later, he spoke about the power of God from a familiarity with 
holding power, the delegation of power and the accompanied power struggles over 
ecclesiastical and legal matters. Also, as Eckhart would do later, Philip spoke into the 
power distinction by calling on the work of Avicenna whose works had been translated 
into Latin in the 12th in century. Avicenna (Ibn Sina, c.980–1037 AD),206 had proposed 
that just because something has essence, it does not necessarily mean it has existence. 
Eckhart cites Avicenna in his Commentary on Exodus, when explaining why God is the 
only one whose essence is identical with his existence.207 The logical sequence begins 
with the proposition that if something is non-contradictory, such as a square circle would 
be, then it is possible, (in essence). Secondly, something that is possible must be 
contingent on a set of circumstances in order to exist. This means the essence of 
                                                 
203 For background on Philip see N. Wicki (ed.), ‘Philippi Cancellarii Parisiensis 
“Summa de bono”, ad fidem codicum primum’, 2 vols. (Berne, 1985), intro. 
204 W.H. Principe, Philip the Chancellor’s Theology of the Hypostatic Union (1975), 21. 
205 D.A. Callus, ‘Philip the Chancellor and the De anima ascribed to Robert Grosseteste’, 
Med. Ren. Stud. I (1941-3), 105-27, 125. 
206 For background on Avicenna see L.E. Goodman, Avicenna (London and New York, 
1992), 1-48. Also for Avicenna on essence, necessity and possibility see S. van Riet (ed.), 
Avicenna Latinus I (Louvain, 1977), 43-55. 
207 See Eckhart, In Ex. n. 15 (LW II 21, 4-6). 
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something is possible without existence. For anything to exist there needs to be a 
necessary existent and this was what Avicenna regarded as the proof for the existence of 
God. The only necessary existence is God and everything else has essence, which is 
neutral, and in order to exist, must see a cause or chain of causes. Avicenna said any 
infinite regress of contingent causes would not lead back to God, but because there needed 
to be something existing in the first place to set off the chain, this must be God.  
Included in Question eight of Philip’s Summa de bono is a discussion on, ‘whether the 
propositional objects of faith have to be necessary, or may be contingent?’208 This is 
considered by looking at the proposition of Christ becoming incarnate as a response to 
the discussion raised initially by Augustine, and later by William of Auxerre, on whether 
the incarnation of Christ was the only manner possible for our salvation. Philip, adopting 
the model of Avicenna, distinguishes between the natures of propositions in that simple 
propositions are true only when they become true, whereas necessary propositions are 
inexorably going to become true. The proposition that Christ will become incarnate could 
be considered firstly in its intrinsic content (essence) and secondly, in relation to some 
power such that it will happen. The difference he sets, therefore, is the one between 
contingent or ‘simpliciter’ propositions which are conditional, whereas necessary or 
‘ordinata’ propositions are unconditionally true. While contingency is usually linked to 
the subject of an event, in the case of Christ becoming incarnate, the subject is God who 
cannot be contingent, then the event cannot be contingent either. Philip adds that he does 
not simply speak about God’s ordination of future events which could or could not 
happen, because if God ordains something then it is necessary. The notion that there is a 
way to perceive the action of God as potential action, whether or not it is actualised is 
apparent, even if, for Philip, there is effectively no difference. Without the later 
formulation of the power distinction, Philip has applied Avicennian logic to determine an 
issue raised by Augustine in a manner that would become a key means for Thomas, using 
the same background issue, to employ the power distinction in the recognisable format of 
the later 13th century.   
The influence of Avicenna was continued by Roland of Cremona who is also noted for 
his adoption of Aristotle to whom he attributed the Liber de Causis he used frequently. 
Roland was succeeded as Chair of Theology by Hugh of St. Cher (1200–1263 AD), 
                                                 
208 Philip the Chancellor, Summa de bono, q.8, (ed.) N. Wicki (1985), 613-4, summarised 
by L. Moonan, Divine Power (1994), 80-6. 
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although it has been suggested that this appointment was set up by the Dominicans in 
order to retain the associated power and prestige. Hugh was a pupil of Roland although 
literary comparisons show that, in some respects, Hugh was the senior. His background 
in law and expertise in the Sentences were good preparation to become the first 
Dominican to be created cardinal.  
Like William of Auxerre, Hugh integrated discussions on disputed questions into his 
major work of commentary on the Sentences. From this commentary his contribution to 
the power debate once more comes through Judas and Peter. He states, in reply:  
To the third [objection] we say that the power of God is twofold, that 
is, is asserted in two ways, as absolute and conditioned. Absolute power 
(potentia absoluta) is that very power considered in itself. By this 
power, [God] has in himself power over all things, even to damn Peter 
and save Judas, etc. Conditioned power (potentia conditionata) of this 
sort is asserted such that it is in respect of the condition or law which 
God in his goodness has laid upon things. While these remain in force, 
God cannot do the contrary and he would be doing that if he were to 
damn Peter and save Judas, because the truth and justice of God 
demands that Peter should have eternal life, and Judas eternal 
punishment. For this is the law given by God, that he should reward the 
good and punish the wicked. This ‘conditioned power’ the Glossa on 
Gen. 19 concerning Lot, calls ‘justice’.209   
From this text, God has absolute power to cover all possibilities, however, similar to 
                                                 
209 Hugh of St. Cher, I Sentences, d. 42, q. 1, in E. Randi (ed.), Potentia dei conditionata: 
Una questione di Ugo di saint Cher sull’omnipotenza divina (1984), 534: ‘ad tertium 
dicimus quod duplex est potentia dei, idest dupliciter dicitur, absoluta et conditionata. 
Absoluta potentia est ipsa in se considerata: hac potest in se omnia, et Petrum damnare 
et Iudam salvare etc. Huiusmodi potentia conditionata dicitur in quantum respicit 
conditionem vel legem quam deus sua bonitate rebus indidit: qua menente, non potest 
deus facere contrarium; quod faceret si damneret Petrum et salvaret Iudam, quia veritas 
et iustitia dei exigit ut petrus habeat vitam aeternam et Iudam poenam aeternam. Haec 
enim est lex data a deo ut bonos remunerat et malos puniat. Hanc potentiam 
conditionatam vocat Glossa super Gen. XIX “iustitiam”, ubi agitur de Loth.’ Trans. L. 
Moonan, Divine Power (1994), 117.    
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Philip, Hugh reduces the notion of absolute power to an abstract and hypothetical self-
contradictory possibility, which by the nature or essence of the divine power is eo ipso 
never to be realised. This declaration that there are two aspects of God’s power, namely, 
absolute and conditioned, is unambiguous in its reference to the power distinction. The 
passage, teeming with the language of a trained lawyer, asserts that the power God 
determines is the potentia conditionata and, expressed in this way, it is as if God is legally 
bound to act according to it. Eternal salvation or punishment is executed according to 
divine judgment set out in the statutes of God (lex data). The use of veritas should be 
taken as the faithfulness of God, as in Ps. 117:2,210 who is acting true to his principles 
rather than making moral judgement. When recalling another case continually recurring 
in the debate, Hugh proposes that the potentia conditionata is what is called justice in the 
Genesis account of Lot fleeing judgment on Sodom. To Hugh then, the potentia 
conditionata equates to the potentia iustitia. The actions of God, that are conditioned or 
determined by the will of God, could not be contrary to the nature of God. Therefore, 
when considering the actions of man, it would not be within the truth and justice of God, 
to damn Peter and save Judas.  
Hugh also visited the power distinction when discussing the issue of delegated powers 
broached earlier by Godfrey of Poitiers and William of Auxerre, asking whether power, 
potestatem cooperationis, could be delegated by God out of ordained or absolute power 
in the context of baptism: 
It should be distinguished, however, that there are two aspects to the 
power of God, the absolute and the ordained. Of absolute power, God 
could give, and still has, power to give mere man the power of 
cooperation. On ordained power he cannot, which means not without 
changing the order of things. For the absolute and ordained power of 
God are altogether the same. But ordained power is in respect of the 
order of things introduced by God. Even more, those who say that God 
could not give power to mere man, understand the aforesaid power as 
                                                 




ordained power of God, and the Master [Peter Lombard] understands 
[it to be] as absolute [power], and so there is no conflict [of idea].211 
According to this passage, God always was, and still is, able to give man the power of 
cooperation through his absolute power although not through his ordained power. If the 
ordinata is exactly the same as the absoluta then this might appear to be a contradiction, 
and so Hugh explains this is a matter of how the two aspects of the one power of God are 
to be understood. The argument presupposes, of course, that absolute power is understood 
as power with regards even to the possibility of self-contradiction (saving Judas and 
condemning Peter), while God’s real power, the power of creation and salvation, is his 
‘ordained’ power. The aspect of ordained power is the one which envisages the world as 
it has been ordained and created by God, while the absolute power is reduced to what 
would have been possible for God to create, but in fact would go against God’s own 
nature. As seen earlier, in distinction 43 Lombard held that God has the potential to do 
things extra to his ordained will. In this case, God can communicate his power to his 
creatures and this includes the power to baptise for the forgiveness of sins as Lombard 
says: 
 the Lord is said to sanctify by invisible grace, and the servant by the 
visible sacrament.212  
The Lord is the author of power, and the human servant is the minister of this created 
power. Lombard does not involve the power distinction in the text although he does quote 
Augustine to point out that the Lord does not transfer the full extent of his power to the 
servant baptising so that the one being baptised recognises this baptism is being done by 
                                                 
211 Hugh of St. Cher, In IV Sentences (Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, Cold. Lat. 573, 
fol. 223r): ‘Distingui tamen debet, quod duplex est potentia Dei, absoluta et ordinata. De 
absoluta potentia potuit Deus et potest adhuc dare puro homini potestatem cooperationis. 
De potestate ordinata non potest, id est non mutato ordine rerum. Idem enim omnino est 
potentia absoluta Dei et ordinata. Sed potentia ordinata respicit ordinem rebus a Deo 
inditum. Forte illi, qui dicunt, quod Deus non potuit dare potentiam puro homini, 
predictam potestatem intelligunt de potentia Dei ordinata et magister intelligit de 
absoluta et sic nulla est contrarietas’; see A.M. Landgraf, Dogmengeschichte, III/1 
(1954), 206-7. Trans. L. Moonan, Divine Power (1994), 127-8. 
212 Lombard, IV Sent., d. 5, c. 3(35).       
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a fellow servant only, while the power remains Christ’s own.213 It is Hugh’s interpretation 
then, which is proposing that Lombard is portioning this action to the potentia absoluta.  
Hugh maintains that, God cannot communicate his ordained power, because mere men 
could interfere with the order of things, and so, for an event to be impossible out of 
ordained power yet possible out of absolute power does not involve a contradiction. 
Hugh’s interpretation allows him to see no contradiction between Lombard and earlier 
scholars, such as Dominican, Guerric of St. Quintino who said that God could not delegate 
his own power, de potestate ordinata, but could do so, de potestate absoluta.214  
The idea of God giving the power of cooperation is being vented, and the key terms 
subsequently used to formulate the power distinction are adopted here, although only in 
the realm of possibility and on this occasion God shows his exclusivity by not sharing his 
ordained power. Hugh could well be drawing on Lombard and indeed the others 
mentioned to add weight to the developing issue within Church politics of the need to 
explain how power is delegated by God.  
Alongside Philip and Hugh from this period of widespread changes to the academic, 
ecclesiastical, legal and social climate, consideration needs to be made of Alexander of 
Hales, (now Halesowen), who was the first Franciscan to hold the position of Chair of 
Theology in Paris.215 One time Canon of St Pauls and Archdeacon of Coventry, Alexander 
(c.1180-1245 AD) studied and taught in Paris before the événements and on his return to 
the university in 1236 AD. Before that he had worked as a negotiator on behalf of the 
University with the pope and also on behalf of the king of England with the court of 
France. Alexander comments on whether God could be incarnated again: 
Let it be noted that God can do all things which, to be able to do, does 
not come down to either not being able (non posse) or not being seemly 
(non decere). So although [God] could (posset) take flesh, in so far as 
his absolute power is concerned (quoad potentiam absolutam), he could 
                                                 
213 Lombard, IV Sent., d. 5, c. 2(34), 2 (2007-10), see Augustine, In Ioannem, tr. 5, n. 7. 
214 See W.J. Courtenay, Capacity and Volition (1990), 73, For Guerric see Paris, Bibl. 
Nat., lat. 15603, fol. 11r: ‘Potestate absoluta potuit dare, sed non potestate ordinata, quae 
respicit ordinem rerum.’ Cited from Landgraf, Dogmengeschichte, III (1954), 1, 207.   
215 For background on Alexander see Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri 
Lombardi, vol. I (Quaracchi, 1951), intro. 
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not in so far as his seemly power is concerned (quoad potentiam 
decentem).216  
With Lombard’s distinction 44 in mind, the main point in this quote here is the 
‘potentiality’ of whether God could or could not incarnate himself again. Alexander states 
that God can do everything except what he is unable to do or what is not decent for him 
to do. Of course, it would have been possible for him to take on flesh again, but it would 
have been indecent. Looked at from the perspective of absolute power, a second 
incarnation would be something possible, but with regards to decency would be 
impossible, hence decency, or being fitting, is linked to God’s ordained power. In dealing 
with whether God is always able to do what he once did, Alexander explains that although 
this is possible de potentia absoluta, it would not be de potentia ordinata. Decentem is 
used in contrast with absolutam to present a self-imposed restriction based on doing what 
is appropriate for God to do. Whether able or not, there are things that would not be fitting 
for God to do. The use of posse and decere is significant because they are expressed by 
Eckhart to introduce the power distinction in Question six. Elsewhere, in his Summa, 
which is more of a Franciscan compilation than a personal volume, when contemplating 
the absolute power of God, ‘Alexander’ states: 
If the power of God is conceived by the soul absolute, the soul will not 
be able to determine the question, or take in the boundless ocean of his 
power. But when the soul considers divine power as ordained with the 
condition of power, of truth, of goodness, I say: what is possible to God 
is that sort of ‘capability’ which is a power to do things; and he is not 
‘capable’ in that sort of ‘capability’ which is a potentiality for having 
things done to its possessor.217 
                                                 
216 Alexander of Hales, Glossa, I, d. 44 (1951), I, 448: ‘Ad notitiam eorum quae hic 
dicuntur, notandum quod omnia potest Deus quae posse non est “non posse” vel “non 
decere”. Licet ergo posset incarnari quoad potentiam absolutam, non tamen quoad 
potentiam decentem.’ Trans. L. Moonan, Divine Power (1994), 130.  
217 Alexander of Hales, Summa Halensis, Pt. 1, inq. 1, tr. 4, q. 3, m. 3, c. 4 (1924), I, 236: 
‘Si potential Dei concipiatur ab anima absolute, non poterit anima determinare nec 
capere infinitum pelagus suae potestatis. Sed cum anima speculatur divinam potentiam 
ut ordinatam secundum conditionem potestatis, veritatis, bonitatis, dico quod possibile 
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This is not just about the soul not being able to grasp the boundless ocean of God, his 
nature and power but that that in our minds there is an infinity of things such that we can 
never say that we have thought of all the things that God can do. In other words, even to 
human understanding there is an absolute power of God that we can only perceive as 
limitless. When the human mind contemplates the ordained acts of God, then these are 
conditioned by power, truth and goodness and so the human mind can see less than the 
full capacity of what God is capable of doing. The reduction in potentiality on this 
occasion is due to human limitation as this example of a power distinction is not so much 
about the power of God but our conception of God’s power. Also in his Summa Alexander 
compares divine power with the divine will: 
When divine power is compared simply (absoluta) to will, power 
includes more than does the divine will; when looked at from the 
standpoint of potentia ordinata, in which ordination is understood as 
pre-ordination, then divine power and will are co-extensive.218 
This text states that there are more things that could possibly be done through absolute 
power than the things that are ordained to be done. The difference can only be viewed 
from the angle of possibility and not the perspective of the ordained will of God from 
which point the two are effectively equal. Later in the same passage Alexander adds 
further explanation to how the absoluta includes things that are not ordained:   
The potentia absoluta... is distinguished from the potentia ordinata. 
For absolute power extends to those things concerning which there is 
no divine pre-ordinance; but ordained power extends to those things 
concerning which there is a divine pre-ordinance, that is, to those things 
which are pre-ordained or disposed by God.219   
                                                 
Deo est quod posse potentiae est et non potest quod est impotentiae.’ Trans L. Moonan, 
Divine Power (1994), 141.   
218 Alexander of Hales, Summa Halensis, Pt. I, inq. 1, tr. 4, q. 1, m. 2, c. 2 (1924), I, 207: 
‘Tamen comparando absolute potentiam voluntati, sic potentia in plus est quam voluntas; 
secundum vero quod intelligentur potentia ordinata, quae quidem ordinatio intelligitur 
in ratione praeordinationis, coaequantur potentia et voluntas.’ Trans. W.J. Courtenay, 
Capacity and Volition (1990), 73. 
219 Alexander of Hales, Summa Halensis, Pt. I, inq. 1, tr. 4, q. 1, m. 4 (1924), I, 135: 
‘Distinguitur ergo potentia absoluta [a] potentia ordinata. Potentia absoluta est eorum 
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The ordinata is explained in contrast to the absoluta by the positive assumption of 
everything that was pre-ordained by God, and therefore existed due to God’s will, while 
absoluta reflects the infinite excess of what was in fact realised or would be realised. This 
is not the realm of any possibility, but the addition of the things God has chosen not to 
do, to the things he has chosen, i.e. ordained, to do. This excess did not include miraculous 
events as these were seen as part of what God had pre-ordained and were not regarded as 
belonging to potentia absoluta, but to potentia ordinata.220 While God is temporarily 
suspending his own laws to act in a miraculous manner, this is not outside of his will and 
therefore within the ordinata. The apophatic leaning of Alexander can be seen in this idea 
that everything that God does is pre-ordained while the absoluta contains the things that 
God chooses not to do, and so does not do.  
Alexander presented the power distinction in diverse ways, using several classic scenarios 
and by considering the absoluta as beyond the possibilities known, there is a bridge to 
later 13th century ideas, yet although his ideas were continued among Franciscan 
followers, it was the Dominicans who championed this debate in future years. By the 
middle of the 13th century two different versions of the distinction were formed which 
differentiated between the two formulated ideas of absolute and ordained power. The 
older one, preserved predominantly by Dominicans, maintained the potentia absoluta 
encompassed everything, every possibility and every realisation, viz. the potentia 
ordinata. The other, as represented by the Summa Halensis, identified potentia absoluta 
with those possibilities that God did not choose, even if he could have chosen them, hence 
excluding the potentia ordinata. And, for our comparison with Eckhart, even more 
important, as stated by Courtenay neither Franciscans nor Dominicans, by this time, ever 
intended to see in the potentia absoluta ‘a description of some form of divine action. God 
never acts – and can never act – in an absolute way, since the discussion of power, viewed 
absolutely, leaves aside the entire question of divine volition and action… (Whether the 
potentia absoluta represents unrealised possibilities or includes both realised and 
unrealised possibilities), all theologians recognised that potentia absoluta was not a form 
                                                 
quorum non est divina praeordinatio; potentia vero ordinata est eorum quorum est divina 
praeordinatio, hoc est eorum quae a Deo sunt praeordinata sive disposita.’ Trans. L. 
Moonan, Divine Power (1994), 138. 
220 See W.J. Courtenay, Capacity and Volition (1990), 73; Alexander of Hales, Summa 
Halensis, Pt. I, inq. 1, tr. 4, q. 1, m. 4 (1924), I, 228. 
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of divine action in any sense.’221 It was the later theological and philosophical ideas of 
the 13th century that can be seen in the thoughts on absolute power of Meister Eckhart, 
who must also have been acutely aware of the changing attitudes towards ecclesiastical, 
and in particular, papal power.  
 
Adapting to philosophical developments 
 
The establishing of European universities and a period of relative stability in Paris, saw 
the arrival of the translation, and increasing profile being given to the works of Aristotle 
(384–322 BC), as well as the introduction of Avicenna (above) and Averroës (Ibn Rushd, 
1126–1198 AD). This meant Christian scholars had to consider the degree to which 
Graeco-Arabic thinking should be embraced as it infiltrated the academic curriculum. The 
continued movement towards apophaticism and abstract ideas also led towards an open 
door to search for new definitions for the potential power of God. The almighty hand of 
God, active in defeating all enemies throughout the Jewish scriptures had met with 
philosophical ideas in the Church cloister and council and now, as more ideas were 
becoming prominent, the ideological battleground for contention became the emerging 
university. As the potential to explore theology had grown in Paris and other early 
universities, the power distinction had become a means to express possibilities beyond 
the ones that could be realised. Instead of restricting God to being able to do simply that 
which he does, the sphere of possibilities could extend beyond limits suggested by 
necessitarianism. The potentia absoluta was generally understood to be the power of God 
to perform all the possible actions as long as these acts could possibly happen. The 
potentia ordinata referred to the power that God had bound himself to exercise by his 
own choice. Francis Oakley stylishly summarises this stage of the power distinction 
saying, ‘the stress, therefore, lies on the realm of the ordained power, which evokes the 
stable, concrete arrangements that the good God, who never acts in a disorderly or 
arbitrary fashion, has pre-ordained in his creation, has actually chosen to effect, and that 
we humans can, therefore safely rely upon. At the same time, the absolute power remains, 
as it were, on dialectical standby, a matter of abstract possibility periodically evoked to 
underline the contingency of creation, the world’s dependence, that is, on the 
untrammelled decision of the divine will, the fact that it does not have either to be what 
                                                 
221 W.J. Courtenay, Capacity and Volition (1990), 74, 77. 
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it is or even to be at all.’222 In order to consider the development of this philosophical 
theology towards the end of the 13th century, especially in Paris, it is helpful to focus on 
Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas as significant predecessors and influences on 
Meister Eckhart.  
Weisheipl records that, ‘not only was Albert (c.1200–1280 AD), the only man of the High 
Middle ages to be called “the Great”, but this title was used even before his death.’223 
After studying and lecturing in Cologne he was sent to Paris where he lectured on the 
Sentences and the Dionysian corpus, and became Chair of Theology before returning to 
Cologne to open the new Studium Generale. Also like Eckhart, he acted as a provincial 
prior serving the Dominicans in various places including Erfurt and Strasbourg. There is 
no record of the two meeting but their distinguished, related career paths, albeit only the 
latter years of Albert coinciding with the early ones of Eckhart, mean an interesting 
encounter could have happened.  
Albert wrote conscientiously about many topics and is highly regarded as a philosopher 
and scientist, but in his theology one recurring theme relevant to this discussion, because 
it is reiterated by Eckhart, who was clearly influenced by Albert,224 is the use of apophatic 
terms to describe the boundlessness of God. Albert wrote:    
God is not bounded by boundaries, because he is simple; neither is his 
being contained in something else, but he is pure actuality, free of all 
potentiality, not the sort of thing which can be received in something 
else in respect of his being.225 
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225 Albert, In Dion. De divinis nominibus, ch. 13, par. 27: ‘Deus autem neque terminis 




There is no bound closing off the whole thing which is God. 226  
These statements from his Companion to Pseudo-Dionysius and Sentences Commentary 
not only link forward to Meister Eckhart but could also be considered as a mediaeval 
connection back to Patristic times with the containing idea of the kratera and yet 
overflowing of its contents. Marking this thirteenth century development in the power 
distinction debate, Albert’s synthesis of philosophy with theology is evidenced in the way 
he considers the unlimitedness of power, which should be seen in two ways; either in 
relation to itself, in se, or to what it does in relation to a specified work, in relatione ad 
opus. In itself, it is considered true that power is before knowledge and will, but in relation 
to work, knowledge directs and power executes, and so this power operates after 
knowledge and will.227 Power in itself is before any constraints, but when it is actualised, 
then it is under the constraints involved in the action, given in this text as knowledge and 
will. This logic of ‘in relatione ad opus’ is used by Albert to present why God could damn 
Peter and save Judas but does not out of ordained wisdom.228 In terms of the power 
involved, as power itself, there is sufficient for God to save Judas, but this power becomes 
subject to the constraint of wisdom should the action take place and so because this action 
is unwise, this power is not actualised. The specified means of wisdom is the constraint 
on power in itself as just abstract potential. Here Albert relates the power distinction 
between the intrinsic concept of power, or potentiality, in se and realised power, in 
                                                 
actus purus, absolutus ab omni potentia, non receptus in aliquo secundum esse suum.’ 
Trans L. Moonan, Divine Power (1994), 156. 
226 Albert, I Sentences, d. 1, art.15, ad. 9, (ed.) Borgnet, 25: 36: ‘Licet non sit terminus 
claudens totum quod est Deus.’ Trans here and following L. Moonan, Divine Power 
(1994). 
227 Albert, In I Sentences, d. 35B, art. 3, ad. 4, 5, (ed.) Borgnet, 26: 183-184: ‘Ad id quod 
ulterius objicitur de ordine exsecutionis, dicendum quod ista quia quae hic tangit 
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ut dirigens, et potentia ut exsequens: et sic potentia est operans post scientiam et 
voluntatem.’ Summarised by L. Moonan, Divine Power (1994), 161.   
228 Albert, In I Sentences, d. 43C, art. 3, (ed.) Borgnet, 26: 381b: ‘Dicendum quod potest 
quidem de potentia absoluta, sed non de potentia relata ad ordinem sapientiae.  
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relatione ad opus, but in his comments on distinction 42, the power distinction is formed 
by considering whatever is possible alongside the actualised possibilities: 
It must be said, however, that power should be considered in three 
modes. The first mode is the genus of all of the powers of any form, 
and so it does not act, (but it follows…the sed sequitur in the text is a 
mistake in this sentence), as knowledge and will follow any other 
power, as genus to species, and in this way power precedes will and 
knowledge.  
In another mode it is said that we can compare power according to 
indefinite work and in this way we say of God that there are many 
things out of the potentia absoluta that he neither does nor will do.  
The third mode, it is said, means power that is regulated by an operative 
skill, and executes something preconceived by wisdom, and something 
willed by a will, and it is only these things which will be done or have 
been done, or are.229  
Albert initially presents three modes of power, but the first presents the overall genus of 
power which is not related to any action and so should rather be thought of as potentiality. 
This genus precedes the species of knowledge and will, and so the sed sequitur in the text, 
implying the reverse order, must be an error. This passage like the one above from 
distinction 35 presents how God acts according to his nature. When potentiality is being 
considered it is before knowledge, will and wisdom but these aspects are involved in any 
movement to act and so they come before actualised power.   
                                                 
229 Albert, In I Sentences, d. 42A, art. 5, sol., (ed.) Borgnet, 26: 362a: ‘Dicendum autem, 
quod potentia consideratur tribus modis. Uno modo prout est genus omnium potestatum 
quocunque modo dictarum, et sic non est ad actum, sed sequitur, ad scientiam et 
voluntatem et quamlibet aliam potestatem, ut genus ad speciem: et hoc modo praecedit 
potentia voluntatem, et scientiam … Alio modo dicitur potentia comparata ad opus 
indefinite: et hoc modo dicimus, quod Deus multa potest de potentia absoluta, quae nec 
facit, nec faciet. Tertio modo dicitur potentia regulata ab arte operative, et exequens 
praeconceptum a sapientia et volitum a voluntate: et haec non est nisi eorum quae fient, 




The second mode considers this potentiality as related to action in general. The ‘potentia 
comparata ad opus indefinite’ is defined as the power to do a particular thing, even though 
whatever it is, it may never be actually done, and so the intrinsic potential exists 
indifferent of any extrinsic execution leaving no restriction except the requirement of the 
act to be possible. This mode describes absolute power in its intrinsic nature of the 
potential to act, prior and regardless of the action, and so can be identified with 
Avicennian essence.  
Mode three is power for specific action, described elsewhere as the ordinata. This 
‘potentia regulate ab arte operative’ is the power to do, ‘things which will be done, or 
have been done, or are’. This is the power to perform the acts that are possible and these 
are the actions that are realised and therefore follow wisdom and will, and describe 
actuality rather than just potentiality. This example of the power distinction, without the 
use of terms absoluta or ordinata, is presented by the difference between whether power 
is related to action in general or to specific actions. Added to these is the notion of 
potentiality as a non-ontological idea unrelated to action. 
Continuing on to the next article in the same distinction, Albert adds limiting conditions 
for an action to be possible for God. Although God as the agent of an action has the 
potentiality to act, because any action is subject to the object of that action then the action 
is thereby constrained by the object:  
God can do many things ‘de potentia’ which, however, cannot be done 
‘in creaturis’, from opposition and confusion’s preventing this: 
opposition as in opposites; confusion as in unions of forms different in 
species, as in the same thing being a man and an ass, and the like.230 
The context of this is a question of whether God could do the impossible and so, Albert 
is expanding on, and distinguishing between the things that are possible for God to do 
and those that could actually be done. Many things that God could do are not done because 
of created things which limit the actions of God through opposition and confusion. 
Although not a problem for God, in creation such things as contradictory events 
happening simultaneously count as an opposite and so could not happen. For example: 
                                                 
230 Albert, In I Sentences, d. 42A, art. 6, sol., (ed.) Borgnet, 26: 364b: ‘Deus multa potest 
de potentia, quae tamen non possunt fieri in creaturis, impediente oppositione et 
confusione: oppositione ut in oppositis: confusione autem, ut in unionibus formarum 
specie differentum, ut quod idem sit homo et asinus et huismodi.’    
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Preston North End could win the championship in 2017 but, if they do, then Blackpool 
could not, as this would not only be a tragedy, but also simultaneously impossible, or 
‘opposite’. The implication is made that these are opposites in the created world as we 
comprehend it, and so outside of this world and its order, there is no such restriction. 
Likewise, to be ‘a thing’ there must be no confusion, i.e. mixing of forms or intersection 
of things. If there is confusion caused by the mixing of forms then this leads to a lack of 
distinction in identity, for example a man and an ass are distinct and cannot be mixed, 
and so the act cannot be considered among that of everything possible, or ‘a thing’.  
Albert considers the idea that nothing is impossible for God starting from the verse from 
Luke’s Gospel suggesting it would seem impossible for a virgin to be with child. He 
acknowledges that nothing is indeed impossible for God, but not all things will be done 
by God.231 Albert places no restriction on what God could do and the sum of everything 
executed by God is not a measure of the full power of God. Courtenay suggests this is an 
example of how Albert used the distinction as ‘a serviceable device for attacking 
Aristotelian, Avicennian and Averroistic views on the absolute necessity of the content 
and structure of the world.’232 In this distinction, by distinguishing between potentiality 
and actuality, and proposing any difference is due to and within creation, Albert has built 
a platform that connects with Aquinas and also is later developed by Eckhart in Question 
six. 
Albert continues this thinking in his comments on distinction 43 when he deals with the 
Abelardian limitation: 
We make reply to these things, opening out a twofold understanding of 
the words, unfolding in this way the things made involved by them: 
‘God cannot do save what is good and just’ that is, cannot do save what, 
if he were to do it, would be good and just - is true. But he can do many 
things which are not good or just, because they neither are nor will be; 
                                                 
231 Albert, In I Sentences, d. 42A, art. 6, sol., (ed.) Borgnet, 26: 364b - 6: ‘Ad aliud 
dicendum, quod nihil est Deo impossibile facere, quod non dicit impotentiam: sed ad fieri 
non omnia sunt possibilia apud Deum… Ad aliud dicendum, quod potentia absoluta 
considerata generalior est quam est ars vel scientia practica: et ideo illa obiectio non 
procedit, nisi de potentia exequente, et non de potentia absoluta considerata.’ 
Summarised by L. Moonan, Divine Power (1994), 165-6. 
232 W.J. Courtenay, Capacity and Volition (1990), 87. 
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nor are done well, nor will be done well; because they never will be 
done. 233  
Without using the language of possibility, on this occasion Albert follows Lombard to 
propose that if there were any things to be done, other than the things that are done, then 
God would not lack power to do them. By stating that God could do other than he does 
in respect of power, but does not do because he only acts in ways that are good and just, 
Albert is adopting the Anselmian idea that God acts according to his nature, but this 
response neither disregards Abelard nor those who considered Abelard to have placed a 
limitation on God.  
Moving on to distinction 44 Albert also brought contemporary thinking to bear when 
dealing with the issue of whether God could do again what he had previously done: 
But more truly and more probably what seems to me to have to be said, 
is that there is power considered absolutely and that it is always the 
same; but that there is power conjoined to actuality which is determined 
by its mode of signification in view of the thing which is being referred 
to it; and the argument is not the same in the latter relation: and also in 
this latter it can neither now work just in the way it has been able to do 
things before, nor does it introduce change in it, but into the thing on 
which the power is being exercised.234   
Rather than resolve this issue just by considering how God operates with respect to time, 
Albert uses two terms that form a model for the power distinction. The potentia coniuncta 
                                                 
233 Albert, In I Sentences, d. 43, art. 6, sol., (ed.) Borgnet, 26: 376: ‘His autem 
respondemus, duplicem verborum intelligentiam aperientes, et ab eis involuta evolventes 
sic: Non potest Deus facere nisi quod bonum est et iustum, id est, non potest facere nisi 
illud quod si faceret, bonum et iustum esset verum est: sed multa potest facere quae non 
bona sunt nec iusta, quia nec sunt, nec erunt, nec bene fiunt, nec fient, quia numquam 
fient.’   
234 Albert, In I Sentences, d. 44, art. 6, (ed.) Borgnet, 26: 399: ‘Sed verius et probabilius 
videtur mihi dicendum, quod est potentia absolute considerata, et haec eadem est semper: 
et est potentia coniuncta actui, et haec determinatur secundum modum significandi ad 
rem quae refertur ad eam: et ratio non est eadem in relatione illa: et hac non potest modo 
quicquid potuit, nec haec ponit mutationem in eo, sed in re in quam potest.’ Own trans. 
adapted from trans. L. Moonan, Divine Power (1994), 170.   
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actui, translated here as the power conjoined to actuality is contrasted with the potentia 
absolute considerata and the tool used to exercise this solution is that of the idea of modes 
of significance. This is an interesting development because ‘Modism’ was being 
formulated during the 13th century with the key text of Thomas of Erfurt, De Modis 
Significandi, only being written in around 1310 AD, by which time the popularity of the 
ideas proposed was already waning. The speculative grammarians, or ‘Modistae’, built 
on Priscian’s ‘ten parts of speech’ and Aristotle’s ‘ten categories’ to devise a system of 
emphasising the actual meaning of a word, exploring it within the context of its 
grammatical position. Kelly notes Albert’s awareness of developments in grammar and 
that philosophical norms are not entirely appropriate to grammar stating, ‘Albertus 
Magnus in particular is very meticulous about distinguishing the different objects of logic 
and grammar: logic had truth as its object, while grammar had congruitas.’235 
There are several traces of Modistic ideas within Albert’s writings although the 
Quaestiones Alberti de Modis significandi dates from c.1285 AD and so is not authentic. 
The twenty one questions in this work, now attributed Pseudo-Albert, reflect speculative 
grammar as it was taught in Paris in the 1270s and 1280s and contain the thoughts of both 
Albert and Thomas, especially in their commentaries on the Perihermeneias.236 It should 
be noted also that Meister Eckhart used the idea of modes of significance in his 
Commentary on Exodus,237 in the section discussing omnipotence. In the above text, 
Albert shows that only absolute power is being considered, in itself isolated from any 
other context, whereas the ordained power of God is considered with regard to its object 
and the context of action. When this ordained power acts, such a relation towards an 
object and such a situation within a context does not alter the power itself, although the 
acting power introduces difference and change in the object. Only absolute power is 
always the same, yet ordained power excludes repetition. Or in other words, God in his 
                                                 
235 L.G. Kelly, ‘‘Composito’ in Grammatica Speculativa’, in G.L. Bursill-Hall, S. 
Ebbesen and E.F.K. Koerner (eds), De Ortu Grammaticae: studies in medieval grammar 
and linguistic theory in memory of Jan Pinborg (1990), 156. Congruitas is the 
construction of a sentence enabling the syntax of the sentence to have order, and thereby 
giving the sentence meaning. See E. Lombardi, The Syntax of Desire (2007), 118-20. 
236 See Quaestiones Alberti de modis significandi, L.G. Kelly (ed.) (1977), intro. 




absolute power is the same and always acts in the same way, whereas God in his ordained 
power never repeats himself and never acts twice in an identical manner. This does not 
mean that when God acts in his ordained power, he or his power are subject to change or 
alteration, but that because the way his power works always includes the relation to the 
object of the action, and is always contextual, then this action is put into practice and 
received differently each time.  
In his treatment of whether a different means of salvation were possible Albert considers 
if God has the power to act in a manner extrinsic to his nature. Rather than two powers 
Albert highlights two modes of the same power: 
It is to be said that God’s power is one and simple but can be considered 
in either of two ways: first as executing a wise foresight and ordinance, 
and so considered, it seems that no other way was possible for our 
liberation, than the one in the foresight of the ordaining wisdom; yet 
another manner could have been foreseen, and then the power operating 
would be executing that other manner; in another way [God’s power] 
may be considered, secondly, according as it stands antecedently to the 
[ordaining] wisdom; for God can do things which through the wisdom 
ordaining all things he has not ordained that he will do – and speaking 
with a determination mentioning that power, another manner was 
possible; and the saints often spoke that possibility.238  
As with other previous solutions, the conclusion is sorted by acknowledging a mode of 
power was available but never to be exercised. The power of God to act extrinsic to his 
nature is described as absolute power to execute actions which are not ordained according 
to wisdom. God’s ordained power, however, is limited by what is foreseen and pre-
                                                 
238 Albert, In III Sentences, d. 20B, art. 3, (ed.) Borgnet, 28: 358-359: ‘Dicendum, una et 
simplex est Dei potentia: sed tamen potest dupliciter considerari, scilicet ut exsequens 
sapientiae praevisionem et ordinationem, et sic videtur, quod non fuit alius modus 
possibilis nostrae liberationis, quam praevisus est a sapientia ordinante: sed tamen potuit 
esse alius modus praevisus, et tunc potentia operans alium exsequeretur. Aliter 
consideratur secundum quod antecedenter se habet ad sapientiam: potest enim Deus 
facere quae per sapientiam omnia ordinantem, non ordinavit se facturum: et de hac 
potentia loquendo, alius fuit modus possibilis: et de hac possibilitate loquntur Sancti 
plerumque.’    
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ordained by wisdom and therefore another means for salvation could not have been 
foreseen or actualised because this would have not been part of God’s ordaining wisdom. 
Only with regards to absolute power could God have run the course of this world in a 
different way. By considering absolute power as potentia operans there is a slight lean 
towards the idea of Eckhart that absolute power is not only abstract, but active, although 
in Albert, the reasoning about an operating absolute power is only presented 
hypothetically.  
Albert exercised the power distinction using a number of different formats, rooting it in 
the past by referring to Plato,239 using classic examples such as those of Augustine and 
yet also representing 13th century developments with contemporary thinking and 
terminology. He was in Paris at the critical time of the transmission of Arabic thinking 
into Latin and his paraphrase is unique in that it is the first known example of the 
interpretation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics in Latin that relies on both Avicenna’s and 
Averroes’ work on the subject. His attitude towards these two sources, however, is not 
only receptive, but also critical, as seen in his rejection of particular theories advanced by 
both Avicenna and Averroes.240    
Equally prominent in philosophical theology with Albert during this period, and likewise 
unquestionably influential on Eckhart, was Thomas Aquinas (c.1226–1274 AD).241 At 
the age of five, Thomas was dispatched to the abbey at Monte Cassino, scene of Damian’s 
question of the fallen virgin. The family motive in sending Thomas was probably to gain 
a foothold in the local abbey, which they sacked anyway shortly afterwards. After 
studying at Frederick’s University in Naples, like Eckhart, he became a Dominican, 
preceding the Meister by studying and teaching in Cologne as well as twice holding the 
prestigious Chair of Theology in Paris.  
                                                 
239 See Albert, Summa Theologiae, Tract. Xix, q. 78, (ed.) Borgnet, 31: 832, in a rare 
quote from Plato’s Meno 73ab in the 12th century translation, in V. Kordeater and C. 
Labowsky (eds), Plato Latinus, I (London, 1940); L. Moonan, Divine Power (1994), 179.   
240 See A. Bertolacci, ‘Avicenna’s and Averroes’s Interpretations and their Influence in 
Albertus Magnus’, in Fabrizio Amerini and Gabriele Galluzzo (eds), A Companion to the 
Latin Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Leiden and Boston, 2014), 95-
136. 
241 For background on Thomas see J.A. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d’Aquino: His Life, 
Thought and Work (New York, 1974). 
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Aquinas began lecturing on the Sentences at Paris in 1252 AD while tensions existed 
between secular clerics and the mendicants who had financial backing and were 
beginning to monopolise teaching chairs. By 1256 AD the Dominicans were so unpopular 
that they needed an armed guard at the front of their convent and although Aquinas’ 
appointment to Regent Master was opposed locally, it was supported by the pope. The 
seculars resented their lack of career opportunities and were aware of their own powers 
being passed to the mendicants, as had happened specifically when Innocent IV who was 
sympathetic to them was replaced by Alexander IV who fulfilled his role as protector of 
the Franciscans. William of St. Amour (c.1200–1272 AD), one of the successful 
petitioners to Innocent IV, became the mouthpiece for the opposition against the 
mendicants, launching a public attack in his sermon ‘Qui amat periculum’242 and later, in 
1256 AD, writing his famous treatise, ‘De periculis novissimorum temporum’.243 William 
accused the mendicant friars, who however are not specified, of the whole list of vices of 
2Tim. 3 244 and warned, the danger is at our doors, and it is the duty of the bishops to avert 
it. In order that those ‘impostors’ and ‘pseudo-preachers’, were to be more easily detected, 
William presented forty-one signs, by which they could be recognised. This treatise made 
an enormous impression, attracting written opposition from mendicants including 
Thomas and Albert, and after being examined by a curial committee, Alexander IV, in 
1257 AD ordered it to be burned and William to be excommunicated.  
The seculars feared for their own livelihoods, and that mendicant power in the university 
would move the emphasis away from academic to monastic development, although in 
practice, at the high end of the ladder, mendicant scholars such as Aquinas were financed 
and thereby released to develop academic study. When considering his use of the power 
distinction, ‘Thomist scholars seemed convinced that, Thomas used the distinction 
                                                 
242 William of St. Amour, ‘Qui amat periculum’, Edward Brown (ed.), Fasciculus rerum 
expetendarum (1690), II, 51; Guil. a S. Amore, Opera omnia quae reperiri potuerunt 
(Constance, 1632), 491. See L. Oliger, ‘Mendicant Friars’, in The Catholic Encyclopedia 
(New York, 1911).  
243 William of St. Amour, ‘De periculis novissimorum temporum’, Opera omnia, op. cit., 
17-72; Edward Brown (ed.), op. cit. 11, 18-41, here under a false title.   
244 2Tim. 3: 1-2, ‘hoc autem scito quod in novissimis diebus instabunt tempora periculosa 
et erunt homines se ipsos amantes cupidi elati superbi blasphemi parentibus 
inoboedientes ingrati scelesti …’  
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sparingly since it did not blend well with Thomas’ view of the inherent rationality of the 
created order, nor with the close association that Thomas presumably saw between the 
created order and the divine nature.’245 However, as Courtenay suggests, the language 
and in particular the concept of the distinction between absolute and ordained power is 
more common than previously thought, and likewise, Moonan notes that the distinction 
featured in the first work that Aquinas was entitled to put forward in his own right as a 
Paris Master,246 and so must have been at the head of his thinking. Both list thirty or more 
occasions when Thomas used the distinction.247  
In his Summa Theologica, Thomas distinguishes what can possibly happen from what is 
just hypothetical: 
Accordingly we should state that by his absolute power God can do 
other things than those he foresaw that he would do and pre-ordained 
to do. Nevertheless nothing can come to pass that he has not foreseen 
and pre-ordained.248 
The idea of foresight is introduced as a constraint on absolute power as in the text from 
Albert stated above, however, while Albert speaks ambiguously of different things being 
foreseen as a possibility, Thomas more clearly states there is nothing actualised, that is 
not foreseen, or foreknown, and pre-ordained. In this passage, although there is distinction 
in power, and there is the potential for unrealised possibilities, the things that are 
contained by the absolute power that are not ordained could never happen. What has been 
ordained is a subset of everything that could happen, but in the reality of what actually 
does happen, there is no difference between what is and what could be, and so this 
                                                 
245 W.J. Courtenay, Capacity and Volition (1990), 88. 
246 See L. Moonan, Divine Power (1994), 229. 
247 See L. Moonan, ‘St. Thomas Aquinas on Divine Power’, in the Atti of the congress 
Thomasso d’Aquino nel suo VII centenario (1974), 3 (1977), 366-407. Also W.J. 
Courtenay, Capacity and Volition (1990), 88. 
248 Thom. Aqu., S.Th. I, q. 25, a. 5, (ed.) Leon. XIII (1888), 297: ‘Secundum hoc ergo 
dicendum est quod Deus potest alia facere de potentia absoluta quam quae praescivit et 
praeordinavit se facturum. Non tamen potest esse quod aliqua faciat quae non 
praesciverit et praeordinaverit se facturum.’ Text and trans. in Thomas Gilby, St. Thomas 
Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (Blackfriars edition), vol. 5 (London, 1967), 173.  
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description of unrealised power is therefore comparable with the potential inferred by the 
potuit sed noluit idea of Augustine.  
Interestingly, Thomas develops this idea of absolute power that remains unrealised:   
It remains therefore, that God is called omnipotent because he can do 
all things that are possible absolutely. For a thing is said to be possible 
or impossible absolutely according to the relation in which the very 
terms stand one to another, possible, if the predicate is not compatible 
with the subject as that Socrates sits; and absolutely impossible when 
the predicate is altogether incompatible with the subject, as, for 
instance, that man is a donkey.249 
This is not just emphasising possibility or otherwise, but presenting the strategic role of 
terms in providing the conditions such that any predication must be compatible with the 
subject and so for God, everything is possible within this constraint and everything else 
is impossible. The principle of contradiction states that everything is possible that does 
not involve something that is impossible such that God, even in potentia absoluta, could 
not make a triangle with anything other than three lines.250 Aquinas presents the case for 
an infinite number of possibilities but these are not unconditional and the conditions are 
in the realm of things, rather than being connected with the nature of God or any question 
of power. As far as God is concerned, contradictions do not exist and so are not capable 
of being done and there is no lacking in power if the action is not in mind to be done. 
God’s power is extended to all being, only excluding ‘what fights against the logic of 
being’, namely ‘non-being,’251 or as with Albert, a man and an ass. God could not make 
something that at the same time ‘is’ and ‘is not’ and so with either absolute or ordained 
                                                 
249 Thom. Aqu., S.Th., I, q. 25, a. 3, (ed.) Leon. XIII (1888), 293: ‘Relinquitur igitur quod 
Deus dicatur omnipotens, quia potest omnia possibilia absolute, quod est alter modus 
dicendi possibile. Dicitur autem aliquid possibile vel impossibile absolute, ex habitudine 
terminorum: possibile quidem, quia praedicatum non repugnat subiecto, ut Socratem 
sedere; impossibile vero absolute, quia praedicatum repugnat subiecto, ut hominem esse 
asinum.’ Trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (1947). See R. Torretti, 
Creative Understanding (1990), 253.   
250 See Thom. Aqu., Scriptum Sent. I, d. 42, q. 2, a. 2, sol., (ed.) Mandonnet (1929), 991. 
251 Thom. Aqu., Summa Theol., I, q. 25, a. 3 (1888): ‘nihil autem opponitur rationi entis, 
nisi non ens.’ Trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (1947). 
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power God could not make contradictory things happen simultaneously. No contradiction 
could happen in the present, and the future is ordained, but God could have acted 
differently in the past, although the fact that God has overseen and therefore ordained 
what has happened, means that actions cannot be reversed. Aquinas used this principle, 
later to be adopted by Ockham, to provide answers to different issues including those 
involving time and the problem of the fallen virgin. Thomas proposes God cannot do what 
is impossible, per accidens, i.e. by circumstances and, even more so, something 
impossible in itself. He refers to Jerome’s letter to Eustochium to say God cannot bring 
about that which in the past has not happened, and parallels Albert’s reference to Jerome 
and Aristotle, although he also adds the reference to Augustine’s ‘Contra Faustum 
Manichaeum’ which was also used by Alexander of Hales when treating divine 
omnipotence.252 He also introduces the fallen virgin to a quodlibet by contrasting her 
plight in the light of Luke’s text,253 and here, the answer to the question is, ‘yes’. As 
Thomas continues, God can recreate her mind through grace and her physical integrity 
through a miracle, however, he could not undo the cause, namely that the virgin had 
sexual intercourse with a man, as God could not undo [the past] such that ‘an event did 
not happen’.254 It is therefore within God’s absolute power to restore the virgin although 
to do this as if intercourse never happened would imply a contradiction, and so in practice 
it is only possible for all the effects of the cause to change if they were ordained to be so. 
In the following question of this quodlibet, Thomas deals with the question, ‘whether God 
could sin, if he wished to do so’.255 Thomas, while acknowledging that it should be 
possible for God to do anything said that, in practice, God only acts within his will but 
while creation is subject to God’s will, God acts according to his nature and his will 
follows this. Aquinas reasoned that everything God wants to do he is able to do, but when 
considered the other way round, it is not right that God wants to do everything he is able 
to do. He uses the illustration of a runner who needs to wish to run as an antecedent before 
                                                 
252 See Thom. Aqu., Scriptum Sent. I, d. 42, q. 2, a. 2, arg. 3, (ed.) Mandonnet (1929), 
990. 
253 Luke 1:37, ‘quia non erit inpossibile apud Deum omne verbum.’ 
254 See Thom. Aqu., Quaestiones quodlibetales V, q. 2, a. 1, (ed.) R. Spiazzi (Rome, 
1949).  
255 Thom. Aqu., Quaestiones quodlibetales V, q. 2, a. 2: (ed.) R. Spiazzi (Rome, 1949).  
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being able to run. With this condition in place, because God has no desire to sin, meaning 
no will to sin, he is therefore not able to sin.  
The clearest reference by Thomas to the power distinction is in his comments on 
Lombard’s Sentences,256 although not when covering the Book 1 distinctions on power, 
but during a Book 3 discussion on: 
Whether the Father is able to assume flesh, and whether the Holy Spirit 
is likewise able.257  
Distinction one, question two begins with Thomas presenting five points of enquiry.258 
U1: whether one of the Persons can assume flesh while another does 
not; 
U2: if this is so, why the Son assumed flesh rather than [another of the 
Persons]; 
U3: whether the Father or the Holy Spirit was or is able to assume flesh; 
                                                 
256 I am grateful to Joseph Haggerty from the Aquinas Institute for the study of Sacred 
Doctrine, Lander, Wyoming, for his work on translating this passage and help with 
devising the system for classifying the different issues within the text. I have adapted the 
translation such that the points of enquiry, beginning ‘utrum’, have therefore been 
prefixed with a U, objections are prefixed Obj, and Sc has been used to identify the 
reasons, sed contra, why the initial question could be possible. The categories of the four-
fold model presented by Thomas are prefixed with C and concluding remarks on the 
initial five points each begin, and so are prefixed, with Ad.   
257 Thom. Aqu., Scriptum Sent. III, d. 1, q. 2, (ed.) Moos (Paris, 1956), 28: ‘Utrum Pater 
vel Spiritus sanctus potuerint vel possint assumere carnem.’ See also d. 1, q. 2, a. 4, (ed.) 
Moos (Paris, 1956), 41: ‘quod natura assumpta a tribus personis sit una unitate singularis 
naturae non est impossibile, loquendo de potentia absoluta, quamvis non sit congruum 
secundum ordinem divinae sapientiae.’ 
258 Thom. Aqu., Scriptum Sent. III, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3, resp. (1956), 28: ‘Deinde quaeritur de 
assumente carnem; et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque; Primo, utrum una persona possit 
assumere carnem alia non assumente; Secundo, si sic, quare magis filius carnem 
assumpsit; Tertio, utrum pater vel spiritus sanctus potuerunt vel possint carnem 
assumere; Quarto, si sic, utrum potuerunt eamdem numero humanam naturam assumere; 
Quinto, utrum una persona possit duas numero humanas naturas assumere.’ 
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U4: if so, whether they were able to assume the numerically same 
human nature; 
U5: whether one of the Persons is able to assume human natures which 
are two in number. 
These 5 points of enquiry are followed by 5 objections: 
Obj1: It seems that the Father was not able to assume flesh. For, as 
Anselm says, that which is in the least degree unbefitting is impossible 
for God. But if the Father were to assume flesh, something unbefitting 
would follow: namely, there would be many sons in the Trinity, 
something which would tend to a certain confusion of the Persons. 
Consequently, the Father was not able to assume flesh.   
Obj2: Also, opposites cannot be joined in the same thing, not even 
through a miracle. But there is in the Father a certain property called 
innascibility, according to which he is said not to be from another; to 
this property nascibility is opposed. The Father, therefore, was not able 
to born of the virgin, which he would be said to be, if he were to assume 
flesh.   
Obj3: Again, as it is said in the text, the mission of the Son is the 
Incarnation itself. But it is not befitting for the Father to be sent, as was 
maintained in Book I [Lombard’s Sentences]; therefore he cannot be 
incarnate.  
Obj4: Again, the best things which can happen are always to be hoped 
for from him who is infinite in mercy. But since the whole world was 
made better through the incarnation of one of the Persons, it will be 
improved all the more if the Father should be incarnate as well. If it is 
possible for the Father to be incarnate, therefore, one must hope for it, 
just as the ancient patriarchs hoped for the incarnation of the Son—
which is entirely absurd. 
Obj5: Furthermore, God’s power does not exceed his will, since each 
is infinite. But the Father never willed to be incarnate; therefore neither 
is he able to be incarnate.259 
                                                 
259 Thom. Aqu., Scriptum Sent. III, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3 (1956), 35: ‘Videtur quod pater carnem 
assumere non potuerit. Quia, ut dicit Anselmus, minimum inconveniens est Deo 
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Having presented five reasons why the Father or Holy Spirit could not become incarnate 
Thomas then highlights three ideas against, sed contra, these five, why it should be 
possible: 
Sc1: But to the contrary, every necessity and impossibility is subjected 
to God, as Anselm says. But nothing is impossible for the One to whose 
will every impossibility is subjected. Therefore it is not impossible for 
the Father to be incarnate. 
Sc2: Also, the joining of things equally distant is equally possible. But 
human nature is equally distant from the three persons, being at an 
infinite distance from any one of them you please. If the Son was able 
to assume [flesh], therefore, the Father is able to as well. 
Sc3: Furthermore, anything of dignity which befits the Son befits the 
Father as well. But to be able to assume flesh is something of dignity 
in the Son; therefore it must also be attributed to the Father.260 
                                                 
impossibile. Sed si pater carnem assumeret, sequeretur inconveniens, ut scilicet essent in 
Trinitate plures filii, quod in confusionem quamdam vergeret personarum. Ergo pater 
carnem assumere non potuit. Item opposita non possunt jungi in eodem, etiam per 
miraculum. Sed in patre est quaedam proprietas, quae dicitur innascibilitas, secundum 
quam dicitur non esse ex alio, cui nascibilitas opponitur. Ergo non potuit pater de virgine 
nasci, quod diceretur, si carnem assumeret. Item, ut in littera dicitur, filii missio, est ipsa 
incarnatio. Sed patri non convenit mitti, ut in primo libro habitum est. Ergo nec incarnari 
potest. Item, ab eo qui est infinitae misericordiae, semper optima expectanda sunt quae 
contingere possunt. Sed cum totus mundus per incarnationem unius personae melioratus 
sit, si etiam pater incarnaretur, multo amplius meliorabitur. Ergo si possibile est patrem 
incarnari, hoc expectandum est, sicut et antiqui patres incarnationem filii expectaverunt: 
quod est omnino absurdum. Praeterea, non est major Dei potentia quam sua voluntas, 
cum utrumque sit infinitum. Sed pater nunquam voluit incarnari. Ergo nec incarnari 
potest. Praeterea, non est major Dei potentia quam sua voluntas, cum utrumque sit 
infinitum. Sed pater nunquam voluit incarnari. Ergo nec incarnari potest.’ 
260 Thom. Aqu., Scriptum Sent. III, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3 (1956), 36: ‘Sed contra, sicut dicit 
Anselmus, omnis necessitas et impossibilitas Deo est subjecta. Sed ei nihil est impossibile, 
cujus voluntati omnis impossibilitas subditur. Ergo patrem incarnari non est impossibile. 
Item, eorum quae aeque distant, aeque possibilis est conjunctio. Sed humana natura 
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The first suggestion emphasises that everything is subject to the will of God, including 
whatever may have been perceived as being impossible and this in accordance with the 
scriptures claiming that nothing is impossible for God. Suggestions two and three are 
based on the idea of equality within the persons of the Trinity in that all three persons of 
the Trinity are the same distance from mankind and all three possess the same dignity. 
And so with both sides of the argument in place Thomas begins his solution by presenting 
the power distinction relative to the initial question: 
When something is ascribed to the power of God, therefore, one must 
consider whether it is attributed to his power considered in itself, or in 
its order to his wisdom and foreknowledge and will. If the former, then 
he is said to be able from his absolute power; if the latter, then he is 
said to be able from his ordained power.261      
The distinction in power is based on whether something is attributed to divine power as 
just the power in itself or it is attributed in relation to the wisdom, foreknowledge and 
will of God. Thomas then presents a fourfold sifting model of the things which he says 
can be attributed to the divine power, although it should be noted that the things of the 
first category cannot be attributed to even absolute power.262 These four categories, each 
introduced by the term, quaedam, because they refer to ‘certain things’, however are not 
without further complication as categories one, two and three all sub-divide. Category 
one contains two aspects which God cannot do even out of absolute power, while 
                                                 
aequaliter distat a tribus personis: distat enim a qualibet in infinitum. Ergo si potuit eam 
filius assumere, potest et pater. Praeterea, quidquid dignitatis convenit filio, convenit et 
patri. Sed posse assumere carnem est dignitatis in filio. Ergo et patri attribuendum est.’ 
261 Thom. Aqu., Scriptum Sent. III, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3, resp. (1956), 36: ‘quando potentiae 
divinae aliquid ascribitur, utrum attribuatur potentiae secundum se consideratae; tunc 
enim dicitur posse illud de potentia absoluta: vel attribuatur sibi in ordine ad sapientiam 
et praescientiam et voluntatem ejus: tunc enim dicitur posse illud de potentia ordinata.’   
262 As Haggerty notes, ‘“Can be attributed” (attribui possunt) is in this sentence 
understood in the broadest sense: one could make the statement, regardless of its truth or 
falsehood. In the very next sentence, “are . . . attributed” (attribuitur) is understood in the 
narrower sense of being truly attributed; such attribution is not possible in C1. Perhaps 
St. Thomas is enjoying a little private joke (about the mind’s absolute and ordained 
powers of attribution) at our expense.’ 
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categories two and three are split according to if the quaedam are being considered in the 
light of a certain condition, namely the will of God: 
C1: Certain things are not attributed to His power, even as absolutely 
considered. These things he is, simply speaking, not able to do, to suffer 
(C1a), for example, and to make contradictories coexist (C1b).   
C1a: By that which “tends to the defect of a power,” on the other hand, 
I mean those things which entail the possibility of a power. For it is 
from a defect in an active power of resisting that it can happen that 
something undergoes corruption or division, or anything of this sort; 
thus softness is said to be a natural powerlessness in consequence of 
being easily divisible. It is for this reason that we do not say that God, 
in his divine nature, has the power of suffering or dying, or anything of 
this sort, just as we do not say that he has the power of being powerless.        
C1b: I say “something in itself” because the joining of an affirmation 
and a negation is nothing, and that which is said to be man and not-
man, taken together and as if by the power of a single statement, 
produces no intellectual apprehension; hence the power of God does 
not extend so far as to allow there to be an affirmation and a negation 
together. The same is true of all things which involve a contradiction.263  
God could not do anything that suggested there was a defect in his power because nothing 
about God’s nature points to weakness or impotence. Likewise, God could not make 
                                                 
263 Thom. Aqu., Scriptum Sent. III, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3, resp. (1956), 37: ‘Quaedam enim nec 
ipsi potentiae absolutae attribuuntur; unde simpliciter dicendum est, Deum ea non posse, 
sicut pati, et contradictoria simul esse. Dico autem in defectum potentiae vergere quae 
passionem potentiae important: ex defectu enim potentiae activae ad resistendum 
contingit quod aliquid vel corrumpatur vel dividatur, vel aliquid hujusmodi; unde et 
mollities impotentia naturalis dicitur propter facilem divisibilitatem; et ideo non dicimus 
Deum in natura divinitatis posse pati vel mori, vel aliquid hujusmodi; sicut non dicimus 
eum posse esse impotentem. Dico autem in se aliquid esse: quia conjunctio affirmationis 
et negationis nihil est, nec aliquem intellectum generat quod dicitur homo et non homo 
simul acceptum, quasi in vi unius dictionis: et ideo potentia Dei ad hoc se non extendit, 




contradictions coexist, or do anything that involved a contradiction because 
contradictions amount to nothing; not to something. With the things that can’t even be 
done by absolute power sorted, Thomas moves on to discuss how everything else is 
attributed within the realm of absolute power:  
Since God’s absolute power is infinite, everything (C2 – C4) which is 
something in itself and which does not tend to the defect of a power 
must of necessity be attributed to it.264   
Categories two and three refer to the power of God as power in itself such that even when 
the thing being considered would not fit within his wisdom and will, (as long as it passes 
the test of category one), God would still be able to do it, but only out of absolute 
power.265 These two categories both subdivide according to whether they are considered 
conditionally, 2cc, 3cc or not conditionally, 2ncc, 3ncc:   
C2: For among these things (C2cc), some are inseparably joined to 
something which is in itself repugnant to the divine wisdom and 
goodness, such as sinning, lying, and things of this sort; these (C2ncc), 
we also say that God is not able to do.  
Certain others (C2) are of themselves repugnant to His wisdom and 
goodness, and (C2ncc) we do not say that God is able to do them, 
except (C2cc) under a condition - namely, if he should will it.  For it is 
not unbefitting that the antecedent of a true conditional be 
impossible.266   
                                                 
264 Thom. Aqu., Scriptum Sent. III, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3, resp. (1956), 36: ‘Ipsi ergo potentiae 
absolutae, cum infinita sit, necesse est attribuere omne id quod in se est aliquid, et quod 
in defectum potentiae non vergit.’  
265 Thom. Aqu., Scriptum Sent. III, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3, resp. (1956), 37: ‘quando autem 
potentia se extendit quantum in se est ad illud quod sibi attribuitur, quamvis non habeat 
ejus sapientia et voluntas ut ita fiat, tunc dicitur posse illud de potentia absoluta tantum.’ 
266 Thom. Aqu., Scriptum Sent. III, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3, resp. (1956), 37: ‘quia in his sunt 
quaedam quae habent aliquid in se divinae sapientiae et bonitati repugnans 
inseparabiliter conjunctum, ut peccare, mentiri, et hujusmodi; et etiam ista dicimus Deum 
non posse: Quaedam vero ex se sapientiae et bonitati ejus repugnant; et ista non dicimus 
Deum posse nisi sub conditione, scilicet si vellet; non enim inconveniens est ut in 
conditionali vera antecedens sit impossibile.’ 
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There are certain things that are repugnant to God’s wisdom and goodness and there are 
also things that have joined themselves to something repugnant to divine wisdom and 
goodness. In these cases God is not able to do them, however, a further constraint is added 
to the text here by Thomas proposing that although something in itself might hold a 
repugnancy, when placed under the condition that it is willed by God to be done, then, 
God would be able to do it. This proposal is generalised with an explanation confirming 
that although the event or thing might be impossible before it is put through the 
conditional test, this does not necessarily mean that it is an inconveniens, i.e. unbefitting 
or inappropriate to God, if God wishes to do it.   
C3: There are certain others (C3) which are in no way unbefitting the 
divine wisdom of themselves, but merely do not befit some ordination 
of His foreknowledge, something which God, according to his will, has 
established or foreseen. An example: that a man’s head should be his 
lowest part. A thing of this sort (C3ncc), God is able to do, since he is 
able to establish a different order in things, according to which that 
would be fitting which now - according to the order which is, in fact, 
present in things - seems unbefitting.   
Again (C3), certain others are not repugnant of themselves, but only 
due to something external to them, and (C3ncc), it must be conceded 
absolutely that God is able to do such things from His absolute power. 
They cannot be denied [to His power] except (C3cc) under a condition 
— namely, it might be said that He is not able if it is repugnant to His 
will.267   
                                                 
267 Thom. Aqu., Scriptum Sent. III, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3 (1956), 37: ‘Quaedam vero sunt quae 
de se non habent inconvenientiam ad divinam sapientiam, sed solum ad ordinem aliquem 
suae praescientiae, quem Deus in rebus statuit vel praevidit, secundum suam voluntatem, 
ut quod caput hominis sit inferius; et haec Deus potest facere, quia potest statuere alium 
ordinem in rebus secundum quem sit conveniens quod nunc secundum istum ordinem qui 
rebus inest, inconveniens videtur. Quaedam vero de se repugnantiam non habent, sed 
solum ab exteriori; et talia absolute concedendum est Deum posse de potentia absoluta; 




In this category Thomas addresses things that are not repugnant in themselves and within 
divine wisdom but are not done because they are not within the will of God according the 
present order of things. God is able to do these things because what is unbefitting in the 
present order might be fitting in a different order. When the condition of being within the 
will of God is applied then, whatever the order, if the thing is repugnant to the will of God 
then it could not be done. As with category two, the condition considered is the will of 
God, but in reverse manner, because in category three God’s will is the exception being 
the restriction whereas in category two it is the exception to the restriction. In categories 
two and three Aquinas applies the thought from Obj5 by demonstrating God’s will and 
power are both infinite and work in tandem. 
C4: Finally, (C4) there are certain things which are attributed to His 
power in the sense that they conform to His will and wisdom; these God 
must be said to be able, simply speaking, to do, and to be in no way 
incapable of doing. Now, when (C4) something which God wills to do 
and which his wisdom holds that he do is attributed to this power 
considered absolutely, then he is said to be able according to his 
ordained power.268 
From within God’s absolute power, if something is within his wisdom and will, then it 
will be done out of God’s ordained power. And so now, Thomas is able to apply his sifting 
process to the question: 
For the Father to be incarnate, therefore, does not belong among those 
things (C1) which are not subject to the absolute power of God, since 
it neither implies a contradiction, nor does incarnation involve any 
defect in the incarnate Person - the Father and the Son are of the same 
dignity, and the same ratio of personhood is in both. Nor does it belong 
among those things (C2) which of themselves involve something 
unbefitting. However, it does belong among those things (C3) which 
involve unbefittingness on account of another ordination established by 
                                                 
268 Thom. Aqu., Scriptum Sent. III, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3, resp. (1956), 37: ‘Quaedam vero sunt 
quae attribuuntur potentiae, ita quod voluntati et sapientiae ejus congruunt; et haec 
simpliciter dicendum est Deum posse, et nullo modo ea non posse … Huic autem 
potentiae absolute consideratae quando attribuitur aliquid quod vult facere et sapientia 
sua habet ut faciat, tunc dicitur posse illud secundum potentiam ordinatam.’ 
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the wisdom of God. That the Son be incarnate, on the other hand, 
belongs to (C4) the fourth category [of things which can be attributed 
to the divine power]. And therefore it must be conceded without 
qualification that the Father was able - speaking of His absolute power 
- to assume flesh, and the Holy Spirit likewise.269    
The incarnation of the Father, Son or Spirit all pass through categories one and two. 
However, although there is not an intrinsic repugnancy to the Father, (or the Spirit), taking 
flesh, it was not within the divine will, which is the essential condition to pass through 
category three. As stated in Obj3 and Obj4 it was the Son who was to be sent and this 
was the best option and therefore the Son to become flesh meets category four. Here 
Thomas repeats the point that is critical to the development of the power distinction, in 
that it was therefore possible for the Father to become incarnate, because it might be 
fitting, according to the will of God, in a different order. This thought is further 
emphasised as Thomas applies his solution to the initial five points of enquiry: 
Ad1: To the first, it must be said that it is impossible that God should 
do something, and that this be unfitting. However, He is able to make 
it so that something which is unbefitting according to one order is made 
befitting according to another order. Thus the Father is able to assume 
flesh by forming it in the same manner in which he formed the body of 
man from earth, so that the name “Son” would not belong to the Father. 
Nor would it even be repugnant of itself if the Father were called “Son,” 
since these names would be attributed according to different natures.270  
                                                 
269 Thom. Aqu., Scriptum Sent. III, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3, (1956), 38: ‘Dicendum est ergo, quod 
patrem incarnari, non est de illis quae potentiae Dei absolutae non subduntur; cum neque 
contradictionem implicet, neque defectum aliquem incarnatio in persona incarnata 
ponat: est enim eadem dignitas patris et filii, et ratio eadem personalitatis in utroque: nec 
est etiam de illis quae ex se inconvenientiam habent: sed est de illis quae habent 
inconvenientiam propter ordinem alium a Dei sapientia institutum. Sed filium incarnari 
est in quarto ordine. Et ideo simpliciter concedendum est quod pater potuit carnem 
assumere, et similiter spiritus sanctus, loquendo de potentia absoluta.’ 
270 Thom. Aqu., Scriptum Sent. III, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3 (1956), 38: ‘Ad primum ergo dicendum, 
quod hoc est impossibile, ut aliquid faciat Deus, et hoc sit inconveniens; sed tamen potest 
facere ut illud quod modo est inconveniens secundum unum ordinem, secundum alium 
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While confirming it is impossible for God to do anything unbefitting, the question of 
unbefittingness could be different in another order. Thomas adds his thoughts on how the 
Father might become flesh such that it would not be unfitting or contain a repugnancy in 
that he could form flesh as he formed Adam and therefore not be born of a virgin. 
Likewise names attributed would reflect the different natures in the new order. In his 
response to Obj2 Aquinas shows how the Father becoming flesh need not contain an 
opposite: 
Ad2: To the second, it must be said that opposites cannot be in the same 
thing in the same respect, but nothing prevents them from being in it in 
diverse respects. Consequently, although innascibility does belong to 
the Father according to his divine nature, birth could nonetheless be in 
the same Father according to his human nature - just as it is in the Son 
to be, according to his divine nature, the father of the virgin of whom, 
according to his human nature, he is the son.271 
This is about the difference in the divine perspective of attributes according to the human 
and divine natures of the Father and the Son. Nascibility and innascibility are opposite 
but only when considered from the same perspective. In his divine nature, the Father does 
not possess the capability to be born of the virgin. However not being able to be born is 
not part of human nature and so, in respect of human nature, there is no opposite involved. 
It is possible for the Father to be innascible in his divine nature and yet nascible in his 
human nature. Therefore, according to human nature, the Father could be born, in the 
same way that the Son in his human nature was born of the virgin, and likewise in his 
divine nature, the Son is innascible, the father of the virgin of whom, in his human nature, 
he becomes the son.  
                                                 
ordinem fiat conveniens; sicut potest carnem hoc modo formando assumere, sicut corpus 
viri de terra formavit: sic enim filii nomen patri non conveniret: nec etiam si pater filius 
diceretur, esset de se repugnantiam habens, cum secundum diversas naturas haec sibi 
attribuerentur.’  
271 Thom. Aqu., Scriptum Sent. III, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3 (1956), 38: ‘Ad secundum dicendum, 
quod secundum idem non possunt opposita eidem in esse; sed secundum diversa nihil 
prohibet. Unde quamvis patri conveniat innascibilitas secundum naturam divinam, posset 




Ad3: To the third, it must be said that the incarnation of the Son is 
called “mission” because the Son is from another. If the Father were to 
be incarnate, however, His incarnation could not be called “mission.” 
In like manner, the ostension of the Holy Spirit in the dove is called his 
visible “mission,” but the ostension of the Father in the sound of the 
voice is not called a “mission.”272   
The emphasis here is on the contrast between being the one sending and the one being 
sent. If the Father were to become incarnate then he would become the one sent, but in 
this case there would be no difference between sending and sent, hence, the Father has 
not become incarnate. The Son and the Holy Spirit both have that sense of being sent out 
and even when the voice of God the Father is heard, it is not a voice that is different from 
that of the Father, but it is the very voice of him. Again, there is no difference between 
speaker and spoken, hence, the argument that the Father is not the one incarnate.273 
Ad4: To the fourth, it must be said that the three Persons are not of 
greater goodness than one alone. For this reason, there would be no 
more of a gain to the universe by the incarnation of all of the Persons 
than by the incarnation of only one; hence it would be superfluous. 
Consequently, although it is possible for the Father to be incarnate, it is 
not to be hoped for.274 
As all three persons of the Trinity possess goodness without measure, then three times 
infinity is still infinity and so nothing is added by all three becoming incarnate and 
                                                 
272 Thom. Aqu., Scriptum Sent. III, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3 (1956), 38: ‘Ad tertium dicendum, quod 
incarnatio filii dicitur missio, quia filius ab alio est. Si autem pater incarnaretur, ejus 
incarnatio missio dici non posset: sicut ostensio spiritus sancti in columba, missio 
visibilis ipsius dicitur; non autem ostensio patris in sono vocis.’  
273 Mark 1:10-1: ‘et statim ascendens de aqua vidit apertos caelos et Spiritum tamquam 
columbam descendentem et manentem in ipso et vox facta est de caelis tu es Filius meus 
dilectus in te conplacui.’ 
274 Thom. Aqu., Scriptum Sent. III, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3 (1956), 38: ‘Ad quartum dicendum, 
quod tres personae non sunt majoris bonitatis quam una tantum; et ideo nihil plus 
universo accresceret per incarnationem omnium personarum, quam de incarnatione 
unius tantum; unde fuisset superfluum; et ideo quamvis sit possibile patrem incarnari, 
non tamen est expectandum.’  
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therefore, the death of the Son is enough for atonement. Ad3 and Ad4 are dealt with 
above in that they present why the Father, (or Spirit), could not become flesh in the current 
order, because the Father is the sending one and the Son is the sent one and so for the 
Father to send the Son is within the wisdom and will of God.275 It was the Son who was 
anticipated and the Son whose blood was sufficient as the atoning sacrifice and so there 
was no need for any other Person of the trinity to become incarnate, or all three.   
Ad5: To the fifth it must be said that the power of God is no greater in 
respect of essence than is his will, but it nonetheless extends to more 
objects. If God does not will something, therefore, it does not follow 
that he is not able to do it by his absolute power.276 
As mentioned above, Thomas again emphasises how the absolute power of God is more 
extensive, or in terms of things, there is potentiality for more than his ordained power 
actualises, even if with respect to essence, God’s potentiality and actuality are the same.   
Thomas has presented the power distinction in this discussion by applying an illustration 
to his own sifting model. Having established there are things, which are effectively 
nothing or repugnant to God’s wisdom and will and therefore not possible in the present 
order, de potentia ordinata, he shows that, in a different order that may be possible, de 
potentia absoluta. The absolute power of God is enough to accomplish all that is ordained 
now and all that may be ordained under a different order. The language Thomas uses is 
taken up by later users of the distinction and importantly the idea that God could act 
differently outside of the current order, re-emerges in a political twist to the distinction.  
Elsewhere in Sentences III Thomas further explored the possibility that God could have 
acted differently out of absolute power, such that, God could have embodied a woman277 
or even a non-rational (i.e. non-human) animal,278 and in other texts, God could have 
                                                 
275 See 1John 2:2, 4:10. 
276 Thom. Aqu., Scriptum Sent. III, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3 (1956), 39: ‘Ad quintum dicendum, quod 
potentia Dei non est major quantum ad essentiam quam voluntas; tamen ad plura objecta 
se extendit potentia quam voluntas; unde non sequitur, si aliquid Deus non vult, quod 
illud absoluta potentia non possit.’ 
277 See Thom. Aqu., Scriptum Sent. III, d. 12, q. 3, a. 2 (1956), 390; see similarly of 
Roland of Cremona (without the distinction terms potentia absoluta/ordinata), Summae 
Magistri Rolandi Cremonensis, A. Cortesi (ed.), III (Bergamo, 1962), 44-9. 
278 See Thom. Aqu., Scriptum Sent. III, d. 2, q. 1, a. 1(1956), 55. 
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effected salvation other than through the incarnation,279 reveal someone’s damnation to 
him,280 change the will of a demon to good 281 and even annihilate everything created. 282 
In another lengthy discussion, this time from his Quaestiones disputatae, Thomas uses 
the negative situation of being unable to walk when applying the power distinction to 
illustrate how God’s ordering of things causes a limitation on absolute power. With a 
broken foot one is completely unable to walk but if walking is not possible because of the 
prevailing condition of being seated, then the inability is termed, ex suppositone.       
Thomas states: 
For even as the divine goodness is made manifest through these things 
that are and through this order of things, so could it be made manifest 
through other creatures and another order. Therefore the divine will 
without prejudice to his goodness, justice and wisdom, can extend to 
other things besides those which he has made. And this is where they 
erred, for they thought that the created order was commensurate with 
divine goodness, as if apart from that order divine goodness could not 
have been expressed. It is clear then that God absolutely can do 
otherwise than he has done. Since, however, he cannot make 
contradictories to be true at the same time, it can be said ex suppositione 
that God cannot make other things besides those he has made; for if we 
suppose that he does not wish to do otherwise, or that he foresaw that 
he would not do otherwise, as long as the supposition stands, he cannot 
do otherwise, understood in the composite, not the divided sense.283 
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Not being able to walk because of a broken foot does not involve choice but simple 
inability, and so with walking and not walking being opposites, and therefore a 
contradiction, then this is not question of power. Alternatively, not walking because of 
remaining seated implies a self-chosen restriction or condition. In this passage, what God 
is able to do is not restricted by goodness, justice and wisdom, as Thomas points out, it is 
that all that we know of God’s goodness, justice and wisdom is a reflection of the current 
order and not their full extent. Those who ‘erred’ refers to the philosophers, such as 
Aristotle, who said that God only acts out of necessity and theologians, such as Peter 
Almalar, (possibly Abelard), who say God cannot act outside of divine justice and 
wisdom. Courtenay explains that, ‘as with others of his generation, Thomas identified 
potentia ordinata with the total divine plan, but he did not identify divine wisdom with 
the present order of things. God’s goodness, wisdom and justice could have been 
expressed through some other pre-ordained system. The present order, therefore, is a 
product of the divine will; it is not the only and necessary product of the divine nature 
and wisdom… Other theoretically possible arrangements or orders about which Thomas 
speculated reveal the extent of divine freedom and the degrees to which the present order 
is not a full reflection of divine wisdom and justice.’284 In remaining faithful to his created 
order, God has set conditions which in effect apply a restriction such that we experience 
his attributes in the limited sense of his ordained rather than absolute power. Thomas uses 
the distinction here to show that God could have acted other than he has done, in that 
other options were possible in the past, though there is no reference in this passage to 
applying this principle to present or future events.  
On the whole, Thomas makes a solid contribution to the debate, and his pointer towards 
the idea that what is not actualised in the present order does not mean, with the appropriate 
conditions, that it does not become possible in a different order, prepared the ground for 
more radical interpretations of the distinction. As with Albert, Thomas is seen as both 
promoting philosophical ideas while upholding the primacy of theology. Steenbergen 
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notes that Mandonnet describes Thomas as ‘the very friendly but independent judge’ of 
Aristotle and concludes that, ‘he [Thomas], pays great attention to the Graeco-Arabic 
doctrines, and refutes them with care.285 Both Thomas and Albert utilised Graeco-Arabic 
ideas as philosophical tools to arrive at different solutions from Aristotle such that the 
world has not just proceeded from God in a necessarianistic order but that God chose the 
effects that order the world and has the power to change the order of things. This notion 
became essential to the ensuing theological thinking that readily employed the power 
distinction to consider the possibility of change to the present order. By applying 
philosophical methods in a charged climate where theology and philosophy were seen as 
harmonious by some, distinct by others or maybe just either helpful or dangerous 
companions, the works of Albert and Thomas received a mixed response. Some regarded 
these two prominent Dominicans as being supportive of this Graeco-Arabic philosophical 
permeation and yet others regarded them as being more cautious about such philosophical 
developments. Although different conclusions are possible, they certainly incorporated 
philosophical ideas when utilising the power distinction to present their theological ideas 
and effectively built the kind of solid platform that Eckhart relished jumping off to take 
his followers into the unknown. 
 
Church politics, canon law and more trouble in Paris 
 
The emerging university system and developing philosophical and theological study, 
supported by mendicant finance, saw various new treatments to the power distinction and 
the impact of these was not restricted to the world of acadaemia. As legal systems for the 
Church and state were being devised, the distinction was used as a vehicle for applying 
canon law and modifying the parameters of ecclesiastical power.  
Before the middle of the 13th century, everything that God did, whether by the cause of 
nature or by miraculous intervention, was generally understood as being within his 
ordained will, the potentia ordinata. Alternatively the potentia absoluta was a more 
abstract area in which there may or may not be things that God could possibly do, but 
would not actually do. Albert and Thomas had maintained that what God does is within 
his ordained will, while opening the door of suggestion that God has the power to do more 
than what is seen in the present order of things. It was Peter of Tarantasia (c.1225–1276 
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AD), the first Dominican to become pope, (Innocent V), who moved this idea of possible 
action into the framework of how God’s ordained will is executed in the present order 
suggesting:  
If one considers things from the standpoint of ordo simpliciter (i.e. if 
one identifies potentia ordinata with ordo simpliciter), then God only 
acts and can only act de potentia ordinata. If, however, one considers 
things from the standpoint of ordo ut nunc (and so defines potentia 
ordinata), then God can do things de potentia absoluta that he does not 
do de potentia ordinata. 286  
Probably without intention, Peter had connected God’s ordained actions with intrinsic 
power in floating the idea that God could act in the present, ordo ut nunc, to change the 
present order. As we have seen previously, intrinsic power was just power unrelated to 
action or to actions that were hypothetical. As Courtenay comments, ‘Peter was obviously 
sensitive to the problem and wished to affirm that God never acts without order, even in 
his miracles. Yet his formulation left the impression that actions in contradiction of the 
present order would be actions de potentia absoluta.’287 This questioning of the ordained 
will of God was not acceptable to everyone and Bonaventure, along with Richard Rufus 
of Cornwall, recognised the limitations of the power distinction maintaining a position, 
not unlike Anselm, that emphasised the stability of the present order as the ordained will 
of God. As Courtenay writes, ‘any discussion of what God could do or could have done 
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outside the order of his wisdom and justice established, attributed to God the possibility 
of doing what was not good, just or wise. Since such actions, even theoretically 
entertained, would contradict the divine nature, they were for Bonaventure not a form of 
power but of impotence that should not be associated with God.’288  
What had been a topic for theological discussion about the nature and actions of sovereign 
power became a tool in the debate about the practical execution of the current order in the 
light of canon law and ensuing ecclesiastical power struggles. The power distinction had 
long been a means of understanding God’s freedom to choose his actions from a larger 
sphere of possibilities but now the analogy between divine and human volition and 
capacity was also being considered. As papal power grew during the thirteenth century, 
so too did the need to clarify the extent of papal authority, not just in relation to the 
Church, but also the to the state, and so canon lawyers sought a formula that would 
express the relation of papal power to ecclesiastical law.289 The pope was accountable for 
upholding the unchangeable foundations of the Church (status ecclesiae), however, he 
also held the plenitude of power (plenitudo potestatis), such that he could suspend or alter 
lesser laws or create a new one if it was deemed to be for the overall good of the Church 
(ratio ecclesiae). This was an adaption of the Roman law principle of lex digna, that the 
prince is bound by the law not by necessity but his own benevolence. As the Prince, or 
King, being head of state upheld the state, so too the pope upheld the Church. And so, 
using the terms of the distinction, although the pope was bound, de potentia ordinata by 
existing law, he could de potentia absoluta, act outside of the law to implement God’s 
higher purposes. In this case, it is as if God could use the pope as his agent to alter the 
present law, in order to bring it into conformity with his general law (lex aerternalis).290  
The term plenitudo potestatis had appeared as early as the 5th century when Leo I 
formulated the pope to be the unworthy heir of Peter (indignus haeres beati Petri)291 and 
so possessing the same commission to be God’s choice as head of the Church in Rome, 
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and its legal executive. Leo, continued in the same sermon, by becoming the first pope to 
claim these legal powers for himself:  
 We are (acting) in St Peter’s place. (vice Petri fungimur),292 
although he did not include the personal merits.  
The idea of the plenitudo potestatis was about papal supremacy rather than the extent of 
power but later, in the 12th century, Gratian used it to describe the fulness of papal power 
in relation to that of the other bishops in the Church. According to Canning it was 
Gratian’s Decretum that brought, ‘some coherence out of the contradictions in the 
existing undifferentiated mass of canon law. His (Gratian’s) work, which had no official 
status, became the standard handbook for the study of the subject: a whole school of 
jurists, known as the ‘Decretists’, devoted their energies to elucidating the Decretum.293 
Also at this time, Bernard of Clairvaux expressed the personal power of the pope: 
Others have been called to a part of the care, you to plenitude of power. 
The power of others is curtailed by certain limits: yours extends also 
over those who have accepted power over others.294 
This informs the pope that he effectively holds the power to act in ways that are restricted 
to others. Canning notes that, ‘in the second half of the 12th century the body of canon 
law had been steadily growing through the marked increase in the issuing of papal 
decretals, especially during the pontificate of Alexander III.’295 The content of canon law 
was increasing and so likewise the need for law-keeping and law-making, and inevitably 
a figure at the top of the pyramid of legal executives. 
By the 13th century plenitudo potestatis was being used to present the pope’s supreme 
legislative authority and Innocent III used the term frequently to describe his supremacy 
of power and jurisdiction. Peter of Tarantasia had not made a direct connection between 
God’s power and papal power but canonists were beginning to apply the power distinction 
to matters of the canon. One early example of the spreading of the distinction into the 
territory of canon law is made by Henry of Segusio, (known as Hostiensis c.1200–1271 
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AD), in his Lectura in qinque Decretalium from around the year 1270 AD. Just as Peter 
Damian had questioned why God could not restore the virgin, Hostiensis questioned a 
statement of Innocent III on the inability of a pope to release a monk from his vow of 
poverty. Innocent had observed that not even the pope could do this, since the vow of 
poverty, like that of chastity, was an essential part of the monastic state.296 Yet, if God 
could suspend the laws of nature, why could the pope not retract from the decisions that 
his predecessors had taken, given that the absolute power of the pope is rooted in the 
absolute power of God? Hostiensis proposed that the pope, out of his plenitudo potestatis, 
could suspend the vow for the greater good, ratio status ecclesiae, not as an action de 
potestate ordinate but de absoluta. Furthermore, this extraordinary act, permissible 
because of the situation, could be executed without consultation with the cardinals. By 
moving from the abstract realm of possibilities to the real power of the plenitudo 
potestatis, the potentia absoluta could now be used to explain the nature of a power 
available for extraordinary human actions and in particular those of the pope.  The 
canonists had hereby devised a way for the pope to change or create laws by acting 
absoluta, even if God never could, because when God acts in an extraordinary way, this 
is still part of his ordained will.297 This move was not only theologically questionable, but 
also realistically unstable because whenever the pope and his advisors changed, there 
were inevitably going to be changes of mind, interest and allegiance. As Courtenay states, 
‘the potential arbitrariness in the exercise of any form of human sovereignty, an 
arbitrariness deplored but widely recognised in mediaeval society, contained serious 
dangers for the understanding of God and for the distinction of absolute and ordained 
power if applied to the concept of divine power.’298 It is a dangerous movement that opens 
the possibility for a human organisation to act in a way comparable with Almighty God.  
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Meanwhile, another issue that had been simmering in Paris was about to re-surface. As 
noted above, the late 12th and early 13th centuries had seen the influx of Graeco-Arabic 
thought into the theology departments of European universities including Paris. The 
relationship between the Church and the university in Paris remained generally workable 
although disquiet on this issue grew as the response from the Church remained mixed. In 
1210 AD the Provincial Council of Paris had prohibited both the public and private 
teaching of Aristotle’s ‘natural philosophy’ and this ban was imposed under pain of 
excommunication and particularly applied to the growing university of Paris.299 Further 
warnings followed later when Gregory IX cautioned the masters of Paris not to rely too 
heavily on philosophy in their teaching. By the middle of the century the warnings 
continued but it is questionable whether concerns, rather than doctrinal, were now more 
political, reflecting rivalry between mendicants and seculars. Also inter-mendicant rivalry 
was stirring because while Franciscan dominance within papal circles had grown, so too 
had Dominican influence in Paris. By using the ideas of Aristotle, although forming 
different answers, the cause of Aristotle had been advanced by Dominicans, Albert and 
Thomas. Meanwhile in the Franciscan camp, there was a mixture of opinion, and in 
contrast with the extensive use of the distinction by those associated with Alexander of 
Hales, Bonaventure expressed concerns about Aristotle and ‘Arab’ philosophers in the 
Lenten series of 1273 AD.300 The open indifference to continued warnings by some, and 
yet clear objections by others to this intrusion of philosophy initiated a papal response on 
January 18, 1277 AD, when John XXI, wrote to Bishop Tempier in Paris and asked him 
to conduct an inquiry about dangerous doctrines which were reported to be circulating 
about the University. The letter described the worrisome problem that the clear streams 
of the Catholic faith was in danger of being polluted.301 Tempier was asked to determine 
by whom and where these errors were being propagated, and to report back to John XXI 
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as soon as possible. Instead, he formed a commission of sixteen theologians, including 
Henry of Ghent (c.1217–1293 AD),302 and had a list of 219 propositions drawn up quickly 
that the masters at Paris were allegedly teaching on the authority of Aristotle. Without 
reporting his findings back to the pope, he issued the condemnation of March 7, 1277 
AD, on his own authority.303 The theory that the condemnations were an attempt to re-
assert divine omnipotence and potentia absoluta in opposition to the necessitarianism of 
radical Aristotelianism may have been overstated. Courtenay explains that, ‘among the 
proscribed articles were those that maintained that God could not do the impossible,304 
that he acted from necessity305 and that he could not do other than he does.306… None of 
the condemned propositions had directly challenged the distinction of absolute and 
ordained power … No suspect proposition hinged on the difference between capacity and 
volition.’307 It seems the reason for these condemnations may have been theological but 
the political wranglings and desire to establish power may have been strong motives also. 
The effects likewise are unclear and more recent research suggests theological scholars 
were careful, but did not suddenly avoid Aristotle, while non-theological faculties 
continued to openly embrace Aristotelian logic to the development of their studies. What 
the condemnations did not solve was the continuing crisis over mendicant privileges, and 
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it was this dispute that would lead to significant changes in the definition and use of the 
distinction.308  
Towards the end of the 13th century, the power distinction had become increasingly 
exposed to philosophical ideas but seemed even more vulnerable to political misuse and 
the 1277 AD condemnations proved to be nothing more than a temporary side-step. With 
the prevalent thinking of the day now proposing a contingent rather than necessary world, 
and God being free to make choices, then so too by analogy were humans, and the 
requirement of this freedom is a sphere of possibilities from which choices are made. 
Canonists could now compare human choice with divine will. Bonaventure showed 
concern that applying a canonist interpretation to the power distinction compromised the 
divine nature and placed God in a temporal setting. The idea of a deliberating God raises 
the problem of God taking time to make decisions and divine action is being likened to, 
and thereby moderated by human frailty. Despite these reservations among some 
Franciscans, followers of Alexander of Hales, and Dominicans in general embraced the 
canonist application before it became a tool in the on-going struggle between old rivals.    
The University of Paris, while growing in prestige, also became a backdrop for the 
increasing needle between secular clerics and theologians and their scholarly counterparts 
from the mendicant orders. The increasingly influential Church and expanding mendicant 
orders meant that, while so strongly entwined, power struggles were inevitable and the 
canonist modification to the power distinction provided the platform for the dispute 
between seculars and mendicants to be brought to a head. As noted earlier, during the 
middle of the century, papal power had begun to favour the mendicants over the seculars 
who became increasingly perturbed by their lack of privileges in terms of ministry and 
receiving legacies, and more personally, that they could not even be buried in a mendicant 
cemetry. The distinction in the power of God became a distinction in papal power as 
secular theologians adopted canonist proposals claiming there was extra or supra legum 
to the law as the ordained will of God. Against the canonist position Petrus de Trabibus 
said that while God retained the ability to do other things than those pre-ordained, it could 
never happen that he would act otherwise,309 and the absoluta did not refer to any actions. 
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This view follows those proposed by his master, Peter of John Olivi who in turn had been 
a student of Bonaventure, and so there is a case for the display of inherited loyalty. 
Alternatively, this was about establishing mendicant power against what was now the 
rising influence of secular clergy and theologians. Papal power was the issue when Olivi 
drafted the idea of papal infallibility in 1280 AD to prevent subsequent popes from 
rescinding a ruling favorable to Franciscans made by the Exiit, decree of Pope Nicholas 
III in 1279 AD. Also Martin IV issued the ‘Ad fructus uberes’ bull in 1281 AD, which 
included for example, the right to hear confessions without the penitent having to repeat 
the confession to his parish priest. These edicts extended privileges to mendicants that 
were previously only held by the clergy and so increased the fears of the secular clergy 
that their authority and position in the parish, and therefore also their stream of income, 
would diminish.   
As popes changed, issues of papal favour moved on without resolution until 1290 AD 
when Nicholas IV, the first Franciscan pope, sent two cardinals to Paris to settle matters 
between mendicants and seculars.310 This became not just a debate about what mendicants 
or secular clergy could do, but also about the authority of the pope to act both within 
canon law and in additional ways, suggesting the parallel with divine action not just out 
of ordained but also absolute power. Henry of Ghent, taking up the mantle of William of 
St. Amour for the secular clerics, was looking for change following Martin’s bull, and in 
a quodlibet from around 1284 AD he considered the distinction between what is possible 
and what is impossible. In language remeniscent of Aquinas, Henry proposes, 
in one sense those things are impossibile that are contradictory or 
repugnant to the common course and order of things. In another sense, 
however, some things repugnant to nature can be done by a 
supernatural power.311  
In discussing the nature of things that would be impossible, Henry is suggesting that if 
something contains a contradiction or repugnancy, then in the present order it is 
impossible but this should not rule out its possibility through a power that is extra to 
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ordinary power. The emphasis is not on God’s power or God’s will but on the order of 
things. When speaking about God, Henry’s language and thoughts can be seen in Thomas, 
Bonaventure and Anselm as he emphasises the immutability of God and his ordained will, 
and absolute power is just hypothetical. Even more significant for this discussion though 
is how Henry applied the power distinction to consider papal power in an unprinted tract 
which only survives in one manuscript, dated around 1288-9 AD by Palémon Glorieux 
and transcribed in a work by John Marrone.312 As seen above, the secular masters were 
concerned that the ‘friars’ interpretation of “Ad fructus uberes” would have meant that 
most penitents would have never confessed all their sins to their parish priests. The 
seculars, among them Henry, retorted that the pope must have intended penitents to 
confess all their sins of the past year to the parish priests, including those previously 
confessed to the friars. For, they argued, by the mendicant interpretation, Martin IV would 
have withdrawn parishioners from the jurisdiction of their bishops and curates. Such an 
act, they contended would have subverted the Church’s divine structure since the 
jurisdiction of prelates came from Christ and not the pope.’313 Henry held the delicate 
position of fronting the cause of the coalition of Parisian secular masters and French 
bishops in a constitutional dilemma questioning the nature and limits of the powers held 
by those above him in the Church’s hierarchy. He described three decrees that a ruler 
could make: 
1. Those that involve ‘an inconveniens that stands against natural and divine law, 
against which (even) the legislator cannot impose or concede (anything) or from 
which he cannot dispense’. Henry cited the example of a ruler who commanded a 
sword to be returned to a madman and this would be evil.314 
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2. ‘A statute or law that in itself, in se, is just and fair, but at certain times may 
contain an inconveniens.’ In this case the ruler ordered the madman’s sword to be 
returned to his brother, an act not sinful in itself but resulting in evil when the 
brother inevitably handed over the sword to the madman.315 
3.  The decrees which did not harm subjects under any circumstances. This class is 
not not directly referred to but promulgated by the discussion and portrays 
ordained power.  
Henry has used the power distinction by framing the possible actions of a ruler, who 
legislates for the Church, clearly intended to be the pope, in a way that almost parallels 
the argument used by Thomas Aquinas,316 to consider the actions of God in whether the 
Father could assume flesh. Rather than a discussion about the absolute power of God, 
Henry was expanding the secular view on the extent of the plenitudo potestatis and so it 
is case 2 which requires further scrutiny. Henry was careful when referring to case 1, and 
stated that the papal endorsement of the mendicant view belonged to cases 2 and 3,317 and 
so he avoided the tricky ground of papal actions that could lead to the deposition of a 
pope. In case 2 he defined absolute power as power used sinfully but validly and so unlike 
other theologians he refused to credit God with an absolute power by which he could 
perform acts that could not be done by his ordained power, since this implied God could 
act unjustly.318 In this typically secular view opposing mendicant privileges, Henry 
distances God from acting out of absolute power but in contrast identifies absolute power 
with the plenitudo potestatis to imply human rulers, such as the pope, could indeed act 
sinfully, and he cemented his case by citing an earlier text of Bernard of Clairvaux.319 As 
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appendix ii. See Bernard of Clairvaux, De Consideratione, in (eds) J. Leclercq, H. M. 
Rochais, S. Bernardi Opera Omnia, 3 (Rome, 1963), 442, 444. 
119 
 
Marrone explains, ‘Henry thus argued that the pope certainly could abolish the need for 
reiterated confessions by his absolute power. He suggested that although such a measure 
did not go counter to divine or natural law by its very nature, it could seriously subvert 
the Church’s divine structure under certain circumstances… His attempt to mark off an 
area of papal action, that area pertaining to the pope’s absolute power which, although it 
did not violate divine law was, nevertheless, sinful because it harmed the community’s 
well-being by violating its fundamental laws, was much more forward-looking and novel 
than the bishops’ position.’320 Canonists had considered the idea of the pope acting 
outside of the law, but never in a sinful way, and the thought that Church rulers could 
violate divine law suggested that maybe even the pope could sin and be deposed, although 
Henry did not go that far.321 
Undoubtedly his aim was for secular gains after earlier losses to the mendicants but his 
strong views to the pope’s representatives in 1290 AD, including Benedict Gaetani 
(Boniface VIII), led to Henry’s suspension from lecturing. For the mendicants, Giles of 
Rome was keen to keep the status quo, and did not equate the plenitudo potestatis with 
potentia absoluta for either God or the pope. He pointed out that papal jurisdiction is not 
a function of absolute ability, but ability in conformity to laws.322 Giles courted popularity 
with both Church hierarchy and French royalty, and this muscle was used to remove 
Henry from office in a victory for the extension of papal power. A more balanced level 
of power between mendicants and seculars was never attained during Henry’s lifetime 
but ironically, it was Boniface VIII in Super Cathedram of 1300 AD who did 
subsequently reduce mendicant privileges and allow any man to be buried in a mendicant 
friary, as long as a quarter of his estate was donated to the Parish.     
Even with these rulings determining papal power, mendicant privileges and secular 
equality, when thinking of the power of God, the potentia absoluta had generally 
remained the sphere of possibility. Secular theologians, in particular Henry of Ghent, had 
applied canonist thinking and made the analogy between divine potentia absoluta and 
                                                 
320 J. Marrone, ‘The Absolute and the Ordained Powers of the Pope’ (1974), 18. 
321 Henry also referred to the absolute and ordained powers of rulers in another work, 
Quodlibet XIV, q. 8. In this discussion, he also equated absolute power with power 
sinfully and unjustly used, although licit. See J. Marrone, ‘The Absolute and the Ordained 
Powers of the Pope’ (1974), 17. 
322 See W.J. Courtenay, Capacity and Volition (1990), 100. 
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papal plenitudo potestatis but now, at the turn of the 14th century, radical input to the issue 
came from a Franciscan. John Duns Scotus (c.1266–1308 AD), was born in Scotland, 
hence the nickname Scotus, studied at Oxford and lectured on the Sentences in Paris 
where he was appointed Regent Master in 1304 AD before transferring to the Franciscan 
Studium in Cologne in 1307 AD.323 Scotus is the most notable theologian of this period 
for using the power distinction with a tendency towards an operationalisation of the 
potentia absoluta in a manner that can be connected with the regulations and range of 
papal power. When using the distinction in his discussion on justification and grace, in 
his treatment on the beatific vision and his work on ethics and moral theory, he is in line 
with the Summa Halensis and Thomas. However, when he applies the distinction in his 
Ordinatio treating Lombard’s distinction 44, Scotus adopts canonist language to define 
God’s power: 
In every agent acting intelligently and voluntarily that can act in 
conformity with an upright or just law but does not have to do so of 
necessity, one can distinguish between its ordained power and its 
absolute power. The reason is that either it can act in conformity with 
some right and just law, and then it is acting according to its ordained 
power... or else it can act beyond or against such a law, and in this case 
its absolute power exceeds its ordained power. And therefore it is not 
only in God, but in every free agent that can either act in accord with 
the dictates of a just law or go beyond or against the law, that one 
distinguishes between absolute and ordained power; therefore, the 
jurists say that someone can act ‘de facto’, that is according to his 
absolute power, or ‘de iure’, that is according to his ordained legal 
power.324 
A connection is made between law-making at a divine level or at a human one such that 
whatever it is possible for God to do, could in theory be possible for any free agent. The 
idea of power is replaced by the law which can be upheld or otherwise by God or indeed 
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any free agent. The distinction is now between the established law as the ordained option, 
de iure, or the potentiality (‘can’) of going beyond or against the law, de facto, as 
exercising the absolute one. This is not two forms of power but two forms of action that 
can be chosen, and therefore not necessary. Scotus is defining the potentia absoluta as a 
potential divine action that, ‘allows one to act outside and against the legal structure.’325 
This would be a significant step from earlier ideas by applying a canonist interpretation 
to the theological model and Hester Gelber likewise notes that, whereas William of 
Auxerre, Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure and Aquinas consider absolute power as what 
God could have done otherwise, Scotus, seems to be suggesting, along with the canonists, 
that God, through his absolute power, can still do otherwise.326 However Scotus continues 
by refining his position: 
Whenever the law and its rectitude are in the power of the agent, so that 
the law is right only because it has been established, then the agent can 
freely order things otherwise than this right law dictates and still act 
orderly, because he can establish another right or just law according to 
which he may act orderly. In such a case it is not simply necessary that 
his absolute power exceed his ordered power, because his action might 
still be ordered according to another law, just as it had been earlier, but 
he would still exceed his ordained power according to the prior law, if 
he acted beyond or against such. This could be illustrated in the case of 
a ruler and his subjects in regards to a positive law.327  
According to Gelber, Scotus is proposing that, God’s absolute power enables him to 
suspend one ordained order and substitute another ordained order for the first one. God’s 
absolute and ordained powers work in tandem, one enabling suspension of an enacted 
statute and the other ensuring that God never acts inordinately but only in a way that 
accords with his legislated will. Because God has the power to endow a created statute 
with governing power, his absolute power transcends any particular order of created law. 
He can establish a new legal order if he so desires: 
                                                 
325 W.J. Courtenay, Capacity and Volition (1990), 102. 
326 See H.G. Gelber, It Could Have Been Otherwise, Contingency and Necessity in 
Dominican Theology at Oxford, 1300–1350 (Leiden, Boston, 2004), 313.  




Hence, I say that many other things can be done orderly; and many 
things that do not include a contradiction other than those that conform 
to present laws can occur in an ordained way when the rectitude of such 
law - according to which one acts rightly and orderly – lies in the power 
of the agent himself. And therefore such an agent can act otherwise, so 
that he establishes another upright law, which, if it were set up by God, 
would be right, because no law is right except insofar as the divine will 
accepts it as established. And in such a case the absolute power of the 
agent in regard to something would not extend anything other than what 
might happen ordinately if it occurred, not indeed ordainedly with 
respect to this present order, but ordinately with reference to some other 
order that the divine will could set up if it were able to act in such a 
way.328  
But such a use of his absolute power is not a form of direct action in the world, only a 
form of action mediated through successive ordained systems.329  
Although Duns Scotus comes close to understanding absolute power as acting power – 
which would be a serious deviation from all previous positions – for him any action is not 
completed by absolute power, but has only been made possible by absolute power, acted 
upon by subsequent ordained power. Everything that happens is part of God’s ordained 
will and God is able to change or set aside this universal order for a new one.  
Scotus also presented how God can act in a particular situation in a manner that would 
seem contrary to the current universal order: 
Keep in mind also that what is ordained and happens regularly can 
occur in two ways: One way is with reference to a universal order. This 
would involve common law, like the common law that ordains that 
“every impenitent sinner must be damned” (as if a king were to 
establish the law that every murderer is to die). The second way is with 
reference to a particular order. This involves a particular judgment or 
decision that does not pertain to a universal law, since a law has to do 
with cases in general, whereas in a singular case what is involved is not 
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a general law, but rather a decision according to law about something 
that is against the law (for instance, a decision that this murderer is to 
die).  
I say, therefore, that God can act otherwise than is prescribed not only 
by a particular order, but also by a universal order or law of justice, and 
in doing so he could still act ordainedly, because what God could do by 
his absolute power that is either beyond or runs counter to the present 
order, he could do ordainedly.330    
The text distinguishes between the universal prescriptions that, ‘every murderer should 
die,’ and the particular application of the law, ‘this murderer should die.’ Scotus proposed 
that particular cases that set aside the universal prescriptions of that law do not subvert it, 
but constitute a particularised application of the universal order.331 Scotus illustrates his 
point by proposing that God in his mercy could prevent someone from being damned 
even if they died in a state of sin. The universal rule is that the unrepentant sinner is 
damned but in a particular case God could supersede justice with mercy and this would 
be a particular act within God’s order rather than an action of absolute power. 
Alternatively, Scotus declared that it was not possible, in the specific case, for Judas to 
be saved within the current dispensation through an ordained judgment, however, because 
to do so would not include a contradiction, God could substitute the current ordained 
system for a new one and this would be through absolute power: 
But we speak of ordained power in reference only to an order 
established by a universal law, and not to that which rightly holds by 
law for a particular case. This is clear from the fact that it is possible 
for God to save one whom he does not actually save, a living sinner 
who will die, however, without repenting and will be damned. 
Admittedly, however, God could not in the same way save Judas, who 
is already damned. (But for God’s absolute power not even this is 
impossible, since it does not include a contradiction.) … God could 
foresee that Judas could be saved by his ordained power – not what is 
now his ordained power, for at present Judas could only be saved by 
God’s absolute power: but Judas’ salvation could have been 
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accomplished by God’s ordained power in another order he might have 
set up.332  
Scotus seems to be covering all bases by firstly saying there are particular things that God 
could do within the current order, even if it is against what is perceived as God’s universal 
law, and then out of absolute power God could hypothetically change things by making 
a different order. By using legal language, the parallel is being made between human will 
and divine will. Both God and people have the freedom of will to act, and both act within 
the ordained system. However, in the way God can act absolutely by making a new order, 
man can also then act in changing a law or creating a new one.   
In a similar manner, in his Lectura, Scotus prepares the ground for someone other than 
God, to act in a way that it was previously thought only God could act, that is, without 
bounds.333 In his Ordinatio, Scotus is dealing with Lombard’s question of what God could 
do, but here the power distinction is being applied directly to the law. The parallel is made 
between God, who acts either within his ordained sphere or beyond, and someone 
important, such as a king in this text. Scotus is incorporating canonist language though 
stopping short of a canonist position with absolute power only possible within the divine 
will. As Courtenay observes, ‘the emphasis Scotus placed on law-changing and on God’s 
unhindered ability to act outside and against his established laws allowed potentia 
absoluta to appear as a form of extraordinary divine action, supra legem.’334 Gelber points 
out that Courtenay would be wrong to suggest that Scotus is proposing that God acts 
directly in the world out of absolute power and that God is not able to start acting 
absolutely in the current order but he is able to set aside the current one in favour of 
another. Scotus hereby maintains both divine free will and the contingency of created 
reality335 in a view proposing that God is capable of ‘doing something new’ without 
‘changing his mind’ based on considering how God acts everything in a single instance 
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of eternity. It is not that he could deviate from his own plan, but God, because he 
actualises creation simultaneously with all possibilities, can in the present tense, do 
otherwise than he does. Gelber states, ‘From God’s perspective, no extension of time 
exists in which his creation, taken as a whole, could become other than it is. It can (present 
tense) be other than it is because possibility and actuality are indexed to the same moment 
of divine present time, but creation does not become other than it is.’336  
In more concrete terms, Scotus was using a theological distinction to permit a change of 
law that could be justified as being within the divine order. There is no possibility of God 
changing his mind and yet Scotus was looking to justify the pope being able to change 
the law as it stood. This may have been a response to the reduction of mendicant privileges 
by Super Cathedram as well as his own personal situation. Despite being presented to the 
Bishop of Lincoln in 1300 AD, Scotus was denied the license to hear confession and so 
he would certainly be keen for the possibility of enabling a pope to change rules set down 
by previous ones.  
The power distinction could well have been adopted here to provide theological 
justification to the suggestion that the pope could act beyond any jurisdiction as long as 
it could be claimed to be for the good of the Church. It seems possible that, rather than a 
secular interpretation of the distinction being used to allow change in order to benefit the 
secular cause, a mendicant, following a papal swing from mendicant to secular, was now 
able to apply the distinction to press for change on behalf of the mendicant camp. Either 
way, it is clear that the power distinction was now a tool that was being utilised in the 
attempt to justify legal change theologically.  
Franciscan followers of Scotus such as John of Bassolis and Antonius Andreas continued 
this emphasis on the power to act being dependent on the one acting. Bassolis, also 
commenting on Lombard’s Sentences, Book I distinction 44, in 1313 AD and so slightly 
later than Eckhart’s Question six presented the power distinction clearly in terms of 
judicial action: 
When one acts or judges according to legislated rules, one acts de 
potentia ordinata. When one acts outside, or against the law, then one 
acts de potentia absoluta. The latter is a means of action open only to 
the law giver, who, in acting ‘absolutely’, can never act ‘inordinately’. 
Those who are subject to the law and act outside or against it, however, 
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do act ‘inordinately’, although not de potentia absoluta. They cannot 
change or override the laws that govern their actions and behaviour, 
and any violations are culpable. The prince or lawgiver, on the other 
hand, has both the power to obey and apply the laws he has made or to 
suspend or modify those laws.337    
The focus is on the prince or anyone who makes the law and those who are just subject 
to the law in this pattern for judging within the legal system that is applying a theological 
tool. The potentia absoluta is a means of action open only to the law giver who, because 
he is the law giver only acts according to the law and never inordinately. This one then, 
who makes the laws, is able to suspend or modify a law, but those who are subject to the 
law are powerless to change things. Those who are subject to the law cannot act de 
potentia absoluta and so when they act outside or against the law they do so inordinately. 
Bassolis did not specifically deal with the case of a judge but Antonius differentiated 
between the prince as law-maker and a judge as law-executor stating that,  
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a judge who does not apply the law as established by the prince acts 
improperly (non recta), while the prince himself, acting in the same 
way, would act properly.338 
Like Bassolis above, only the one who makes the law is effectively outside of the law. As 
well as certain seculars and Franciscans the juridical interpretation of the distinction was 
also applied by some Dominicans such as Pierre de Palude, a fellow Dominican and 
contemporary of Eckhart in Paris. Pierre lectured on the Sentences in Paris in 1310 – 11 
AD, was involved in the internal commission appointed in 1313 AD that led to the censure 
of fellow Dominican, Durandus of St. Pourçain and became a master in 1314 AD. Palude 
proposed that God, as the source of the law, is able to change the law and made the 
connection between divine power and human sovereignty meaning the pope, as the one 
with the power within canon law, paralleled the emperor who had executive power within 
Roman law. Courtenay notes that Pierre argued in the manner of Hostiensis such that, 
‘the pope has the power to dispense a monk from his religious vow.339 Yet the papal 
potentia absoluta did not extend to laws that were not created by the Church or that 
belonged to the status ecclesiae’,340 and so the pope could not make a dispensation 
allowing a divorced person to remarry,341 but could de potentia absoluta reverse the trend 
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of mendicant privileges and re-introduce double confession.342 In these texts papal power 
is given both its scope and limitations. 
Although it was naturally among Scotus’ Franciscan followers that this juridical 
interpretation received the most attention, it should also be noted from the Dominican 
angle, even in his work highlighting the problems with Scotus’ Sentence Commentary, 
Thomas Sutton, despite writing mostly against Scotus, accepted Scotus’ definition of the 
power distinction.343  
Alongside Scotus as a key figure of the early 14th century is fellow Franciscan, William 
of Ockham (1288–1347 AD),344 and although consideration of Ockham should be 
acknowledged as post – Eckhart, his views do bear relation to the context of Eckhart’s 
second magisterium in Paris.345 Ockham used the distinction, like Scotus, throughout his 
writings, but while he borrowed the language of the Scot, he used it to provide a 
contrasting interpretation of the distinction. Ockham emphasised, as with Aquinas, the 
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absoluta was a way to hypothesise about the things God was able to do but does not wish 
to do. For Scotus, when God changes the law he does so extraordinarily but this remains 
ordinata and never inordinata. It is within God’s power to decree another law so that his 
de facto becomes in effect de iuro.  Alternatively Ockham saw this as inordinata and so 
actioned out of absoluta, asserting that God could never act in this way that represents 
possibility, not a sphere of action. Likewise, as shown by Eugenio Randi, in order to keep 
absoluta merely as possibility, whereas Scotus said God can do things de facto that he 
cannot do de iure,346 Ockham considered them as effectively the same with de facto not 
pointing to anything actually possible, because whatever God could do, de potentia 
absoluta, that he will never do, de potentia ordinata, then de facto he will never do 
them.347 Ockham did use the idea of potentia absoluta in connection with papal power but 
unlike Scotus, and more like Olivi and Trabibus, to show that the pope is bound to uphold 
his laws once instituted. As Courtenay writes, ‘While the canonists used the distinction 
to underscore the present ability of the pope to act outside his laws, Ockham used the 
distinction to underscore the present inability of the pope to act outside ecclesiastical law 
once instituted. Ockham did not intend to identify potentia absoluta with extraordinary 
action on the part of the pope, but simply to apply to the concept of papal power, the self-
binding notion of the distinction and the pact or covenant it implied.’348 The various uses 
of the distinction by Ockham have led to extensive research but his differing proposals as 
well as personal interest in dealing with John XXII have caused diverse conclusions. The 
consensus seems to be that he erred more towards Aquinas rather than Scotus and 
generally regarded the distinction as, ‘an heuristic instrument for detecting and 
articulating the radical contingency of created reality’, while rebutting ‘the threat of the 
still pervasive Graeco-Arabic necessitarianism.’349 His contribution to the debate falls 
after Eckhart but it is worth noting that Ockham regarded this, 
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common distinction of the theologians… when… sensibly understood, 
is in harmony with the orthodox faith.350 
And he accused Pope John XXII of heresy by not accepting the distinction and ‘having 
allegedly implied in one of his sermons that everything comes about by necessity and 
nothing in a manner completely contingent.’351 
 The early years of the 14th century were turbulent as Church and state issues led to 
difficult times for the papacy. The dispute for supremacy between Philip of France and 
the Church led to the papal bull, Unam Sanctum of 1302 AD, in which there are many 
mentions of power but these are about establishing the extent of the power of the Church 
over its members, and the pope over his subjects, rather than the power distinction.   
This background has noted how the power distinction was used as a tool in the disputes 
between mendicants and seculars, theologians and philosophers, and also inter mendicant 
rivalries yet there was even inter-Dominican disputes simmering around the time of 
Eckhart. The conflict between Durandus of Pourçain and Hervaeus Natalis seemed to 
cover different issues from 1307 AD although, as previously thought, Lowe points out, 
Durandus’ first commentary on the Sentences that year was coincidental,352 and Durandus 
had attacked the Thomism of Natalis, his master in Paris earlier in 1302-3 AD. This was 
both a doctrinal and personality clash with the loyal Dominicanism and proponent of 
Thomism, Natalis at friction with the radical and sharper Durandus. Pierre de Palude and 
John of Naples also joined in the fray using their own works to question the orthodoxy of 
Durandus around 1310 AD. Natalis became a key figure in structuring the Dominican 
order by promoting equality and giving priority to the teaching of Aquinas. There is no 
evidence to suggest the power distinction was used to strengthen either case in this dispute 
within the order, and while the tension within the order would have been known to the 
Meister, it does not appear to have affected his teaching.  
                                                 
350 William of Ockham, Tractatus contra Benedictum III 3, in H.S. Offler (ed.), Opera 
Politica III (Manchester, 1956), 3:230, trans. F. Oakley, Omnipotence, Covenant and 
Order (1984), 61. 
351 F. Oakley, Omnipotence, Covenant and Order (1984), 61. 
352 See Elizabeth Lowe, ‘The Contested Theological Authority of Thomas Aquinas. The 




Clearly at the time of Eckhart the connection between papal and divine power was blurred 
as demonstrated by a question of Gerard of Saint Victor. Glorieux dates this particular 
question to a quodlibet from around 1312-13 AD but Courtenay suggests that, because 
Gerard was still regent master in 1317, this is too precise and it is only possible to date it  
as sometime between 1310 and 1317 AD. The question is recorded with others of Gerard 
in the Vat. Lat. 1086 manuscript on the folios following Eckhart’s questions, and without 
referring specifically to the power distinction, power is presented as twofold although 
without using notions of being absolute or directed. This question of power confirms that 
the issue of questioning papal power in the light of divine power was still an evocative 
issue in Paris at this time.353 Gerard considers whether the power bestowed by ordination 
should be considered as being from Christ or from the pope. This is a comment again on 
how, and by whom, political power within the church should be exercised. He proposes 
that power is from Christ but this has been given to the pope to exercise for the common 
good. Also slightly later than Eckhart’s magisterium, another Dominican master, John of 
Naples presented several questions concerning the omnipotence of God using the power 
distinction to present his views.354 Courtenay shows that John follows Thomas with the 
view that God could assume an irrational nature, de potentia absoluta, but such was 
inappropriate, de potentia ordinata.   
The theme of omnipotence was evidently common in quodlibeta in these early decades 
of the 14th century and the questioning of ideas was a key part of a student’s learning and 
testing the sharpness of a master’s mind. From the late 13th century, the potentia ordinata 
had become more than the willed actions of God as there was now the possibility of 
exceptions and God, doesn’t just possess the capacity to do other than he does, he could 
change situations by acting in an extraordinary way. Potentia absoluta meant that God is 
                                                 
353 Gerard of Saint Victor, Vat. Lat. 1086 fol. 224v. Transcription by A. Quero-Sánchez 
and I.R. Richardson, see appendix ii. See W.J. Courtenay, ‘Reflections on Vat. Lat. 1086 
and Prosper of Reggio Emilia’, O.E.S.A. in Christopher Schabel (ed.), Theological 
Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages, the Fourteenth Century (Leiden: 2007), 352-3; P. 
Glorieux, La Littérature Quodlibétique vol. II (Paris, 1935), 96.  
354 See W.J. Courtenay, Capacity and Volition (1990), 118-9, summarising John of 




not bound by necessarily actualising all possibilities and as well as being sovereign and 
sustaining power, he could also act in alternative ways in a given situation.  
By making the distinction an issue of human freedom and sovereignty the idea of de 
potentia absoluta could now be seen as the goal itself, the actual power not just to suspend 
any law of nature or ordained happening but the license to act beyond existing parameters. 
As van den Brink confirms, ‘The critical, transcendental concept of potentia absoluta is 
misunderstood as referring to a resource which is actualised from time to time in the real 
world.’355 This misuse in particular could be utilised by the pope, who as God’s 
representative, could act in a way never previously thought, as long as it could be justified 
under the category of being for the general good of the Church. It was as if absolute power 
was now a means for papal activity, claiming the authority of God, but in practice simply 
of human will.  
The early 14th century saw this increasing emphasis on how absolute power could be 
actualised and Oakley suggests the degree to which the invocation of the absolute power 
had consistently been motivated by the wish to vindicate the Old Testament vision of 
Yahweh as a personal God of power and might against the threat of philosophic 
determinism,’… matches,  ‘the affiliated discrimination of a divine ordained power,’… 
that, ‘is likewise a response to another fundamental biblical theme – that of God’s promise 
and covenant.’356 The terms and nuances used to describe how God’s omnipotence should 
be understood according to their development within context, but the fundamental notion 
of omnipotence is traceable throughout. Changes in theological, philosophical thinking, 
and to some extent, ecclesiastical power, oversaw the framing of a power distinction and 
yet both notions of the potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata are rooted in the Jewish 
scriptures. 
From this Hebrew foundation to the 14th century need to express the absolute 
omnipotence of God in contemporary terms, we find the unique place of Meister Eckhart,  
and it seems the re-appointing of Eckhart to Paris was strategic so that the Dominicans 
would have his innovative and provocative theology as a champion of their intellectual 
thrust in Paris.357 As a Dominican Magister teaching in Paris, there can be no doubt that 
                                                 
355 G. van den Brink, Almighty God (1993), 83-84.  
356 F. Oakley, Omnipotence, Covenant and Order (1984), 61. 
357 Pater Walter Senner OP explains the complex reasons for Eckhart’s 2nd Paris 
magisterium in W. Senner, ‘Meister Eckhart’s life, Training, Career and Trial’ (2013), 
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he would have been well aware of the implications when opening up this question of the 
power distinction. Likewise there should be no doubting the Meister’s awareness and 
desire to speak into the political as well as theological issues presented by this question. 
Was this the moment to engage with inter-mendicant, or inter-Dominican rivalries, or 
with the issue of papal or secular power or even that of the regency over the Church? 
Whether or not the context was the prime reason for presenting his thoughts is difficult 
to ascertain because in this transcript alone, there are no definite pointers to anything other 
than the theology and philosophy of the question. Certainly some of his predecessor’s 
treatments of the omnipotence of God, and the distinction, are considered in such a way 
that frailties in the arguments of even the revered Augustine and Thomas are exposed. 
The incisive manner of the Meister develops a line of thought that is typically radical, and 
therefore typically Eckhartian, and in some respects controversial, and yet on inspection, 
there does not seem to be an overtly political thrust. Having said this, if so desired, the 
implications of Eckhart’s notion of absolute power would have strengthened the hand of 
anyone seeking to justify the possession of an excessive amount of power and control.   
                                                 
26-8. See also Christopher M. Wojtulewicz, 'Theology and Speculation at the University 
of Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century' in P. Gemeinhardt and T. Georges (eds), 




Part II. Parisian Question six  
Introduction 
 
The focus for this part of the thesis is the actual text of the question under investigation.  
The following codex and earlier transcriptions have been used to produce a new 
transcription and English translation. 
 
V = Codex Vaticanus Latinus 1086, olim Prosper de Reggio, 1312-23 AD. 
gr = Martin Grabmann, Neuaufgefundene Pariser Quaestionen Meister Eckharts und ihre 
Stellung in seinem geistigen Entwicklungsgange (Munich: 1927), 115. 
d = Magistri Eckardi Quaestiones Parisienses, (ed.) Antoine Dondaine, commentariolum 
de Eckardi Magisterio adiunxit Raymundus Klibansky, Magistri Eckardi Opera Latina, 
XIII (Leipzig, 1936), 32-4. 
st = Loris Sturlese, Magistri Echardi, Quaestiones Parisienses, LW V Supplementum, 
(ed.) and (German) trans. Josef Koch, Bernhard Geyer, Eric Seeberg, Loris Sturlese 
(2006), 461-2.   
se = Pater Walter Senner O.P., forthcoming, to be published by Reclam. 
  
Citation of the Latin Works (LW) and German Works (DW): 
[Abbreviated title of the text] n. [paragraph number], (L(D)W [volume], [page 
number(s)], [line number(s)]). For example: In Ex. n. 30 (LW II 36,7). 
 
DW and LW = Meister Eckhart. Die deutschen und lateinischen Werke, Hrsg. im Auftrag 
der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft (Stuttgart, 1956-2015). 
 
Question Six 
Meister Eckhart, Quaest. Par. VI, (LW I/2) 461-2, (ed.) L. Sturlese (Stuttgart, 2015). 
 
The Bible version used for the parallels in the critical apparatus is Biblia Sacra iuxta 
Vulgatam Versionem, … recensuit et brevi apparatu critico instruxit Robertus Weber … 
editionem quartam emendatam … praeparavit Roger Gryson (Stuttgart, 1994) (Sigle: v). 
 
The codex contains many words that are abbreviated and so it has been important to 
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consider as clearly as possible what the intended word actually is or could be. Also the 
nature of the notes recorded is such that words are omitted that today are necessary in 
order to make the text flow with understanding.   
 
[ … ] =  Words enclosed by square brackets are not in the text but are implied by the text.   
< … > =  Words in delta brackets have been added to the translation of the transcription 
to help the flow or understanding of the translation.  
               
Critical text and translation 
 
The text, critical apparatus and English translation have the following structure: 
 
1 Latin text 
2 Codex and Editions 
3 OT and NT Parallels 
4 Critical Apparatus 
5 Eckhart parallels 
6 Earlier or contemporary parallels 





1 Utrum omnipotentia, que est in Deo, debeat attendi secundum 
potentiam absolutam vel secundum potentiam ordinatam? 
q6 
 
V fol. 222va; 1 Utrum] gr 115; d 32,13; st 461,1; se 32,1. 
Gen. 17:1, 35:11; Exod. 6:3, 15:3; Job 11:7; Ps. 24:10; Ezek. 10:5; Amos 4:13; Rev. 1:8, 4:8, 11:17, 15:3, 
19:6. 
1 In Ex. n. 27 (LW II 32,6-8): ‘et  secundo quomodo in scriptura et a doctoribus et sanctis dicatur deus 
quaedam non posse’. 
1-2 John Duns Scotus, Lectura I, d. 44, q. un., n.3, 5, (1966), 533-4: ‘Dicendum quod quando est agens 
quod conformiter agit legi et rationi rectae, – si non limitetur et alligetur illi legi, sed illa lex subest 
voluntati suae, potest ex potentia absoluta aliter agere; ... sicut, ponatur quod aliquis esset ita liber (sicut 
rex) qod possit facere legem et eam mutare, tunc praeter illam legem de potentia sua absoluta aliter 
potest agere, quia potest legem mutare et aliam statuere ... Et sic patet quomodo debet intelligi quod 
Deus potest facere de potentia absoluta quod non potest de potentia ordinata’; Ordinatio I, d. 44, q. un., 
n. 3 (1963), 364: ‘Et ideo non tantum in Deo, sed in omni agente libere – qui potest agere secundum 
dictamen legis rectae et praeter talem legem vel contra eam – est distinguere inter potentiam ordinatam 
et absolutam; ideo dicunt iuristae quod aliquis hoc potest facere de facto, hoc est de potentia sua absoluta, 
– vel de iure, hoc est de potentia ordinata secundum iura.’   
1-2 Johannes Bassolis, Super I Sent, d. 44, q. un. (1517), fol. 213vb: ‘Nam potentia ordinata est in agente 
tali quando agit secundum regulam rectam institutam, sed quando agit contra illam vel praeter legem 
tunc dicitur potentia absoluta, eo modo quod iuristae distinguunt posse de facto et de iure. Quando autem 
illa lex non est in potestate agentis sed est instituta ab alio cui subiectum est tale agens, tunc potentia 
eius absoluta non potest excedere potentiam eius ordinatam circa aliqua obiecta in agendo inordinate. 
Quicquid enim potest et agit circa materiam legis praeter legem vel contra legem potius inordinate potest 
et agit. Si autem agens non sit subditum legi sed lex sit in potestate agentis, et cum hoc etiam rectitudo 
legis, ita quod lex non est sibi lex nec est recta nisi quia instituta a tali agente, tunc potest agens aliter 
ordinare ex libertate…, et tunc planum est quod in tali agente potentia absoluta excedit ordinatam 
secundum unam legem sine omni deordinatione vel inordinatione, sed cum alia ordinatione vel lege. Et 
possent poni exempla de lege mere positiva et principe potestatem ipsam cum subditis suis, sed non 
curo’; Joannes de Napoli, Quaestiones variae disputatae, q. 3, punctum 3, ad 3 (1618), 25-6: ‘Non enim 
omne prius potest virtute divina absolvi a posteriori, quantitas enim non potest fieri sine figura etiam de 
potentia Dei absoluta, supposito secundum  communem doctrinam quod Deus non possit facere quantum 
infinitum … Vel dicendum quod si Deus de potentia absoluta conferret alicui gratiam sine charitate, talis 
esset dignus vita aeterna non simpliciter, cum supponatur carere charitate, sed secundum quid, idest 
ratione gratiae; sicut si Deus alicui de potentia absoluta conferret visionem beatam sine dilectione et 
fruitione, talis esset beatus non simpliciter, sed secundum quid, utpote cui conferretur lumen gloriae 
secundum visionem tantum’;  Quaestiones variae disputatae, q. 36, punctum 2, p.313, ‘Quamvis autem 
de potentia absoluta Deus potuerit naturam irrationalem assumere, ut supra probatum est, tamen de 
potentia ordinata non decuit quod assumeretur’; William of Ockham, Quodlibeta septem VI, q. 1, Opera 
Theologica (1980), 585-6: ‘Quaedam potest Deus facere de potentia ordinata et aliqua de potentia 
absoluta. Haec distinctio non est sic intelligenda quod in Deo sint realiter duae potentiae quarum una sit 
ordinata et alia absoluta, quia unica potentia est in Deo ad extra, quae omni modo est ipse Deus. Nec sic 
est intelligenda quod aliqua potest Deus ordinate facere, et aliqua potest absolute et non ordinate, quia 
Deus nihil potest facere inordinate. Sed est sic intelligenda quod “posse [facere] aliquid” quandoque 
accipitur secundum leges ordinatas et institutas a Deo, et illa dicitur Deus posse facere de potentia 
ordinata. Aliter accipitur “posse” pro posse facere omne illud quod non includit contradictionem fieri, 
sive Deus ordinavit se hoc facturum sive non, quia multa potest Deus facere quae non vult facere, 
secundum Magistrum Sententiarum, lib. I, d. 43’; Summa logicae III, 4, c. 6 (OP I, 779-80): ‘Item, talis 
propositio “Deus per suam potentiam absolutam potest aliquem acceptare sine gratia sed non per suam 
potentiam ordinatam” multiplex est. Unus sensus est quod Deus per unam potentiam, quae est absoluta 





non absoluta, non potest acceptare eum, quasi essent duae potentiae in Deo per quarum unam posset hoc 
et non per aliam. Et iste sensus falsus. Aliter accipitur improprie, ut ponatur ista propositio pro ista 
oratione: Deus potest acceptare aliquem sine gratia informante, quia hoc non includit contradictionem, 
et tamen ordinavit quod hoc numquam est facturus. Et iste sensus verus est’; Tractatus contra 
Benedictum III 3, Opera Politica III, (ed.) H.S. Offler (1956), 233, ‘Deus aliqua potest de potentia 





Whether omnipotence which is in God should be considered as absolute 






  1 Et videtur, quod secundum ordinatam, quia debet attendi secundum 
quod decet Deum facere, et secundum ea, que potest facere. 
Contra: Omnipotentia respicit omnia que non implicant 




V fol. 222va; 1 Et] gr 115; d 32,15; st 461,6; se 32,3. 
Gen. 18:14; Exod. 15:6; 1Chr. 29:11; Ps.115:3, 135:6; Jer. 32:17; Amos 4:13; Matt. 9:6; John 3:8; Rev. 
11:17, 15:3, 19:6. 
1 quod] om. gr; 2 que] quae d, st. 3 que] quae d, st; 4 hec] haec d, st. 
1 In Ex. n. 27 (LW II 32,4-6): ‘primo quod omnipotentia proprie deo convenit et ipse solus potest omnia: 
“omnipotens”, ait,  “nomen eius” - circa primum videndum quomodo deus possit omnia’; 3-4 In Ex. n. 
30 (LW II 36,11-4): ‘“Omnipotens” duo dicit: omnia et potentia, potens omnia, potens omnium. Quae 
ergo sunt de numero omnium, illa potest. Iterum quae posse est potentiae, illa potest. Quae vero nec sunt 
in numero omnium et quae posse non est posse sed potius non posse, illa non potest’; In Ex. n. 32-3 (LW 
II 38,8-39,2): ‘Quantum ad primum dicimus deum non posse omnia, quae implicant contradictionem. Si 
enim contradictoria ponantur simul esse, sequitur neutrum eorum esse. Si enim unum est, non est 
alterum, et e converso. Igitur si utrumque est, neutrum est. Rursus etiam universaliter dicimus deum non 
posse malum, quia malum ut sic non est nec ens est nec cadit in numero omnium. Adhuc deus dicitur 
non posse ea quae contradictionem implicant et mala, in quantum mala, quia huiusmodi posse non est 
posse sive nihil posse, eo quod talia sint nihil et non entia, sed sint privatio omnis entis nec habent  
causam efficientem, cum non sint effectus, sed habent causam deficientem, cum sint defectus. Deus 
autem, utpote esse, non potest deficere in esse, se ipsum amittere non potest, “se ipsum negare non 
potest”, 2Tim. 2 [vs. 13]’; Quaest. Par. IV, n. 3 (LW V 72, 1-2, 7-8): ‘Utrum aliquem motum esse sine 
termino implicet contradictionem … Dicendum quod implicat contradictionem, quia non contingit 
moveri, nisi contingat motum esse. Item esset potentia sine actu.’ 
1 Thom. Aqu., Q.d. De potentia, q. 1, a. 1, resp., (ed.) Marietti (1953), 9: ‘Deo autem convenit esse 
actum purum et primum; unde ipsi convenit maxime agere, et suam similitudinem in alias diffundere, et 
ideo ei maxime convenit potentia activa’; Alexander of Hales, Glossa, I, d. 44 (Quaracchi, 1951), I, 448: 
‘Ad notitiam eorum quae hic dicuntur, notandum quod omnia potest Deus quae posse non est “non 
posse” vel “non decere”. Licet ergo posset incarnari quoad potentiam absolutam, non tamen quoad 
potentiam decentem’; 3-4 Thom. Aqu., Scriptum Sent. I, d. 42, q. 2, a. 2, sol., (ed.) Mandonnet (Paris, 
1929), 991: ‘per consequens dicitur non posse facere omne illud in quo contradictio implicatur, et propter 
hoc non potest facere quod illud quod praeteritum est non fuerit ... et ex hoc sequitur ulterius quod 
nullum eorum possit in quibus contrarium praedicati est in definitione subiecti, ut quod faciat hoc, 
scilicet hominem non esse rationalem, vel triangulum non habere tres lineas. In hoc ipso enim quod 
ponitur triangulus, ponitur tres lineas habere; unde hoc est simul habere tres est non habere’; Scriptum 
Sent. III, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3, (ed.) Moos (Paris, 1956), 38: ‘Dicendum est ergo, quod patrem incarnari, non 
est de illis quae potentiae Dei absolutae non subduntur; cum neque contradictionem implicet, neque 
defectum aliquem incarnatio in persona incarnata ponat: est enim eadem dignitas patris et filii, et ratio 
eadem personalitatis in utroque: nec est etiam de illis quae ex se inconvenientiam habent’; Scriptum 
Sent. III, d. 1. q. 2, a. 4, resp., (ed.) Moos (Paris, 1956),41: ‘Dicendum quod tres personas divinas 
assumere unam humanam naturam in unitate unius personae, est impossibile, quia contradictionem 
implicat’; Q.d. De potentia, q. 1, a. 7, resp., (ed.) Marietti (1953), 23 a-b: ‘Potentia Dei, quantum est de 
se, ad omnia illa obiecta se extendit quae contradictionem non implicant … Relinquitur ergo quod Dei 
potentia ad ea se extendat quae sunt possibilia secundum se. Haec autem sunt quae contradictionem non 
implicant’; Henry of Ghent, Quodlibeta VIII, q. 3 (Paris, 1518), fol. 304v: ‘Ponere impossibile primo 
modo simpliciter implicat contradictionem et repugnat factioni secundum omnem cursum et ordinem 
rerum’; John Duns Scotus, Reportatio Parisiensis iv, d. 1, q. 5: ‘aliquid autem est possibile deo 
dupliciter: vel secundum potentiam absolutam, qua potest omne id quod non includit contradictionem, 
aut secundum potentiam eius ordinatam secundum quam fit omne illud quod consonat legibus divinae 
iustitiae et regulis sapientiae eius; quos si fieret aliter, et secundum alias leges statutas et ordinatas a 
divina voluntate, non inordinate fieret, sed ita ordinate sicut modo secundum ista.’ 
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3-4 Hugh de Novocastro, Sent. I, d. 42, q. 2, (ed.) E. Randi, Il sovrano (1987), 135-6: ‘De primo 
sciendum quod licet potentia divina sit una secundum rem, potest tamen distingui tripliciter secundum 
rationem in potentiam absolutam, ordinabilem et ordinatam. Potentia absoluta Dei dicitur quae respicit 
omne possibile quod contradictionem non includit. Eadem secundum rem dicitur ordinabilis secundum 
illud quod contradictionem non includit habet rationem sapientialem in Deo secundum quam si fieret 
bene fieret. Eadem autem dicitur ordinata quia est determinata per aliquam rationem sapientialem libere 
tamen ad faciendum hoc determinate et non illud’; cf. Thomas Sutton (vel Thomas Wylton), Liber 
propugnatorius super I Sententiarum contra Iohannem Scotum (Venice, 1523), fol. 124vb in E. Randi, 









And it seems it should be considered as directed [power], because it 
should be related [to the things] that are befitting for God to do and [the 
things] it is possible for God to do. 
The counter-argument: Omnipotence comprises everything that does 

















Hic primo ostenditur, quod potentia est in Deo. Nam potentia dicitur in 
ordine ad actum. Sed duplex est actus: scilicet primus, qui est forma, que 
respondet potentie passive, et operari, quod respondet potentia activa. 
Et hec est in Deo: tum quia, ubi est operatio intrinseca et extrinseca, ibi 
est potentia. Sed in Deo est operatio intrinseca et extrinseca: tum quia 
secundum Avicennam potentia primo inventa est in hominibus, quia 






V 222va; 1 Hic] gr 115; d 32,20; st 461,10; se 32,7; 2 qui] d 33,1. 
1 1o in marg.; 2 que] quae d, st; 3 potentie passive] potentiae passivae d, st; passive] passiva V; potentia 
activa] potentie active gr, potentiae activae d, st; 4 hec] haec d, st; extrinseca] ergo add. / del. V, om. gr, 
d, st, se; 7 habent] habet gr.    
2-5 In Eccl. n. 50 (LW II 278,8-12): ‘per quas agunt secunda agentia, id, quod sunt formae et actus, a 
deo sunt, qui est primus actus formalis. Adhuc autem ipsae formae, quibus agunt secunda, non possunt 
moveri ad agendum nisi a deo, utpote a primo motore, sicut, verbi gratia, forma(e) ignis et caloris non 
possunt calefacere nisi motae a motore caeli’; In Sap. n. 80 (LW II 411,12-412,3): ‘deus est principium 
omnis motionis sive corporalis sive spiritualis, utpote primum movens; est et principium omnis formalis 
perfectionis, utpote primus actus formalis qui est esse. Secundum hoc ergo actus creaturae cuiuslibet 
dependet a deo quantum ad duo: uno modo, in quantum ab ipso habet formam per quam agit, alio modo, 
in quantum ab ipso movetur ad agendum’; 4-5 Prolog. Gen. in Opus tripartitum n. 17 (LW I 161,3-4): 
‘notandum quod omne quod deus creat, operatur vel agit, in se ipso agit et operatur. Quod enim extra 
deum est et quod extra deum fit, extra esse est et fit’; In Gen. II, n. 131 (LW I 596,4-5): ‘radix, origo et 
meritum omnis operationis exterioris ab intra est, secundum illud Luc. 17, “regnum dei intra vos est”’; 
In Ex. n. 52 (LW II 55,12-56,2): ‘Propter forma est causa intrinseca rei. Secus de agente et fine, quae 
non dant se ipsa substantialiter nec illa respicit materia nec appetit ipsorum substantiam nec per ipsam 
sui, materiae, esse, naturam. Propter quod agens et finis causae sunt extrinsecae rerum materialium’; 
Quaest. Par. I, n. 3 (LW V 39,12-40,2): ‘Cum igitur esse in deo sit optimum et perfectissimum, actus 
primus et omnium perfectio, omnes actus perficiens,  quo sublato omnia nihil sunt, ideo deus per ipsum 
suum esse omnia operatur  et intrinsecus in deitate et extrinsecus in creaturis’; 7-8 Sermo XXIX n. 297 
(LW IV 264,8-9): ‘Secundo in uno nunquam est dolor sive poena sive molestum, sed nec passibilitas 
aut mortalitas.’ 
1-2 Thom. Aqu., Q.d. De potentia, q. 1, a. 1, (ed.) Marietti (1953), 7: ‘Et primo quaeritur utrum in Deo 
sit potentia’; Albert the Great, In Dion. De divinis nominibus, ch. 13, n. 27: ‘Deus autem neque terminis 
terminatum est, quia simplex est, neque esse suum est comprehensum in aliquo, sed est actus purus, 
absolutus ab omni potentia, non receptus in aliquo secundum esse suum’; 2-8 Thom. Aqu., S.Th. I, q. 
25, a. 1, (ed.) Leon. XIII (1888),  290: ‘Unde sibi maxime competit esse principium activum, et nullo 
modo pati. Ratio autem activi principii convenit potentiae activae. Nam potentia activa est principium 
agendi in aliud, potentia vero passiva est principium patiendi ab alio, ut philosophus dicit, V Metaphys, 
Relinquitur ergo quod in Deo maxime sit potentia activa’; Q.d. De potentia, q. 1, a. 1, resp., (ed.) Marietti 
(1953), 8b-9a: ‘Ad huius quaestionis evidentiam sciendum, quod potentia dicitur ab actu: actus autem 
est duplex: scilicet primus, qui est forma; et secundus, qui est operatio … Unde et similiter duplex est 
potentia: una activa cui respondet actus, qui est operatio; et huic primo nomen potentiae videtur fuisse 
attributum: alia est potentia passiva, cui respondet actus primus, qui est forma, ad quam similiter videtur 
secundario nomen potentiae devolutum… Sicut autem nihil patitur nisi ratione potentiae passivae, ita 
nihil agit nisi ratione actus primi, qui est forma’; 5-7 Avicenna, Liber de Philosophia prima, tr. IV, 2: 
Avicenna Latinus I, (1977), 193,72-194,75, 196,16-8: ‘Quod intelligitur de hoc nomine potentia, primum 
imposuerunt intentioni quae est in animalibus, ex qua possunt provenire actiones validae quae sunt de 
genere motuum, nec sunt saepissime in plerisque hominibus in sua quantitate et qualitate’, ref. in Thom. 














It has to be shown first that [this] power is in God. For, potentiality is 
spoken of with regard to actuality. But actuality is two-fold: 
The first actuality, which is the form [of something], relates to passive 
potentiality and [the second actuality which is] the act [of something], 
relates to active potentiality, [which is power].   
And this is in God: Both because where there is intrinsic or extrinsic 
action, then there is power [to bring it about]. But in God there is intrinsic 
and extrinsic action. [Therefore God has power for intrinsic and extrinsic 
action]. And, because according to Avicenna, power is firstly found in 
men because they have the strength to overcome. But God cannot suffer 
[at the hands of] anything, therefore God is actuality of the highest 














Sed dices: quomodo ponitur ista potentia in Deo?  
Dicendum, quod1 secundum quod2 invenitur in creaturis, amota 
imperfectione, ut est ultimum complementi.  
Item dico, quod ista potentia est una realiter, quia dicitur de omnibus 
singulariter.  
Item, essentia est principium emanationum omnium, et ipsa est una. 




V fol. 222va; 1 Sed] gr 115; d 33,6; st 461,17; se 32,14.  
Deut. 32:4; Ps. 8:5; Isa. 40:10-26, 46:5-7; Mal. 3:3; John 17:21-3; Rom. 5:5, 8:32;  1Cor. 13:10; Col. 
1:15-20; Heb. 1:3; Jas. 1:18. 
2 quod2] quid gr; 3 complementi] complimenti gr.  
2-3 In Ex. n. 137 (LW II 125,9-13): ‘Propter quod actio dei perfectissima est et incipit a perfecto, Deut. 
32: “dei perfecta sunt opera”. (Deut. 32:4) Propter quod etiam dicitur descendere, Iac. 1: “omne datum 
optimum et omne donum perfectum desursum descendens est”. (Jas. 1:17) Operatio autem naturae sive 
generatio e converso incipit ab imperfecto, et quo fini est vicinior, tanto perfectior’; Quaest. Par. IV, n. 
4 (LW V 73,4-8): ‘Nam aliqua sunt, quae sunt perfectionis, quaedam imperfectionis; nam moveri dicit 
imperfectionem. Et ideo quanto aliquid magis perfectum, tanto minus de motu et de loco, et quia corpus 
caeleste est perfectum primo, ideo minime movetur et locatur, sed omnia movet et omnia locat’; 4-6 In 
Ex. n. 29 (LW II 34, 14-35, 1): ‘Unde Gregorius ait quod omnia in nihilum redigerentur, si non ea manu 
teneret omnipotentia creatoris’ (Gregory the Great, Morals on Job, 16. 37. 45); In Ex. n. 105 (LW II, 
106,9-10): ‘Hoc autem est id, quod deus ipse, utpote causa prima, influit se ipso primo’; cf. De Causis 
propositio 1 (163,3)’; In Gen. II n. 3 (LW I  453,9–454,5): ‘adhuc autem et ipsa divinarum personarum 
sacratissima emanatio cum ipsarum proprietate, distinctione sub una et in una essentia, uno esse, vivere 
et intelligere, et abinde exemplata et derivata creaturarum productio, et quomodo in omni opere naturae, 
moris et artis elucet pater ingenitus, filius a patre solo genitus, amor essentialis concomitans et amor 
notionalis, spiritus sanctus a patre et filio uno principio spiratus seu procedens’; In Gen. II, n. 215 (LW 
I, 691,2-10, or 439,11-9 in 2015 edition): ‘operationes intellectus sive intellectuales in deo sunt reales 
processus sive productiones et emanationes et producta sunt quid reale, puta filius et spiritus sanctus. 
»Ipse enim intellectus« in deo »res est«, similiter et voluntas. Et propter hoc procedens manet in 
producente et cum producente in unitate essentiae, naturae, esse, vivere et intelligere et huiusmodi, 
nequaquam cadens vel recedens ab uno nec sub uno, sed sic procedens reali processione est ipsa essentia 
producentis intra unum, in uno et ipsum unum; procedit enim a producente inquantum producens unum 
est. Propter quod sancti optime patri in divinis attribuunt unitatem’; In Ioh. n. 469 (LW III, 12,13): ‘in 
divinis radicale principium generationis et spirationis est essentia divina’; In Sap. n. 260 (LW II, 592,7-
9): ‘Et [De causis] 18 propositione scribitur: “omnes res habent essentiam per primum ens, et res vivae 
omnes sunt motae per essentiam suam propter vitam primam, et res intelligibiles omnes habent scientiam 
per intelligentiam primam”’; Sermo XXIV n. 299 (LW IV, 266,7-9): ‘Undecimo, quia deus eo dives 
profusivus est, quia 'unus'. Primus enim et supremus est ratione qua unus. Propter quod unum descendit 
in omnia et singula, manens semper unum et divisa uniens.’ 
2-3 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX c. 2 (103ra 30): ‘perfectio enim causati inferior est perfectione causae 
agentis.’ Thom. Aqu., S.Th. I, q. 13, a. 2, sol, (ed.) Leon. XIII (1888), 142: ‘Significant enim sic nomina 
Deum, secundum quod intellectus noster cognoscit ipsum. Intellectus autem noster, cum cognoscat 
Deum ex creaturis, sic cognoscit ipsum, secundum quod creaturae ipsum repraesentant … Deus in se 
praehabet omnes perfectiones creaturarum, quasi simpliciter et universaliter perfectus. Unde quaelibet 
creatura intantum eum repraesentat, et est ei similis, inquantum perfectionem aliquam habet, non tamen 
ita quod repraesentet eum sicut aliquid eiusdem speciei vel generis, sed sicut excellens principium, a 
cuius forma effectus deficiunt, cuius tamen aliqualem similitudinem effectus consequuntur; sicut formae 
corporum inferiorum repraesentant virtutem solarem … Sic igitur praedicta nomina divinam substantiam 
significant, imperfecte tamen, sicut et creaturae imperfecte eam repraesentant. Cum igitum … id quod 
bonitatem dicimus in creaturis, praeexistit in Deo, et hoc quidem secundum modum altiorem’; Q.d. De 
potentia, q. 1 a. 1, resp., (ed.) Marietti (1953), 9a; ‘Sed et sciendum, quod intellectus noster Deum 
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exprimere nititur sicut aliquid perfectissimum. Et quia in ipsum devenire non potest nisi ex effectuum 
similitudine; neque in creaturis invenit aliquid summe perfectum quod omnino imperfectione careat: 
ideo ex diversis perfectionibus in creaturis repertis, ipsum nititur designare, quamvis cuilibet illarum 
perfectionum aliquid desit; ita tamen quod quidquid alicui istarum perfectionum imperfectionis 











But you will then ask, ‘How is this power in God to be understood? 
The answer has to be: as that which is found in creatures as ultimate 
perfection, once the imperfection is removed [from them].  
I say also, in reality there is only one power, because it is said that 
all things [are done] in a particular [singular] way.  
Also, [divine] essence is [the] principle [origin] of all emanations, 


















Secundo inquirendum quomodo debet intelligi ista distinctio, scilicet 
potentia absoluta et ordinata. Nam quando aliqua attribuuntur Deo 
secundum se, talia pertinent ad potentiam absolutam. Sed quando sibi 
aliqua attribuuntur secundum comparationem ad rationem et 
sapientiam, sic pertinet ad potentiam ordinatam. 
Tunc tertio, ad quaestionem dicendum, quod Magister in Sententiis 
determinat auctoritatibus sanctorum; et videtur dicere quod attenditur 
secundum utrumque.  
Quidam tamen dicunt, quod ex hoc est omnipotens, quia potest facere 











V fol. 222va; 1 Secundo] gr 115; d 33,12; st 461,22; se 32,21; 5 ad] se 33,25; 6 Tunc] st 462,1. 
1 debet] debeat gr, d, se; ista] illa gr; 2o in marg. 2 aliqua] gr, d, se, aliquid V, st, in V error cop.?; Titulus 
supra ‘a’ = taliam, vel ‘i’?; 3 sibi] om. gr; 4 attribuuntur secundum] attribuuntur in V; secundum 
comparationem] in comparatione st; pertinet] pertinent gr, d, st; error in num. lineae, st scribit 15 versus 
25; 6 Tunc tertio] Tertio est gr, Item tertio d; quaestionem] questionem gr, se; 3o et 10 in marg. = sectio 
3(1); 8 secundum] om. se; 10 quidquid] quicquid gr. 20 in marg. = sectio 3(2). 
2-3 In Ex. n. 163 (LW II, 142,11-2): ‘illud nomen est propriissimum rei, cui competunt et attribuuntur 
omnia, quae illius rei sunt propria.’  
1-5 Thom. Aqu., Scriptum Sent. III, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3, resp., (ed.) Moos (Paris, 1956), 36: ‘quando potentiae 
divinae aliquid ascribitur, utrum attribuatur potentiae secundum se consideratae; tunc enim dicitur posse 
illud de potentia absoluta: vel attribuatur sibi in ordine ad sapientiam et praescientiam et voluntatem 
ejus: tunc enim dicitur posse illud de potentia ordinata’; 6-8 Peter Lombard, I Sent. d. 42, c. 3 (186) 
(Grottaferrata, 1971): ‘Quod omnipotentia Dei secundum duo consideratur. Hic igitur dili genter 
considerantibus omnipotentia eius secundum duo apparet, scilicet quod omnia facit quae vuit, et nihil 
omnino patitur. Secundum utrumque Deus omnipotens verissime praedicatur, quia nec aliquid est quod 
ei ad patiendum corruptionem inferre valeat, nec aliquid ad faciendum impedimentum afferre’; cf. ibid., 
c. 1-3,  294-8; I Sent. d. 43, c. 1, 1 (187) (Grottaferrata, 1971): ‘Aiunt enim: Non potest Deus aliud facere 
quam facit, nec melius facere id quod facit, nec aliquid praetermittere de his quae facit’; 9-10 Cf. William 
of Auxerre, Summa Aurea l. I, tr. 11, q. 6 (Paris and Grottaferrata, 1980), 215,36-8: ‘Sed melius 
dicendum est quod Deus est omnipotens quia potest facere ex se et per se quicquid vult facere’, ref. in 
Thom. Aqu., Q.d. De potentia, q. 1 a. 7, resp., (ed.) Marietti (1953), 23a: ‘Quidam etiam dixerunt, quod 
ideo dicitur [Deus] omnipotens, quia potest quidquid vult; et hoc habet a se et per se’; Augustine, Sermo 
de symbolo ad catechumenos 2 (CChr.SL 46, 185-6, PL 40, 627), trans. H. Browne, from NPNF (1887): 
‘Quam multa non potest, et omnipotens est: et ideo omnipotens est, quia ista non potest … Nam ego 
dico quanta non possit. Non potest mori, non potest peccare, non potest mentiri, non potest falli. Tanta 
non potest: quae si posset, non esset omnipotens ... Facit quidquid vult: ipsa est omnipotentia. Facit 
quidquid bene vult, quidquid juste vult: quidquid autem male fit, non vult. Nemo resistit omnipotenti, ut 














Second, it is to be enquired how this distinction between absolute and  
directed power should be understood. For when some properties are 
attributed to God [insofar as he is God], these pertain to absolute power. 
But when some properties are attributed with respect to his intellect and 
wisdom, then these pertain to directed power.  
Now thirdly, to this question we say what the Master in his Sentences, 
with the [authoritative] sayings of the saints, determined, and it seems 
that, according to him, [God’s omnipotence] is to be considered as both. 
[as absolute and as directed power]. 
Some others say, however, that he is omnipotent because he can do 

























Contra. Hoc solum declarat modum potentie. 
Dico igitur, quod magis attenditur secundum potentiam absolutam, 
quia debet attendi secundum quod se potest extendere ad omnia que 
non implicant contradictionem, quia attenditur in ordine ad possibile. 
Item: alias potentia Dei esset limitata, si secundum aliqua attenderetur.  
Item sicut scientia dicitur Dei omnia scientem, quia scit omnia, ita de 
potentia. Quare autem non dicitur omnia volentem?  
Responsio: Solum vult illa, ad que applicat suam scientiam vel 
potentiam.  
Et nota quod non dicitur omnipotens, quod in eo sit omnis potentia, sed 











V fol. 222va; 1 Contra] g 115; d 33,21; st 462,5; se 33,30, 5 alias] d 34,1. 
Job 21:22, 36:3-5; 1John 3:20. 
1 potentie] potentiae d; st; 30 in marg. = sectio 3(3). 3 que] quae d; st; 6 sicut] sic st; dicitur Dei] dicimus 
Deum gr, st; Dei dicitur d; quia scit omnia] del. gr; 6-7 Cf. omnia scientem / omnia volentem] d, st; 7 
dicitur] dicimus gr; 8 Responsio] Respondeo gr, d, st. que] quae d, st; 10 quod] quia gr, d, se; sit] p.c. 
sicut V. 
10-11 In Ex. n. 32 (LW II, 38, 1-2): ‘Patet ergo quod deus iuxta nomen “omnipotens” potest omnia et 
potest quaecumque posse est potentiae.’ 
2-4 Thom. Aqu., Q.d. De potentia, q. 1 a. 5, (ed.) Marietti (1953), 18a: ‘Praeterea, in Deo duo 
contradictoria simul esse non possunt. Sed absolutum et regulatum contradictionem implicant; nam 
absolutum est quod secundum se consideratur; illud vero quod regulatur, ordinem ad aliud habet. Ergo 
in Deo non debet poni potentia absoluta et regulata’; 5 Thom. Aqu., Q.d. De potentia, q. 1, a. 2, resp. 
13, (ed.) Marietti (1953), 12b: ‘Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod Deus semper agit tota sua potentia; 
sed effectus terminatur secundum imperium voluntatis, et ordinem rationis’; 6-7 (10-1) Thom. Aqu., 
Q.d. De potentia, q. 1, art. 7, arg. 1, (ed.) Marietti (1965), 23a; ‘Et videtur quod dicatur omnipotens quia 
simpliciter omnia possit. Sicut enim Deus dicitur omnipotens, ita dicitur omnisciens. Sed dicitur 
omnisciens, quia simpliciter omnia scit. Ergo et omnipotens dicitur, quia simpliciter omnia potest’; 6-7 
Thom. Aqu., Q.d. De potentia, q. 1, art. 7, arg. 5, (ed.) Marietti (1965), 23a: ‘Item quaeritur quare Deus 
dicitur omnipotens et omnisciens, et non omnivolens’; 10-1 Cf. Thom. Aqu., Q.d. De potentia, q. 1 a. 3, 
resp.5, (ed.) Marietti (1953), 15a: ‘Praeterea, omne quod resistit alicui, resistit in ratione alicuius 
oppositionis. Sed potentiae divinae nihil est oppositum, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ergo ei nihil potest 
resistere; et ita potest facere omnia impossibilia.’ 




















The counter argument:  This only explains how [the way in which] 
power works.  
Therefore I say it [God’s power] is to be considered rather as absolute 
power because it should be considered insofar as it extends to all things 
which do not involve a contradiction, because it is considered as 
referring to everything that is possible.  
Also, the power of God would otherwise be limited if we considered it 
as relating to something.   
Likewise, when we  refer to God’s knowledge, we say that God is 
omniscient because he knows everything [and] it is also the same when 
referring to power. [He is omnipotent because he is able to do 
everything].  
Now, why is it not said that God is omnivolent? [wills everything?] 
In response I say that he only wills those things to which he applies his 
knowledge or power.  
And notice that he is not said to be omnipotent because in him would be 




















Ad argumentum dicendum, quod Deus1 de potentia absoluta potest 
Deus2 facere que nunc non sunt decentia. Si essent tamen facta, essent 
decentia et iusta.  
Sed dicis: ‘non potest nisi que previdit?’ Dicendum quod, si referatur ad 
actum, scilicet ‘nisi’, tunc est vera, quia quidquid facit previdit. Sed si 
referatur ad potentiam, tunc est falsa.  
Sed dicis: ‘Augustinus in Enchiridio dicit, quod est omnipotens, quia 
“potest quidquid vult”, non quia potest omnia.’ 
Dicendum, quod Augustinus ex hoc <habet> ‘vult’, quia inter ‘omnia’ 











V fol. 222va; 1 Ad] g 115; d 34,7;  st 462,14; se 33,40.  
Ps. 139:1-5, 15-6; Is. 46:9-11. 
1 Deus1] om. st; 2 Deus2] om. gr, d, se; que] quae d, st; 4 que] quae d, st; previdit] praevidit d, st. 
7 Enchiridio] Enchiridion st; 8 quidquid] quicquid se; 9 habet] conj. habet se, om. V, gr, d, st; 10 que] 
quae d, st. 
1-3 Cf. Proc. Col. I, n. 95 (LW V, 282, 15-283,3): ‘Tota enim perfectio hominis est conformari divinae 
voluntati volendo quod deus vult et modo quo deus vult, praesertim cum omne quod deus vult et modo 
quo deus vult quippiam, hoc ipso bonum est illud’;  Proc. Col. I, n. 12 (LW V 203,4-12): ‘talis homo ita 
conformis est divinae voluntati quod ipse vult, quidquid deus vult et illo modo quo deus vult. Et quia 
deus aliquo modo vult me fecisse peccatum, quia sic impletur voluntas divina “in terra”, hoc est in 
delictis, “sicut in caelo”, hoc est in benefaciendo …’; Buch der göttlichen Tröstung (Quint) (DW V 22,5-
14).      
2 Cf. Alexander of Hales, Glossa, I, d. 44 (Quaracchi, 1951), I, 448. (cf. n.1 above); 7-8 Augustine 
Enchiridion c. XXIV, n. 96: CChr.SL 46, 100, 40-1: ‘Neque enim ob aliud veraciter vocatur omnipotens 
nisi quoniam quidquid vult potest’; cf. Thom. Aqu., Q.d. De potentia q. 1, a. 7, resp. 3, (ed.) Marietti 
(1953), 22b: ‘Item videtur quod dicatur omnipotens quia potest omnia quae vult: Dicit enim Augustinus 
in Enchiridion [capit. xcvi]: Non ob aliud vocatur omnipotens, nisi quia quidquid vult, potest’; ‘Non 
quia potest omnia’ non vidi in Augustine nisi in Thomas; cf. Peter Lombard, I Sent., d. 42, c. 3, 2 (186). 
9-10 Cf. Peter Lombard, Sent. I, d. 42, c. 3, 3 (186) (Grottaferrata, 1971), 296,21-4. ‘Sed ad hoc potest 
dici quod Augustinus, ubi dicit: “Omnipotens non dicitur quod omnia possit” etc., tam ample et 
generaliter accepit “omnia”, ut etiam mala includeret, quae Deus nec vult nec potest. Non ergo negavit 



















To this [first] argument it must be said that out of [his] absolute power 
God can do things that are not decent now. But if they were done, then 
they would be decent and just. 
But you [may] ask [against this], ‘Can he only do something, if he has 
foreseen it?’ 
To this it should be said that, if this ‘if ’ refers to the things he has 
actually done, then this is true. Because he has foreseen anything he has 
done. [does]. 
But if this ‘if’ refers to what he is able to do, then it is false.    
But you [may] say [against this] that Augustine in ‘Enchiridion’ states 
that, ‘he [God] is omnipotent because “he can do everything he wills”, 
not because “he can do everything”.’  
To this it should be said that Augustine says ‘wills’ because by 
‘everything’ he also understood to include the evil things that God is 























The manuscript, Codex Vaticanus Latinus 1086, contains writings derived from the 
Augustinian, Prosper de Reggio Emilia and are believed to be a collection of 
reportationes from questions in which Prosper had participated during his Parisian 
studies.358 Among these are six questions now attributed to Meister Eckhart, and although 
the precise context is not entirely verifiable, there is no doubt that these notes form a 
significant contribution to understanding both the thinking of Eckhart and something of 
their context of early 14th century life within the University of Paris. More is known about 
the collating of manuscripts with Dominican and Franciscan orders than Augustinian and 
so it is unclear if the writing will have been done by Prosper or under his direction by one 
of his students. The reason why these questions are found in this particular codex and 
these folios is a matter for speculation but modern research is definitely able to make 
plausible suggestions which add to both the background and also the mystery.359  
Adding to the uncertainty, there are traces of earlier writing under the main text as well 
as in the margins and so areas of this folio were wiped at some point and then, at different 
times, the text of the question, titles, accreditations, notation marks and marginal notes 
have been added. The lack of clarity within the text is especially compounded by certain 
erasures in the main columns and margins and even erasures on top of previous erasures, 
and so these different markings and erasures on the folio have literally smudged the issue 
                                                 
358 See W.J. Courtenay, ‘Reflections’ (2007), 345-58; A. Kenny, J. Pinborg, ‘Medieval 
Philosophical Literature’ (1982), 37-8. 
359 For information on the fascinating investigation into the discovery and authentication 
of Eckhart’s Parisian questions see M. Grabmann, ‘Neuaufgefundene Pariser 
Quaestionem Meister Eckharts und ihre Stellung in seinem geistigen Entwicklungsgange: 
Untersuchungen und Texte’ (1927); A. Pelzer, CodicesVaticani Latini, 2/i: Codd. 679-
1134 (Bibliothecae Apostolicae Vaticanae Codices manuscript recensiti; Vatican City, 
1931); L. Sturlese, Einleitung in Eckhart (LW I/2), 455-60, (Stuttgart, 2015); M. Vinzent, 
‘Questions on the Attributes (of God): Four Rediscovered Parisian Questions of Meister 
Eckhart’ (2012); A. Beccarisi, Eckhart’s Latin Works, in Brill’s Companion to Meister 
Eckhart (2013), 90-3. 
154 
 
of authenticity. Transmitting information by copying was not always perfect and, also 
there may have been an agenda behind why certain material was recorded, meaning 
possible amendments or omissions by the copyist. There is evidence, or at least 
allegations, of copyists dishonestly revising text in order to produce a copy more palatable 
to the one paying for the copy, which could include presenting a more acceptable doctrine. 
Loris Sturlese explains how there are critical erasures in the middle at the top of the folios 
under investigation, where questions elsewhere are attributed to their master, and instead 
there is now reference to the particular master in the margin next to the start of their 
question. The booklet comprising folios 221r – 228v may well have been allocated to John 
Du Mont St. Eloi whose reference has been erased and the space taken up by questions 
from Jean du Val des Ecoliers, Amodeus (de Castello) and Gérard de Saint-Victor, as 
well as what we now know as ‘Questions six to nine of Eckhart’.  
Focussing on Question six, the form of the question on this folio is not a dictated verbatim 
copy of the Meister’s words, and, as has been shown, neither a reportatio, but seemingly 
an abbreviation of a master’s copy,360 although it should be noted that this dispute 
occurred too early for Prosper to have been the master. Either way, there will be a strong 
correlation between the actual disputatio, its re-worked version by the master, and the 
abbreviation of it. The text is succinct rather than substantial suggesting all that we have 
is a compressed version of the question as a whole, although it should be noted that the 
length of these questions is substantial in comparison with many other questions in this 
manuscript. Question six occupies a full column of the manuscript, and before and after 
this, questions five and seven fill two columns each, while many other questions recorded 
occupy just a few lines. This suggests that despite this being an abbreviated account, it 
seems Prosper wished to be both precise and methodical in his reproduction of Eckhart. 
This points to the importance with which either Eckhart or the content of his disputationes 
were regarded.  
When considering the content of a manuscript it must be noted that the practical details 
are also a source of information. The nature of the velum and even the ink used speak of 
the reason for such a text being copied, as well as the meaning of the text, and so for the 
purpose of this investigation, it is important to add that the Augustinian order must have 
valued the thoughts of Eckhart highly enough to fill this space on these folios with this 
                                                 
360 See M. Vinzent, ‘Meister Eckharts lateinische Texte, überlieferungsgeschichtlich 
gelesen – am Beispiel seiner Pariser Quästionen’ (2016), 131-3.  
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text. The structure of these notes suggests the sequential passage through a series of 
propositions with counter propositions, solutions and reasoning. This particular question 
resembles his first Parisian Question and so may be considered to be typical of the nature 
of an abbreviated question, but also more specifically of Eckhart, and although all we 
have is the abbreviation, the form is such that the actual disputatio can still be imagined. 
Considering the structure is helpful in considering the main question, although of prime 
importance to this investigation is gaining the thrust of Eckhart’s thinking, and any 
structure suggested can only be a reflection of the notes as they have been transferred to 
this manuscript. 
In looking to reproduce the flow of the text, the paragraph numbers are retained as 
presented by the critical edition of Loris Sturlese published in the year 2015. The 
commentary below follows the order of the text with these paragraph numbers because 
they reflect the notes as they are recorded. Some of the propositions or arguments fit more 
than one label because of the complexity in Eckhart’s thinking, or at least these notes. I 
have used the terms proposition, argument, counter argument, question and solution 
although not all paragraphs are simply an argument, question, proposition, solution or 
counter. Two different labels ‘argument’ and ‘proposition’ present a statement rather than 
a question and are employed mainly to help clarify the structure. The two responses to 
the main question are labelled as ‘propositions’ and the three responses to the main 
question that are referred to by the text and correspondingly marked as such in the margin 
are labelled as ‘arguments’. Likewise the label ‘counter’ is used to reflect the different 
uses of ‘sed’ and ‘contra’ in the text and the oscillating nature of the treatment. Following 
the main question through paragraphs one to fourteen presents the following questions, 
propositions, solutions, arguments and counter arguments:  
   
Table 1: The text as it functions 
 
 Content Latin Text 
Q6 Main Question 
Utrum omnipotentia, que est in Deo, debeat attendi 
secundum potentiam absolutam vel secundum potentiam 
ordinatam? 
n. 1 Proposition 1 
Et videtur, quod secundum ordinatam, quia debet attendi 




n. 2 Counter Proposition 1 
Contra: Omnipotentia respicit omnia que non implicant 




Hic primo ostenditur, quod potentia est in Deo. Nam 
potentia dicitur in ordine ad actum. Sed duplex est actus: 
scilicet primus, qui est forma, que respondet potentie 
passive, et operari, quod respondet potentia activa. 
Et hec est in Deo: tum quia, ubi est operatio intrinseca et 
extrinseca, ibi est potentia. Sed in Deo est operatio 
intrinseca et extrinseca: tum quia secundum Avicennam 
potentia primo inventa est in hominibus, quia habent vim 










Dicendum, quod secundum quod invenitur in creaturis, 
amota imperfectione, ut est ultimum complementi. 
Item dico, quod ista potentia est una realiter, quia dicitur 
de omnibus singulariter. 
Item, essentia est principium emanationum omnium, et 




Secundo inquirendum quomodo debeat intelligi ista 
distinctio, scilicet potentia absoluta et ordinata. Nam 
quando aliquid attribuuntur Deo secundum se, talia 
pertinent ad potentiam absolutam. Sed quando sibi aliqua 
attribuuntur secundum comparationem ad rationem et 




Tunc tertio, ad quaestionem dicendum, quod Magister in 
Sententiis determinat auctoritatibus sanctorum; et videtur 
dicere quod attenditur secundum utrumque. 
n. 8 Counter n. 7 
Quidam tamen dicunt, quod ex hoc est omnipotens, quia 
potest facere quidquid vult per se et a se. 








Solution Sub-Question 2 
Dico igitur, quod magis attenditur secundum potentiam 
absolutam, quia debet attendi secundum quod se potest 
extendere ad omnia que non implicant contradictionem, 
quia attenditur in ordine ad possibile. 
Item: alias potentia Dei esset limitata, si secundum aliqua 
attenderetur. 
Item sicut scientia dicitur Dei omnia scientem, quia scit 
omnia, ita de potentia. Quare autem non dicitur omnia 
volentem? 
Responsio: Solum vult illa, ad que applicat suam 
scientiam vel potentiam. 
Et nota quod non dicitur omnipotens, quia in eo sit omnis 
potentia, sed quia potest facere omne possibile. 
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n. 11 Counter nn. 1 and 8 
Ad argumentum dicendum, quod Deus de potentia 
absoluta potest Deus facere que nunc non sunt decentia. 
Si essent tamen facta, essent decentia et iusta. 
n. 12 
Counter n. 11 
Sub-Question 3, 
Solution Sub-Question 3 
Sed dicis: ‘non potest nisi que previdit?’ Dicendum quod, 
si referatur ad actum, scilicet ‘nisi’, tunc est vera, quia 
quidquid facit previdit. Sed si referatur ad potentiam, tunc 
est falsa. 
n. 13 Counter n. 12 
Sed dicis: ‘Augustinus in Enchiridio dicit, quod est 
omnipotens, quia “potest 
quidquid vult”, non quia potest omnia.’ 
n. 14 Counter n. 13 
Dicendum, quod Augustinus ex hoc <habet> ‘vult’, quia 
inter ‘omnia’ includuntur mala, que Deus non potest. Ideo 
sic loquitur. 
 
The main issue is approached by the introductory question at the head of the text and then 
placed in the context of the debate of a power distinction based on whether God acts out 
of absolute or directed power. This distinction was not held by Eckhart but he was keen 
to show how it had been wrongly understood. N. 1 presents the first proposition that God’s 
omnipotence should be considered as ordinata because God can only do what is decens 
or alternatively, the counter proposal is presented in n. 2 that God is able to do more than 
what is decens for him to do, and in fact everything that does not involve a contradiction, 
and therefore potentia should be considered as absoluta.  
To bring his own thoughts into the debate, the Meister states in n. 3 that, the first point to 
be made, is this power is in God, both in essence and action. This statement then leads to 
a question of how this power should be understood in n. 4 which is answered with a 
threefold explanation of power in n. 5.  
The next block of paragraphs re-introduce the question of the power distinction, n. 6, and 
this is framed, firstly, by presenting that how the distinction should be understood is a 
matter of perception and then, secondly, in the light of previous treatments. N. 7 presents 
the thought of there being both absolute and directed power as perceived by Lombard and 
other authorities and then in n. 8 another opinion is given, based on the emphasis of God’s 
will, which from the evidence of the following text, could be a reference to  Augustine or 
maybe even a pointer towards Thomas . N. 8 does not directly refer to Proposition 1 but 
when considering the views of Augustine across the text, Eckhart seems to wish to 
emphasise the connection between the will of God and directed power. Marginal 
markings also link n. 9 to n. 7 and n. 8 likewise suggesting that this proposition deals with 
power, whether directed or absolute, or both, in action rather than essence.  
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Having presented that there are those who consider God’s power as directed, and some 
who consider it to be both directed and absolute, Eckhart in n. 10 states that it should be 
considered as absolute, in accordance with the argument of n. 2, labelled as ‘Counter 
Proposition 1’. This leads into the closing set of statements which swing between 
Proposition 1 and its Counter Proposition, with particular focus on how the will of God 
has been perceived as limiting the power of God to do everything that is actualised. The 
notion of not involving a contradiction from n. 2 is revisited in n. 10 and the need to be 
fitting, from n. 1, alongside being just, is considered in n. 11. These issues were treated 
by Thomas in his Quaestiones disputatae De potentia Dei and earlier in Lombard’s 
Sentences and Eckhart uses similar language here to make comparison inevitable, as he 
also does when introducing the question of foresight in n. 12 which also provides a 
solution that suggests that by incorporating this issue of perception, Counter Proposition 
1 is appropriate. Finally, further thoughts on the will of God from Augustine’s 
Enchiridion are considered in nn. 13 and 14.  
The text contains what can be taken as three sub-questions but there is effectively only 
one main question of, ‘how the omnipotence of God should be considered’, and likewise, 
the proposals, arguments and counter points can be simplified because there is effectively 
only one issue of, ‘when considering this omnipotence, whether one should differentiate 
between the potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata’ There is not enough material in the 
text to confirm a clinically clear structure but this ‘best-fit’ attempts to simplify the outline 
of the treatment that Eckhart was aiming to achieve.  
Complexity maybe increases arises because the Meister, in his own thinking, does not 
acknowledge the distinction and he is rather presenting his thoughts on how others 
perceive a distinction. For Eckhart, God possesses absolute power, and as given in the 
solution block of nn. 3-5, God acts absolutely. This however does not mean that any 
action is not directed and so Eckhart is careful to incorporate the ordinata within his 
notion of absoluta, even if this is less obvious from the text. This connects the idea that 
power is absolute, as in n. 2, with the idea that the distinction shows that power is both, 
as in n. 7. When considered as power there is unlimitedness, and when considered as 
action, which is only relevant from the human perspective, God acts absolutely, but not 
without direction. 




Table 2: Hierarchical flow-chart 
 
   Q6 Main Question 
‘How one should 
consider omnipotence 
in God’ 
1-14 1-2 1.2 1 Proposition 1 Ordinata, decet. 
   2 Counter Proposition 1 
Absoluta, non - 
contradictione. 
 3-14 3.4,5 3 
Main Question 
1st Argument 
‘This power is in God’. 




How is power to be 
understood? 





  6 6 
Main Question 
2nd Argument 
How the distinction 
should be understood? 
  7.8,9 7 
Main Question 
3rd Argument 
Master, Saints,  
say both. 
   8 Counter n. 7 
Others say, ‘everything 
he wills’. 
   9 Counter n. 8 
‘Only’ explains how 
power works. 
  10.11-4 10 
Solution 
Main-Question, 
(Counter Proposition 1) 
 
Sub-question 2, 
Solution Sub-Question 2 





   11 Counter nn. 1 and 8 
Would be decet and 
just. 
   12 
Counter n. 11 
Sub-Question 3, 
Solution Sub-Question 3 
Only foreseen?  
If…  things or able. 
   13 Counter n. 12 
Wills, everything. 
(Augustine) 






This shows there is an introductory section, and a response to the notion of power and 
how it should be understood before considering the power distinction with a series of 
ideas that are proposed and either countered or upheld. In answer to the main question, 
mixed in among the opposing sides of the distinction is a dynamic revelation of Eckhart’s 
notion of how God’s omnipotence should be considered, but this is found in the 
propositions, counter propositions and arguments as well as the paragraphs labelled as 
solutions. Nn. 3-5 are not isolated but feed into the distinction and, by dealing with power 
from both a human and divine perspective, glue the treatment together. This section of 
teaching slotted in after the introductory propositions is vital in understanding Eckhart’s 
treatment of the distinction in the proceeding paragraphs.  
Another factor, to be considered is the large amount of material surrounding the main 
text. There are writings in the margins above, below and to the side of the text of Question 
six and early inspection suggests there are connections with, although they are unlikely 
to have been part of, the initial script. Interestingly there are references and quotes from 
others, notably Anselm, and Duns Scotus with notes on omnipotence and distinction 44 
of the Sentences, which is a key text for the power debate. On closer inspection, the 
writing style of these marginal notes reflect that of a late 15th century hand, and so are 
likely to be further additions from around a hundred years after the question was added 
to the folio. The dating, authorship and purpose of the notes is unclear, though it seems 
this material, or most of it, does connect thematically with the question.  
There are also characters in the margin, denoting some elements of the question’s 
structure which could have been added to the folio either earlier or with the question but 
do seem to be in the margins independent of the extra notes that are present. Following 
the main question, initial and counter proposals, in the left hand margin, adjacent to n. 3, 
which begins, ‘hic primo’, there is a 1 with the abbreviation character for ‘us’ above it, 
therefore denoting primus. Lower down in the margin adjacent to n. 6 there is the 
corresponding character for ‘secundus’ and adjacent to the next paragraph a character 
denoting ‘tertius’. The third point also denotes three sub-points with the corresponding 
numbers 1, 2 and 3 with an ‘m’ above the figure to present the abbreviation for primum, 
secundum and tertium. These markings cannot be totally unrelated to the question as they 
match specific points in the text although this could mean as little as pointing to their 
corresponding word. To this extent they inform something of the structure of the question 
although they are also possibly to be simply regarded as an aide mémoire for the copyist.  
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The text of the Question does not follow a simple pattern unveiling the Meister’s thoughts 
on omnipotence or the omnipotence debate. Coming from a disputatio it typically uses a 
series of arguments, (or propositions), and responses although there is not the simple 
treating of one issue followed sequentially by another, but rather an inter-weaving of 
arguments and solutions in response to the main question which is typical for late 
scholastic texts, e.g. Hervaeus Natalis and William of Ockham. This being the case, the 
text flows effectively, although arguments being visited and re-visited obviously leads to 
a certain amount of repetition. This, maybe, was typical of the Meister’s pedagogic style 
or alternatively, it reflects the best attempt at abbreviating and subsequent matching of 
the different arguments contained. Question six is not simply the linear discussion of one 
argument and so this commentary, by moving through the text systematically, inevitably 
reflects something of the incorporated repetition. It is not that the treatment spirals 
towards a climax but that the various aspects related to the overall subject are revisited 
and a clearer image of the whole picture emerges as the text proceeds.   
 
Q6 Whether omnipotence which is in God should be considered as absolute power 
or as directed power? 
 
Having recorded the development of the question of God’s omnipotence within the 
history of philosophical theology in Part I, it is helpful now to explore the context of this 
question within the works of the Meister. The historical significance of the context for 
airing this particular question is covered in chapter one and it should be acknowledged 
that within the text, while there are references to earlier treatments of connected issues, 
there seems to be no direct reference to any of the political or canonical concerns raised 
by, what had been, the smouldering context.361 Other treatments do seem to have been 
given with a suggestion of either theological implication or practical application but 
                                                 
361 For applications of the distinction in Part I see Johannes Bassolis, Super I Sent., d. 44, 
q. un. (Paris, 1517), fol. 213vb; John of Naples, Quaestiones variae disputatae, q. 3, 
punctum 3, ad. 3; q. 36, punctum 2, p.313; John Duns Scotus Ordinatio, I, d. 17, qq. 1 et 
3; I, d. 44 (Vatican edition, vol. VI 363-9); William of Ockham, Quodlibeta septem VI, 
q. 1 (Opera Theologica vol. IX [St. Bonaventure, 1980], 585-6), Summa logicae III, 4, c. 
6 (OP I, 779-80), Tractatus contra Benedictum III 3, in H.S. Offler (ed.), Opera Politica 
III (Manchester, 1956), 233. 
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although the text of Question six may have inferences to other issues, these are not 
obvious from this record. 
The clear ordering of these so called ‘re-discovered questions’, dating from Eckhart’s 
second magisterium around 1311-3 AD, suggests that this is not a set of random 
questions, typical of a quodlibet, but a series of developed arguments presented in the 
quaestiones disputatae of a master. These were the opportunity to develop thinking on a 
doctrinal issue by using a question, argument and response format. Alternatively, it may 
be that Prosper, or whoever was writing the notes on his behalf, was being systematic in 
developing a strand of thought based on the theme of the questions. The development of 
thought within these questions prove that their ordering is not random and, either way, it 
is helpful to consider the juxtaposition of this question on God’s power. 
As a twice Master of Theology in Paris, Meister Eckhart must have held a number of 
different quodlibeta and disputationes yet relatively few questions from these have been 
identified. The first three questions, generally accepted as authentic, are found on the 
Avignon, Bibliothèque Municipale Codex Ms. 1071, which would place them within 
Eckhart’s first magisterium, 1302–3 AD. More significantly, Questions four and five 
precede the four new questions in Vat. Lat. 1086 (although Question four is several folios 
earlier), which means they should be dated within the second magisterium and therefore 
are worth considering in order to appreciate the context of Eckhart’s treatment of the 
power distinction.  
 












Utrum in corpore Christi morientis in cruce 
remanserint formae elementorum? 
222r-v 
6 
Utrum omnipotentia, que est in Deo, debeat 
attendi secundum potentiam absolutam vel 
secundum potentiam ordinatam? 
222v 
7 
Utrum essentia Dei esset actualior quam 
proprietas? 
222v – 223r 
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8 Utrum diversitas esset relatio realis vel rationis? 223r-v 
9 
Utrum differentia secundum rationem sit prior 
quam differentia secundum rem? 
223v – 224r 
 
Question six is found at the top of folio 222v and the previous question, ‘Whether in the 
body of the dying Christ on the cross, the forms of the elements remain?’362 begins folio 
222r with the inscription above the question, ‘M. Aycardus’, attributing this work to 
Eckhart. As with the question on omnipotence, this is also a contribution to an ongoing 
question, with this one considering the form of the elements of something in comparison 
with the form of the whole entity. Eckhart gives his thoughts to this Christianised idea of 
the hylomorphic (matter – hyle and soul – morphé) system of Aristotle, alongside other 
key mediaeval contributions such as that from Duns Scotus, who maintained the form of 
the soul is different from the form of the body and informs the body during life before 
separation at death.363 Alternatively Ockham emphasised the actuality of the forms of the 
elements making up the whole such that when the organism dies, the corpse is both 
speciﬁcally and numerically the same body as the body of the living organism. Eckhart 
presents, as he does in his Prologue to the Book of Propositions, how the form of 
something is derived from the whole: 
Individual parts contribute absolutely no existence to their whole; 
rather they receive their total existence from their whole and in their 
whole.364 
                                                 
362 Eckhart, Quaest. Par. V, n. 4 (LW V 77,1-2), see Table 3, Quaest. Par. trans. here and 
following A. Maurer (1974). 
363 See Master Eckhart, Parisian Questions and Prologues, trans. with an introduction 
and notes by Armand Augustine Maurer (1974), 26-8; T.M. Ward, ‘Animals, Animal 
Parts, and Hylomorphism: John Duns Scotus’s Pluralism about Substantial Form’, 
Journal of the History of Philosophy, 50:4 (2012), 531-58; A.J. Cascardi, The Cambridge 
introduction to Literature and Philosophy (Cambridge, 2014), 128; M. McCord Adams, 
William Ockham (Indiana, 1987), 633-70. 
364 Eckhart, Prolog. in Opus Propositionum n. 18 (LW I 176,15-177,1): ‘partes singulae 
nullum esse prorsus afferunt suo toti, sed potius totum suum esse accipiunt a suo toto et 
in suo toto.’ Trans. A. Maurer (1974). 
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Maurer summarises Eckhart saying, ‘in the process of dying, everything happened to 
Christ as to other men: the difference lay in the fact that throughout his dying and at his 
death his complete human nature, soul and body, remained united to his divine person.’365  
The Meister, having considered form and matter in Question five, also refers to the idea 
of forms in Question six and further considers the form of God further in Question seven. 
Before this, it should be noted that Question four, ‘Whether motion without end implies 
a contradiction?’366 is attributed to ‘M. Ayerdus’ above the question, and found on the 
same manuscript but on the earlier folio, 143r. The reason why this isolated question 
appears on this particular folio is unclear but it might relate to the academic year, 1311-2 
AD while the ones on the later folios are from the following year 1312-3 AD. Rather than 
illuminate any contextual idea, it confirms that alongside the other questions there is a 
sequential expression of Eckhart’s thinking. In this question, as with Question five, 
Eckhart considers a problem from Aristotle’s Physics367 and likewise concludes any 
motion implies a start or terminus. However, rather than merely a physical issue, Eckhart 
presents how the heavens and especially the first heavenly sphere (or the subject of 
motion, the first mobile body), dominates and controls the whole natural order, and its 
movement is intended to serve the well-being of the whole universe.368 Eckhart states that 
motion without terminus would deny motion, however there is the idea that to be set in 
                                                 
365 A.A. Maurer, Master Eckhart, Parisian Questions and Prologues (1974), 28.  
366 Eckhart, Quaest. Par. IV, n. 4 (LW V 74,1-3), ‘Item est unus motus, et movetur per 
partes, non per centrum; nam est primum mobile ab immobili quod est in ipso, quia hoc 
est perfectionis; ideo debet moveri in se, non in centro.’ For recent discussion on this 
question see M. Vinzent, ‘Eckhart on Space and Time’ (2016). 
367 For Question four see Aristotle Phys. VI, 6, 236b 33, Metaph. IX (14, 1049b 35); for 
Question five see Phys. III (Γ c. 6, 207a 13), Metaph. VII (Z c. 6, 1033b 17).  
368 See Parisian Questions, A.A. Maurer (1974), 24-6; Thom. Aqu., In XII Metaph. Lect. 
9, n. 2558. This “ninth” orb or sphere of which St. Thomas speaks was postulated by the 
astronomers to account for the motion which the celestial pole was discovered to be 
describing every 36,000 years. Since it encompassed all the other spheres, it was 
considered to be a ninth or outermost sphere, and therefore the first in order of all the 
spheres; See Q.d. De potentia, q. 5, a. 5, (ed.) Marietti (1953), 140a-5b. 
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motion denotes imperfection in contrast with the perfect, immobile power,369 who sets in 
motion. The threads in Question four concerning potentiality apart from actuality, or 
power not related to motion, the idea that the power of God is perfect in contrast with the 
imperfection found in creatures, that the first (mobile body) has only one uniform 
movement and also grammatical use of the tool of contradiction,370 all connect with 
Question six. 
Following Question six, on the adjacent side of folio 222v, is a question looking at the 
essence of God, ‘Whether the essence of God is more real than the property?’371 Eckhart 
considers how the power of God to generate is his absolute active potentiality, and so this 
marks a clear link by developing the notion of God’s power in Question six. The problem 
raised is that, if God does not extend his power to generate to the Son when the Son is 
generated, then the Son is less powerful and therefore secondary to the Father. Eckhart 
emphasises throughout that the Father’s act of generating the Son is not through him being 
Father, but out of his very essence of being God. And so, because they share the same 
essence, the Father and Son are both able to generate and share the same power such that 
the Son could generate the Father. This answer is paralleled by Eckhart in his 
Commentary on Exodus and therefore, with consecutive questions on Vat. Lat. 1086 
corresponding to consecutive paragraphs in the Commentary, this very much strengthens 
the case that these questions were from the same disputationes and present a developing 
argument.  
Further evidence for the authorship of these questions comes from Latin Sermo XXVIII, 
‘he has done everything well’ (Mark 7:37), in which there are consecutive paragraphs 
corresponding to Questions five and six.372 As the comments later on n. 1 and n. 11 
present, these contain the provocative idea that God could make decens what is not decens 
now, or in other words, God could make something that is indecent, or unbefitting but for 
                                                 
369 See Eckhart, Quaest. Par. IV, n. 4 (LW V 73, 4-8): ‘Nam aliqua sunt, quae sunt 
perfectionis, quaedam imperfectionis; nam moveri dicit imperfectionem. Et ideo quanto 
aliquid magis perfectum, tanto minus de motu et de loco, et quia corpus caeleste est 
perfectum primo, ideo minime movetur et locatur, sed omnia movet et omnia locat.’ 
370 See Aristotle, De caelo et mundo II t. 35 (B c. 6, 288, a 11, seq.). 
371 Eckhart, Quaest. Par. VII (LW I/2 463,1-2), see Table 3.  
372 Eckhart, Sermo XXVIII (LW IV 252–62); See M. Vinzent, ‘Questions on the 
Attributes’ (2012), 179-82. Lectura Eckhardi 4 (2011–2). 
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God it would be decent and fitting. This is noticeable because the content between the 
sermon and the question are parallel and it is in contrast with the thoughts on this issue 
by Thomas and Henry of Ghent.373 Also significantly, there is a parallel between Sermo 
XVIII and Parisian Question five with a consideration of Aristotle’s Physics that ‘being 
pertains to the whole and not to a part.’   
And more than authenticity, these parallels between the questions and his Latin 
Commentaries, by extending to his sermons, prove that Eckhart incorporated the same 
notions of his doctrine in the various means of expression. As Markus Vinzent explains, 
it is not just the ordering of these questions within the questions and their parallels 
elsewhere, but the nature of, and manner in which the arguments are developed 
sequentially that is striking. 
Question six was therefore neither random nor unimportant for Eckhart as seen by its 
context with his other questions and also because this was the second time he dealt with 
the omnipotence debate in Paris. Certainly parts of his Commentary on Exodus date from 
his first magisterium in Paris around, 1302-4 AD,374 but the discussion of the question of 
God’s omnipotence as part of a treatise on divine names seems to have been introduced 
after the delivery of the present ‘new’ questions. This can be seen from the different 
literary nature (with absence of Scriptural references, for example) of the section of the 
Commentary that has parallels to the Quaestiones and the rest of the text which follows 
closely the pattern of Eckhart’s other scriptural commentaries. The question of 
omnipotence is found in paragraph 27 and paralleled in Question six, the issue of the 
power of generating in the Father is covered by paragraph 28 and paralleled in Question 
seven and the issue of relation is covered by paragraph 62 and paralleled in Questions 
eight and nine with the example of whiteness featuring in Questions seven and eight.375 
Inference of the power distinction is made to introduce a block of commentary dealing 
with the almightiness of God from the text of Exodus 15:3,376 the Song of Moses after 
                                                 
373 See Henry of Ghent, Quodlib. XI 2; Thom. Aqu., Scriptum Sent. III, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3; 
Q.d. De potentia, q. 1, a. 1, r, also Grabmann, ‘Neuaufgefundene Pariser Quaestionen 
Meister Eckharts’, 358. 
374 See L. Sturlese, The Origins of the Opus Tripartitum in, The Brill Companion to 
Meister Eckhart, (2013), 125-35. 
375 See M. Vinzent, ‘Questions on the Attributes’ (2012), 180. 
376 See Exod. 15: 1-22 for the songs of Moses and Miriam. 
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God had rescued his people from the hands of the Egyptians. Eckhart points to the 
proposal that God can do everything, or alternatively: 
How scripture, the theologians, and the saints say that there are some 
things that God cannot do.377  
The comments in this portion of commentary show several parallels with Question six 
and are a critical reason why these ‘rediscovered questions’ must be attributed to Meister 
Eckhart.378 The context of the action taking place in the book of Exodus is the backdrop 
to a discussion about the power of God, and how God actualises this power, and also how 
limitations to God’s power are sometimes perceived. This is an on-going exploration but 
something of Eckhart’s thinking on power can be gleaned by examining these two 
treatments from Paris as the two clearest explanations, known so far, on this aspect of 
theology. The nature of the power of God naturally features in other works of Eckhart, 
and for example, of similarly recent interest, the newly discovered ‘Troyes fragment’379 
considers the extent of God’s power in relation to infinity, and therefore holds a strong 
connection to Question six.   
 
n. 1 And it seems it should be considered as directed [power], because it should be 
related [to the things] that are befitting for God to do and [the things] it is possible 
for God to do. 
n. 2 The counter-argument: Omnipotence comprises everything that does not 
involve a contradiction, and this is more than [the things] of [just] directed [power]. 
 
With this recurring question forwarded, and being a disputatio, possibly done so in 
advance, Eckhart’s audience should have been familiar with earlier treatments, as noted 
                                                 
377 Eckhart, In Ex. n. 27 (LW II 32,6-8): ‘et secundo quomodo in scriptura et a doctoribus 
et sanctis dicatur deus quaedam non posse.’ trans. here and following B. McGinn and F. 
Tobin (1987).  
378 See M. Vinzent, ‘Questions on the Attributes’ (2012), 179-81. 
379 A text of Eckhart has been identified in the margin of a manuscript from Clairvaux, 
now held at the Centre régional de documentation, University of Troyes, France. This has 
been transcribed by Pater Senner OP and published in LW I/2, 2015. See Tagung 
Deutscher Thomismus im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert. Ergebnisse der Forschung und neue 
Perspektiven. Freiburg i. Br., 28.-30. Januar 2010. For the fragment of Eckhart, 
manuscript: Troyes, Médiathèque de l’Agglomération Troyenne, cod. 269, fol. 85v, marg. 
inf. with an English translation, M. Vinzent, ‘Questions on the Attributes’ (2012), 182-4. 
168 
 
in Part I, and also the place held by this particular debate in dealing with ecclesiastical 
issues. Eckhart refers to Augustine and Lombard directly but although there is no mention 
of Thomas by name, there is little doubt that the Meister’s audience would be making the 
connections with the works of Thomas, and soon noticing parallels with the thinking of 
Aquinas and especially the Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei. Maybe they were 
even more attentive in eagerly watching out for any difference between the ‘Angelic 
Doctor’ and the enigmatic Eckhart who often began from the starting point of Thomas 
before venturing into uncharted territory. It was not unusual practice to start from the 
position of the key player in the field and by the start of the 14th century, due appreciation 
of Aquinas, as the standard for orthodoxy, was not just accepted, but expected. Both 
meisters lectured on the Sentences in Paris, and so both would have been well aware of 
the distinction on power in this standard mediaeval theology text, and therefore parallels 
with Lombard, who referred largely to Augustine, are also inevitable.380  
Having introduced the question of omnipotence with the ‘utrum’, Eckhart begins his 
setting out of the debate raised quite conventionally with ‘et videtur’, and thereby 
suggesting the door to questioning is being opened. He moves to the first argument by 
proposing, also quite ordinarily, that God’s power must, ‘it seems’, be considered as 
‘ordinata’. The potentia ordinata to this point had generally been considered as the power 
associated with the things God wills to do and therefore actually does, with ordinata 
accordingly being translated as ‘ordained’. This idea picks up the threads from Augustine, 
and in the narrowest sense, Abelard, that the ordinata contains everything that God could 
do, because, if it is his will to do something, and the will of God cannot be thwarted, then 
the extent of God’s power is seen in the way he does everything that is actualised. A 
second option for translation, recognises that in philosophical argument, if anything is not 
taken as ‘absolute’ then it should be regarded as being ‘related’ to something. Power 
therefore could be seen as either general potentiality, in which case absolute, or 
                                                 
380 Investigating Question six reveals several parallels with different works of Eckhart’s 
predecessors but the connections with those of Thomas Aquinas are worth particular 
consideration. Many of the parallels naturally come with the Thomas’ Q.d. De potentia 
which is a more substantial work than Question six. For a side by side view of parallels 
between Question six and various texts of Thomas see Appendix iv, Comparison between 
Eckhart Q6 vs Thomas Aquinas. Lombard’s writings, in particular, Sentences, Book 1, 
distinctions 41-4 are featured in Part I: Scholastic advances. 
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potentiality related to action. Translating ordinata as ‘related’ would emphasise the idea 
of power other than in a general sense by pointing to the things that are actualised by 
power, but this would be without any inference of how that power is being exercised. In 
the recently published edition of the Questions, ordinata has been translated into German 
by the word geordnetes and so emphasising the notion that these are the precise actions 
of God.381 Potentia ordinata has therefore been translated using a third option of 
‘directed’ power, because this combines all three ideas of being within the will of the one 
exerting power, while referring to the actual things being done, and importantly, 
accentuating that this power is operational. This first proposal of the text wraps up 
omnipotence as power with the actions it does, therefore ‘directed power’ is a dynamic 
term matching the view of Eckhart emerging throughout the question, portraying his 
thought of not separating power as an abstract concept from what it actualises.  
The Meister explains this proposal with two criteria reflecting the ordinata, as the need 
for God’s actions to be fitting and to be possible. For God, to only do the things that are 
befitting for him to do could maintain that he simply does as he wills, but decens is used 
to present something that seems decent or becoming, therefore also suggesting that God 
acts according to his nature. God does the things that are right for God to do, as echoed 
by the German translation, angemessen,382 and these are the actions that are appropriate 
for him to do according to his essence, the nature of his being. In n. 11 decentia has been 
translated ‘decent’ in English and gehörig383 in German, again emphasising that these 
actions relate to God and are true to his nature. Eckhart uses the similar term convenit in 
his Commentary on Exodus, when inferring the power debate, to describe how power 
belongs properly to God and this use simply relates to God as being almightiness.384 This 
treatment from Eckhart is in the context of God being able to do everything or otherwise, 
and Thomas also describes the importance of the nature of God when actions are 
determined: 
                                                 
381 Eckhart, n. 1 (LW I/2 717,1), trans. here and following L. Sturlese, W. Senner and M. 
Vinzent. 
382 Eckhart, n. 1 (LW I/2 717).  
383 Eckhart, n. 11 (LW I/2 717). 
384 See Eckhart, In Ex. n. 27 (LW II 32,4-6): ‘primo quod omnipotentia proprie deo 
convenit et ipse solus potest omnia: “omnipotens”, ait, “nomen eius” - circa primum 
videndum quomodo deus possit omnia.’  
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Now God is act both pure and primary, wherefore it is most befitting to 
him to act and communicate his likeness to other things: and 
consequently active power is most becoming to him.385 
The term convenit was used by Abelard to explain why God can only do what he does, 
(and now do what he always could do)386 but Thomas does not use the term in such an 
exclusive sense. Here it has been translated as befitting and becoming, to propose that, as 
seen earlier in chapter one, if something is convenit for the Father then it must be convenit 
for the Son.387 This idea connects with the thoughts of Alexander of Hales, who uses the 
term ‘decet’ in his gloss on Lombard’s distinction 44 to state that, although it could be 
possible for the Father to assume flesh, it would not be fitting, or seemly.388 Alexander 
proposes that something might be possible but not befitting, and thereby distinguishing 
between the potentia ordinata and absoluta, and Eckhart concurs, that according to this 
proposal, for something to be directed, it must be both possible and befitting. This is not 
a question of the extent of God’s power but the idea of a self-imposed limitation.  
In the proceeding counter argument, Eckhart introduces the absoluta by proposing that 
God does everything possible and these things exist because they do not involve a 
contradiction. As with others before, there is no disagreement with the principle that two 
things that comprise a contradiction cannot happen. The term ‘implicat’, has been 
translated ‘involved’ because the more literal translation, ‘implied’ points simply to the 
action, whereas the idea of involving, suggests containing within either the action, or the 
subject of the action, which relates more closely to the idea of directed power. Likewise, 
in German einschließt,389 adds the element of enclosing rather than just pointing to the 
action. In this case then, if something cannot be done, there is a contradiction contained 
within the proposition of possibility.  
 
                                                 
385 Thom. Aqu., Q.d. De potentia, q. 1, a. 1, resp., (ed.) Marietti (1953), 9: ‘Deo autem 
convenit esse actum purum et primum; unde ipsi convenit maxime agere, et suam 
similitudinem in alias diffundere, et ideo ei maxime convenit potentia activa.’ 
386 See Peter Abelard, Introductio ad Theologiam III, 5 (PL 178, col. 1103-4; CCCM 
13,527), see appendix ii.   
387 See Thom. Aqu., Scriptum Sent. III, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3 (1956), 36 footnote 260.   
388 See Alexander of Hales, Glossa, I, d. 44 (1951), I, 448, footnote 216. 
389 Eckhart, n. 2 (LW I/2 717). 
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Eckhart gives further clarification in his Commentary on Exodus, in which the question 
of the things that are possible for God to do is raised in connection with the term 
omnipotence, which implies simply that God has the power to do everything, and that it 
is beyond suggestion that God could lack the power to do anything. He breaks the Latin 
term down into the two parts of omni and potent to explain how God has power to make 
whatever is among everything that is or could be.390 God has power for all things, 
therefore it is appropriate to call God ‘Omnipotent’ and because God is active power in 
his substance, this is expressed in directed action.391 Stating how God has power over 
everything that exists the Meister proposes:  
‘Every agent has natural power over those things, and solely over those 
things through itself which are contained under the form which is the 
principle of the agent’s action. Being, however, is the principle of every 
divine action. Therefore God has power over everything that is or can 
be… Hence the fire that in its sphere is right next to the moon’s sphere 
does not act upon it and does not touch it, although it is touched by 
it.’392 
Fire is then used as an illustration by showing that it will burn everything it is brought 
into contact with that can be burnt, although there may be things that don’t burn, such as 
the Moon. An agent can only act on things within the sphere of activity that it is able to 
                                                 
390 See Eckhart, In Ex. n. 30 (LW II 36,11-4): ‘“Omnipotens” duo dicit: omnia et potentia, 
potens omnia, potens omnium. Quae ergo sunt de numero omnium, illa potest. Iterum 
quae posse est potentiae, illa potest. Quae vero nec sunt in numero omnium et quae posse 
non est posse sed potius non posse, illa non potest.’ 
391 See Eckhart, In Ex. n. 27-78 (LW II 32,2-82,8). See Thom. Aqu., Q.d. De potentia, q. 
1, a. 7, (ed.) Marietti (1965), 22b: ‘Septimo quaeritur quare Deus dicatur omnipotens’, 
for Lombard distinction 42 see note 163. 
392 In Ex. n. 28 (LW II 32,9-12… LW II 32,14-33,3): ‘omne agens potest naturaliter in 
omnia illa et sola illa per se, quae continentur sub forma, quae in ipso est principium 
actionis. Sed esse est principium omnis actionis divinae. Igitur deus potest omnia quae 
sunt et quae esse possunt… Ignis enim calefacit calore, et propter hoc agit in omnia 
calefactibilia et per se in nihil aliud, quod non sit capax caloris et formae ignis. Propter 
quod ignis, in sua sphaera immediatus orbi (lunae), in ipsum non agit, sed nec tangit 
physice ipsum, licet tangatur ab illo.’  
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do, and therefore God, as existence, is the creator of everything that merely exists and has 
power over everything that is, and yet more than this, everything that could be. Thomas 
asked the same question in his Q.d. De potentia, following Lombard who asked the 
question in distinction 42. 393 There is some pointer to a distinction here because, whereas 
fire is limited in its action to only burning certain things, God, whose form is his being 
acts from his being and could do even more than what is, if it possibly could be, and hence 
possesses absolute power. Nothing else could act on everything that is, let alone 
everything possible.   
In his Commentary Eckhart deals with the way the term ‘omnipotence’ has led to the 
notion that there are things God cannot do, or rather that the ‘vulgaris’, or common 
people, suggest there are things that God does not have power over.394 He points out that 
omnipotence is truly power over everything and that because nothing and everything are 
mutually opposed, to have power over nothing is to have no power at all. Anything that 
is not subject to God’s power is a kind of nothing, does not exist and belongs to impotency 
rather than potency. This includes anything involving a contradiction and anything evil 
which are two ideas featuring later in this treatment (nn. 10, 13, 14). Eckhart explains 
something cannot exist at the same time as that which contradicts it and God cannot do 
evil because it does not fall within the things that exist and so it is a nothing. In both cases 
for God to have power over such non-beings would suggest a failing in God’s power and 
therefore be a mark of impotency rather than potency. Also, God could not hold any defect 
or indeed deny himself, which is the thought used by others such as Augustine on this 
issue taken from the text of Paul’s Letter to Timothy.395 Eckhart connects here with 
Thomas stating that God’s power extends to things that are possible in themselves, 
meaning all the things that do not involve a contradiction,396 and also, as seen in chapter 
one, that God, within his ordinata would not do anything that involved a contradiction in 
                                                 
393 See Eckhart, In Ex. nn. 32-3 (LW II 38,8-39,2).  
394 See Eckhart, In Ex. n. 30 (LW II 36,7). 
395 See Eckhart, In Ex. n. 32-3 (LW II 38, 8-39, 2), also 2Tim. 2:13, footnote 121.  
396 See Thom. Aqu., Q.d. De potentia, q1, a. 7, resp., (ed.) Marietti (1953), 23a-b; see also 
Scriptum Sent. I, d. 42, q. 2, a. 2, sol., (ed.) Mandonnet (Paris, 1929), 991; John Duns 
Scotus, Reportatio Parisiensis iv, d. 1, q. 5, L. Wadding edition (Lyons, 1639). 
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the current order, but these things may be possible, absoluta, in a different order.397 This 
argument and the extent to which Eckhart concurs with Thomas is expanded later in 
Question six and at this stage the Meister is simply stating where developments have 
reached. 
The counter argument, therefore, to the idea that the power of God should be considered 
as that through which God could only do what is befitting and possible, out of the potentia 
ordinata, n. 1, presents the notion that things could be done, out of potentia absoluta, n. 
2, and this power is only restricted by the question of whether or not the thing could 
possibly exist. This idea that God does everything that is possible, seems to be common 
to both arguments, therefore the further constraint, that he can only do the things are 
appropriate for him to do, is the reason why there are more things that can be done 
absoluta than ordinata. This is an expression of the power distinction. Eckhart has 
summarised the omnipotence debate by presenting the two sides of the issue, such that 
either God’s power should be seen as that which is able to do everything possible, 
absoluta, or everything that is possible and that is also decens, and thereby within his 
nature, or essence, as God, ordinata.398 The proposal and counter proposal have suggested 
there are two constraints, or filters on the actions of God. One considers how ‘everything’ 
is different from ‘everything possible’ and this is based on the need for there to be no 
contradiction involved and can be designated the restriction, or filter of ‘logical 
possibility’. The second constraint is based on any action being decens’ and this can be 
designated the filter of ‘moral possibility’. This idea had featured earlier in the power 
debate when Alexander of Hales used both terms, decere and posse, to present a 
distinction between ordinata and absoluta.399 These two filters of limitation introduced 
in the first two paragraphs are central to the arguments raised throughout Question six. 
The counter argument of n. 2, dealing with the issue of doing everything possible that 
does not involve a contradiction, is specifically considered in n. 10, and the first argument, 
the limitation of being decens, features in n. 11.     
                                                 
397 See Thom. Aqu., Scriptum Sent. III, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3, (ed.) Moos (1956), 38, footnote 
270. 
398 See Hugh de Novocastro, Sent. I, d. 42, q. 2, (ed.) E. Randi, Il sovrano e l’orologiaio: 
due immagini di Dio nel dibattito sulla “potentia absoluta” fra XIII e XIV secolo 
(Florence, 1987), 135-6 See W.J. Courtenay Capacity and Volition (1990), 116. 




n. 3 It has to be shown first that [this] power is in God. For, potentiality is spoken of 
with regard to actuality. But actuality is two-fold: The first actuality, which is the 
form [of something], relates to passive potentiality and [the second actuality which 
is] the act [of something], relates to active potentiality, [which is power].   
And this is in God: Both because where there is intrinsic or extrinsic action, then 
there is power [to bring it about]. But in God there is intrinsic and extrinsic action. 
[Therefore God has power for intrinsic and extrinsic action]. And, because 
according to Avicenna, power is firstly found in men because they have the strength 
to overcome. But God cannot suffer [at the hands of] anything, therefore God is 
actuality of the highest degree. [Total power in action].     
 
In n. 3, the Meister begins to step from his introduction and the main thrust of historical 
treatments towards his own radical solution by focussing on the nature of power and 
explaining firstly that God’s possesses all power. Or more precisely, all power that is, is 
in God. The previous paragraph began with ‘et videtur’ and two ways that power could 
be perceived, but there is no pointer to uncertainty here and no thought of distinction, but 
the expression of power being in God, and taking this a step further, God himself, as being 
total power itself.   
The notes, and indeed the marginal note, emphasise that this is the first point to be 
considered and therefore not unimportant. The distinction cannot be thought of without 
the notion of omnipotence in action and so this paragraph presents power in a different 
way. It had always been thought, that if something could be done, then God has enough 
power to do it, but Eckhart connects with Avicenna, and thereby Albert and Thomas, by 
considering power firstly in its essence, or potentiality, as a quantity with the potential to 
achieve something irrespective of whether or not that something exists. These notes of 
Question six seem an abbreviation in comparison with the substantial record of Thomas 
in the Q.d. De potentia when, in article one he asks if there is power in God,400 and there 
are eighteen following arguments and a solution presenting that God is indeed power, and 
this is God in essence, which matches the relatively succinct solution given by Eckhart. 
The Meister explains that actuality, or what actually is, or happens, comprises of passive 
potentiality which is just from the form of something and active potentiality, or power, 
which relates to action. This explanation of actuality is not original and can be found in 
Thomas: 
                                                 
400 See Thom. Aqu., Q.d. De potentia, q. 1, a. 1, (ed.) Marietti (1953), 7a. 
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I answer that to make the point at issue clear we must observe that we 
speak of power in relation to act. Now act is twofold; the first act which 
is a form, and the second act which is operation… Wherefore in like 
manner power is twofold: active power corresponding to that act which 
is operation - and seemingly it was in this sense that the word ‘power’ 
was first employed: - and passive power, corresponding to the first act 
or the form, - to which seemingly the name of power was subsequently 
given.401 
Eckhart does amplify this notion of power in his Commentary on Exodus,402 saying the 
form of God, as God, possesses all potentiality before any action is conceived, and so this 
form expresses Being, or Existence as God,403 who both is, and is capable of all action 
possible. But God is not simply capable of all action possible, as pure being, God is 
existence and therefore holds the power for all that exists, or could exist, the total actuality 
which is both passive and active. Just in his very form, God is passive potentiality, and in 
the things he does, all his actions, he is active potentiality. Eckhart describes how God is 
potentiality in himself and so, whether just passive or active, this is not just contained by 
God as one of his attributes among others, but this is the nature of God. With the terms 
established, two reasons are given why all potentiality is in God. Firstly the Meister 
employs the logical sequence that if there is action, then there must be power to bring this 
                                                 
401 Thom. Aqu., Q.d. De potentia, q. 1, a. 1, resp., (ed.) Marietti (1953), 8b-9a: 
‘Respondeo. Ad huius quaestionis evidentiam sciendum, quod potentia dicitur ab actu: 
actus autem est duplex: scilicet primus, qui est forma; et secundus, qui est operatio: et 
sicut videtur ex communi hominum intellectu, nomen actus primo fuit attributum 
operationi... Unde et similiter duplex est potentia: una activa cui respondet actus, qui est 
operatio; et huic primo nomen potentiae videtur fuisse attributum: alia est potentia 
passiva, cui respondet actus primus, qui est forma, ad quam similiter videtur secundario 
nomen potentiae devolutum… Sicut autem nihil patitur nisi ratione potentiae passivae, 
ita nihil agit nisi ratione actus primi, qui est forma.’ See Albert, In I Sentences, d. 35B, 
art. 3, ad. 4, 5, (ed.) Borgnet, 26: 183-4, footnote 227. 
402 See Eckhart, In Ex. 15:3, n. 28 (LW II 32,9-12… LW II 32,14-33,3). 
403 For the first proposition that ‘Existence is God’, Esse est deus”, see Eckhart, Prolog. 
Gen. in Opus tripartitum n. 12, (LW I/2, 29,16-31,9), also In Gen. II, n. 131 (LW I 596,4-
5), Quaest. Par. IV, n. 4 (LW V 73,4-8). 
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action about. As he states in his Prologus generalis in Opus tripartitum, God is active 
within himself and also outwardly, and therefore, because in God there is both intrinsic 
and extrinsic action, then there must be power. prologe 
Here it should be noticed that everything God creates, works or does, 
he works or does in himself. What is outside of God and is made outside 
of him, exists and is made outside of existence.404  
God being the source of action is stated in the first Parisian question: 
Now God’s existence is most excellent and perfect, being the primary 
actuality and the perfection of all things, bringing all acts to completion, 
so that if it were removed everything would be reduced to nothing. So 
God does everything through his existence, both intrinsically in the 
Godhead and extrinsically in creatures.405 
The truth of God’s existence means that there is actuality, and by his very nature, God is 
involved in both intrinsic and extrinsic activity, or rather, is both intrinsic and extrinsic 
activity. This passage proposes not just that God is involved in all actuality, but all that 
activity would be reduced to nothing if God were not active, meaning that without the 
existence and thereby activity of God, there is nothing. In his comments on Ecclesiasticus 
the contrast is again made that all action is from the ‘First Mover’ and anything that does 
move, does so because of the ‘heavenly mover’.406  
                                                 
404 Eckhart, Prolog. Gen. in Opus tripartitum n. 17 (LW I/2 33,21-3): ‘notandum quod 
omne quod deus creat, operatur vel agit, in se ipso agit et operatur. Quod enim extra 
deum est et quod extra deum fit, extra esse est et fit.’ Trans. here and following A. Maurer 
(1974). 
405 Eckhart, Quaest. Par. I, n. 3 (LW V 39,12-40,2): ‘Cum igitur esse in deo sit optimum 
et perfectissimum, actus primus et omnium perfectio, omnes actus perficiens, quo sublato 
omnia nihil sunt, ideo deus per ipsum suum esse omnia operatur et intrinsecus in deitate 
et extrinsecus in creaturis.’  
406 Eckhart, In Eccl. n. 50 (LW II 278,8-12): ‘per quas agunt secunda agentia, id, quod 
sunt formae et actus, a deo sunt, qui est primus actus formalis. Adhuc autem ipsae formae, 
quibus agunt secunda, non possunt moveri ad agendum nisi a deo, utpote a primo motore, 
sicut, verbi gratia, forma[e] ignis et caloris non possunt calefacere nisi motae a motore 
caeli.’ trans. here and following B. McGinn and F. Tobin (1987). See also In Sap. n. 80 
(LW II 411,12-412,3), In Ex. n. 52 (LW II 55,12-56,2). 
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Likewise, as seen in Parisian Question four earlier, using Aristotelian logic, the fact that 
there is action points to being put into action, and so from Eckhart’s perspective, this first 
mover is the ‘one’, and the ‘actualising Being’. This activity is described in Sermo XXV, 
when Eckhart refers to the bullitio and ebullitio as the boiling up action within God and 
the active boiling over of himself into every other thing: 
God as good is the principle of “boiling over” on the outside; as 
personal notion he is the principle of the “boiling within himself,” 
which is the cause and exemplar of the “boiling over.”407  
God in his essence is active within himself in principle, and so this is intrinsic action, yet 
also God actively boils over and this is extrinsic action. God is the active boiling source 
of everything that exists and so power is both in God in essence and in action.408 There is 
no mere passive potentiality here as the emphasis is on action with the adjectival sense of 
boiling rather than merely sitting or simmering. This is dynamic activity, and again there 
is more added with the idea of not merely boiling, but boiling over. Power is not just 
resting in God, not just dynamically active within God, but explosively burgeoning in 
overflowing activity. 
The second reason given affirms that there is no greater power than God by making the 
comparison between God and man, to accentuate the extent of this power. Man is seen to 
have power because of his actions, and this is to be regarded as strength because man 
overcomes something. Yet power in man is compared with that in God. One man will be 
the strongest man, but not for ever, and will eventually be weaker than another. God in 
his nature cannot suffer at the hands of anyone or anything that exists, and cannot fail, 
and cannot be denied anything that is within his will. Therefore there is no greater power 
                                                 
407 Eckhart, Sermo XXV n. 258 (LW IV 236): ‘deus sub ratione boni est principium 
ebullitionis ad extra, sub ratione vero notionis est principium bullitionis in se ipso, quae 
se habet causaliter et exemplar[iter] ad ebullitionem.’ Trans. B. McGinn and F. Tobin 
(1987).  
408 McGinn notes that Eckhart introduces three scholastic terms important for the early 
development of the sermon: (1) quod quid est, the Aristotelian term that signifies the 
“quiddity,” or “whatness” of a thing; (2) id quod est, or “what it is,” a Boethian term; and 
(3) quo est indicating God, existence itself as the source of all things. See Teacher and 
Preacher (1986), 221. 
178 
 
possible and neither no-one, nor nothing external to God, with power greater than God as 
Eckhart states here in a sermon describing the oneness of God: 
In the One there is never pain, punishment or distress, nor ability to 
suffer or die.409 
The contrast is absolute between being vulnerable to total suffering or possessing total 
power. Thoughts from Avicenna,410 which are also cited by Thomas emphasise that 
whatever power there is in man, then it is greater in God and this trails all the way back 
to the Hebrew concept of Sabaoth,411 the one able to overcome any challenge and defeat 
any enemy physical or spiritual. We know about power because it is present in man as 
part of creation but the extent of our power points to frailty in comparison with the all-
surpassing omnipotence of God. This is not a statement about the question of potentiality 
but reinforcement of the point just given above that God is active and could not possibly 
be passive. To be actively passive would mean being able to suffer at the hands of a 
different power and this would be inconsistent with the notion of being total power. 
Passive potentiality is not being passive, but the potential to be active. In English terms, 
the maxime actus of Eckhart or maxime sit potentia activa of Thomas, means that power 
is total, ultimate and maximum and there is simply no greater power that exists or could 
possibly exist. This is not just the potential power that could be available to use, but 
absolute, actualising power, therefore God is declared to be total power, the maximum 
and ultimate active (and passive, being careful not to say potential in this statement), 
actuality.  
The comparison between Eckhart and Aquinas is apparent in presenting the nature of the 
actuality in God. Thomas states:  
Whence it most fittingly belongs to Him to be an active principle, and 
in no way whatsoever to be passive. On the other hand, the notion of 
active principle is consistent with active power. For active power is the 
                                                 
409 Eckhart, Sermo XXIX n. 297 (LW IV 264,8-9): ‘Secundo in uno nunquam est dolor 
sive poena sive molestum, sed nec passibilitas aut mortalitas.’ Trans. B. McGinn and F. 
Tobin (1987).  
410 See Avicenna, Liber de Philosophia Prima, tr. IV, 2: Avicenna Latinus I (ed.) S. Van 
Riet (1977), S, 193,72-194,75, 196,16-8 ref. in Thom. Aqu., Scriptum Sent. I, d. 42, q. 1, 
a. 1, sol., (ed.) Mandonnet (1929), I 983.   
411 For the idea of Sabaoth see Part I, ‘The Sovereign God of Israel’, 5-6. 
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principle of acting upon something else; whereas passive power is the 
principle of being acted upon by something else, as the Philosopher 
says (Metaph. v, 17). It remains, therefore, that in God there is active 
power in the highest degree.412 
For Thomas, as with Eckhart, it is effectively impossible for God to be ‘acted upon’, by 
anything external but there is a subtle pointer to a clear difference in the thinking of the 
two with regards to the relationship between God as creator and his creation. Both 
acknowledge there is nothing outside of God in principle. Thomas, however, places a 
distinction between God and man in that God does not possess the physicality to be 
measured and if even he did then he would still be other than creation. Alternatively 
Eckhart uses the Neo-Platonic notion of the participation of the creator in creation to 
emphasise the oneness of God in everything that comes from God and that nothing is 
outside of God because God includes and pre-contains all being at once.413 Thomas allows 
for the participation of God with creation but Eckhart expresses the active participation 
of God from within creation. This is an example of why it is important to consider how 
the two masters may not be expressing the same point despite using identical terms. In 
other words Thomas considers God as both transcendent and immanent, unknowable and 
present but for Eckhart, God’s immanence is an expression of transcendence. He 
expresses this in Middle High German: 
That a word flows out and yet remains within is certainly marvellous. 
That all creatures flow out and yet remain within is a wonder. What 
God has given and what he has promised to give is simply marvellous, 
incomprehensible, unbelievable. And this is as it should be; for if it 
were intelligible and believable, it would not be right. God is in all 
                                                 
412 Thom. Aqu., S.Th. I, q. 25, a. 1, (ed.) Leon. XIII (1888), 290: ‘Unde sibi maxime 
competit esse principium activum, et nullo modo pati. Ratio autem activi principii 
convenit potentiae activae. Nam potentia activa est principium agendi in aliud, potentia 
vero passiva est principium patiendi ab alio, ut philosophus dicit, V Metaphys. 
Relinquitur ergo quod in Deo maxime sit potentia activa.’ Text and trans. in Thomas 
Gilby, St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (Blackfriars edition), vol. 5 (London, 
1967). See Aristotle, Metaphysics v 17 for the notion of ‘limit’.  




things. The more he is in things, the more he is outside the things; the 
more within; the more outside; the more outside, the more within.414  
Eckhart is using seemingly paradoxical language in his typical way of presenting a 
profound idea, and indeed by saying ‘daz ist gar wunderlich’ he is acknowledging this is 
a mystery. There is no suggestion of any pantheistic notion of God being everything, but 
the attempt to explain, as elsewhere in Predigt 9 and his Sermons and Lectures on 
Ecclesiasticus, how God is both within and beyond everything, and that also in terms of 
power, this is the one singular action, which the Meister continues to unveil in n.  5. 
Therefore this is not so much a paradox, the simultaneous assertion of opposites 
presenting something wonderful to comprehend, but the use of two ostensibly 
contradictory truths in dialectical reasoning as a means of pointing towards God’s 
incomprehensibility.415  
 
n. 4 But you will then ask, ‘How is this power in God to be understood? 
n. 5 The answer has to be: as that which is found in creatures as ultimate perfection, 
once the imperfection is removed [from them].  
I say also, in reality there is only one power, because it is said that all things [are 
done] in a particular (singular) way.  
Also, [divine] essence is [the] principle [origin] of all emanations, and itself [this 
essence] is one. Therefore and so forth. 
 
With the verdict that God is total power in action, Eckhart then suggests by the ‘sed’ that 
it is consequential, once being made aware of this power of God, to want to know how 
this power should be understood. What follows is the key presentation of Eckhart’s notion 
                                                 
414 Eckhart, Pr. 30, (DW II 94, 1-7): ‘Ez ist ein wunderlich dinc, daz ein dinc ûzvliuzet 
und doch inneblîbet. Daz daz wort ûzvliuzet und doch inneblîbet, daz ist gar wunderlich; 
daz alle crêatûren ûzvliezent und doch inneblîbent, daz ist gar wunderlich. daz got 
gegeben hât und daz got gelobet hât ze gebenne, daz ist gar wunderlich und ist 
unbegrîfelich und unglouplich. Und dem ist reht; wan wære ez begrîfelich und wære ez 
glouplich, so enwære ez niht reht. Got ist in allen dingen. Ie mê er ist in den dingen, ie 
mê er ist ûz den dingen: ie mê inne, ie mê ûze, und ie mê ûze, ie mê inne.’ Trans. B. 
McGinn and F. Tobin (1987).  
415 Eckhart, Pr. 9 (DW I 141-58); In Eccl. n. 54 (LW II 282,13-283,14); M. Vinzent, The 
Art of Detachment, Eckhart: Texts and Studies, vol. 1 (Leuven, 2011), 244-5; O. Davies, 
Meister Eckhart: Mystical Theologian (London, 1991), 113.  
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of omnipotence and so it is essential that something of his philosophical shaping is 
incorporated as background to this section. Likewise it should be noted that the reasoning 
presented in the text relates to the treatise on divine names in his Commentary on Exodus, 
and therefore, although not referred to directly, the concept of a name is integral to this 
reasoning, and included here to reflect the parallels between the two. There are also 
several references to Thomas in this section, because it is in n. 5 that key differences 
between the two meisters become evident. While this is not so clear from the text of 
Question six, the ideas, inferred by the astute employment of certain words in the text, are 
expressed more fully in Eckhart’s other works. One of the difficulties of discerning the 
difference between Eckhart and Aquinas is that, especially in the text of this question, 
similar terms and format are used by Thomas so it is essential to explore if there are 
different implications behind certain words. These differences could be due simply to the 
time gap between the two meisters, because meanings of terms evolve over time, or 
maybe, and more likely, it is because each wanted to convey a particular idea.  
The format of Question six and development of the argument suggests the key to 
understanding Eckhart comes in n. 5, because this is where he clearly expresses his 
thoughts on omnipotence, and builds on the n. 3 notion that omnipotence is in God, the 
maxime actus. N. 5 is a three-statement revelation of God’s power, and while the format 
of the whole text is similar to that of any typical disputatio question structure, this 
paragraph is outstanding, in the context of the background question of the distinction, as 
a clear synopsis of the Meister’s thinking.  
The first of these three statements about the power of God presents the comparison made 
between God and creatures when using the idea of perfection. The power of God has to 
be seen as the power to be found in creatures through the action of replacing imperfection 
with perfection. This is an issue of distinction from God, because where there is 
indistinction from God there is perfection and oneness, whereas imperfection points to 
distinction, and so the move to perfection from imperfection speaks of the return to 
oneness with God. Secondly the emphasis is made that there is only one power, therefore 
all things are done in one way, and everything that is done bears the mark of the one doing 
it; i.e. God is seen in all action because it is one singular action and he is the power doing 
the action. Thirdly, building on the second point, all things have emanated from the one 
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principle and therefore are the outpouring of the one divine essence. God, as one, is the 
unity of essence and the essential unity we comprehend in emanating activity.416  
To find the core of the understanding Eckhart is seeking to communicate, it is helpful to 
consider how he embraced the philosophical tool of analogy, especially in his doctrine on 
the unity of God, as a pointer towards God:  
Again note … that these three are to be distinguished: “the univocal, 
the equivocal and the analogous. Equivocals are divided according to 
different things that are signified, univocals according to the various 
differences of the [same] thing.” Analogous things are not 
distinguished according to things, nor through the differences of things, 
but, “according to the modes [of being]” of one and the same simple 
thing. For example, one and the same health that is in an animal is that 
[and no other] which is in the diet and the urine [of the animal] in such 
a way that there is no more of health as health in the diet and urine as 
there is in a stone. Urine is said to be “healthy” only because it signifies 
health, the same in number, which is in the animal, just as a circular 
piece of wood which has nothing of wine in it [signifies] wine.  
Being or existence and every perfection, especially general ones such 
as existence, oneness, truth, goodness, light, justice and so forth are 
used to describe God in an analogical way. It follows from this that 
goodness and justice and the like [in creatures] have their goodness 
totally from something outside to which they are analogically ordered, 
namely God.’417 
                                                 
416 See T. Tsopurashvili, The Theory of Transcendentals in Meister Eckhart, in Brill’s 
Companion to Meister Eckhart (2013), 196-203.   
417 In Eccl. n. 52-3 (LW II 280,5-281,5): ‘Rursus nono advertendum quod distinguuntur 
haec tria: “univocum, aequivocum et analogum. Nam aequivoca dividuntur per diversas 
res significatas, univoca vero per diversas rei differentias, analoga” vero non 
distinguuntur per res, sed nec per rerum differentias, sed “per modos” unius eiusdemque 
rei simpliciter. Verbi gratia: sanitas una eademque, quae est in animali, ipsa est, non 
alia, in diaeta et urina, ita quod sanitatis, ut sanitas, nihil prorsus est in diaeta et urina. 
non plus quam in lapide, sed hoc solo dicitur urina sana, quia significat illam sanitatem 
eandem numero quae est in animali, sicut circulus vinum, qui nihil vini in se habet. Ens 
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The differences between equivocity, univocity and analogy are presented to provide a 
framework helpful when considering the relation between God and man. Nothing is added 
to the idea of being equivocal, suggesting that God and man are not simply different 
things and it is how univocal and analogous relations can be applied that is of more 
importance here. Analogy is not based on difference or similarity, but on the different 
modes of the same thing. In the parallel passage from his Exodus Commentary, Eckhart 
introduces these ideas in connection with Aristotle’s ten categories, and reducing them to 
just the two in God, of essence and relation, refers to modes of existence, in connection 
with modistic ideas, applied by Albert as seen above in chapter one. Of the two examples 
described the urine conveying health is from Thomas418 but the wooden garland 
signposting wine is more peculiar to the Meister.419 Although urine does not contain 
health in itself, and the wood does not contain wine, they signpost towards health and 
wine respectively. By analogy, creation is nothing of itself, but it is a signpost to the one 
who possesses all attributes. Creation receives the being, nature and perfections of its 
creator, who is outside of creation, meaning creation is dependent on its creator for its 
own existence. McGinn, with a quote of Dietmar Mieth, explains that this passage also 
highlights the difference between Eckhart and Aquinas: 
                                                 
autem sive esse et omnis perfectio, maxime generalis, puta esse, unum, verum, bonum, 
lux, iustitia et huiusmodi, dicuntur de deo et creaturis analogice. Ex quo sequitur quod 
bonitas et iustitia et similia bonitatem suam habent totaliter ab aliquo extra, ad quod 
analogantur, deus scilicet.’ See Eckhart, In Ex. n. 54 (LW II 58,1-60,5); Thom. Aqu. De 
Principiis Naturae, c. 6, 46.   
418 See Thom. Aqu., S.Th. I q. 16, a. 6, (ed.) Leon. XIII (1888); S.c.G., I, 34, 1-6, (ed.) 
Leon (Rome, 1918). For background on how Thomas uses analogy see G.P. Rocca O.P., 
Speaking the Incomprehensible God, Thomas Aquinas on the Interplay of Positive and 
Negative Theology (Washington, 2004), 93-134, including a critique of analogy, 93-103. 
419 The wreath or garland was a common sign above the door of a tavern in mediaeval 
Germany, and indeed it still is. For a contemporary example: The Fichtekränzi Tavern in 
Frankfurt, founded in 1849, bears a logo of a ring consisting of twisted branches of spruce, 
or in German, Fichte. For many hundred years, in Frankfurt and the surrounding area, 
this has been indicating that this is an apple wine tavern and apple wine is served here. 
See also Eckhart, In Ex. n. 64 (LW II 69,2-4).   
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Therefore, analogy does not indicate some kind of sharing of God and 
creature in a predicate (e.g. esse), but rather denotes the fact that God 
alone really possesses the attribute. As Dietmar Mieth puts it: Analogy 
is not, as with Thomas, a connective relationship, but a relationship of 
dependence; analogy does not explain what something is, but where it 
comes from. The reality of creatures in Eckhart’s doctrine of analogy 
is the reality of a sign pointing to God.420   
In order to emphasise the oneness of God and his creation, Eckhart shows that creatures 
have nothing of themselves and remain in God.421 God is inside man and man is inside 
God and so anything predicated of man comes from inside, and points to the source of 
this predicate, who is God. Relative perfection in man signposts the inner and mutual 
dependence between himself and the one who is truly perfect, and so this is an analogous 
relation, because this is the same perfection although seen in the two modes of human 
and divine.  
Thomas, however, used analogy to present how God as the creator can be seen in created 
beings which have their own being and are distinct from the creator, who as fullness of 
being has given them being. God possesses attributes, such as goodness, in their 
perfections, whereas creatures possess these attributes because they are given them by 
God, and so the attributes reflect God but in a creaturely way. This system of analogy 
                                                 
420 B. McGinn, The Mystcal Thought of Meister Eckhart (2001), 92; D. Mieth, Die Einheit 
von Vita Activa und Vita Passiva in den deutschen Predigten und Traktaten Meister 
Eckharts und bei Johannes Tauler (1969), 136. Eckhart referred to Thomas using 
univocal, equivocal and analogous terms to solve certain arguments as part of his defence 
in Cologne in order to align himself with orthodoxy. “Documents Relating to Eckhart’s 
Condemnation” are in McGinn, Essentials (1981), 75. 
421 See J. Hackett and J. Hart-Weed, ‘From Aquinas to Eckhart on Creation, Creature and 
Analogy’ (2013), 228; This article traces recent developments on Eckhart and Analogy 
by: R. Schürmann, Meister Eckhart: Mystic and Philosopher (1978), 172-80; F. Tobin, 
Meister Eckhart: Thought and Language (1986), 34-77; A. de Libera, Le Problème de 
l’étre Chez Maître Eckhart: Logique et Métaphysique de L’Analogie (1980), 1-63; B. 
Mojsisch, Meister Eckhart: Analogy, Univocity and Unity (2001); B. McGinn, The 
Mystical Thought of Meister Eckhart (2001). See also O. Davies, Mystical Theologian 
(1991), 99-125.        
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used by Thomas involves ‘intrinsic participation’ and emphasises the reality of God as 
God, and the reality of man as an identity who is like God because he is an effect of God 
and dependent on God as the cause of all creation.422 Thomas therefore uses analogy to 
present distinction between God and man, but Eckhart uses analogy and also univocation 
to signify indistinction, and this is best seen in the generation of the Son. Eckhart explains 
this relation in his Commentary on John’s gospel: 
The son, or Word is the same as the Father or Principle is. This is what 
follows, “The Word was God.” Here it must be noted that in analogical 
relations what is produced derives from the source, but is nevertheless 
itself. Still, insofar as it is in the principle, it is not other in nature or 
other in supposit. A chest in the maker’s mind is not a chest, but is the 
life and understanding of the maker, his living conception. On this 
account I would say what it says here about the procession of the divine 
Persons holds true and is found in the procession and production of 
every being of nature and art.423 
The example of a chest to its maker explains how it exists in the maker and insofar as it 
remains just in the mind of the maker, it is the maker and not a chest, and this pattern of 
procession and production holds true for every being of nature and art. Once produced, 
then it is a chest in itself, however much it signposts its maker in the same way that fallen 
man is still in the image of God.424 It is explained that in analogical relationships, what 
                                                 
422 See B. Montagnes, The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being According to Thomas 
Aquinas, trans. E.M. Macierowski, Pol Vandewelde and Andrew Tallon, Marquette 
Studies in Philosophy 25 (Milwaukee, 2014), 44.  
423 Eckhart, In Ioh. n. 6 (LW III 7,10-8,5): ‘quod sit id ipsum filius sive verbum, quod est 
pater sive principium. Et hoc est quod sequitur: 'deus erat verbum'. Ubi tamen et hoc 
notandum quod, licet in analogicis productum sit descendens a producente, est tamen sub 
principio, non apud ipsum. Item fit aliud in natura, et sic non ipsum principium. 
Nihilominus tamen, ut est in illo, non est aliud in natura, sed nec aliud in supposito. Arca 
enim in mente artificis non est arca, sed est vita et intelligere artificis, ipsius conceptio 
actualis. Quod pro tanto dixerim, ut verba hic scripta de divinarum personarum 
processione doceant hoc ipsum esse et inveniri in processione et productione omnis entis 
naturae et artis. Trans. here and following E. College and B. McGinn (1981). 
424 See Gen. 1: 26-7. 
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derives from the source is something in itself but this would mean the Son would be 
inferior to the Father therefore:  
In things that are analogical what is produced is always inferior, of 
lower grade, less perfect and unequal to its source. In things that are 
univocal, what is produced is always equal to the source. It does not 
just participate in the same nature, but it receives the total nature from 
its source, in a simple whole and equal manner… A son is one who is 
other in person but not other in nature.425  
The idea of a univocal relation is expanded to explain how the second person of the Trinity 
is both God in nature yet separate in personhood. This idea, when adapted to consider the 
relation between God and man, proposes the attributes that man possesses are not just 
possessed by God but are God and remain in God. Although man is inferior analogically 
and different with regards to him being a creature to his creator, he is no different 
univocally, because man is of the one source God and God remains in man as his source. 
Creation is other than its creator if looked at analogically, but they are not different by 
nature. As Frank Tobin concludes, 
Creatures have no being, unity, truth or goodness in themselves as 
creatures. God is their being, unity, truth and goodness.426 
By considering God as esse absolutam, pure intellect, or principle, then everything else 
is esse hoc et hoc, ‘this and that being’ and so there are two types of being and therefore 
distinction.427 However from the idea that God is the source, then created beings pre-exist 
in God and so there is indistinction and therefore a univocal relation. Outside of time, 
oneness with God is seen as univocal and within time, man as separate from God, is a 
pointer to God by analogy but with the awareness of the unseen univocity that is the basis 
                                                 
425 Eckhart, In Joh. n. 5 (LW III 7,4-9): ‘Ubi notandum quod in analogicis semper 
productum est inferius, minus, imperfectius et inaequale producenti; in univocis autem 
semper est aequale, eandem naturam non participans, sed totam simpliciter, integraliter 
et ex aequo a suo principio accipiens… Filius est enim qui fit alius in persona, non aliud 
in natura.’  
426  F. Tobin, Meister Eckhart: Thought and Language (1986), 45. 
427 See M. Enders, ‘Meister Eckhart’s Understanding of God’ (2013), 359 - 87; ‘Deus est 
unus omnibus’ (2011), 109-36.   
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for Eckhart’s analogy. Eckhart shows that what is created is analogically an imperfect 
version of its creator but univocally equal.  
Together with analogy and univocity, dialectic was used by Eckhart as a linguistic tool, 
typical of Neoplatonic tradition for predicating opposed determinations in order to present 
a higher truth. Anything that can be affirmed of God cannot be affirmed of creatures and 
vice versa because God is everything and creation is nothing. This is an extreme use of 
language but the total polarity was used by Eckhart to emphasise that God, as the source 
of creation, is both one with creation and yet beyond creation. In his Commentary on 
Wisdom he states that oneness is the same as indistinction and these are a signpost towards 
God and his perfection: 
We must understand that the term “one” is the same as indistinct… 
Therefore, saying that God is one is to say that God is indistinct from 
all things, which is the property of the highest and first existence and 
its overflowing goodness … God is one which is indistinct. This 
signifies the highest divine perfection, by which nothing exists without 
him or distinct from him.428 
Here there is nothing outside of God nor distinct from God, and everything that exists, 
does so through God and remains in God. No other one nor thing could hold this property, 
and Eckhart substantiates this important dialectic, by quoting Thomas proposing that God 
is something indistinct which is distinguished by his indistinction.429 Being indistinct 
from creation makes God distinct.  
                                                 
428 Eckhart, In Sap. n. 144-5 (LW II 482,4… 482,10-483,1…483,3-4): ‘Est igitur 
sciendum quod li unum idem est quod indistinctum… Dicens ergo deum esse unum vult 
dicere deum esse indistinctum ab omnibus, quod est proprietas summi esse et primi et 
eius bonitas exuberans… deum esse unum, quod est indistinctum, significat divinam 
summam perfectionem, qua sine ipso et ab ipso distinctum nihil est aut esse potest.’ Trans.  
here and following B. McGinn and F. Tobin (1987).  




The connection between being one, holding power and exercising power is made as 
Eckhart expands on the auctoritas, ‘and since it [wisdom] is one, it can do all things’430 
and personalising God as wisdom:  
For it would not be able to do anything were it not one, much less do 
all things. It should be recognised that insofar as a thing is more simple 
and more unified, it is more powerful and more strong, able to do more 
things. The reason is that every composite thing draws its power and 
strength from the other things composing it … the more a thing is one, 
the more powerful it is as said. Therefore what is simply one, and it 
alone, can do all things.431    
Power is the source of, and seems to be directly proportional to, oneness. Total power 
comes from total oneness. Things draw their power from other things, but not something 
that is one because it does not lack power. Rather than compare the extent of power with 
oneness though, the conclusion is clear that God, as one, can do all things, and likewise 
the contrast is made that anything that is not simply one, is therefore not able to do all 
things. This background of recognising Eckhart’s notion of the relation between God and 
creation and the proposal that omnipotence is through oneness, illuminates the three 
statements of n. 5.  
Firstly, from his Exodus Commentary, Eckhart develops this idea of supreme power by 
wrapping together notions of oneness and perfection: 
In God every perfection is one … and this is above all.432  
                                                 
430 Wis. 7:27, ‘et cum sit una omnia potest’. See Eckhart, In Sap. n. 144-57 (LW II 481-
494). 
431 Eckhart, In Sap. n. 156-7 (LW II 492, 2-5, 493,1-2): ‘Nec enim posset, nisi esset una, 
multo minus posset omnia. Sciendum ergo quod quanto quid est simplicius et unitius, 
tanto est potentius et virtuosius, plura potens. Ratio est: omne enim compositum posse 
suum et virtutem trahit ab aliis ipsum componentibus … quanto quid unitius, tanto 
potentius, ut dictum est. Ergo quod est simpliciter unum - et ipsum solum - potest omnia.’ 
See also: Aristotle, Topics, 2.11 and 5.8 (115b, 137b); Book of Causes, Proposition 17 
(16).   
432 Eckhart, In Ex. n. 57 (LW II 62,14-63,1… 63,5): ‘Sic in deo omnis perfectio una est… 
quid unum super omnes.’  
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The relation between God and his attributes is seen in oneness, therefore perfection is 
seen in God who in his essence is one. As with the passage above from Wisdom there is 
no possibility of being higher or greater or before God and as such this is an abstract 
reflection of the Hebrew notion of Sabaoth. To be ‘above all’ means there is an ‘all’ and 
correspondingly this ‘all’ must be less than perfect. In his Commentary on John, Eckhart 
describes how creatures move through life in an imperfect way, but perfection is proper 
to God and every perfection comes from him.433 In his Commentary on Exodus, he uses 
texts from Deuteronomy and James to show how God is perfect and all his ways are 
perfect, but nature’s work begins from what is imperfect.434 The Meister refers to 
Dionysius when describing how the difference between perfection and imperfection can 
be perceived:  
Our intellect grasps the perfections which belong to existence from 
creatures where perfections of this kind are imperfect, divided and 
scattered.435  
Perfection belongs to existence in contrast with the things that merely exist who possess 
the same things, but in an imperfect way because they are divided or scattered. Therefore 
God’s power can be seen by us as the perfection of the imperfections we know, and yet 
these also provide an inner sense of the nature of perfection. God’s power is seen in active 
oneness and the perfection of oneness is seen in the action of God being one, whereas in 
everything created, there is multiplicity. Distinction between God and his creation is seen 
in the imperfection of multiplicity whereas oneness portrays perfection. As Christopher 
                                                 
433 See Eckhart, In Joh. n. 61-2, 86 (LW III 51,1-14, 74,6–75,2).   
434 Eckhart, In Ex. n. 137 (LW II 125,9-13): ‘Propter quod actio dei perfectissima est et 
incipit a perfecto, Deut. 32: “dei perfecta sunt opera”. Propter quod etiam dicitur 
descendere, Iac. 1: “omne datum optimum et omne donum perfectum desursum 
descendens est”. Operatio autem naturae sive generatio e converso incipit ab imperfecto, 
et quo fini est vicinior, tanto perfectior.’ Deut. 32:4, ‘Dei perfecta sunt opera…’, Jas. 
1:17, ‘omne datum optimum et omne donum perfectum desursum…’ See also Eckhart, 
Quaest. Par. IV, n. 4 (LW V 73,4-8). 
435 Eckhart, In Ex. n. 78 (LW II 81,5-7): ‘Intellectus enim noster perfectiones, quae ad 
esse pertinent, apprehendit ex creaturis, ubi huiusmodi perfectiones imperfectae sunt et 
divisae sparsim.’  
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Wojtulewicz points out in a recent study, Eckhart proposes the powers in man are not 
imperfect because they are limited, but because they are not one.436  
The point that God, because he is one, not only is perfect but also that he contains all 
perfection, is developed by Eckhart as he incorporates a number of scriptures, including 
this text from Galatians, supplemented here as the biblical rationale:  
All perfections … since they are in God as the First Cause of all things, 
are in him as necessarily and simply one and one thing, because “God 
is one” (Gal. 3:20).437  
Perfection, or more specifically here, all perfections, are perfections in God who is the 
principle, or origin, or first cause of everything. In this sense, because everything has 
come from God, and God is one, then in everything from God, there is oneness. Yet, the 
perfection of everything is its perfection in God, though it is still the perfection of 
everything because the perfection is simultaneously in God, and God being the First 
Cause of all things, also in those things. The idea that a cause contains more perfectly the 
perfections of its effects, is picked up by Thomas in a passage which uses the context 
attributions being used as names to present how the perfection of God is seen in imperfect 
creation: 
For these names [such as goodness] express God, so far as our intellects 
know Him. Now since our intellect knows God from creatures, it knows 
Him as far as creatures represent Him … God pre-contains in Himself 
all the perfections of creatures, being Himself simply and universally 
perfect. Hence every creature represents Him, and is like Him so far as 
it possesses some perfection; yet it represents Him not as something of 
the same species or genus, but as the excelling principle of whose form 
the effects fall short, although they derive some kind of likeness thereto, 
even as the forms of inferior bodies represent the power of the sun … 
Therefore the aforesaid names signify the divine substance, but in an 
imperfect manner, even as creatures represent it imperfectly. So … 
                                                 
436 C. Wojtulewicz, 'Kenosis and God's Power in Meister Eckhart's Parisian Question VI' 
(2016), 267-85. 
437 Gal. 3:20: ‘mediator autem unius non est Deus autem unus est’; Eckhart, In Ex. n. 57 
(LW II 62,9… 62,9-11): ‘Perfectiones autem omnes... utpote in causa prima omnium, et 
in ipso necessario sunt unum simpliciter et res una, quia “deus unus”.’ 
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"Whatever good we attribute to creatures, pre-exists in God," and in a 
more excellent and higher way.438 
From this, the extent to which we know God is related to the way he has revealed himself 
through us. Thomas uses ‘praehabet’ to show that the perfections we see in imperfect 
creation are from God who possesses all perfections. The idea, that effects have a cause 
and therefore require power to exist, is rooted in both Hebrew scriptures and Greek 
philosophy and here, perfections of creation reveal both God’s power and his nature. 
Attributes in man are not the same as they are in God but, there is a likeness because the 
form of man comes from God as principle, and so an image of God is seen, although an 
inferior one.439 Creation is therefore a pointer towards the divine substance, but a flawed 
one and so any attribute found in man is an imperfect representation of the perfect God. 
Thomas is using analogy to show that perfections attributed to God are different in man 
and can only be applied through this relation between God and man. John O’Callaghan 
considers how Thomas reaffirmed Augustine’s theological insight that man is in the 
highest imago Dei but ‘does not posit a fissure at the heart of human life between our acts 
as embodied persons and our acts as images of God.’440 Our actions do not truly reflect 
God. 
                                                 
438 Thom. Aqu., S.Th. I q. 13, a. 2, resp., (ed.) Leon. XIII (1888), 142: ‘Significant enim 
sic nomina Deum, secundum quod intellectus noster cognoscit ipsum. Intellectus autem 
noster, cum cognoscat Deum ex creaturis, sic cognoscit ipsum, secundum quod creaturae 
ipsum repraesentant … Deus in se praehabet omnes perfectiones creaturarum, quasi 
simpliciter et universaliter perfectus. Unde quaelibet creatura intantum eum 
repraesentat, et est ei similis, inquantum perfectionem aliquam habet, non tamen ita quod 
repraesentet eum sicut aliquid eiusdem speciei vel generis, sed sicut excellens principium, 
a cuius forma effectus deficiunt, cuius tamen aliqualem similitudinem effectus 
consequuntur; sicut formae corporum inferiorum repraesentant virtutem solarem … Sic 
igitur praedicta nomina divinam substantiam significant, imperfecte tamen, sicut et 
creaturae imperfecte eam repraesentant. Cum igitur… id quod bonitatem dicimus in 
creaturis, praeexistit in Deo, et hoc quidem secundum modum altiorem’ Text and trans. 
in Thomas Gilby, St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (Blackfriars edition), vol. 5 
(London, 1967). 
439 See 2Cor. 3:18.  
440 J. O’Callaghan, ‘Imago Dei’ (2007), 144, see 100-44.   
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Eckhart also speaks notionally of the superior containing all imperfections when 
considering the name of Jesus: 
this name is above every name … because … the superior is not 
deprived of the inferior’s perfections, but pre-contains them all in a 
more excellent way.441 
In using this passage from Philippians presenting the kenotic and atoning works of Jesus, 
the Meister explains why this is the name above all names not just because of the key 
incidents of incarnation and crucifixion within the temporal sphere, but outside of this in 
terms of perfection. Implied by the use of ‘praehabet’, as above with Thomas, the sense 
of time is included to reflect a moment when everything was within God. Eckhart’s use 
of the present tense, however, is also significant, because this pre-containing, rather than 
just referring backwards, is then to be understood as a continuing action. Whereas we 
comprehend God’s actions such as creation and incarnation as moments in history, ‘Christ 
is not a stage in the history of salvation but the saving inner structure of history. The inner 
structure is at the same time dynamic and perpetually present: creatio and incarnatio 
continua. Incarnation is the epitome of historicity.’442 In this action there is no distinction, 
but functional unity between God and his creation.  
It is this action, the maxime actus referred to in n. 3, that is the continuing process of 
generation which comes from perfection and also leads to perfection. In n. 5, Eckhart 
proposes that creatures possess total perfection once all imperfection is removed, and so 
having moved his audience to consider the imperfections of man, he now asks the listeners 
and readers to think of God removing these imperfections and replacing them with his 
own perfections.443 It is in this action that God’s power can be comprehended.  
As described above in the notes on n. 3, the perfect intrinsic action of the Godhead, 
because it is total action, cannot remain just intrinsic (bullitio), and therefore also breaks 
                                                 
441 Phil. 2:9: ‘propter quod et Deus illum exaltavit et donavit illi nomen super omne 
nomen’; Eckhart, In Ex. n. 35 (LW II 41, 13-5): ‘“donavit illi nomen quod est super omne 
nomen”. Superius enim non est privatum perfectionibus inferiorum, sed omnes praehabet 
excellentius.’ See G.D. Fee, ‘Paul’s Letter to the Philippians’ (1995), 39-46, 191-229.  
442 D. Mieth, ‘Dynamics of Meister Eckhart – Past and Present’ (2016), 90-1. 
443 See Avicenna, Metaphysics IX c. 2 (103ra 30), Avicenna Latinus, Liber de Philosophia 
Prima Sive Scientia, Partes V-X (ed.) Simone Van Riet (1980), 456. 
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out, extrinsically into creation (ebullitio).444 Reiner Schürman presents how created 
beings receive being itself, are nothing in themselves and their dependence is 
understandable only in terms of the ebullitio of perfections out of their source.445 In 
creation there is imperfection, and in this regard distinction from God, but with the trace 
left of the perfection that is held through the metaphysical process of exit and return. From 
the divine perspective, because all action is perfect, creation retains this sense of oneness 
in God and therefore perfection. This continuous boiling over activity, from the Godhead, 
is described by Eckhart as the process of ‘going out’ (exitus) from God, and the ‘return’ 
(reditus) to God.  
Every creature below man goes forth into existence according to the 
idea of similarity, and therefore seeks God again. It is enough for it to 
be similar to God. But man, because he has been made to the image of 
the one whole substance of God and has been brought forth into 
existence according to the idea of the One Whole, is not satisfied by a 
return to what is similar, but returns to the One from which he came 
forth. Thus alone is he satisfied.446  
The significance of oneness and the ‘One’ is very apparent and in his descending into 
each and every action, God in essence is one and God not only remains one but unites 
what is divided.447 The action of God is seen here as if from a human perspective. 
Everything that exists does so because of the idea of the one, in departure from the one, 
and with the desire to return to the one. This second phase of the operation is mirrored 
biblically as the deep longing for eternity God has placed in the heart of man that can only 
                                                 
444
 See Eckhart, Sermo XXV n. 258 (LW IV 236). 
445 R. Schürmann, Meister Eckhart: Mystic and Philosopher (1978), 179-80.  
446 Eckhart, In Joh. n. 549 (LW III 479,6-480,1): ‘Sed omnis creatura citra hominem exit 
producta in esse sub ratione similitudinis et propter hoc repetit deum et sufficit ipsi esse 
similem deo. Homini autem, cum sit factus ad imaginem totius unius substantiae dei et sit 
in esse productus sub ratione unius totius, non sufficit recursus ad simile, sed recurrit ad 
unum unde exivit, et sic solum sibi sufficit.’ 
447 Eckhart, In Sermo XXIV n. 299 (LW IV 266,7-9): ‘Undecimo, quia deus eo dives 
profusivus est, quia 'unus'. Primus enim et supremus est ratione qua unus. Propter quod 
unum descendit in omnia et singula, manens semper unum et divisa uniens.’ Trans. B. 
McGinn and F. Tobin (1987).  
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be satisfied by being fully contained again within the oneness of God.448 Human and 
divine perspectives are obviously different, and while we consider the things we see in 
nature as perfections, they are in fact, imperfections. Also, from a human perspective 
there is the transformation from perfection to imperfection and then return to perfection 
but Eckhart is proposing all transformations are contained within a single continuous 
action from God. This means God is continually actualising, according to Dietmar Mieth, 
‘as immanent by transforming human nature into a process of receiving God, as a 
permanent relation between God’s ground and the ground of the human soul … God is 
not substance but a process: the continuous process of God giving “Godself”’.449  
In his Commentary on Exodus the Meister again uses the concept of a name to present the 
singularity of God’s action. The name of God reflects his essence and also his action and 
so, using a text from Zechariah, he states: 
In that day there will be one Lord, and his name will be One.450  
This eschatological passage declares that God’s name is ‘One’, and in his future reign this 
oneness will be seen and known. Being one is the fundamental revelation of God to his 
people and the same terms used above to present God as one repeat those used in the 
‘Great Shema’, ‘Hear O Israel! The Lord God (YHWH), our God, (YHWH) is one.’451 
Therefore, linking these notions together, God whose name is ‘one’ is revealed by this 
oneness because this name is also his essence, and because his essence is one, his action 
is one, and this single action is particular to God who is one.  
Eckhart refers to Maimonides,452 as he does frequently in this treatise on divine names, 
and using fire again as an illustration, states how fire melts, bleaches, blackens and burns 
                                                 
448 See Eccl. 3:11: ‘cuncta fecit bona in tempore suo et mundum tradidit disputationi 
eorum ut non inveniat homo opus quod operatus est Deus ab initio usque ad finem.’ See 
T. Longman, ‘The Book of Ecclesiastes’ (1998), 118-21.  
449 D. Mieth, ‘Dynamics of Meister Eckhart – Past and Present’ (2016), 77, 79.  
450 Zech. 14:9: ‘et erit Dominus rex super omnem terram in die illa erit Dominus unus et 
erit nomen eius unum’; In Ex. n. 57 (LW II 63, 7-8): ‘in illa die erit dominus unus et 
nomen eius unum’. See C. L. Meyers, E.M. Meyers, ‘Zechariah 9-14’ (1993), 439-40.  
451 Deut. 6:4: ‘audi Israhel Dominus Deus noster Dominus unus est’. 
452 For the influence of Maimonides on Eckhart see J.Koch, ‘Meister Eckhart und die 
jüdische Religionsphilosophie des Mittelalters’ (1928), 134-48. And Eckhart’s adoption 
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and so might seem to possess different powers, but in practice all these are the one action 
of fire that by its nature, heats.453 As humans exercise wisdom, power or the will, they are 
seen as different properties, but in the creator these are exercised through his substance, 
and consequently are one and reflect their creator. Power is one because there is 
effectively only one source of power, and so all things are done in one particular, 
singulariter, way.  
These first and second statements that omnipotence is seen in the perfection of one power 
acting in a singular way, also link to the third statement of the text by using Eckhart’s 
comments on Exodus. Contrasting what man can and God can do, Eckhart describes how 
Maimonides, following on from above example of fire, gives the second example of man, 
who by a single rational power “in which there is no multiplicity” does 
many different things. Through it he builds, cuts, covers, rules fellow 
citizens, knows arithmetic, and by the one rational power brings many 
things of this sort into existence. “If this be so, how will we remove 
from the power of the high and lofty Creator, the different things that 
proceed from one simple substance in which there is no multiplicity nor 
anything added on?”454  
Eckhart is continuing to develop his point about God being one in substance and powerful 
in his substance with the contrast, made again, between the power and oneness of the 
creator, and also, leading into the third statement of n. 5, this creation proceeds from God. 
The creator is not only powerful in his substance but all things flow in procession from 
this one simple substance which matches the development in the text of Question six 
through nn. 3-5. This notion is established by recalling further from the treatise on divine 
                                                 
of Maimonides in comparison with how he uses Thomas see B. McGinn, Teacher and 
Preacher (1986), 15-26. 
453 See Eckhart, In Ex. n. 42 (LW II 46,10-47,11). 
454 Eckhart, In Ex. n. 43 (LW II 47,12-48,3): ‘Secundum exemplum ibidem ponit in homine 
qui una potentia rationali, “in qua non est multitudo”, operatur diversa et plurima. Per 
ipsam aedificat, scindit, texit, regit cives, scit arithmeticam, et multa huiusmodi una 
potentia rationali “extrahit ad esse. Quod si ita est, quomodo removebimus a potentia 
creatoris sublimis et excelsi quod ista diversa, quae operatur, proveniant ab una 
substantia simplici, in qua nulla est multitudo nec aliquid additum super ipsam?”’  
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names that not only is God one, and his name is ‘One’ but also that God is omnipotent 
and his name is ‘Omnipotent’ because  
we name things from knowing them and according to the manner in 
which we know them.455  
Actions proceed from essence, therefore, because names come from action, they reveal 
essence, and it is right to name God as ‘All-Powerful’.456 To take this a step further, as 
the one who is all-containing, God is not un-nameable but omni-nominable.457 For 
Eckhart, instead of being unable to know God, as Maimonides maintained generally, God 
is revealed through all the attributes we comprehend, even if in an imperfect sense. This 
apophatic to cataphatic shift by Eckhart relates back to the notion inferred by the Greek 
term in the LXX for Almighty God, pantokrator,458 as the all-powerful, all-conquering, 
all-containing, all-sustaining,459 one, and this forges the links between perfection, the 
singularity of power, and God’s essence being the principle of all emanations. Power 
emanates from one divine essence in one singular, or particular divine action.460 This is 
one action because it is from God’s essence, in contrast with being an action of God’s 
will. God is not deliberating about which action to choose such that there may be 
alternatives to select from, because this is pure action, and so all actuality is the one 
exercise of his potentiality. God’s oneness of essence is seen in the oneness of his action 
and this is his nature and therefore this action aligns with what we perceive as his will. 
Power in God can be understood as the emanation, or pouring out of perfection, and this 
                                                 
455 Eckhart, In Ex. n. 57 (LW II 62,7-8): ‘et quia secundum quod res cognoscimus, 
secundum hoc et ex illis ipsas nominamus.’  
456 See A. Beccarisi, ‘Eckhart’s Latin Works’ (2013), 97. 
457 Eckhart, In Ex. n. 35 (LW II 41,15-42,1): “‘Nomen” ergo, “quod est super omne 
nomen”, non est innominabile, sed omninominabile.’ See R. Williams, The Edge of Words 
(2014), 175.    
458 See above Part I, ‘The Permeation of Hellenism’. 
459 See Eckhart, In Ex. n. 29 (LW II 34,14-35,1), (Gregory the Great, Morals on Job, 16. 
37. 45). 
460 See A. Beccarisi, ‘Eckhart’s Latin Works’ (2013), 109; Eckhart, In Gen. II n. 3 (LW I  
453,9–454,5), n. 215 (LW I, 691,2-10, or 439,11-9 in 2015 edition), In Sap. n. 260 (LW 
II, 592,7-9), In Ioh. n. 469 (LW III, 12,13). 
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power is both absolute in essence and related to action as stated by Eckhart during his 
defence against charges of heresy in 1326 AD:  
Even the absolute acts of the Godhead proceed from God according to 
the property of his attributes.461 
God operates out of his essence in all his actions and even when considering directed 
actions, these proceed from God. Power may be considered distinct in its own essence 
but, in the sense that it is the emanating action from God, it is indistinct from the actions 
it causes. The passage from the Commentary on Wisdom referred to above makes the 
connection between potency, the one acting and action caused by this one acting. Three 
reasons are given to show how nothing is so one and indistinct as God and every created 
being: 
1. Nothing is as indistinct as being and existence, potency and its act, 
form and matter. This is how God and every creature are related. 
2. Nothing is so much one and indistinct as a thing that is composed 
and that from which, through which and in which it is composed 
and subsists. 
3. Nothing is as distinct from anything as from that from which it is 
indistinguished by its own distinction.462 
Three points are used to describe how nothing numbered or created is indistinct from God 
because all things are from God as first principle. In the first point, three pairs, termed 
‘termini generales’ by Eckhart, listed as being and existence, potency and act and form 
                                                 
461 See B. McGinn, Essentials (1981), 72.  
462 See Eckhart, In Sap. n. 155 (LW II 490,11-491,10): ‘Rursus vero et hoc notandum 
quod nihil tam unum et indistinctum quam deus et omne creatum. Ratio est triplex, ut 
prius in opposito. Primo, quia nihil tam indistinctum quam ens et esse, potentia et actus 
eiusdem, forma et materia. Sic autem se habet deus et omne creatum. Secundo sic: nihil 
tam unum et indistinctum quam constitutum et illud ex quo, per quod et in quo constituitur 
et subsistit. Sed, sicut dictum est, numerus sive multitudo, numeratum et numerabile ut 
sic ex unitatibus constituitur et subsistit. Igitur nihil tam indistinctum quam deus unus aut 
unitas et creatum numeratum. Tertio sic: nihil tam indistinctum ab aliquo quam ab illo, 
a quo distinctione ipsa indistinguitur. Sed omne numerosum sive creatum sua distinctione 
indistinguitur a deo, ut dictum est supra. Ergo nihil tam indistinctum et per consequens 
unum. Indistinctum enim et unum idem. Quare deus et creatum quodlibet indistincta.’ 
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and matter, are presented as possessing an incomparable indistinction, with the middle 
pair being significant to the notion of God’s omnipotence. Having proposed in the earlier 
paragraph that all potentiality and actuality are in God, Eckhart has demonstrated how, 
because these are of God’s essence, and this essence is one, then the potentiality to act 
and actuality are indistinct. God’s absolute power flows in the perfection of oneness, 
because his essence emanates into the actions he directs. 
Oneness is seen in distinction and indistinction, and also perfection and imperfection and 
all this is through one singular action as the process of emanation is an emphatic 
expression of power. Referring to Proclus in his General Prologue Eckhart states: 
It is the nature of the first and superior, being “rich in itself”, to 
influence and effect the inferior with its properties, among which are 
unity and indivision. What is divided in the inferior is always one and 
undivided in the superior. It clearly follows that the superior is in no 
way divided in the inferior; but, while remaining undivided, it gathers 
together and unites what is divided in the inferior.463 
It is in this action of influencing and effecting that God in his very nature, returns creation 
to himself, and the divisions it possesses, into perfect unity. The inferior has come from 
the superior which actively emanates in such a way as to return the inferior to itself. This 
is another way of describing the absolute power of God, or the essence of God, and 
indeed, the exitus and reditus of God as the ebullitio of divine action. Eckhart also refers 
to the Book of Causes in his Commentary on Exodus to describe this emanating action:  
God is insofar as he is the First Cause flowing into [all things] with 
himself in the first instance.464 
The ‘First Cause’, although not a thing, is indistinct from all things in actualising them. 
There is no distinction in how power operates. The contrast between Eckhart and the 
                                                 
463 Eckhart, Prolog. gen. in Opus tripartitum, n. 10 (LW I/2 21-5): ‘De ratione enim primi 
et superioris, cum sit “dives per se”, est influere et afficere inferiora suis proprietatibus, 
inter quas est unitas et indivisio. Semper enim divisum inferius unum est et indivisum in 
superiori. Ex quo patet quod superius nullo modo dividitur in inferioribus, sed manens 
indivisum colligit et unit divisa in inferioribus.’ See Proclus? (Anonymous), Liber de 
Causis, proposition 20. 
464 Eckhart, In Ex. n. 105 (LW II 106,9-10): ‘Hoc autem est id, quod deus ipse, utpote 
causa prima, influit se ipso primo.’ See Liber De Causis proposition 1 (163,3). 
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earlier treatments of the power debate is clear because later 13th century incorporation of 
philosophical ideas saw the focal point move to consider power in its essence while 
canonical issues presented the extra possibilities for man (or at least the pope). Either way 
the switch of emphasis was such that, in early 14th century Paris, the debate now focussed 
more on the question of how to understand de potentia absoluta and for the Meister this 
was not just an abstract concept. Eckhart’s treatment compares with that of Thomas by 
showing similar thinking in many aspects of the debate, although there is also a subtle but 
important difference reflecting the general thinking of each and this gap widens as the 
text continues.  
The three strands of perfection, singularity of action and emanating essence are drawn 
together in oneness and one indistinguishable expression of deity and, superficially, this 
does not seem to stray too far from Thomas in his Q.d. De potentia, who makes the 
apparent connection between power and essence by setting up this argument: 
Essence is more dignified than power, because power is an addition to 
essence.465 
However, in reply to this, Thomas suggests our minds, in wrestling to fathom something 
incomprehensible, might perceive a distinction between God’s power and his essence but, 
in practice, active power in God is identical with his essence saying,  
All operation proceeds from power. Now operation is supremely 
attributable to God. Therefore power is most fitting to God … We 
attribute power to God by reason of that which is permanent and is the 
principle of power, and not by reason of that which is made complete 
by operation.466 
God’s power is to be seen in principle rather than just as actualising power (the apparent 
inconsistency in Thomas’ notion of all potentiality being actualised is considered later, in 
comments on n. 10). Thomas associates power here with God in principle, rather than the 
action which proceeds from power. As seen earlier in his Summa, Thomas uses the phrase 
                                                 
465 Thom. Aqu., ‘Q.d. De potentia, q. 1, a. 1, 6, (ed.) Marietti (1953), 8a: ‘Dignius autem 
est essentia quam potentia: quia potentia essentiae advenit. 
466 Thom. Aqu., ‘Q.d. De potentia, q1, a.1, resp., (ed.) Marietti (1953), 8b-9a: ‘omnis 
operatio ab aliqua potentia procedit. Sed Deo maxime convenit operari. Ergo Deo 
maxime potentia convenit… Potentiam vero attribuimus ratione eius quod permanet et 
quod est principium eius, non ratione eius quod per operationem completur.’  
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‘maxime potentia activa’ in comparison with Eckhart’s ‘maxime actus’ and so neither 
seem to make a distinction between God and active power and both emphasise the 
ultimate and absolute nature of this.  
Eckhart, like Aquinas, refers to God’s active power being seen in the perfection of the 
imperfections we know, but it is in this statement of Eckhart in n. 5 that the difference is 
revealed, as the Meister presents how the oneness of perfection emanates in one singular 
action into creation. This is the picture of a continuous flow of actualising power from 
God into everything. God does not act distinctly from himself, but in the act of generation 
which is the continuously flowing singular act of emanation. This continuity of action 
retains a unique sense of oneness, indistinction and perfection between God and his 
creation. For Thomas however, there is the flow of action from essence, and this being 
firstly from form, but these actions are being operated as actions in themselves meaning 
there is a separation between God and creation. Consequential of this difference is the 
notion of man’s perfection because Eckhart describes perfection as being actualised in 
the emanating flow of power. Thomas proposes that God holds the perfection of all the 
imperfections we perceive in man, like Eckhart, but there is not the same intimation that 
God is actively and continuously removing the imperfections to complete the act of 
perfecting.467 Thomas speaks of the removing of imperfections to gain an expression of 
divine perfection but these are distinct from divine perfections. The above text infers a 
distinction between essence and the completion of operation whereas for Eckhart the 
perfection of oneness between God and man is in the continuous action of the operation.  
It is Eckhart who says man’s creaturely imperfections are removed, and it is this action 
that is effectively the maxime actus of God. God is actively and continuously removing 
the imperfections of man and replacing them with his own perfections. This ‘amota 
imperfectione’ is an expression of the reditus, the returning, emanating action of God’s 
power bringing creation back to himself. Therefore, in this action man is being perfected, 
but this is not by becoming perfect man but actually God. This could never match the 
thinking of Thomas who said that man does not possess the perfections of God in any 
measure, and what man does possess, is just a reflection of God’s perfections. This means 
that goodness in man is not like goodness in God but an imperfect version of it. In 
Thomas, God is working in man to make him perfect such that man’s goodness becomes 
perfect, but this means he becomes perfect man and in no sense God.  
                                                 
467 See Thom. Aqu., Q.d. De potentia, q. 1, a. 1, resp., (ed.) Marietti (1953), 9a. 
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In n. 5 Eckhart’s use of amota imperfectione, and singulariter can be used in this way to 
unlock the door to this radical idea because this is consistent with his teaching elsewhere. 
For Eckhart, creation, considered isolated from God, is imperfect and a negation but the 
action of God is to perfect creatures through the negation of negation. ‘Everything’ is 
opposed to ‘nothing’, and God has power over everything because power over nothing 
would be its total negation. To have power over nothing is to have no power.468 Action 
from God is the flowing out of the divine source and also its return and so there is the 
sense of continuous perfecting of all that is flowing and the unchanging perfection of the 
indistinct Godhead. Creation remains indistinct with the origin, or principle of this action 
suggesting the notion of living continuously in this divine perfection. Eckhart spoke of 
this, and not just in an abstract manner, urging the negating of creatureliness as the act of 
detachment, abgeschiedenheit in which man loses all of himself to be full of God. As man 
detaches himself from every particular thing, then God unites himself with man and this 
is a natural operation for God. Eckhart separates the outer man with senses from the inner 
man which, by detachment from everything, unites totally with God who, as the one who 
negates this negation, in essence is the negation of negation. Instead of creatureliness 
which, by its nature, is dependent on other things and in particular the creator, man moves, 
or effectively returns, to the divinity and as such is independent. Creation does not possess 
that power in itself but in the act of detachment, becomes independent and not lacking in 
anything, including power. More than this thought of human response, it is an expression 
of the very essence and total action of God. As Eckhart explains how, ‘what goes for 
God’s knowledge is equally true about his kingdom and rule’, and then by using Micah 
4:5, ‘we will walk in the name of the Lord our God for ever and beyond’, he proposes 
that God does not just possess knowledge but transfers this divine knowledge to ‘us’.469 
This is consistent with the perfecting process described earlier in n. 5. In his treatise ‘On 
Detachment’ the illustration of a baker’s oven describes both God’s action as a single 
action and the significance of man’s response: 
                                                 
468 See Eckhart, In Ex. n. 30 (LW II 36,7-37,8). 
469 Mic. 4:5, ‘quia omnes populi ambulabunt unusquisque in nomine dei sui nos autem 
ambulabimus in nomine Domini Dei nostri in aeternum et ultra.’ Eckhart, In Ex. n. 86 
(LW II 89,4-6): ‘Et sicut est de scientia dei, sic pari ratione est de regno ipsius et 
regimine, Mich. 4: “ambulabimus in nomine domini dei nostri in aeternum et ultra”’. See 
M. Vinzent, Detachment (2011), 1-4. 
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If someone heats a baker’s oven, and puts in one loaf of oats and 
another of barley and another of rye and another of wheat, there is only 
one temperature in the oven, but it does not have the same effect upon 
the different doughs, because one turns into fine bread, another is 
course and a third even coarser. And this is not the fault of the 
temperature but of the materials, which are not the same. In the same 
way, God does not work alike in every man’s heart; he works as he 
finds willingness and receptivity.470 
This is obviously similar to the example given of fire although the results of the heat on 
this occasion are seen in Eckhart’s congregation. Speaking of fire emphasised the 
particular action of God, but the message here is almost that of the ‘parable of the Sower’, 
or ‘soils’ in which Jesus described how the different types of soil or ground represented 
the different ways people respond to the gospel, yet one way is best.471 The good soil that 
was fruitful compares, to some extent, with the notion of detachment as a way of life. The 
context of this treatise is uncertain but it represents the consistency between his Latin and 
German works and also the sense of the Meister, as a member of the ‘Order of Preachers’, 
seeking his listeners, or at least readers if this is not a sermon, to apply his theoretical 
musings into practice. It is worth pausing to mull over the term Eckhart has used here in 
Middle High German to describe the notion that has been translated into English as 
detachment. Abgeschiedenheit is a compound of ab and schieden pointing to the 
                                                 
470 Eckhart, VAb, (On Detachment) (DW V 424,4-11): ‘Des vinden wir ein glîchnisse in 
der natûre: sô man einen bakoven heizet und dar în leget einen teic von habern und 
einenvon gersten und einen von roggen und einen von weizen, nû enist niht dan éin hitze 
in dem ovene und enwürket doch niht glîch in den teigen, wan der ein wirt schœne brôt, 
der ander wirt rûcher, der dritte noch rûcher. Und daz enist niht der hitze schult, ez ist der 
materien schult, diu dâ unglîch ist. Ze glîcher wîse sô enwürket got niht glîch in allen 
herzen; er würket dar nâch, als er bereitschaft und enpfenclicheit vindet.’ Trans. E. 
College and B. McGinn (1981). 
For a recent discussion on Eckhart’s understanding of abgeschiedenheit, especially 
alongside his concept of time see T. Kim, “Ez wære allez éin lieht’ an Artist’s Advance’ 
(2016), 26-37.   
471 See Matt. 13: 1-23, J. Nolland, ‘The Gospel of Matthew, A Commentary on the Greek 
text’ (2005), 520-42. 
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separating, or cutting off, from something and hence the English translation. This adds 
understanding to the dialectic issue of God being continually transcendent and immanent, 
and encapsulates the Aristotelian influence in Meister’s through the works of Avicenna 
and Albert.472 Eckhart uses Abgeschiedenheit to translate abstractus to describe literally 
the abstracting or separating from matter. In modern German, das Abgeschiedene refers 
to what has been separated and so the connection between abgeschiedenheit and the Latin 
absoluta should not be missed. The Latin absolute is a similar compound of ab and 
solvere literally meaning to solve by setting free or releasing. Knowing the exact thinking 
process of the Meister can only be speculation but connecting the two ideas of being 
separated and setting free portrayed by these terms is irresistible. Eckhart set out, or more 
correctly, was sent out from Tambach-Dietharz and the wonderful hills and forests of the 
Thüringen Wald, to head for the mediaeval bustle around the Dominican compound in 
Erfurt. In his Latin and theology lessons he will have learnt about the absolute nature of 
God and maybe even the absolute omnipotence of God. As a young German studying in 
his local town, his notions of what he is learning about as absolute might just have 
resonated with the sense of beauty, freedom and yet uncontainable wildness of his own 
territory. He probably spent time wandering between home and the tower at Altenfels, 
which could have been the look out-tower, used by workers on behalf of his father as toll-
gatherer.473 Maybe a young Eckhart deliberated over a term that could transfer the Latin 
                                                 
472 See D. Gottschall, ‘Eckhart’s German Works’ (2013), 180-3; J.D. Caputo, The 
Mystical Element in Heidegger’s Thought (1986), 11-2. 
473 It is not known exactly where Eckhart lived but there is a record suggesting the family 
moved from Hocheim near Gotha to Tambach-Dietharz and his father held a position 
connected with toll-collecting. The place associated with Eckhart at Altenfels is remote 
and rocky and unlikely to be the family home. It is more likely that this location, where 
the ruins today are a mixture of natural rock and man-built walls, would lend itself to 
being a look-out tower. Maybe travellers paid their tolls to travel, and this was checked 
at the tower which holds a secure position which overlooks three navigable passages. The 
young Eckhart, could well have accompanied his father who was the director of 
operations, and explored what is now the Thüringer Wald nature park. For an account of 
Eckhart’s background see W. Senner, ‘Meister Eckhart’s life, Training, Career and Trial’ 
(2013); E. Albrecht, ‘Zur Herkunft Meister Eckharts’ (1978). Also for placing Eckhart’s 
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absolute into the vernacular, and his experience of life, together with his education in 
Erfurt, moulded this concept into the abgeschiedenheit he described in his German 
sermons.  
 The orthodoxy of the thought that man could be perfect, indistinct from God and 
essentially part of the divine being would be questioned, especially with Thomas being 
regarded as the plumb-line. For Thomas, God acts from his power to bring about creation 
which is distinct, and also God acts to restore perfection but this is only creaturely. 
Absolute power is the power from God that brings man’s perfection about but for Eckhart, 
it is the way in which God actively holds indistinction and secures it between himself as 
existence and everything that exists. Creation is within this absoluteness and the negating 
of creation is the action of absolute power, therefore God is detachment and indeed, the 
negation of negation, in both essence and action.  
Abgeschiedenheit, bullitio and ebullitio, exitus and reditus are terms that particularly 
shape Eckhart’s thinking, and although they are not referred to specifically in this text, 
they are essential in gaining the clear ‘understanding’ that is consequential to n. 3. The 
total power of God, is in God, and is the action of God, perfecting the imperfections of 
man, in a singular, emanating action. 
 
 
n. 6 Second, it is to be enquired how this distinction between absolute and directed 
power should be understood. For when some properties are attributed to God 
[insofar as he is God], these pertain to absolute power. But when some properties 
are attributed with respect to his intellect and wisdom, then these pertain to directed 
power.  
n. 7 Now thirdly, to this question we say what the Master in his Sentences, with the 
[authoritative] sayings of the saints, determined, and it seems that, according to him, 
[God’s omnipotence] is to be considered as both [as absolute and as directed power]. 
n. 8 Some others say, however, that he is omnipotent because he can do everything 
he wills by himself and of himself. 
 
Having stated how God’s power should be understood, such that absolute power is the 
action that both exemplifies and brings indistinction, the Meister moves on to this second 
point of enquiry, as marked in the margin, by returning to the question of how the 
                                                 





distinction between absolute and directed power should be understood. As far as Eckhart 
is concerned, the distinction does not exist from God’s perspective and it is only formed 
from man’s conception of the connection between God, his power, and his relation to 
man. When we consider God, certain terms used to comprehend God such as ‘one’ and 
‘perfection’, as expanded in n. 5, present an idea in contrast with something else, in that 
God is not multiple or imperfect. Likewise, God is the ‘First Cause’ and ‘Necessary 
Existence’ and these terms imply that there are other causes or existences.474 The notions 
raised by these terms emphasise the difference between God and everything else from 
man’s perspective, and for Eckhart this is the reason for the power distinction. The 
difference is according to how properties are attributed to God, and this is also reflected 
in the n. 3 proposal that actuality in God is seen as both active and passive. The notion of 
potentiality becomes a matter of perspective. Eckhart states here that when considering 
God in his essence irrespective of action, this relates to potentia absoluta, and alongside 
this, the extent to which we refer to God as the one who has brought everything into 
existence, then the focus is on the actions of God and this relates to potentia ordinata. By 
considering the statements of n. 3 and n. 5, potentiality is power in its essence not directed 
into action, but because God is total active power, he is total actuality. Man can only 
comprehend God in his total actuality, otherwise God is not God.  
From n. 1, there is the proposal that God only does what is decens and acts out of such as 
intellect and wisdom and so anything attributed to God because of what he does comes 
under the idea of directed power. Intellect or reason, and wisdom are indistinct within the 
essence of God, therefore consistency within this argument suggests that other predicates 
than ratio and sapientia, because they are given by man, could also fill these slots which 
emphasise the distinction, rather than these particular characteristics. In a comparative 
passage in his Sentences Commentary, Thomas supplies an identical argument but 
proposes the distinction is based on wisdom and foreknowledge, sapientia and 
praescientia.475 Eckhart’s Commentary on Exodus is again helpful in shedding light on 
                                                 
474 See Eckhart, In Ex. n. 21 (LW II 27,8-11), with reference to Avicenna’s Metaphysics 
8.1.4; In Ex. n. 80 (LW II 83,11-84,2), with reference to the ‘Book of Causes’, 
propositions 167,4.  




how the difference is according to the way properties are attributed to God and the 
significance of a name is again a key to unlocking the proposition: 
… no name is more proper to Existence itself than the name 
“Existence”. But God is Existence itself … The name is most proper to 
a thing which encompasses everything that belongs to and is attributed 
to it. But Existence Itself has and possesses everything which is proper 
to God … Further, existence belongs to and is attributed to God because 
he is said to be lasting and eternal, having no cause nor principle, but 
himself being the cause and principle of all things. All these statements 
more plainly and clearly appear to belong to God under the name of 
existence than under the name “God”.476  
Attributing existence to God focusses on God in his essence and not his actions, and 
everything existing, does so through this existence. N. 6 presents God’s power as being 
attributed to God as God or, alternatively, attributed to God according to the actions that 
God actualises. The distinction here is expressed as the difference seen through 
attribution. From comments on Exodus,477 existence relates to the affirmation of God as 
‘I am who I am’ presenting both God in his essence and as pure naked existence. Eckhart 
connects God’s ‘that it is’ (anitas), with his ‘what it is’ (quidditas), to signify his existence 
is the same as his essence and this essence is self-sufficient or, its own sufficiency.478 
Anitas, as Eckhart cites, is from Avicenna (Metaphysics 8. 4). McGinn believes Eckhart 
                                                 
476 Eckhart, In Ex. n.162-3 (LW II 142,8-10…142,11-3…143,12-144,3): ‘Igitur nullum 
nomen est magis proprium ipsi esse quam li esse. Deus autem est ipsum esse … illud 
nomen est propriissimum rei, cui competunt et attribuuntur omnia, quae illius rei sunt 
propria. Sed ipsi esse conveniunt et congruunt omnia, quae deo sunt propria … Rursus 
quod deus dicitur permanens, sempiternus, nullam habens causam nec principium, sed 
ipse est principium et causa omnium, et pari modo de omnibus quae dicuntur de deo 
generaliter: conveniunt et attribuuntur ipsi esse. Evidentius etiam et planius apparent 
convenire ipsi deo sub hoc nomine esse quam sub hoc nomine deus.’  
477 Exod. 3:14, ‘dixit Deus ad Mosen ego sum qui sum’.   
478 Eckhart, In Ex. n. 15 (LW II 21,2-6): ‘Quod quotiens fit, purum esse et nudum esse 
significat in subiecto et de subiecto et ipsum esse subiectum, id est essentiam subiecti, 
idem scilicet essentiam et esse, quod soli deo convenit, cuius quiditas est sua anitas, ut 
ait Avicenna, nec habet quiditatem praeter solam anitatem, quam esse significat. 
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uses this idea of essence and existence as a Neoplatonic perspective on the Thomistic 
metaphysics of identity. Jan Aertsen also notes the rarity of the term quidditas in the 
middle ages, describing Eckhart’s use of the term as ‘remarkable’ and points to Thomas 
showing that in creatures, essence is intrinsic but existence comes from outside.479 It is 
not co-incidental that God is described as the all-sufficient one in this treatise which 
explains how the Hebrew name for God given as ‘Shaddai’, as seen in chapter one, that 
has been translated into English as ‘Almighty’, actually points to the sufficiency of 
God.480 Eckhart explains that God  
does not need any creature’s essence or anything outside himself to 
establish him or perfect him, but his essence is self-sufficient to all 
things and in all things. Such sufficiency is proper to God alone … 
Therefore, substance and power, existence, and operation are different 
in everything that is beneath God. Such divine sufficiency is signified 
when from God’s Person we hear, “I am who am”.481  
Outside of God, substance, power, existence and operation are multiple within things 
which are thereby dependent on something other than themselves, or in other words, 
anything which is creaturely, is different in itself by nature, and action, if only because it 
is not self-sufficient. However these things are not different in God, and therefore, as 
stated in n. 5, ‘there is only one power’ and one action. This is consistent with the idea, 
presented above, that perfection, or detachment, is a position of independence and 
sufficiency.  
                                                 
479 See J. Aertsen, Nature and Creature: Thomas Aquinas’s Way of Thought (1988), 139; 
Thom. Aqu., S.c.G., I, 22, (ed.) Leon (1918); De veritate 8, 8; B. McGinn, Essentials 
(1981), 32-8. 
480 See Eckhart, In Ex. n. 156–60 (LW II 138,10-142,2). 
481 Eckhart, In Ex. n. 20 (LW II, 26,6-8, 26,12-4): ‘non eget essentia alicuius entis nec 
eget alio extra se ad firmitatem sive perfectionem sui, sed ipsa essentia sufficit sibimet ad 
omnia et in omnibus. Et hoc est proprium soli deo, talis scilicet sufficientia … Propter 
hoc in omni citra deum differt substantia et potentia, esse et operari. Talis ergo 
sufficientia dei significatur, cum ex persona dei dicitur: “ego sum qui sum”’. See In Ex. 
n. 14–21 (LW II 20,1-28,10); Eckhart includes a quote from Moses Maimonides, Guide 
for the Perplexed 1:63.  
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Eckhart continues to show how considering difference is a matter of relation and the 
different perspectives held by God and creation. Firstly, substance is mentioned as being 
different outside of God and this distinction is also presented later in his Commentary on 
Exodus in a formula connecting substance and relation. Everything that exists does so 
because of the existence or substance that has brought it into existence: 
Everything of this sort is a being or thing in external fashion by an 
analogical relationship to the one thing which is a being and a thing, 
that is, substance.482 
God’s absoluteness is his in substance whereas everything else exists in relation to him. 
Everything external to being has an analogical relation to the substance of being but this 
is different from the univocal relation of substance to the beings that have emanated from 
it. The idea of relation with God is treated more thoroughly in Question eight, so here it 
is suffice to show that this difference in relation between being and beings connects with 
the power distinction as being a matter of perspective.  
Secondly with regards to power, as shown in n. 5, whereas God actualises through one 
power, we perceive different actions although they are only one action, as demonstrated 
by the fire illustration given earlier.483 Everything that ‘is’, exists because it has been 
brought about by the power of God and this points to distinction, yet the idea of power 
presented in n. 5 proposes a oneness between God and his creation and an indistinction. 
As seen earlier, Eckhart uses this dialectic of distinction and indistinction to dissolve the 
difference between absolute and directed power. When power is considered, the 
distinction can be made between the power directed in things, and absolute power which 
is God himself who is beyond these things. For Eckhart, God is one, singular absolute 
action and so there is no difference other than from man’s perspective because man 
comprehends only directed power as an expression of God’s absolute power, or his total 
potentiality in actualisation. This is the same for the other two aspects mentioned above, 
namely existence and operation, in that they are different from a human perspective 
because we perceive actions and beings, but God simply is action and being. We can only 
speculate that from God’s perspective, there is no distinction. 
                                                 
482 Eckhart, In Ex. n. 54 (LW II, 59,7-9): ‘Sunt ergo omnia huiusmodi entia sive res extra 
analogice ad unum, quod est ens et res, scilicet substantia.’ 
483 See Eckhart, In Ex. n. 42 (LW II 46,10-47,11), also footnote 453.  
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Having shown that God’s power is not distinct from his essence, the Meister calls to 
attention earlier contributions from the power debate and referring to Lombard and 
Augustine would keep his audience alert as these two are not only prominent figures in 
the scholastic and philosophical approach to theology, but they also mark the innovation 
of Eckhart’s proposal in Question six.  
This response to n. 6 highlights the earlier roots to the debate, firstly calling to mind Peter 
Lombard, but not on his own, as the authoritative sayings of the saints are also included 
in this point. As presented in chapter one, Lombard’s Sentences were the most important 
text book in the new universities and so Eckhart’s audience would already be well versed 
in the distinctions in Book I considering the power of God. Maybe Eckhart’s ‘et videtur’ 
was a way of being careful not to disrespect Lombard, and indeed any other scholars or 
‘saints’ while co-incidentally presenting the frailty in their earlier arguments. Including 
the ‘saints’ adds weight behind Lombard, and grammatical construction suggests these 
authoritative teachings of the past belong to the same thinking as Lombard, although 
literally it is only the ‘Master of the Sentences’ who is specified to be maintaining that 
God’s power should be seen as both absoluta and ordinata. Lombard wanted to release 
the shackle of Abelard’s restriction by proposing that God could do more things than he 
chooses to do, although he never actually does them. The terms designating potentia, 
either as absoluta or ordinata were not yet conventional to the debate and it was 
developments from such as William of Auxerre, Godfrey of Poitiers, Hugh of St. Cher 
and Alexander of Hales who established the formula and significantly, the difference 
between the two terms as presented by Eckhart. Therefore, because there is a possible 
difference to be seen, then there must be two aspects to God’s power, enabling Eckhart 
to point to this argument that God’s power should be seen as ‘both of them’. The term 
both simply confirms that there are two ways that God’s power can be perceived, and 
these are set out in the introductory paragraphs one and two. Lombard does not refer to 
absoluta and ordinata as two ways to consider God’s omnipotence but in distinction 42 
he describes two aspects that should be considered: 
Namely that he does all that he wills, and that he suffers nothing at 
all.484 
                                                 
484 Lombard, I Sent., d. 42. C. 3 (186) (1971), 294-8: ‘Quod omnipotentia Dei secundum 
duo consideratur. Hic igitur dili genter considerantibus omnipotentia eius secundum duo 
apparet, scilicet quod omnia facit quae vuit, et nihil omnino patitur. Secundum utrumque 
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The first aspect is the same as the following statement of n. 8, that God does everything 
he wills. The link is made by Lombard, that this is why God is called omnipotent and 
reference is made to Augustine, and specifically to Enchiridion, as does Thomas and also 
Eckhart in n. 13. The second aspect connects with the idea presented in n. 3 when God, 
is presented as maxime actus and therefore cannot suffer at the hands of anything. These 
two aspects then, to some extent, relate to the ordinata and absoluta because the first one 
limits God’s power according to what he does, and the second seeks to emphasise the 
absoluteness of God’s power.   
Earlier in this treatment, Eckhart has presented this view with his initial and counter 
argument proposing that directed power describes the things God does, and then 
suggesting there are more things that God could do. Lombard, worked from what was 
seen as the view of Augustine that God only does what he wills to do, and used the 
distinctions in his Sentences to present how God’s capacity is greater than his volition, as 
others such as Anselm, and even Abelard in theory, had been keen to show.485  
In n. 8, when Eckhart says, ‘some others say’ that God is omnipotent because he can do 
everything he wills, this is likely to be a reference to Augustine and this is confirmed by 
the closing statements in this treatment, as well as the references from Lombard, above. 
The ‘quidam tamen’ suggests there maybe differences between Lombard and the 
authoritative others and Augustine’s notion of God’s power, although Lombard refers 
several times to Augustine during his distinctions on power and mostly uses these texts 
as the orthodox framework on which to build. Marginal markings also suggest a 
separation between n. 7 and n. 8 but this is maybe just to indicate Augustine’s emphasis 
of the will in the actions of God, rather than there being two ways of understanding God’s 
power. Aquinas, in his Q.d. De potentia, also points to Augustine saying that God can do 
everything he wills by himself and of himself and this small phrase also connects with 
Lombard describing how God is powerful both in himself and through himself.486 In these 
                                                 
Deus omnipotens verissime praedicatur, quia nec aliquid est quod ei ad patiendum 
corruptionem inferre valeat, nec aliquid ad faciendum impedimentum afferre.’ 
485 See Lombard, I Sent., d. 43, c. 1, (187) (1971). 
486 Thom. Aqu., Q.d. De potentia q. 1 a. 7, resp., (ed.) Marietti (1965), 23a: ‘quia potest 
quidquid vult; et hoc habet a se et per se’. Thomas could well be referring to the earlier 
13th century work from the University of Paris by William of Auxerre whose Summa 
Aurea considers Lombard’s Sentences; Lombard, I Sent., d. 42, c. 3, 4 (186) (1971): ‘Et 
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four very similar quotations Lombard, and also Altissiodorensis, use ex se et per se, while 
Aquinas says a se et per se and Eckhart referring to Augustine, per se et a se. The Meister 
is unquestionably meticulous in his wording yet, on this occasion, rather than suggest a 
significance in the different prepositions, or ordering, especially because the text is only 
an abbreviatio, it is however reasonably safe to conclude that God is being proposed as 
possessing power in his being as God, and also having the will to act using this power. 
Any difference in the ordering of the phrase is unlikely to be significant because of the 
structure of the two aspects simply being added (although, later in n. 10, the ordering of 
the aspects involved leads to a clear difference in thought). This being the case, then 
Eckhart has wrapped up Lombard with Augustine to consider power as the potentiality to 
act, and thereby pointing to a restriction in things God does based on his will, which is 
through his own unique nature, and seen in his action. From what has been recorded in 
the actual text so far, it might be speculation to suggest any alignments, or otherwise, 
between himself, Augustine and Thomas, but during the rest of the text the Meister leaves 
no doubt as to his own position in relation to the other two.  
The difference in time between the late patristic and early scholastic periods saw the 
development and refinement to the question of a power distinction and the Meister is able 
to introduce his own ideas on the power of God and the distinction, by reflecting on the 
treatments of his notable predecessors. In terms of historical development, as seen in 
chapter one, Augustine is a key figure in the establishing the notion implied by the term 
omnipotence and he acknowledged God only does what he chooses to do, but that this 
does not mean any deficiency of power. 
  
                                                 
Deus quidem ex se, et per se potest; homo autem vel angelus, quantum que beatus est, 
non est potens ex se vel per se.’       
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n. 9 The counter argument: This only explains how [the way in which] power works.  
n. 10 Therefore I say it [God’s power] is to be considered rather as absolute power 
because it should be considered insofar as it extends to all things which do not 
involve a contradiction, because it is considered as referring to everything that is 
possible.  
Also, the power of God would otherwise be limited if we considered it as relating to 
something.  
Likewise, when we refer to God’s knowledge, we say that God is omniscient because 
he knows everything [and] it is also the same when referring to power. [He is 
omnipotent because he is able to do everything].  
Now, why is it not said that God is omnivolent? [wills everything?] 
In response I say that he only wills those things to which he applies his knowledge 
or power.  
And notice that he is not said to be omnipotent because in him would be the power 
to do everything, but because he is able to do everything that is possible 
 
N. 9 is a simple statement acting as a hinge connecting this treatment in Question six with 
historical views from Augustine through to the scholastic treatments and even canonist 
interpretations of the later 13th century. The marginal mark pointing to n. 9 as sub-point 
three of point three, connects this statement with the earlier ones of n. 7 and n. 8, 
especially the previous one presenting the thought of Augustine. Beginning with a 
‘contra’ though also connects with the first ‘contra’, which is the counter argument, 
proposing God’s power should be considered as absolute. The ‘only’ is significant for 
Eckhart who is pointing to the weaknesses with these historical treatments and that he 
favours the notion that views power other than by simply considering how it works. N. 9 
links with nn. 7 and 8 but is effectively opening the way for the Meister to expand on the 
initial counter argument of n. 2.  
If he is making the statement that the views of his predecessors just related power to 
action, Eckhart would be aware of his own over-generalising, although early discussion 
did tend to focus on what God is actually able to do, and it was only during the 13th 
century that a keener interest in understanding the idea of potentia absoluta grew. 
Augustine certainly focussed on power as the ability to perform an action and preserved 
the sense of God being unrestricted, except by choice. Forward to mediaeval times and 
Damian likewise was looking to express how God should be able to do everything with 
the focus on action, as were Anselm and Abelard. Lombard further explored the 
difference between capacity and volition by considering how such constraints as time and 
language effected our understanding, but this was still in relation to action. Godfrey of 
Poitiers, William of Auxerre and Hugh of St Victor used the ideas of conditionality and 
justice when exploring the power distinction and the best terms to frame it. Into the early 
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part of the 13th century, power was generally considered in relation to action, and when 
Alexander of Hales proposed the sphere of action greater than the ordinata, and this was 
the absoluta, this was still in the context of works.487 It was acknowledged that God must 
possess power but absolute power remained either equivalent to power in action, or the 
power needed to do everything possible for God to do, and this remained the case before 
ensuing philosophical revisions.  
Rather than focus on the actions God does, the 13th century saw the discussion move from 
how God works to considering God in his essence. Arabic and Greek ideas were embraced 
thoughtfully rather than emphatically by Albert and Thomas who were instrumental in 
something of a shift of focus from the potentia ordinata to the absoluta and to some extent 
this is presented by the development from n. 9 to n. 10. It is important to note what is 
meant by the term absoluta because, as with ordinata, the term was used in a number of 
different ways. Building on Avicenna’s idea that essence is possible without existence, 
the intrinsic concept of power could now be considered, enabling the possibility for power 
irrespective of operation. Albert acknowledged power in its essence and also makes the 
distinction between the power that could do all the things that possibly could be done, 
and the power that actually does things. As seen earlier, Thomas also spoke of power in 
its essence, the potential power to do anything possible and the power actualised when 
the action does not contain a contradiction or repugnancy and is simply befitting for God 
to do.488 Absolute power, according to Thomas, connects with essence rather than action 
as if it would be a contradiction to consider the two together, and he is more concerned 
than Eckhart to make the distinction between action and power.  
Eckhart proposed that absolute power was the capacity to do everything possible, which 
is quite similar to the literal notion of the term omnipotence. This is the reason, explained 
                                                 
487 See Alexander of Hales, Alexander of Hales, Summa Halensis, Pt. I, inq. 1, tr. 4, q. 1, 
m. 4 (1924), I, 135 see footnote 218, 219. 
488 See Thom. Aqu., Q.d. De potentia q. 1, a. 5, (ed.) Marietti (1953), 18a: ‘Praeterea, in 
Deo duo contradictoria simul esse non possunt. Sed absolutum et regulatum 
contradictionem implicant; nam absolutum est quod secundum se consideratur; illud vero 




above, why it is right to call God ‘Omnipotent’.489 Absolute power remained an 
ambiguous expression of God’s power, with uncertainty over whether it should be related 
to God in essence or action or both. It is maybe because there were different concepts of 
de potentia absoluta, sitting somewhere between the two fixed positions of either just 
abstract or concrete ideas, that it could be deliberately misconstrued, or at least distorted 
by adapting it conveniently into canonical issues.  
From this context, Eckhart described the nature of absolute power in n. 5, and then, the 
question of a power distinction framed in n. 6 points to the need to consider God in his 
essence and this is in contrast with earlier views cited in nn. 7 and 8. In n. 10 Eckhart 
presents his solution within the framework of the argument beginning with a strong, ‘dico 
igitur’ emphasising both that this statement is in the light of the previous ones and also 
that this is his own view as opposed to that of anyone else. He also uses the term magis 
to emphasise that this is his own view, and this is a contrasting answer from the ones 
previously given. The potentia absoluta is defined as the power that can do everything 
possible and the limit of possibility is based upon whether or not the thing that could be 
done involves a contradiction. This is the counter argument of n. 2 in which it is added 
that this absoluta contains more than what is contained within the potentia ordinata.  
When first presented at the head of the question, Eckhart answered by linking the et 
videtur with potentia ordinata, and now his own answer proposes the counter argument 
that God’s power needs to be considered as potentia absoluta. He maintains that God’s 
power is absolute in that it applies to everything, or as respicit in n. 2 has been translated, 
comprises, everything that does not involve a contradiction. Respicit suggests the idea of 
containing and maybe, using a more modern idiom, it might be appropriate to say God’s 
absolute power is able to do everything that comes ‘under the umbrella’ of not involving 
a contradiction. This picture of a raised umbrella protecting everything underneath, 
presents the idea of containing everything possible but Eckhart also states that by only 
                                                 
489 See Eckhart, In Ex. n. 32 (LW II 38,1-7): ‘Patet ergo quod deus iuxta nomen 
“omnipotens” potest omnia et potest quaecumque posse est potentiae. E converso 
quaecumque dicitur deus non posse, ideo dicitur, vel quia illa non sunt nec sunt entia nec 
in numero omnium, sed quoddam nihil omnium; vel haec dicitur deus non posse, quia 
posse huiusmodi non est posse nec ad potentiam pertinet sed ad impotentiam, sicut posse 




considering the way in which power works, this is not a complete picture. Rather than an 
umbrella, maybe a kratera portrays a truer sense of Eckhart’s notion of omnipotence. The 
kratera could be perceived as the container of God’s essence which actively bubbles up 
and boils over. Absolute power for Eckhart is this boiling and over-boiling, emanating 
activity. Stretching the metaphor a little further could equate the umbrella with the 
thoughts of Thomas, such that all that is done is contained under the umbrella, and 
anything else that possibly could be done, is done when it comes under the umbrella. The 
difference is that the umbrella asserts containment and order whereas the kratera 
heightens the thought of dynamic activity. Thomas contains the ordinata within the 
absoluta, although he is only prepared to limit the effects of power rather than power,490 
but Eckhart considers the ordinata as being done continuously absoluta. Markus Vinzent 
explains how Eckhart, in Parisian Question four shows that God and the heavens should 
not be seen as a closed container space and this notion of space goes beyond those of 
Albert and Thomas, as taken from a discussion on Aristotle’s Physics.491 God is the 
unlimited container, and ‘as the principle itself has no spatial and temporal splits, but is 
only the condition for any form of spatiality and temporality, so also the container space 
should not be misread as a closed location or a particular place, but as the condition and 
potential for space.’492 This contrast is maybe seen in pedagogic style in that, whereas 
Thomas sets out many questions which he duly answers in a concrete fashion, Eckhart in 
a more speculative manner sometimes leaves his audience still asking questions. Whereas 
Thomas is renowned for his compendium of theology, Eckhart is often regarded as a 
mystic. 
                                                 
490 See Thom. Aqu., Q.d.. De potentia, q. 1, a. 2, resp. 13, (ed.) Marietti (1953), 12b: ‘Ad 
decimumtertium dicendum, quod Deus semper agit tota sua potentia; sed effectus 
terminatur secundum imperium voluntatis, et ordinem rationis.’ q. 1 a. 3, resp. 5, (ed.) 
Marietti (1953), 15a: ‘Praeterea, omne quod resistit alicui, resistit in ratione alicuius 
oppositionis. Sed potentiae divinae nihil est oppositum, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ergo ei 
nihil potest resistere; et ita potest facere omnia impossibilia.’  
491 M. Vinzent, ‘Eckhart on Space and Time’ (2016), 59-62. See Aristotle, Phys. VI 6, 
236b 33; Th. Aqu., In Phys. IV c. I lectio I n. 7, II 147; Albert, Phys. IV tr. I c. 2, III 260a; 
Eckhart, In Gen. I n. 49, LW I/2, 220,1-221,6. 
492 M. Vinzent, ‘Eckhart on Space and Time’ (2016), 62. 
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In his Commentary on Exodus, Eckhart refers to Augustine in order to explain how God 
is almighty by reason of his substance, but his substance is not related to any other 
thing,493 and this helps to explain how God is total power in himself. The Meister does 
not distinguish essence from action, and so while God remains actus purus, the distinctio 
rationis is still necessary. Power always relates to reasoned action but it is not like the 
awareness we have as creation that in terms of quantity, each task requires a certain 
amount of power, because God uses his total power in every action. The contrast is made 
between power which is regarded as infinite and able to action every possibility, and 
alternatively the limited, and thereby measurable amount of power related to a specific 
action. The potentia absoluta comprises all actuality and so, as seen in n. 3, refers to all 
intrinsic and extrinsic action although this should not be considered by referring to any 
particular action. When the woman who had been haemorrhaging for twelve years 
touched Jesus, he knew that power (δύναμιν) had gone out from him.494 It was not that an 
amount used was noticeable because of him becoming weaker, but acknowledgement that 
power, when considered practically, is related to action. This incident conveys the idea 
that power is not to be thought of in terms of quantity, because in God it is immeasurable. 
There is no need to presuppose that if more power were needed then it would be available. 
Likewise it is not the case that God has enough power because through his foreknowledge, 
he knows, and always did know, what potentiality is actualised in each action and this is 
all that is ever needed. Eckhart introduces the constraint of foreknowledge, or foresight, 
in n. 12 and so it is suffice here to say the Meister is always keen to propose God’s power 
should never be thought of as limited. By considering God as maxime actus, God is total 
power or power of the highest or ultimate degree, so it cannot be said there is more of 
God, or that more power exists as that would be nonsense because it is impossible to 
quantify God and hence the notion that God is infinite, and in this case infinite power. In 
reference to actions there is no limit to number nor any degree of difficulty to the things 
                                                 
493 See Eckhart, In Ex. n. 64 (LW II 69,2-4, 7-8): ‘propter quod deus substantia sua est 
sapiens, bonus, omnipotens et huiusmodi, non autem substantia sua est relatus ad alterum 
quippiam … Haec est ergo ratio, quare omne genus accidentis transit in substantiam in 
deo praeter relationem.’ See Augustine, De Trinitate, V, c. 5, n. 6. 
494 Luke 8:46: ‘et dixit Iesus tetigit me aliquis nam ego novi virtutem de me exisse.’ See 
Luke 8:43-8. See J.A. Fitzmyer, ‘The Gospel According to Luke, with Introduction, 
Translation and Notes’ (1979), 742-7. 
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God could do, because he would not then be omnipotent. Therefore, absolute power for 
Eckhart is not simply the greatest quantity of power needed to perform all possible 
actions, but is the very essence of God in unlimited, total action.  
When speaking of power as God’s essence there can be no question of limit but here the 
Meister explains that if power were to be considered as ordinata, then by being related to 
something, it would be limited. From Peter Damian’s question of the virgin there was 
always the need to express the problem of an apparent limit to God’s power and Eckhart’s 
line, here in the established terms of the debate, is clear that power should not be 
considered as merely potentia ordinata. Power related to action points to limitation, but 
power as the potentiality to do everything possible, holds no such limit.  
The contrast between God being infinite rather than limited is proposed by the Meister in 
the passage from his Commentary on Wisdom considered earlier presenting the 
connection between oneness, indistinction and perfection, and, 
furthermore there is an indistinction that concerns God’s nature, both 
because he is infinite, and also because he is not determined by the 
confines or limits of any genera or beings. But it is the nature of any 
created being to be determined and limited by the fact that it is created, 
as we read [Sap. 11:21], “You have ordered all things in measure, and 
number and weight.”’495  
As seen above, Eckhart presents the notion that God is indistinct, and he is indistinct 
because he is infinite, and secondly as the infinite creator, contrasted with creation in 
being neither limited nor determined. In his very nature, God is infinite unlike everything 
else which is determined by him as creator. This paradox of how creation is both indistinct 
from its creator and yet measurable in its own nature is described earlier with the analogy 
of the chest and its maker. Understanding how being indistinct is shown by infinity is 
further explained in Eckhart’s comments on Exodus on existence being outside of 
number: 
                                                 
495 Eckhart, In Sap. n. 144 (LW II 482,5-9), ‘Rursus de natura dei est indistinctio, tum 
quia infinitus, tum quia non determinatus ad terminos et limites alicuius generum sive 
entium. De natura vero creati est esse determinatum et limitatum hoc ipso quod creatum 
est, infra undecimo: “omnia in mensura et numero et pondere disposuisti.”’ [Wis.], 11:21: 
‘sed omnia mensura et numero et pondere disposuisti.’  
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Existence is not counted along with being, nor is form generally with 
the thing that is formed. Existence and every form is from God as the 
First Existence and the first Form. Therefore, no distinction can exist 
or be understood in God himself … all distinction is repugnant to the 
infinite. But God is infinite.496 
This is helpful because infinity is seen, not so much as beyond measure, as immeasurable, 
or in an over-simplified example, God is not just a bit greater than the greatest amount 
we can measure, but greatness that we cannot start to measure. God is not infinite in that 
he is more than everything else but that he is not anything that can be counted and the 
amount of anything he possesses in himself is immeasurable. Indistinction as infinity is 
only possible because God is first and the source of everything. This again describes the 
outflowing of God proposed in nn. 3 and 5. The Meister describes this positon 
experientially in Predigt 52: 
When I stood in my first cause, I had no cause, and then I was the cause 
of my own self; …. I desired nothing, since I was an empty being and 
I was the act of knowing myself in the enjoyment of the truth. Then I 
wanted myself, and wanted no other thing; what I wanted, that I was; 
and what I was, that I wanted. And here I stood empty of God and of 
all things. But when I went out of my own free will and received my 
created being, then I had a God; for before the creatures existed, God 
was not “God”, but he was what he was. But when the creatures came 
into existence and they received their created being, then God was not 
in his own self “God”, but he was “God” in the creatures.497  
                                                 
496 Eckhart, In Ex. n. 60,1 (LW II 66,4-8): ‘quia esse cum ente non ponit in numerum, nec 
universaliter forma cum formato. Esse autem et omnis forma a deo est, utpote primo esse 
et forma prima. Nulla igitur in ipso deo distinctio esse potest aut intelligi… distinctio 
omnis infinito repugnat. Deus autem in finitus est.  
497 Eckhart, Pr. 52 (DW II 492,3-493,2): ‘Dô ich stuont in mîner êrsten sache, dô enhate 
ich keinen got, und dô was ich sache mîn selbes; dô enwolte ich niht, noch enbegerte ich 
niht, wan ich was ein ledic sîn und ein bekenner mîn selbes nach gebrûchlîcher warheit. 
Dô wolte ich mich selben und enwolte kein ander .dinc; daz ich wolte, daz was ich, und 
daz ich was, daz wolte ich, und hie stuont ich ledicgotes und aller dinge. Aber dô ich 
ûzgienc von mînem vrîen willen und ich enpfienc min geschaffen wesen, dô hâte ich 
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Initially this seems to be a self-personal description of being with God or simply being 
God or rather just being, because the idea of God only exists in relation to creation once 
it comes into being. Eckhart says that it is only once I am a created being, that I recognise 
distinction between myself and God. This movement from within being to becoming a 
distinct being explains how two different relations can be described. God is infinite in 
himself but creation is measurable insofar as a created being is in creation. ‘This or that’ 
beings are part of the physical, measurable, created world which, from this human 
perspective, is distinct from God who has brought order through the confines of length, 
mass, capacity and time. Measures do not determine God, who can only be without 
confines or limits, therefore God is infinite and God’s power in action, the ‘maxime actus’ 
must be infinite.498  
For his notion of infinity, the Meister may well be following the thoughts of his 
Dominican predecessors such as Albert who stated that the name ‘eternal’ pointed to a 
being without limit in his comments on the Book of Causes.499  
Albert was using what he thought was Aristotle’s work to propose God is the one who 
has caused everything else and so must be without limit. Thomas likewise, in his first 
theory for the existence of God, proposes there is no movement without a first mover and 
this idea is framed in terms of power to explain how all potentiality in God is actualised.500 
This is also presented in Summa contra Gentiles in which he contrasts prime matter, 
which has potency, with God who only has actuality.  
But, since potency is said relatively to act, it cannot exceed act either 
in a particular case or absolutely. Hence, since prime matter is infinite 
in its potentiality, it remains that God, who is pure act, is infinite in his 
actuality. Moreover, an act is all the more perfect by as much as it has 
                                                 
einen got; wan ê die crêatûren wâren, dô enwas got niht ,got', mêr: er was, daz er was. 
Aber dô die crêatûren gewurden und sie enpfiengen ir geschaffen wesen, dô enwas got 
niht ,got' in im selben, mêr: er was ,got' in den crêatûren.’ Trans. E. College and B. 
McGinn (1981). 
498 See Eckhart, In Sap. n. 146 (LW II 484,3-4): ‘Deus autem, utpote nullo genere finitus 
et limitatus aut finibus comprehensus, infinitus est.’ 
499 See Albert Magnus, Liber de Causis et Processu Universitatis a Prima Causa, L. II, 
tr. 1, c. 8, (ed.) Colon., Vol. XVII 2), p. 69.  
500 See Thom. Aqu., S. Th., Ia, q. 2, a. 3; Aristotle, Metaphysics XII 1072a.   
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less of potency mixed with it. Hence, every act with which potency is 
mixed is terminated in its perfection. But God is pure act without any 
potency … He is, therefore, infinite.501  
Thomas presents prime matter not as substance but potential, although this potential is 
based on actual substance, and whatever it is, its actuality could not exceed its potential 
even if this is infinite. Therefore God who is pure action, not just potential action, is 
infinite actuality. Clearly from this, God only has actuality, and although the text initially 
seems to connect potency with imperfection on a continuum such that 100% potency is 
0% actuality and vice versa with variations possible, it later affirms the view that being 
infinite means God in his perfection is 100% actuality and 0% potentiality. 
This idea of all potentiality being actualised might seem inconsistent with his view 
presented in the Sentences text considered in chapter one in which he deals with the 
generation of the Son from the Father and related issues. In his Sentences Commentary, 
Thomas describes the potentia absoluta as being the power that could do anything 
possible while all actuality is attributed to the potentia ordinata but with the possibility 
for extra potentiality in the absoluta is kept open. This seems to suggest there could be 
unrealised potentiality but the text, above from Summa contra Gentiles, connects infinity 
and actuality, and dismisses any idea of unrealised power. Thomas maybe amended his 
view, in this slightly later work, to propose all potentiality is actualised or alternatively 
he regarded absolute power as infinite when being considered as essence but finite and 
directed when considered as action.  
Either way, it seems the concept of infinity might have been an awkward one for Thomas 
to reconcile consistently within his overall thinking and this is seen in his Q.d. De potentia 
in which he treats this issue by referring to John Damascene declaring that the infinite is 
that which neither time nor place nor mind can grasp. He also refers to Hilary stating that 
                                                 
501 Thom. Aqu., S.c.G., 1, 43, 6-7, (ed.) Leon (Rome, 1918): ‘Sed potentia, cum dicatur 
ad actum, non potest actum excedere, sicut nec in unoquoque, ita nec simpliciter. Cum 
igitur materia prima sit infinita in sua potentialitate, relinquitur quod Deus, qui est actus 
purus, sit infinitus in sua actualitate. Item. Tanto actus aliquis perfectior est, quanto 
minus habet potentiae permixtum. Unde omnis actus cui permiscetur potentia, habet 
terminum suae perfectionis: cui autem non permiscetur aliqua potentia, est absque 
termino perfectionis. Deus autem est actus purus absque omni potentia… Est igitur 
infinitus.’ Trans. A.C. Pegis. 
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God’s power is immeasurable, before concluding that because this is the same for divine 
power, then God’s power is infinite.502 From this point Thomas presents how this power 
as a quantity should only be predicated of God in the negative sense that God is beyond 
limits ascribed to him, and to all that is in him, because privations point to imperfections, 
but when,  
ascribed to God and to all that is in him, because he himself, his 
essence, his wisdom, his power, his goodness are all without limit, 
wherefore in him all is infinite.503 
Power is listed alongside essence as something ascribed to God without limit. The 
contrast is made between God who is infinite act and man whose actions are limited. The 
limits of creation are seen by the agent doing the act and who or whatever is in receipt of 
the action. He adds: 
Now God’s action is not limited by any agent, because it proceeds from 
no other but himself: nor is it limited by any recipient, because since 
there is no passive potency in him, he is pure self-subsistent act … But 
we must note that, although his power is infinite by reason of his 
essence, nevertheless from the very fact that we refer it to the things 
whereof it is the source, it has a certain mode of infinity which the 
essence has not … divine power is infinite: since never does it produce 
so many effects that it cannot produce more; nor does it ever act with 
such intensity, that it cannot act more intensely. But in the divine 
operation intensity is not measured according as operation is in the 
operator, for then it is always infinite, since God’s operation is his 
                                                 
502 See Thom. Aqu., Q.d. De potentia, q. 1, a. 2, resp., (ed.) Marietti (1953), 11; John 
Damascene, Orthodox Faith, Book 1, c. 1, NPNF, Series 2, vol. 9; Hilary of Poitiers, De 
Trinitate, viii, NPNF, Series 2, vol. 9. 
503 Thom. Aqu., Q.d. De potentia, q. 1, a. 2, resp., (ed.) Marietti (1965), 23a: ‘quae longe 
a Deo est. Infinitum autem dictum negative convenit Deo quantum ad omnia quae in ipso 
sunt. Quia nec ipse aliquo finitur, nec eius essentia, nec sapientia, nec potentia, nec 
bonitas; unde omnia in ipso sunt infinita.’ 
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essence, but according as it attains its effect, for thus some things are 
moved by God more efficaciously, some less.504 
Thomas is making the point that God’s power in its essence is infinite and not subject to 
any limitation. Operation and essence are connected but only according to the effects of 
power as with the text above from the same article, which proposed power should be 
thought of as unlimited and it is rather the effects of power that are limited by God’s will, 
and order of reason. Again the thought is emphasised that when God acts, he does so from 
his divine power and all operation is from his essence. However, there is also a clue to 
the proposal made in the notes above on n. 5, that there is an analogous relation between 
the different modes of power. In one mode, power in its essence is infinite and in yet 
another mode, connected with action, it is measurable. Power actualised from the mode 
of essence is infinite but from the angle of the one receiving the operation it can be 
measured. In the line at the top of this text, Thomas emphasises that God’s power is not 
restricted by the recipient of the operation but the closing lines do suggest the power used 
is quantifiable. This is one way to consider Thomas’ idea of potentiality. God’s action 
could not be limited by anything outside of himself but there is a limit to the potentiality 
and therefore using this logic, a sense in which not all potentiality is actualised. This 
suggests there may be some ambiguity within Thomas’ treatment of infinity, and this is 
demonstrated by Eckhart in his comments on the Exodus text, ‘the Lord has reigned for 
ever and beyond’. The Meister states that this,  
                                                 
504 Thom. Aqu., Q.d. De potentia, q. 1, a. 2, resp., (ed.) Marietti (1965), 23a: ‘Ipse autem 
divinus actus non finitur ex aliquo agente, quia non est ab alio, sed est a se ipso; neque 
finitur ex alio recipiente, quia cum nihil potentiae passivae ei admisceatur, ipse est actus 
purus non receptus in aliquot ... Sed sciendum quod quamvis potentia habeat infinitatem 
ex essentia, tamen ex hoc ipso quod comparatur ad ea quorum est principium, recipit 
quemdam modum infinitatis quem essentia non habet … divina potentia est infinita. Nam 
nunquam tot effectus facit quin plures facere possit, nec unquam ita intense operatur quin 
intensius operari possit. Intensio autem in operatione divina non est attendenda 
secundum quod operatio est in operante, quia sic semper est infinita, cum operatio sit 
divina essentia; sed attendenda est secundum quod attingit effectum; sic enim a Deo 
moventur quaedam efficacius, quaedam minus efficaciter.’ 
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Plainly and briefly intends to say that his kingdom will always and 
infinitely stand beyond any measure of counting or conceiving.505  
[However]: 
Thomas has a wonderful saying … about the infinity of the thoughts 
and affections of hearts that are known by God with the knowledge of 
vision. This is obscure to many, and I cannot remember anyone before 
Thomas who said it. Not even Thomas himself in other places says 
about this knowledge of vision, but only about the knowledge of simple 
understanding.506  
In the Summa contra Gentiles, Thomas speaks of the knowledge of God as a simple 
understanding but one that is a direct, immediate, and exhaustive knowledge of all things, 
even things that are not and infinite things. Likewise, in his Summa Theologia, Thomas 
refers to a ‘knowledge of vision’ of infinite things: ‘God knows even the thoughts and 
affections of hearts, which will be multiplied to infinity as rational creatures go on for 
ever.’ As Markus Vinzent points out, Thomas could never hold to things being infinite 
because that would contradict the orthodox idea that generation is finite and yet ‘Eckhart 
feels himself entitled to highlight this extraordinary, if not conflicting, statement as 
support for his own view that the ongoing kingdom is infinite, because potentiality and 
actuality of things are immeasurable and inconceivable and can only be known by God 
himself.’507 Thomas could only perceive there to be a time before time, or eternity outside 
of time in order for God to be ‘Principle’ and distinct from creation, but Eckhart proposed 
                                                 
505 Eckhart, In Ex. n. 86 (LW II 89,4-6): ‘Ultimo breviter et plane, cum dicitur: “dominus 
regnavit in aeternum et ultra”, vult dicere quod ultra quam possit numerari aut cogitari 
semper in infinitum stabit regnum eius.’ 
506 Eckhart, In Ex. n. 86 (LW II 89,6-10): ‘Secundum quem modum Thomas optime dicit 
p. I q. 14 a. 20 quod cogitationes et affectiones cordium sunt infinitae et sciuntur a deo 
scientia visionis, quod multis obscurum est; nec memini me ab aliquo ante Thomam esse 
dictum. Sed nec ipse Thomas alibi fortassis invenitur hoc sensisse de scientia visionis, 
sed tantum de scientia simplicis intelligentiae.’ See Thom. Aqu. S Th. I q. 14, a. 12, (ed.) 
Leon. XIII (1888); S.c.G., I c. 49-69 (ed.) Leon (Rome, 1918). 
507 M. Vinzent, Detachment (2011), 2-3. 
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God acts continuously in the eternal now, or ‘nunc aeternitas’.508 This means no 
distinction between bullitio and ebullitio but one actualising absolute action.    
This statement of Eckhart in n. 10, concerning the limited nature of power related to 
action, might also be referring, in a more subtle way than others referred to in nn. 7 and 
8, to Thomas among those who hold the view that power can be considered in this related 
way. When speaking of power in its essence both meisters speak of this as infinite but 
Thomas has expressed two modes of absolute power in which the one related to action is 
measurable and thereby limited, whereas Eckhart has defined God’s power as absolute 
because it is unlimited. This thoughtful difference in the use of word ‘absolute’ reflects 
Eckhart’s emphasis of there being one emanating action of God.  
The proposition that God’s power is unlimited, and indeed the contrast with Thomas, is 
developed further as Eckhart continues by presenting knowledge and will as two more 
aspects attributed to God. In n. 8 the Meister has already considered how it had long been 
thought how God is perceived as only doing that which he wills to do, but this always 
remained an open discussion. Here in n. 10 is the second occasion Eckhart has brought 
the connection between the will of God and omnipotence into the discussion, and this is 
a major theme running through to the end of Question six. The pattern of the debate can 
be traced by the key words being used in virtually the same sequence in Lombard’s 
distinction 43. 
The term of ‘omniscience’ is introduced as referring to the notion that what God knows, 
he always knows, always and this is everything. The connection between power and 
knowledge, as seen in chapter one, was made by Lombard with his ‘semel scit Deus, 
semper sciat et semper scierit’ formula and as with power, it is beyond human 
imagination to consider how every particular act is known. Eckhart, by using similar 
terms is pointing to the thought that God knows everything, and so he must have the 
power to do everything.  
                                                 
508 See J. Casteight, ‘What does “in the principle” mean? Eternity and time in the first 
article of the Votum Avenionense’ (forthcoming, 2016). Julie Casteight presents how the 
Meister presents his idea of creation in connection with eternity in his Commentary on 
Genesis, In Gen. I, n. 7 (LW I/2 65, 8-12, 12-23), and this became the first article to be 




This idea is presented by Thomas when treating the question of why God is called 
Almighty:  
It would seem that the reason is because he can simply do all things. 
For he is called almighty in the same way as he is called omniscient. 
Now he is called omniscient because he simply knows all things. 
Therefore he is called almighty because he can simply do all things.509     
And in response: 
God is called omniscient because he knows all things knowable. Now 
the false are not knowable and therefore he knows them not: and things 
impossible in themselves are compared to power as the false are 
compared to knowledge.510 
Everything that is possible to be known is known by God. The parallel between God 
knowing everything and having the power to do everything is generally accepted, and 
power and knowledge are said to be infinite, especially in the sense that they are 
incomprehensible from the viewpoint of creation. Thomas adds that the logic used to 
explain how there is nothing existing that God does not know, is the same as that showing 
that if something cannot be done, then it does not exist. If something exists, then God 
knows about it, and it exists through his power. Existence for God determines both 
omniscience and omnipotence.  
Breaking down the Latin terms in this way, by using omni as a prefix, the compound term 
points to everything, and it was the adoption of this term, omnipotent, that quickly became 
a catalyst for the power debate. Having made a point that is easy to establish using the 
prefix ‘omni’, Eckhart throws a third ‘omni’ into the pot which had also featured 
previously in discussions about God’s power. The words omnia and scientem are separate 
but combined in English usage to present the notion of all-knowingness in the way that 
omni and potent present all-powerfulness and here omnia and volentem are linked to 
                                                 
509 Thom. Aqu., Q.d. De potentia, q. 1, art. 7, arg. 1, (ed.) Marietti (1965), 23a: ‘quare 
Deus dicatur omnipotens. Et videtur quod dicatur omnipotens quia simpliciter omnia 
possit. Sicut enim Deus dicitur omnipotens, ita dicitur omnisciens. Sed dicitur omnisciens, 
quia simpliciter omnia scit. Ergo et omnipotens dicitur, quia simpliciter omnia potest.’ 
510 Thom. Aqu., Q.d. De potentia, q. 1, a. 7, r. 1, (ed.) Marietti (1965), 23a: ‘quod Deus 
dicitur omnisciens quia scit omnia scibilia; falsa autem, quae non sunt scibilia, nescit. 
Impossibilia autem secundum se comparantur ad potentiam sicut falsa ad scientiam.’. 
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present the idea of willing everything. I have used the terms omniscient and omnipotent 
in translation, and so for the purpose of emphasising the parallel being made, I have kept 
the term ‘omnivolent’ as the Anglicised term. The question is one asked by Thomas in 
the same manner: 
If God is called almighty and all-knowing, why is he not also called all-
willing?511 
The single word ‘omnivolens’ has been translated as all-willing but in English, this is 
ambiguous in that it could refer to submissive acceptance of everything, rather than active 
willing of everything. In the context of a sentence referring to omniscience and 
omnipotence it seems best to keep the Latin term omnivolens (omnivolence), alongside 
omnipotence and omniscience. The link between being able and being willing had been 
famously made much earlier by Epicurus stating: 
Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not 
omnipotent. 
Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. 
Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil? 
Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?512 
Clearly Epicurus (or probably just Hume), was making a particular point in denial of God 
but this logic, from a human perspective, explains why it is impossible to be both all-
powerful and actively all-willing. The Meister explains that God could not will everything 
because he only wills the things that are within his knowledge and power. The connection 
being made between knowledge and power is consistent with the idea that anything else 
does not exist. This affirms that God has power for everything, therefore he is omnipotent, 
and he knows everything, therefore he is omniscient, however when considering the will, 
this would introduce a contradiction if God were to will everything, therefore he is not 
omnivolent. 
                                                 
511 Thom. Aqu., Q.d. De potentia, q. 1, art. 7, arg. 5, (ed.) Marietti (1965), 23a: ‘Item 
quaeritur quare Deus dicitur omnipotens et omnisciens, et non omnivolens.’ 
512 This quote is generally attributed to Epicurus although not referenced, and the thought 
was adopted by Church Father, Lactantius, as part of an apology in De ira Dei and then 




Eckhart could well be pointing to this same question when asked by Thomas in his Q.d. 
De potentia 513 as to why God is not called omnivolent, and he must have been aware that 
Thomas is careful in his response not to equate God’s will with the infinite nature of 
God’s knowledge and power: 
in voluntary actions, power and knowledge (as stated in Metaph. ix, 2, 
5) are brought into action by the will: wherefore in God power and 
knowledge are described in universal terms as being without limit, as 
when we say that God is all-knowing and almighty: whereas the will, 
seeing that it is the determining force, cannot cover all things, but only 
those to which it determines power and knowledge: hence God cannot 
be called all-willing.514 
The will is limited according to the things it determines and consequently brings into 
action. Thomas cites Aristotle, describing how in order for something to be done well, 
then it must at least be done and yet, just because something is done, it does not 
necessarily mean it is done well.515 From his own Commentary on Metaphysics, Thomas 
describes how there are different types of potency but when the one acting with potency 
is using reason, then contrary options are involved.516 Or in other words, decision making 
implies there must be a choice opposed to what is not chosen. God can only do what is 
right, and these things that are done, are the things God must be willing to do, and so God 
                                                 
513 Thom. Aqu., Q.d. De potentia, q. 1, art. 7, arg. 5, (ed.) Marietti (1965), 23a, above.  
514 Thom. Aqu., Q.d. De potentia, q. 1, a. 7, r. 5, (ed.) Marietti (1965), 23b: ‘in his quae 
aguntur per voluntatem, ut dicitur IX Metaph., potentia et scientia determinantur ad opus 
per voluntatem; et ideo scientia et potentia in Deo quasi non determinata universaliter 
pronuntiantur, ut cum dicitur omnisciens vel omnipotens, sed voluntas quae determinat, 
non potest esse omnium, sed eorum tantum ad quae potentiam et scientiam determinat; et 
ideo Deus non potest dici omnivolens.’ 
515 Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book XI 2, 5, from Thom. Aqu., Commentary on Metaphysics: 
‘It is also evident that a potency for doing something well involves the potency of merely 
doing something or undergoing some change. But the latter does not always involve the 
former; for he who does a thing well must do it, but he who does something need not do 
it well.’  
516 See Thom. Aqu., Commentary on Metaphysics Book 9, 1768-85. 
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has not done any alternative action making him unwilling to do that action and therefore 
he cannot be all-willing.   
In answer to his own question, concerning God being said to be all-willing in the way that 
he is all-powerful and all-knowing, Eckhart links the three by saying God’s will is not 
infinite, but limited by the application of knowledge and power, a limitation which is not 
“outside” of God. Many factors have been seen to influence whether or not God does 
something and for God to do anything he has to be willing to do it. Being willing has been 
expressed in terms of his nature because God could only act in consistency with himself. 
Eckhart uses the two terms here, scientia and potentia, but not in a random way because 
these are the two terms just put forward in the reasoning behind why God is not 
omnivolent. Eckhart and Aquinas affirm the restricted nature of the will of God in contrast 
with knowledge and power. However, this response of the Meister proposes that acts of 
the will follow the knowledge and power of God, whereas Thomas sees the will as 
determining the actions of knowledge and power. Eckhart repeats Thomas’ question on 
omnivolens closely and so this change of order may be a less than subtle, reversal in the 
process involved, reflecting the contrasting ideas of the two meisters. Eckhart consistently 
looks to emphasise oneness in God, but Aquinas’ ordering of events here suggests God’s 
knowledge and power follow God’s will, meaning that power and knowledge are 
secondary, although it is still the will which is limited. For Thomas, God’s will is not 
changed by his power, yet while God’s power does not change, its effects can be limited 
by his will.  
Eckhart presented how power should be understood earlier in n. 5 and the activation of 
knowledge, will and power are in this singular action and so this question of the ordering 
predicates cuts deeply to Eckhart’s fundamental notion of God and the primacy of 
intellect.517 In his first Parisian question Eckhart shows how the prologue of John states 
that it is the ‘Word’ in the beginning, and not ‘being’ in the beginning, and that the idea 
of a word, whether considering either the speaker or what is spoken, relates to intellect. 
Everything owes its being to God as intelligere and therefore it is this intellect that ‘is’, 
and is the revelation to Moses in the revelation of ‘I am who I am’. Oneness in God is 
preserved, and emphasised, by everything flowing from intellect. Markus Enders explains 
how Eckhart places God above Being in this question and yet points to God as Being in 
the Prologus generalis in Opus tripartitum and concludes the ‘difference lies in the 
                                                 
517 M. Enders, ‘Meister Eckhart’s Understanding of God’ (2013), 361-70.  
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grounding of the Being of God in his knowing’.518 God is above any sense of creaturely 
being as well as being ‘Pure Being’. Eckhart moves on to show how intelligere is ahead 
of existence, or being, or essence, and therefore power which it effects:  
In God there is no passive potentiality. But there would be unless 
understanding and existence were the same in God … 
In God existence itself is his act of understanding for he acts and knows 
through his existence … he exists because he understands. God is an 
intellect and understanding, and his understanding itself is the ground 
of his existence.519 
Intelligere, translated here as understanding is before anything and from this comes the 
source of everything including God as we comprehend him, and all his nature, and 
anything we predicate of him including power. This priority of intellect, according to Jens 
Halfwassen, places thinking at ‘the highest and most proper definition of the absolute, on 
which all other definitions that apply to God, including precisely his Being, are based.’520 
To follow this through, everything coming from intellect bears the form of this intellect 
and hence there is the oneness continually inferred. This placing of existence after 
intellect is confirmed when the Meister states his aim is not to deny God, by saying God 
is not existence, but acknowledge God as the cause of all existence: 
                                                 
518 M. Enders, ‘Meister Eckhart’s Understanding of God’ (2013), 370. See Meister 
Eckhart, Prolog. gen. in Opus tripartitum, n. 11 (LW I/2, 29,12-3): ‘Prima igitur 
propositio est: Esse est deus. Prima quaestio de divinitate: Utrum deus sit.’ 
519 Eckhart, Quaest. Par. I, n. 2, 3, 4 (LW V 38,7-8, … 40,3-4, … 40,5-11): ‘Quarto, quia 
in deo nulla est potentia passiva. Esset autem, nisi intelligere et esse sint idem in deo … 
et sic in deo ipsum esse est ipsum [intelligere], quia ipso esse operatur et intelligit … 
ostendo quod non ita videtur mihi modo, ut quia sit, ideo intelligat, sed quia intelligit, 
ideo est, ita quod deus est intellectus et intelligere et est ipsum intelligere fundamentum 
ipsius esse. Quia dicitur Ioh. 1: “in principio erat verbum, et verbum erat apud deum, et 
deus erat verbum”. Non autem dixit evangelista: “in principio erat ens et deus erat ens”. 
Verbum autem se toto est ad intellectum et est ibi dicens vel dictum et non esse vel ens 
commixtum.’ 
520 J. Halfwassen, ‘Gibt es ein Philosophie der Subjektivität im Mittelalter? Zur Theorie 
des Intellekts bei Meister Eckhart und Dietrich von Freiburg’ (1997), 343.  
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I deny nothing to God that is his by nature, asserting as I do that God 
precontains everything in purity, fullness and perfection, more 
abundantly and extensively, because he is the ground and cause of all 
things. And this is what he intended to say when he declared “I am who 
I am.”521  
This is why Eckhart can say, and indeed maintain, that God only wills the things to which 
he applies his knowledge and power. There is no passive potentiality with Eckhart 
because God is total actuality and so God does everything possible, and this as shown 
earlier, is in this singular action of the maxime actus.  
Eckhart’s consistency in this issue seems to contrast with Thomas who, as far as he was 
concerned, had shown a certain ambiguity. Although in his Q.d. De potentia Thomas 
states there is no passive potentiality and ‘proves there is no passive power in God’522 
and, as seen above, this is supported in his Summa contra Gentiles there does seem to be 
a difference between potentiality and actuality as presented in both his Summa Theologica 
and Scriptum Sententiarum. 
The ordering of power, knowledge and will is presented differently according to how God 
is understood. For Thomas, creation is an act of the will and therefore there is distinction 
between God and creation. God is Subsistent Being itself,523 and because he must be a 
thinking as well as active being, then God is also intellect, but this intelligere could not 
exist apart from being, even if in a way distinct from being. This means everything comes 
from intelligere, including every being, and so upholds the standard Dominican position 
of the primacy of intellect in contrast with the Franciscan emphasis of the will and love 
of God as held by such as Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure and Duns Scotus.  
The Meister continues to treat the relation between God’s power and his will from n. 8 
onwards and so it is not a side issue and in doing so he is not just making a point about 
the will of God but demonstrating the consistency within his own argument. This change 
                                                 
521 Eckhart, Quaest. Par. I, n. 12 (LW V 48,5-8): ‘Nihil igitur nego deo, ut sibi natum est 
convenire. Dico enim quod deus omnia praehabet in puritate, plenitudine, perfectione, 
amplius et latius, exsistens radix et causa omnium. Et hoc voluit dicere, cum dixit: “ego 
sum qui sum”’. 
522 Thom. Aqu., Q.d. De potentia, q. 1 a. 7, r. 5, (ed.) Marietti (1956): ‘quod ratio illa 
probat quod in Deo non sit potentia passiva.’ 
523 See Thom. Aqu., S.Th. Ia, q. 8, a. 1, (ed.) Leon. XIII (1888). 
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of order by Eckhart seems to be placing Thomas closer to the Franciscan camp, or at least 
towards Augustine, and thereby sowing the slightly acerbic thought that, in comparison 
with himself, Thomas is concerned to emphasise the will of God in determining actualised 
power, and this is further developed in the closing paragraphs.  
The final statement of n. 10 is introduced with et nota quod, and so, once again it is 
emphasised that it is important to give attention to the idea that there is a difference 
between being able to do everything, and being able to do everything that is possible. 
There is no argument to support the idea that God does everything. This again is a hinge, 
because it both closes out this paragraph and leads forward to the closing paragraphs 
which should be considered together as they form the final sequential steps of this 
treatment.  
  
n. 11 To this [first] argument it must be said that out of [his] absolute power God 
can do things that are not decent now. But if they were done, then they would be 
decent and just. 
n. 12 But you [may] ask [against this], ‘Can he only do something, if he has foreseen 
it?’ 
To this it should be said that, if this ‘if’ refers to the things he has actually done, then 
this is true. Because he has foreseen anything he has done [does]. 
But if this ‘if’ refers to what he is able to do, then it is false.  
n. 13 But you [may] say [against this] that Augustine in ‘Enchiridion’ states that, ‘he 
[God] is omnipotent because “he can do everything he wills”, not because “he can 
do everything”.’  
n. 14 To this it should be said that Augustine says ‘wills’ because by ‘everything’ he 
also understood to include the evil things that God is not able to do.  
And that is why he [Augustine] spoke in this way.  
 
A re-visiting of the question of omnipotence takes place in this final section with gaining 
an understanding of the will of God as the key to understanding the initial argument. The 
idea that God does not do everything possible was raised in n. 1 as a means to explain the 
difference between the ordinata and absoluta. The counter argument refers to everything 
that does not involve a contradiction and this is referred to again in n. 10, in which Eckhart 
connects everything possible with anything not involving a contradiction. Therefore 
absolute power is essentially the capability to do everything that is logically possible. 
Here, the question of doing everything possible is considered, firstly in connection with 
being fitting, secondly in the context of foresight and thirdly in the light of another 
question concerning the will.  
It can be noted that the manuscript, (n. 11), includes a duplication of the word, Deus. 
Grammatically the sentence only requires one use and so the extra one is probably a 
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copyist error. In n. 11, reference is made back to the initial argument of n. 1 in which the 
power of God was restricted such that God could only do the things that are befitting, 
decens, for him to do. Justice, iusta, is included here with decens, which, because this is 
the first mention of justice, could simply be an isolated reference suggesting these are just 
two among all the predicates that can be attributed to God, however justice is also one of 
the specifics in the treatment of Thomas: 
God has done whatever is actually just, not whatever is just potentially: 
since he is able to do that which at present is not just through not being 
in existence; yet if it were, what he does would be just.524 
The language of Eckhart has modelled that of Thomas, and so being just seems to be 
carrying the same effect as being fitting. The nature of the abbreviatio, and likewise 
knowledge of the Meister, suggest the use of iusta might not simply be accidental or 
simply to add another possibility or even constraint to the situation, because interestingly, 
the notion that justice acted as a restriction on God’s power was stated by Augustine.525 
Referring in n. 11 to justice, not only connects with the treatment of Thomas in his Q.d. 
De potentia but also Augustine and this seems to be intentional of Eckhart in this second 
half of the text. Augustine was a key source for Lombard who also considered this 
question when reflecting, probably on Abelard, and the fear of restricting to being only 
able to do that which he actually does. In distinction 43 Lombard moves through a 
discussion on why God’s power should not be seen as limited and that he is able to do 
more than he does, stating, 
God is not able to do anything other than what is good and just, that is 
he cannot do anything other than what, if he were to do it, would be just 
and good … He (God) is able to do many things which are neither good 
nor just because they neither are nor will be.526 
                                                 
524 Thom. Aqu., Q.d. De potentia, q. 1 a. 5, r. 7, (ed.) Marietti (1965), 23a: ‘Deus fecit 
quidquid est iustum in actu, non autem quidquid est iustum in potentia; potest enim 
aliquid facere quod nunc non est iustum, quia non est: tamen si esset, faceret iustum.’ 
525 See Augustine, Contra Gaudentium Donatistarum Episcopum, Book 1, 30, 35 (PL 43, 
727; CSEL 53, 233), footnote 127. 
526 Lombard, I Sent., d. 43, c. 2 (187) (1971): ‘Non potest Deus facere nisi quod bonum 
est et iustum, id est non potest facere nisi illud quod, si faceret, bonum esset et iustum, 
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Lombard is floating the idea about things being done, that are in fact never done, but if 
they were, then they would be good and just.  Coincidently this is a response to those who 
have proposed a limitation and adopted ‘sacred authorities’ to establish the case. Eckhart 
remains respectful, but is less concerned about agreeing with these sacred authorities. 
This refusal to limit God’s power then draws in the idea of foreknowledge before calling 
on Augustine’s Enchiridion. As already noted there are parallels between Question six 
and distinctions 42 to 44, yet although there are similarities in format, they also show the 
contrasting ideas proposed. Justice is introduced by Eckhart and not again mentioned 
directly, whereas Lombard is keen to develop the notion of justice alongside that of God’s 
will and expands his thoughts on this with further reference to Augustine.527 The ‘if it 
were to be done’ is not pointing to things that could be done, in contrast with Eckhart, 
and simply emphasises all that is done by God is just. Justice featured in the power debate 
after Augustine, notably through Stephan Langton, William of Auxerre, Hugh of St Cher, 
and then later with Albert who said that God can only do what is good and just.528 
Canonist treatments incorporated the debate as Church legislation and structure 
developed, and Duns Scotus added that God could act outside of existing law through his 
absolute power but this would still be within the ordinata.529 During Eckhart’s times in 
Paris, the notion of justice was inevitably a factor as there were several rivalries in which 
either party would be glad to claim victory with divine justification. The notion of iusta 
is not out of place in this question of omnipotence and it could be that slotting it in here, 
is neither inappropriate nor arbitrary, but it is loaded, in the way it aligns Thomas with 
Augustine.  
Whether this is just mixing in another predicate from what could be many, or if there is a 
more pointed reason, this is the expression of the filter of right action, or moral possibility. 
Eckhart, as Thomas had done, considers the filter of an action to be fitting for God by 
                                                 
verum est; sed multa potest facere quae nec bona sunt nec iusta, quia nec sunt nec erunt, 
nec bene fiunt vel fient, quia nunquam fient.’ 
527 See Lombard, I Sent., d. 42, c. 1-3 (184-6).   
528 See Langton, Der Sentenzenkommentar des Kardinals Stephan Langton, (ed.) A.M. 
Landgraf (1952), distinction 43, (1952), 60, footnote 184; William, Summa Aurea, (ed.) 
J. Ribailler, 1 (1980), 212, footnote 193; Hugh, I Sentences, d. 42, q. 1, footnote 209; 
Albert, In I Sentences, d. 43, art. 6, sol., (ed.) Borgnet, 26: 376, footnote 233. 
529 See John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 44, q. un., footnote 332. 
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introducing a temporal aspect by using the ‘if it were … then it would be’ conditional 
clause. Thomas has said that this is the case for being just and here Eckhart uses this same 
grammatical tool but with the idea of being fitting. The Meister states firstly, again to 
emphasise his stance, that potentia must be seen as absolute because everything that God 
does now is not only possible, but befitting, otherwise God would not be doing it. But 
more than this, God could still do it, even if it were not decent and just at this moment in 
time, then it would be. According to Grabmann, this position is in ‘sharp contrast’ with 
Thomas and the general opinion of the period as typified by Henry of Ghent who said, 
In God’s work, honest and expedient are the same. So because God 
cannot do what is not good, he cannot do what is not decent, appropriate 
or honest. And to put it precisely, he can make nothing which it would 
be inappropriate or disorderly for him to make. Whatever he makes is 
appropriate for him to make and whatever he makes and is able to make, 
if it were appropriate for him to make it, would be made decently and 
in order.530 
The thrust of Henry’s position is that God only actualises what is decens even 
acknowledging the last statement above which is still dependent on the action being 
decens.  
Further clarification proceeds immediately, as the Meister justifies saying that God could 
do something whether it is decens or not, by adding that if it were to be done, then it 
would be decens. Like Henry above, this statement could simply be saying, that if God 
does an action, it is because it is possible and befitting, and nothing else actually exists 
such that it would not be decens for God to do. This would mean there is no difference in 
the actions God does and the ones he could possibly do but this implies a limitation based 
on action and the Meister is looking to stretch further into the realm of possibility. This 
                                                 
530 Henry of Ghent, Quodlib. XI, 2: ‘In Dei opere idem sunt bonum, honestum et 
expediens. Quare quia Deus nullo modo potest facere quod non est bonum, nullo modo 
potest facere, quod non sit decens sive decorum sive honestum. Et sic absolute dico, quod 
Deus nullo modo potest facere aliquid, quod nullo modo et secundum nullem ordinem 
deceret eum facere. Immo quicquid facit, decet eum facere et quicquid facit et quicquid 
facere potest, si faceret deceret eum facere et non nisi secundum ordinem decentem 
faceret.’ See M. Grabmann, ‘Neuaufgefundene Pariser Quaestionem Meister Eckharts’ 
(1927), 358; with trans. M. Vinzent, ‘Questions on the Attributes’ (2012), 176-8. 
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can be seen from Paul’s letter to Titus saying that, ‘to the pure all things are pure’531 and 
in the context of the epistle, the thinking process involves, not cutting across, but 
necessitating right behaviour and so this could explain rather than excuse God’s action. 
Alternatively, maybe Eckhart was suggesting that whatever action not seems decens from 
a human perspective could still be decens from God’s perspective, but this would mean 
right behaviour from God’s perspective not being according to his revealed will to 
creation such that God has one set of rules of behaviour for his creation and another set 
for himself. As God is prior to creation then this is permissible but questionable from 
creation’s perspective. It was Thomas who suggested God could do things differently in 
some other order and so this is a possible explanation, although this statement was 
possibly just Thomas’ way of not wishing to be seen to be limiting God. Likewise, in the 
case of justice for Thomas, whenever God acts it must be justly, because this is how God 
acts. Yet there is also a fourth explanation, in which Eckhart is about to take his listeners 
further away from the comfort zone of orthodoxy.  
Throughout Question six the way in which power is to be considered and the difference 
between viewing power according to its nature and how it is actualised is explored, and 
for Eckhart, the whole idea of a power distinction, is only an issue from a human 
perspective, because God simply acts absolutely. At the head of the question the potentia 
ordinata was the power limited by the action having to be fitting but now the new 
proposal is that the potentia absoluta is the power able to do everything that is not only 
possible but also befitting. For something to be decens is not a limitation for the Meister. 
Or rather, the Meister does not see this as a limitation on God. This is similar to the notion 
of Thomas, who as seen earlier, follows and thereby connects his treatment of the plight 
of the fallen virgin with the question of whether or not God could sin. Outside of the 
confines of creation it is possible to restore the virgin, because through absolute power 
God can do everything that is possible including restoring something that is broken now. 
Eckhart’s thinking matches that of Thomas here in that God is able to make something 
right outside of time that is wrong within time. However, this is where Thomas draws the 
line between the absoluta and the ordinata. For Thomas, absolute power is power 
                                                 
531 Titus 1: 15: ‘omnia munda mundis coinquinatis autem’. 
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according to its principle while directed power relates to its operation532 and so, within 
creation, God could not do something unbefitting, or unjust, because his nature does not 
go against his will, but the Meister seems to be proposing here that God should not be 
seen as being restricted in this way.  
Within the text there is no definite explanation of how God makes an action befitting at a 
different time, although there is the notion that, within time, God can be perceived by 
man as self-limiting but in the reality of atemporality there is no such limitation. However, 
Eckhart does not make the temporal distinction and maintains God could do something 
unbefitting now out of absolute power irrespective of what man thinks. This is a 
dangerous step to propose that God can actually do things which are not decens within 
the present order but this may well have been in Eckhart’s mind, by emphasising the 
‘now’.  
This is not just that, outside of creation, the nature of God is not subject to the will of God 
and so, if it were in God’s nature to act in a way that is wrong within creation, then he 
could do so outside of creation but this would no longer be wrong, but rather, this is God 
acting in an unbefitting manner within time and creation. The whole idea of how creation 
perceives an action as befitting is only relevant to creation.  
God’s singular maxime actus is always befitting because that is the nature of his action 
and, because it is one action, it is, paradoxically for creation, both temporal and atemporal. 
This would unquestionably cause a stir among his audience because in this, and in contrast 
to Thomas and Henry, Eckhart cuts against the orthodox value that God always acts in 
the expected and accepted manner. The Meister in qualifying this proposal by saying that 
if God does something, then it is befitting, is elevating God beyond man’s understanding 
and this is not untypically Eckhartian. In Predigt 5b,533 Eckhart speaks of how God made 
himself poor taking on human nature in Christ,534 and urges his hearers to ‘let God be 
God’ as he is in the innermost ground where nature is suspended. Although this is in the 
context of comparing God’s nature with human nature, the same thought applies here 
                                                 
532 Thom. Aqu., Q.d. De potentia, q. 1 a. 1, resp., (ed.) Marietti (1965), 23a: ‘Potentiam 
vero attribuimus ratione eius quod permanet et quod est principium eius, non ratione eius 
quod per operationem completur.’ 
533 See Eckhart, Pr. 5b (DW I 85-96). 
534 2Cor. 8: 9: ‘scitis enim gratiam Domini nostri Iesu Christi quoniam propter vos egenus 
factus est cum esset dives ut illius inopia vos divites essetis.’ 
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such that, when thinking of God, human nature no longer applies and sin exists only 
within the human context. Eckhart also made the connection between sin and the will of 
God in his Book of Divine Consolation, in a passage that is found similarly in his defence 
in Cologne. The intention seems to be to urge man to gain the same will as God such that 
he will not sin but it is also plain that God acts according to his will and, whatever he 
does, it is not sin.535  
This notion, that God has not actualised anything that does not exist, and all possibilities 
that exist, could possibly be done, and so all that exists is decens and all that possibly 
could be done would also be decens is not inconsistent for the Meister in emphasising 
God as being absolute power with no limitation. In different words Eckhart spoke of how 
God only became God at the point of creation as the idea of God is relevant only from the 
context of creation. There is no suggestion from Eckhart that he is connecting Question 
six with Predigt 52 but his thoughts in the sermon do help to explain this thought of all 
God’s actions being decens as he describes the flowing-out from God as well as the 
breaking-through to God. In what is effectively another way of describing detachment, 
Eckhart states this process of breaking-through, durchbruch although it seems there is no 
Latin equivalent for this term: 
Let God perform what he will, and let man be free. Everything that ever 
came from God is directed into pure activity … God is free of all things 
… When I flowed out from God … I acknowledge that I am a creature. 
But in the breaking-through, when I come to be free of will of myself 
and of God’s will, and of all his works and of God himself, then I am 
above created things, and I am neither God nor creature, but I am what 
I was and what I shall remain, now and eternally.536 
                                                 
535 See Eckhart, Proc. Col. I, n. 95…12 (LW V, 282, 15-283,3… 203,4-12) See Buch der 
göttlichen Tröstung (Quint) (DW V 22,5-14).      
536 Eckhart, Pr. 52 (DW II 495,4-6 … 497,5 … 504,5 … 504,6 – 505,1): ‘Und lâze got 
würken, waz er welle, und stâ der mensche ledic. Allez, daz ie von gote gekam, daz ist 
gesast in ein lûter würken … ist got ledic aller dinge … Dô ich ûz gote vlôz … wan alhie 
bekenne ich mich crêatûre. Mêr: in dem durchbrechen, dâ ich ledic stân mîn selbes willen 
und des willen gotes und aller sîner werke und gotes selben, sô bin ich ob allen crêatûren 
und enbin weder got noch crêatûre, mêr: ich bin, daz ich was und daz ich blîben sol nû 
und iemermê.’ Trans. E. College and B. McGinn (1981). 
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The message of the sermon urges this step of durchbruch into freedom because in this 
state all actions are untainted. This mirrors God who is free and whose actions are pure. 
The notion of something being appropriate for the omnipotent God to actualise is only an 
issue within creation. Everything that God does is pure or decens. God could not do 
anything that was wrong for God to do and therefore it is no trouble to remove this filter 
that restricts what is actualised according to what is befitting for God to do. Rather than 
the actions of God having to pass through two filters, the Meister is always seeking to 
present the power of God as the absolute singular, emanating and perfecting maxime 
actus.  
The key to this section of n. 11 is found in the Latin Sermo XXVIII which contains 
fragments of text parallel to questions five and six as seen above in the notes on Q6. 
Eckhart states: 
God alone, as first, universal cause makes everything: ‘everything is 
made through him’, etc. (John 1:3). Again, he alone makes everything 
good, as the universal End of all things. And further, because God 
makes something he makes it good, and it is good. See [the homily on 
James 1:17] ‘(All) best gifts’. Further, however, only the final End 
which is also the first End itself makes something good, both because 
only that one is properly the End, and because anything that is in 
whatever way conceived as being not directed [towards this End] is not 
a good in itself, and things are good in themselves only if they are in 
whatever way redirected [towards it] again.537 
Again Eckhart explains the actions of God such that our perception of what is good is 
addressed. When something is ordained or directed by God then it is also redirected 
                                                 
537 Eckhart, Sermo XXVIII/2 n. 289-90 (LW IV 259,8-15): ‘(Item) solus deus “omnia” 
facit, utpote causa prima universalis, Ioh. 1: “omnia per ipsum facta sunt” etc. Item solus 
“bene” facit, utpote finis universalis omnium.  Et iterum, quia hoc ipso quod aliquid facit 
deus, “bene” facit et bonum est. Vide super [“Omne] datum optimum”. Rursus autem 
solus finis ultimus sive etiam primus ipsum facit bonum, tum quia ille solus proprie est 
finis, quia finis [qui non est ultimus finis] non est finis, tum quia quocumque posito praeter 
ordinem in ipsum non est res bona, et quocumque amoto stante ordine in ipsum res sunt 
bonae.’ For trans. see ‘Questions on the Attributes’ (2012), 179-82, and notes on the 
homily on Jas 1:17 referred to in the passage and issues on translation. 
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towards God and so it is good because all that God does is good. As Markus Vinzent 
explains, ‘God doing everything good does not mean that everything he makes is good 
now, because what something is now is not its real essence. Conversely, what is indecent 
now is not indecent by its nature, but if it is directed towards the good end it becomes 
good and just.’538 Being decens ‘now’ then involves a temporal aspect and 
acknowledgement what is within time as we perceive it.  
As far as being decens is concerned this does not affect the ‘everything possible’ for 
Eckhart and this is clarified, secondly, in n. 12 with another temporal aspect, foresight, 
being introduced in a way that is consequential to the notion of decens not being a 
limitation on God. The previous statement by incorporating time implied, or at least 
questioned, whether God could do something that he had not previously been able to do, 
or rather thought not able to do, with consideration of how God acts within time, and in 
particular the problem raised if God is able to do something he was not able to do before.  
The natural response to this problem of everything being decens, is to question if God is 
limited to only do the things he already knows about, which suggests there could be 
something unknown by the ‘omniscient’ God. By using this style of argument, Eckhart is 
probably showing, as with the implication of decens, the idea of foresight is only of 
concern within creation. If the previous paragraph questioned whether being decens is a 
restriction on God’s power then this paragraph questions whether God’s previdit is a 
restriction.  
Comprehending how God is both transcendent and immanent, and acts outside of 
temporality and yet, as far as we are concerned, within it, had always been relevant to the 
question of a power distinction. Eckhart could well be referring back to Augustine again, 
who, as seen in chapter one, was a major contributor to the issue of reconciling God’s 
sovereign power with the man’s freedom of choice. Augustine stated how man cannot 
resist the will of almighty God, otherwise God would not be omnipotent.539 
Moving through what became classic cases for the power debate, such as that of the 
possible raising of Judas, the apparent limitation of waiting for Lot, the problem of evil 
and necessity for Christ’s suffering on the cross, Augustine demonstrated that God choses 
to allow certain actions that might appear questionable, but are in fact within his 
                                                 
538 M. Vinzent, ‘Questions on the Attributes’ (2012), 178. 
539 See Augustine, Sermo de symbolo ad catechumenos 2 (CChr.SL 46, 185-6, PL 40, 
627), footnote 120. 
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permissive will. God possesses absolute power but with a self-imposed limitation that he 
will only actually do whatever he chooses to do. God’s will is his choice based on his 
own nature such that actions permitted are always good and just etc. even if that is not 
apparent from a human perspective. There is enough power to do other things but this 
remains unused. This way God remains omnipotent, but from man’s perspective, there is 
also the essential thoughtful, decision-making, freedom of choice and it is this strong 
connection between omnipotence and the will that is picked up by Eckhart. N. 9 has 
already considered the ordering of power with regards to the will and knowledge and the 
three are held in tension again here with particular focus on the will being a matter of 
choice effecting any action. The proposal of n. 11, that God acts absolutely in a way that 
is befitting leads to the next ‘but’ of n. 12. The ‘non’ combined with ‘nisi’ when translated 
into English brings an ‘only’ into the text and, as before in n. 9, this is a trigger for Eckhart 
to explain his own view, this time that foresight, or foreknowledge, is not a limitation 
from a divine perspective. Indeed the Meister then picks up this ‘only’ to present a similar 
idea to the one floated by n. 9 when stating here that if God ‘only’ does the things he has 
foreseen then this proposition is true. Power cannot be fully understood by only 
considering the works it performs and likewise there is a perceived limitation to power if 
only considering what God has foreseen.  
Eckhart explains that it is critical how the ‘if’ is understood. When the ‘if’ refers to what 
has been actualised, then the proposition is true that God sees, knows, and actualises only 
the same things which are done. Alternatively if this ‘if’ is referring to the power needed 
to do anything whether within time or not, then God must have enough power to do it or 
he would not be omnipotent and the proposition is false. In this context, God’s power is 
infinite but in reference to things done, God only actualises something he has foreseen. 
The strand of thought running through Question six demands that power should not be 
thought of as limited, and so God has power to do whatever is possible whether it has 
been foreseen or not. The logic when dealing with an action, is that God as omniscient 
must know beforehand what he is going to do, and likewise, must have seen what he 
knows and so God only actualises what he has foreseen. 
Once again the Meister is following Thomas in dealing with the notion that God could 
only do what he has foreseen:  
When you say that God is not able to do except what he has foreseen 
that he would do, the statement admits of a twofold construction: 
because the negative may refer either to the power signified in the word 
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able, or to the act signified in the word do. In the former case the 
statement is false: since God is able to do other things besides those 
that he foresees he will do, and it is in this sense that the objection runs. 
In the latter case the statement is true, the sense being that it is 
impossible for God to do anything that was not foreknown by him. In 
this sense the statement is not to the point.540 
Aquinas breaks down the issue of foresight into whether or not the action is being 
considered in terms of the power required to do it or the ability to do action. As Thomas 
alludes, considering the foresight of an act itself does not deal with the question of 
whether God can do other than he does. The phrasing of the argument is different between 
the two meisters but the concepts and conclusions are effectively the same. Eckhart has 
considered two ‘ifs’ and Thomas designates the two conditions as being related to either 
the power by which God is able or the act signified by the ‘do’ although these ideas are 
in reverse order. Eckhart’s first ‘if’ deals with the things God actually does and therefore, 
as with Thomas’ ‘do’ it is impossible for God to do something he does not know about 
and thereby foreseen. In this case God ‘only’ does these things. Thomas adds that this 
statement is effectively irrelevant and maybe Eckhart thought likewise, but these are 
‘only’ Prosper’s abbreviated notes. The second ‘if’ of Eckhart deals with whatever God 
could do, matching the ‘able’ of Thomas and so in both cases there is no limitation as this 
is a question concerning power. When considering power in its essence, neither meister 
wishes to suggest any limitation. In following Thomas, Eckhart has also followed 
Lombard who had also suggested the problem was caused by those wishing to limit God’s 
power by using terms that could be taken ambiguously.541       
Eckhart has shown in nn. 11 and 12 how being fitting for God, and what God foresees, or 
his omniscience, have no effect on his omnipotence and in n. 13, the will is revisited as 
                                                 
540 Thom. Aqu., Q.d. De potentia, q. 1 a. 5, r. 7, (ed.) Marietti (1965), 23a: ‘quod haec 
locutio, Deus non potest facere nisi quod praescit se facturum, est duplex: quia exceptio 
potest referri ad potentiam quae importatur per ly potest, vel ad actum, qui importatur 
per ly facere. Si primo modo, tunc locutio est falsa. Plura enim potest facere quam 
praesciat se facturum; et in hoc sensu ratio procedebat. Si autem secundo modo, sic 
locutio est vera; et est sensus, quod non potest esse quod aliquid fiat a Deo, et non sit a 
Deo praescitum. Sed hic sensus non est ad propositum.’ 
541 See Lombard, I Sent. d. 43, c. 5 (1971). 
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another, and final ‘but’ is introduced, this time calling on Augustine whose Enchiridion 
is quoted to consider how God’s will is a constraint on his action. By introducing this 
notion of Augustine with another ‘but’, it is fairly apparent where the Meister is going 
with this. After announcing in n. 6 that this treatment needed to consider not just that 
power is in God, but also the issue of a power distinction, the will of God, as a constraint 
on power, becomes a recurring theme.  
Augustine’s notion of omnipotence, coined by the phrase, ‘potuit sed non noluit’, is 
presented here by the proposal that God cannot do everything, and that he only actually 
does everything he wills. This proposal of n. 13, headed by the ‘but’, reflects that of 
Thomas taken in his Q.d. De potentia, who also brought this quote from Enchiridion:  
Nor can we doubt that God does well even in the permission of what is 
evil. For he permits it only in the justice of his judgment. And surely 
all that is just is good. Although, therefore, evil, in so far as it is evil, is 
not a good; yet the fact that evil as well as good exists, is a good. For if 
it were not a good that evil should exist, its existence would not be 
permitted by the omnipotent Good, who without doubt can as easily 
refuse to permit what He does not wish, as bring about what He does 
wish. And if we do not believe this, the very first sentence of our creed 
is endangered, wherein we profess to believe in God the Father 
Almighty. For he is not truly called Almighty if he cannot do 
whatsoever He pleases, or if the power of His almighty will is hindered 
by the will of any creature whatsoever.542 
                                                 
542 Augustine, Enchiridion, c. xxiv, n. 96, trans. J.F. Shaw. From NPNF, First Series, vol. 
3, (ed.) P. Schaff (1887), ch. 96: ‘Nec dubitandum est Deum facere bene etiam sinendo 
fieri quaecumque fiunt male. Non enim hoc nisi iusto iudicio sinit, et profecto bonum est 
omne quod iustum est. Quamvis ergo ea quae mala sunt, in quantum mala sunt non sint 
bona tamen ut non sola bona sed etiam sint et mala, bonum est. Nam nisi esset hoc bonum, 
ut essent et mala, nullo modo esse sinerentur ab omnipotente bono, cui procul dubio quam 
facile est quod vult facere, tam facile est quod non vult esse non sinere. Hoc nisi credimus, 
periclitatur ipsum nostrae confessionis initium, qua nos in Deum Patrem omnipotentem 
credere confitemur. Neque enim ob aliud veraciter vocatur omnipotens nisi quoniam 




As seen in chapter one, Augustine was a key figure in developing the notion that God is 
rightly called Almighty, and professed as almighty. This text explains how this all-
mightiness means that God is able to do whatsoever he pleases and is not limited by the 
will of any creature. However, it is just as clear that anything that has happened, has only 
done so because God has permitted it. Everything that happens must be within the 
permissive will of God. This is not an early suggestion of the notion that God can make 
something befitting that is not befitting now because God is not actively doing anything 
evil. Neither is evil becoming good. The emphasis of Augustine is that whatever God 
permits is in a sense good because it has passed through the filter of God’s will. Without 
presenting any criteria, God is perceived to be making a decision on whether or not an 
action is done based on choice. Likewise Lombard had pointed to Augustine in order to 
show that ‘all things’ includes the evil things that God could never will to do, and God 
should not be denied doing anything that is fitting, convenit, for him to do.543 The things 
that are befitting for God to do, he does and he has the will and power to do them, but if 
something is not befitting, then God would not be able to do them because he would not 
be willing. It is noted in the critical apparatus that the clause attributed to Augustine 
should not include ‘non quia potest omnia’ as this has been found neither in Augustine 
nor Thomas.  
It is just Eckhart who incorporates this to the quote from Augustine, and by doing so he 
presents the distinction proposed in this paragraph. Thomas points out that Augustine 
emphasised God can do whatever he wills and Eckhart adds the sense that this is not the 
same as doing everything possible, which is the point followed up in n. 14. As shown it 
is a typically Augustian proposal that God does what he wills, but only what he wills, and 
so it is not too unreasonable for Eckhart to make this addition. The notion that God’s 
omnipotence relates to being able to do everything possible, rather than everything, has 
just been pointed out in n. 10, and so this paragraph is highlighting the contrast between 
himself and Augustine who emphasised the will of God as a constraint on what God 
actually does. By making the connection between doing good, and the will, there is a 
difference presented between God doing everything that it is possible to do and doing 
everything that is right for him to do, or in other words, that he chooses to do. At the time 
of Augustine the power debate had not yet embraced the terms absoluta and ordinata, but 
with these later ideas available, this seems like the notion of ordinata being a subset of 
                                                 
543 See Lombard, I Sent., d. 42, c. 3, 3 (1971), 296,21-4. 
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the absoluta based on being possible and befitting or logically and morally possible. 
Hence the ‘potuit sed non noluit’, confirms God does less than he possibly could do and 
this was the basic starting point for Damian, and others moving through the scholastic 
period when power was considered mostly in relation to action.  
This apparent limitation on God’s power is explained in the closing sentences of the text 
when Eckhart shows how this view of Augustine effects how both omnivolence and 
omnipotence should be considered. Eckhart shows common ground in that Augustine was 
proposing that God should not be considered as omnivolent because God cannot will 
everything although the two understand this term differently. For Eckhart the only filter  
is that of logical possibility and so the only restriction in terms of the will is that God does 
not will something that could not possibly happen. Eckhart simply adds in the closing 
paragraph how Augustine was referring to everything as including the things God is not 
able to do because they are evil deeds. ‘Everything’ here is the same as what has been 
termed by other treatments as ‘everything possible’ and everything God wills is a subset 
of this everything. The first filter, namely that of the principle of contradiction, is assumed 
because this is concerning God’s action rather than essence. For the Meister, it is as if, 
according to Augustine, God does not possess the power to do the things that would be 
evil. Augustine then is also incorporating the second filter of moral choice such that 
everything that is actualised by God is only done so because God chooses to do only what 
is right for him to do. Lombard refers to an example quoted by Augustine: 
The will of the almighty is able to do many things which it neither wills 
nor does. For it could have caused twelve legions of angels to fight 
against those who seized Christ.544  
This speaks of the will being able, rather than a defect of power but again in the context 
that God could do more than he does but chooses not to. Whether God is able to do 
something is a question of choice, not power. As already shown, it was the philosophical 
introduction, as seen in this Question six with Eckhart’s reference to Avicenna, that 
moulded later 13th century theology. The idea that God could do more than he ordains 
was proposed by Albert who accepted that God only acts according to his nature but there 
is the idea that out of absolute power God could have foreseen another manner and 
                                                 
544 Lombard, I Sent. d. 43, c. 9 (1971): ‘Augustinus etiam in Enchiridion [c. 95] ait: 
“Omnipotentis voluntas multa potest facere, quae nec vuit nec facit. Potuit enim facere 
ut duodecim legiones Angelorum pugnarent contra illos qui Christum ceperunt”’. 
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therefore could have done things differently.545 Albert presented the notion of absolute 
power that was greater than power that is operated and likewise Thomas, as seen earlier, 
proposed God could do more out of his absolute power than he has foreseen and pre-
ordained, although he does not, and the proposal was not without the statement that 
nothing is actualised if it has not been foreseen or pre-ordained.546 This is the last word 
though, and so the matter has not rested with Albert or Thomas but with Augustine.  
Eckhart’s treatment, or at least the abbreviatio of his treatment, ends at this point with no 




Ensuring that a summary of the content of Question six is an accurate account of Eckhart 
is difficult because the text we have is already only an abbreviatio. This is not therefore 
Eckhart directly, and yet there is no reason to imagine there is any wastage or deviation 
and, as noted, every statement is relevant and supportive of the thinking being presented. 
Likewise, this thoughtfulness within the text is reflected not just in the content, but also 
because the structure bears similarity with Lombard’s distinctions and Thomas’ treatment 
of the omnipotence of God. The question is only a small piece of text expressing Eckhart’s 
notion of omnipotence and yet, because of the consistency of his thinking, by applying 
other texts, both Latin and Middle High German, the Meister’s overall idea is effectively 
amplified. Both, what are perceived as, scholarly or mystical works develop the text of 
Question six enabling a richer understanding. More than just a question of omnipotence, 
there are several definite points the Meister seemingly wishes to make over and above the 
thoughts he expresses in direct response to the question. Eckhart pays respect to historical 
treatments and uses the opportunity provided by this question to record something of the 
notions fundamental to his own theology. In this treatment, as well as making reference 
to key theological scholarship, Eckhart demonstrates that he believed Greek and Arabic 
philosophical tools could be embraced to develop and explain this revelation of the nature 
of God.  
The text begins with Eckhart asking whether omnipotence in God should be regarded as 
absolute, or directed towards action. He then lays down the proposal that power should 
                                                 
545 Albert, In III Sent., d. 20B, art.3, (ed.) Borgnet, 28: 358-9, footnote 238.  
546 See Thom. Aqu., S.Th. I, q. 25, a. 5, (ed.) Leon. XIII (1888), 297, footnote, 250. 
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be related to the things God is able to do because they are both possible and befitting. The 
counter proposal states that this would impose a limitation on God’s power, which needs 
to be considered rather as absolute because God can do everything that is possible.  
Eckhart deals with this theological question with a philosophical idea that power can be 
considered in essence itself or as being related to the actions it is able realise. This 
proposal and counter proposal present that, for God to act simply based on the logical 
possibility, i.e. that a thing could happen, would point to absolute power. Alternatively, 
God only does the things that are befitting for him to do and so the power to do these 
should be considered as directed. This idea that there are two thresholds of possibility 
which can be termed as logical and moral are central throughout this treatment.  
Eckhart states there are two aspects to this question in that it is both an issue about how 
the power of God should be understood and also a question of how this apparent 
distinction should be understood. These two thoughts are obviously connected, and 
Eckhart presents that how power is understood effects how the distinction should be 
considered and so firstly he shows that God possesses the power being described. By 
framing power in terms of potentiality and actuality, the ideas of active and passive 
actuality and also intrinsic and extrinsic action are introduced. Power then can be seen in 
God both as the potential to do any possible action and also as the power that is actualised. 
This is power, both in God in himself, and in all his action. God’s power in action is 
indistinct from God. The contrast is made between the nature of God’s power with man’s 
power to show that God is total power, and more than that, God is a singular, continuous, 
emanating act of power, action of the highest degree.  
This explanation is critical because, having said that power is considered in two ways, in 
practice there is only one act of power. With there being no need to distinguish within the 
nature of God’s power Eckhart returns to Question six to consider how potentia has been 
considered previously as both absoluta and ordinata. And for his answer, Eckhart points 
to whether the focus is on God’s power or the way in which God directs this power with 
the proposal God’s omnipotence should be considered as absolute because otherwise it 
would be limited. The closing stages of text follow a pattern of argument and counter 
argument to show why God’s power should not be thought of as limited. Firstly, God’s 
power would be restricted if any action of God was subject to his will. This issue can be 
dealt with by considering God’s will as intrinsic to his being and therefore relates with, 
but is not primary to, God as power. God could only will to do the things that are logically 
possible and these are also therefore within his knowledge and power. God’s existence is 
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not distinct from his action, but is his action. The will is also considered as a matter of 
choice based on what is befitting, or morally right, for God to do and in this sense is 
subject to other factors and so cannot be predicated in the same way as knowledge and 
power. The Meister shows how earlier treatments, including that of Thomas, apply God’s 
will as a second filter, meaning God actualises less than is possible based on power alone. 
Secondly, to restrict God to only doing what he foresees is shown to depend on whether 
power is considered in itself or in relation to action. Finally Augustine is not just, 
notionally as earlier, but literally brought into the argument for seeming to limit the power 
of God according to his will. Eckhart explains that Augustine included evil things as 
possible and so to rule out the thought of God doing evil, God only does the things he 
chooses to do.  
The conclusion running through the text, is that Eckhart always looks to point to the 
absolute power of God as actually being absolute, and any of these factors that have been 
considered by others to restrict the power of God, should be regarded as focussing on 
power as it is directed towards action. For Eckhart, God’s directed power is just the 
emanation of absolute power. More than that, God is able to do all that is logically 
possible and whether or not it is morally possible should not be taken as a restriction. 
Again this is a feature of the Meister, to draw a line between himself and earlier treatments 
including those by such as Augustine, who spoke into the notion of how God acts, long 
before the ‘power distinction’ was formulated. Earlier treatments incorporated into 
Question six provided Eckhart with an academic opportunity for comparison with others, 
but importantly emphasise how his own notion of the omnipotence of God, as this 
explosion of absolute power, is both radical yet consistent within his own philosophical 
theology. 
For Eckhart, there is no question of God not acting absolutely, but this is expressed here 
in an ongoing debate about the notion of a power distinction. The Meister is persistently 
aiming to take his audience into God’s perspective from which there is no distinction, 
even if the filters that seem to limit God’s power are real from a human perspective. 
Restricting God according to choice based on logical or moral possibility is not decision-
making from a divine view, likewise breaking down actuality into active or passive 
potentiality, or considering God’s intrinsic and extrinsic activity do not limit God, but 
reflect human limitations in comprehending God.  
There is a truth in the statement that it is not us who measure God, but God who measures 
us and so the concept of omnipotence for Eckhart should always point to the God of active 
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power beyond any human comprehension. God’s absolute power is not some ‘thing’, let 
alone something that could be measured. God’ is one action, the maxime actus a 
continuous actualisation of himself. McGinn summarises Eckhart’s methodology stating:  
The task of theology for Eckhart was not so much to reveal a set of 
truths about God as it was to frame the appropriate paradoxes that 
would serve to highlight the inherent limitations of our minds and to 
mark off in some way the boundaries of the unknown territory where 
God dwells.547  
In this text Eckhart shows that any boundaries exist only in our thinking, by presenting 
God as measureless and without boundary. The question of a power distinction asked by 
Damian was about the measuring of God and Eckhart has blown the question away 
through a revelation of how we should understand God’s power. This is neither the first 
nor the last treatment of the so-called power distinction, but it holds substantially as a 
clear reflection of Eckhart’s thinking, and as such must be considered as a significant, as 
well as militant contribution.  
Question six is Meister Eckhart’s treatment of the omnipotence of God and the, 
historically considered, perceived power distinction typifies his thinking in seeking to 
show God is not restricted to our understanding of God. Rather than what we see and 
know, the focus is switched to whatever is possible, because our notion of omnipotence 
should point to God as the ‘everything possible’ … absolute power in essence and action.  
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ii. Latin texts cited in a footnote. 
 
139 Peter Damian, Disputatio (PL 145, 597AB; SC 191, 388-90): ‘Si nihil, inquam, potest 
Deus eorum quae non vult: nihil autem, nisi quod vult, facit; ergo nihil omnino potest 
facere eorum quae non facit. Consequens est itaque, ut libere fateamur, Deum hodie 
idcirco non pluere, quia non potest; idcirco languidos non erigere, quia non potest; ideo 
non occidit iniustos; ideo non ex eorum oppressionibus liberat sanctos. Haec et alia multa 
idcirco Deus non facit, quia non vult, et quia non vult, non potest. Sequitur ergo ut 
quicquid Deus non facit, facere omnino non possit. Quod profecto tam videtur absurdum 
tamque ridiculum ut non modo omnipotenti Deo nequeat assertion ista congruere, sed ne 
fragile quidem homini valeat convenire. Multa siquidem sunt quae nos non facimus, et 
tamen facere.’ possumus… Si quid igitur tale divinis paginis reperitur insertum, non mox 
passim procaci ac praesumptiva vulgari debet audacia, sed sub modesta sobrii sermonis 
proferendum est disciplina; quia si hoc diffundatur in vulgus, ut Deus in aliquot, quod 
dici nefas est, impotens asseratur, illico plebs indocta confunditur, et Christiana fides 
non sine magno animarum discrimine perturbatur’.   
 
141 Peter Damian, Disputatio, (PL 145, 598D-599A; SC 191, 396): ‘Hoc ergo quod dicitur 
Deus non posse malum aliquod vel nescire, non referendum est ad ignorantiam vel 
impossibilitatem, sed ad voluntatis perpetuae rectitudinem’. 
 
145 Peter Damian, Disputatio (PL 145, 601C-620C; SC 191, 448): ‘Ad adfirmandum 
namque quod Deus nequeat virginem reparare post lapsum, quasi consequenter adiciunt: 
numquid enim potest Deus agree ut quod factum est factum non fuerit? Tamquam si semel 
constet ut fuerit virgo corrupta, iam nequeat fieri ut rursus sit integra’. Ibid., 474-6: ‘sed 
sicut ipse semper est quod est, ita sibi quicquid adest semper adest. Quapropter, sicut 
possumus rite dicere: potuit Deus ut Roma, antequam facta fuisset, facta non fuerit, ita 
nichilominus possumus et congrue dicere: potest Deus ut Roma, et postquam facta est, 
facta non fuerit.’ 
 
148 Anselm, Cur Deus Homo II, (Opera Omnia II, 100): ‘Non enim haec est dicenda 
necessitas, sed gratia, quia nullo cogente illam suscepit aut servat sed gratis. Nam si 
quod hodie sponte promittis te cras daturum, eadem cras voluntate das, quamvis necesse 
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sit te cras reddere promissum, si potes, aut mentiri, non tamen minus tibi debet ille pro 
impenso beneficio cui das, quam si non promisisses, quoniam te debitorem ante tempus 
dationis illi facere non es cunctatus. Tale est, cum quis sanctae conversationis sponte 
voyet propositum. Quamvis namque servare illud ex necessitate post votum debeat, ne 
apostatae damnationem incurrat, et licet cogi possit servare, si nolit, si tamen non invitus 
servat quod vovit, non minus sed magis gratus est Deo, quam si non vovisset; quoniam 
non solum communem vitam, sed etiam eius licentiam sibi propter Deum abnegavit, nec 
sancte vivere dicendus est necessitate, sed eadem qua vovit libertate. Quare multo magis 
si Deus facit bonum homini quod incepit, licet non deceat eum a bono incepto deficere, 
totum gratiae debemus imputare, quia hoc propter nos, non propter se nullius egens 
incepit. Non enim illum latuit, quid homo facturus erat, cum illum fecit, et tamen bonitate 
sua illum creando sponte se, ut perficeret inceptum bonum, quasi obligavit. Denique Deus 
nihil facit necessitate, quia nullo modo cogitur aut prohibetur facere aliquid, et cum 
dicimus Deum aliquid facere quasi necessitate vitandi inhonestatum quam utique non 
timet, potius intelligendum est, quia hoc facit necessitate servandae honestatis. Quae 
scilicet necessitas non est aliud quam immutabilitas honestatis eius, quam a se ipso et 
non ab alio habet, et idcirco improprie dicitur necessitas. Dicamus tamen, quia necesse 
est, ut bonitas Dei propter immutabilitatem suam perficiat de homine quod incepit, 
quamvis totum sit gratia bonum quod facit.’  
 
151 Peter Abelard, Ad Theologiam ‘scholarium’ III, c. 5 (PL 178, 1103; CCCM 13, 526): 
‘Qui etiam sicut Omnia semper scit quae aliquando scit, vel semper vult quae aliquando 
vult, nec umquam aliquam scientiam amittit vel voluntatem mutat quam umquam habuit, 
ita omnia semper potest quae aliquando potest, ne umquam aliqua sua potentia privatur.’ 
 
155 Hugh of St. Victor, De Sacramentis, I, 2, 22 (PL 176, 215): ‘Constat enim quod omne 
quod sit ab aeterno praevisum est futurum esse; quia ab aeterno futurum est, quod ipsum 
tamen ab aeterno non est. Et dicimus quod possibile est non fieri quod futurum est. Et si 
non fieret quod fiet, et non fieri possibile est, numquam futurum fuisset nec praevisum. 
Quod quia fiet, et futurum semper est et praevisum est. Nulla ergo mutatio hic, aut 
cassatio providentiae apparet; quia, sicut praevisum est, et fiet: sic si praevisum non 
esset, non fieret.’ Also, ‘Ergo Deus aliud potest facere quam facit, ut tamen ipse aliud 




175 Peter Lombard, I Sent., d. 44, c. 2, 4 (306): ‘Fateamur igitur Deum semper posse et 
quidquid semel potuit, id est habere omnen illam potentiam quam semel habuit, et illius  
omnis rei potentiam cuius semel habuit; sed non semper posse facere omne illud quod 
aliquondo potuit facere: potest quidam facere aut fecisse quod aliquando potuit. Similiter 
quidquid voluit, et vult, id est omnem quam habuit voluntatem, et modo habet; et 
cuiuscumque rei voluntatem habuit, et moto habet; non tamen vult esse vel fieri omne 
quod aliquando voluit esse vel fieri, sed vult fuisse vel factum esse.’ 
 
181 Magna Carta, third revision issued 11th February 1225 AD, ‘In primis concessimus 
Deo et hac presenti carta nostra confirmavimus pro nobis et heredibus nostris in 
perpetuum quod anglicana ecclesia libera sit, et habeat omnia jura sua integra et 
libertates suas illesas. Concessimus etiam omnibus liberis hominibus regni nostri pro 
nobis et heredibus nostris in perpetuum omnes libertates subscriptas, habendas et 
tenendas eis et heredibus suis de nobis et heredibus nostris in perpetuum.’ 
 
182 Stephen Langton in Der Sentenzenkommentar des Kardinals Stephan Langton, in 
Artur M. Landgraf (ed.), Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologied des 
Mittelalters, 37/1, distinction 42 (1952), 58-9: ‘“Nunc de omnipotentia,” Hic queritur, 
utrum omnia possit Deus” responsio: Potest intelligi perfecta et potest intelligi 
imperfecta. Secundum quod perfecta, falsa est, nisi restringatur universitas, quia non 
potest hoc demonstrato quodam turpi. Si imperfecta, diverse possunt esse suppletiones. 
Si suppleatur hoc verbum agere, falsa est; si hoc facere, vera, ita dato secundum quod 
dicitur, quod mala actio a Deo est. “Set queritur” Non determinat, per cuiusmodi nomen 
supponatur Deus. Aliud enim est, si dicat: divina essentia potest omnia agere, quia 
huiusmodi suppletionem ponit magister; et aliud, si dicat: Deus potest omnia agere. 
Prima falsa est, quia essentie non convenit ambulare. Secunda vera, quia verba 
convenientia rebus creatis naturaliter, id est naturalia significantia restringunt terminum 
sibi supponentem, ut supponat pro re, cui conveniat talis actus. Et ideo, si dico: Deus 
potest ambulare, vera est, quia per predicatum restringitur ad supponendum pro persona, 
sicut per terminum notionalem.’ 
 
184 Stephen Langton,  Der Sentenzenkommentar des Kardinals Stephan Langton, A.M. 
Landgraf (ed.), distinction 43 (1952), 60: ‘“In Genesi” Hoc falsum est, quia ibi non est, 
ad glosam ibi; oculos vestros conficiat etc. (The Landgraf footnote at this point refers to 
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Exod. 26:16) “Set non poterat per iustitiam.” Si intelligas de iustitia Dei falsum est. 
Quicquid enim potest per potentiam, potest per iustitiam suam. Set tamen propria sit. Ad 
iustitiam enim Dei non pertinent posse. Unde hanc quidam negant: ex iustitia potest. Set 
de iustitia Loth ibi loquitur. Tenebatur enim Deus Loth ex pacto, quod fecerunt cum eo 
angeli.’ 
 
187 Godfrey of Poitiers, Summa Theologiae, from MS Avranches, Bibliotèque de la ville, 
Cod. Lat. 121, fol. 137r, in A.M. Landgraf, Dogmengeschicte, II/2 (1954), 103: ‘Item 
quaeritur, utrum potuerit ei dare omnium potentiam. Si dicit: non, quare non? Quid 
impedivit potestatem illius, quare hoc non potuit? Si dicit: ita, sed dedit, quicquid potuit: 
ergo dedit. – Dico, quod de potestate absoluta potuit ei dare. Quis enim auderet de 
potestate eius et immensitate disputare. Sed non potuit de potentia conditionali, scilicet 
manentibus decretis, quae ipse constituit. Si enim ei daret potestatem iustificandi et 
salvandi, sic spes poneretur in homine, cum ‘Maledictus sit qui confidit in homine.’ Sic 
non revertentur flumina ad locum, unde exierunt, idest homines ad primam causam, a 
qua processerunt.’ 
 
286 Peter of Tarantasia, Sent I, d. 43, q. 1, a. 4 In IV Libros Sententiarum Commentaria, 
vol. I (Toulouse, 1652; repr. 1964), 360-1: ‘Respondeo: est ordo simpliciter et est ordo ut 
nunc. Nihil potest Deus nisi de potentia ordinata, primo modo loquendo de ordine; sed 
multa potest de potentia circumscripto hoc ordine, scilicet ut nunc. Primo modo dicitur 
posse de potentia absoluta; secundo modo dicitur posse de potentia ordinata. Ergo multa 
potest primo modo quae non potest secundo modo. Ideo quaedam dicitur posse de 
potentia absoluta, quae non potest de ordinata, quia multa subsunt suae potentiae quae 
non congruit sibi ut nunc facere; posset tamen ea facere convenientia, et sic ea facere.  
 
301 John XXI, Letter to the Bishop of Paris, ‘Episcopo Parisiensi. Relatio nimis implacida 
nostrum nuper turbavit auditum, amaricavit et animum, quod Parisiis, ubi fons vivus 
sapientie salutaris abundanter hucusque scaturiit, suos rivos limpidissimos, fidem 
patefacientes catholicam usque ad terminos orbis terrae diffundens, quidam errores in 
preiudicium eiusdem fidei de novo pullulasse dicuntur. Volumus itaque tibique 
auctoritate presentium districte precipiendo mandamus, quatinus diligenter facias 
inspici, vel inquiri a quibus personis et in quibus locis errores hujusmodi dicti sunt sive 
scripti, et que didiceris sive inveneris, conscripta fideliter, nobis per tuum nuntium 
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transmittere quam citius non omittas.’ - Dat. Viterbii, xv kalendas februarii, anno primo 
(Cad 92, 51), 6. 
 
311 Henry of Ghent, Quodlibeta VIII, q. 3 (Paris, 1518), fol. 304v: ‘quod aliquid dicitur 
impossibile fieri dupliciter. Uno modo obiective tanquam illud quod habet ab alio fieri ... 
Hoc modo quod impossibile est fieri nullum agens potest facere … Tale impossibile fieri 
nec Deus potest facere non propter defectum alicuius potentiae, sed quia ad tale non 
ordinatur aliqua activa potentia. Alio autem modo dicitur aliquid impossibile fieri 
subiective … Ponere impossibile primo modo simpliciter implicat contradictionem et 
repugnat factioni secundum omnem cursum et ordinem rerum ... Impossibile vero 
secundo modo, etsi esset impossibile fieri respectu alicuius agentis et secundum aliquem 
ordinem et cursum rerum, non tamen secundum omnen, ut cum aliquid dicitur fieri ex 
nihilo quid solum possibile est facere agentem supernaturaliter. Impossibile modo tertio 
est ubi est aliqua potentia in subiecto reducibilis ad actum per agens supernaturale, non 
autem per agens naturale, ut quod naturaliter caecus fiat videns, aut quod mortuus 
resurgat. Isto autem secundo et tertio modo impossibile fieri non dicitur impossibile fieri 
simpliciter, sed solum impossibile primo modo … ita quod magnum inconveniens est 
dicere Deum posse aliquid agere secundum quemcunque cursum et ordinem rerum quod 
secundum se simpliciter impossibile est fieri. Est enim magnum inconveniens dicere de 
tali impossibili, puta quod contradictoria sunt simul in eodem, quod non est impossibile 
quia Deus non potest facere hoc, sed quia hoc non potest fieri.’ 
 
314 Henry of Ghent, Bibliotheque Nationale, Manuscript Latin 3120 fol. 139rb: ‘Legislator 
non potest concedere privilegium aut condere statutum ad quod sequitur in ecclesia 
subtractio debite reverentie et obedientie inferiorum ad suos superiores aut universaliter 
destructio ordinis ecclesiastici, quia hoc est magnum inconveniens et contra ius naturale 
et divinum, contra quod legislator nichil statuere potest aut concedere aut dispensare; 
puta quod furioso reddendus sit gladius, existente actu in furia, quem deposuit. Si enim 
legislatori statuenti generaliter quod gladius deponenti reddendus est talis casus 
occurreret, ipsum legis director excipiendum a statuto generali iudicaret secundum 
veridicam doctrinam philosophie, V Ethicorum, (Nicomachean Ethics V, 1137b. Text not 




315 Henry of Ghent, Bibliotheque Nationale, Manuscript Latin 3120 fol. 139va: ‘Secundum 
autem modo bene quandoque sequitur inconveniens in statuto vel privilegio existente in 
se iusto et equo, saltem in casu, verbi gratia, si statueretur quod gladius depositus a 
furioso redderetur fratri suo sano. Ex hoc enim non inconveniens dictum nisi ex prava 
dispositione occulta huiusmodi sane, qua gladium sibi redditum vellet tradere furioso ut 
vel se vel alium occideret.’ 
 
317 Henry of Ghent, Bibliotheque Nationale, Manuscript Latin 3120 fol. 139va: ‘Statutum 
autem vel privilegium ad quod secundo modo sequitur inconveniens dictum, scilicet 
substractio debite reverentie etc., an hoc posset statuere aut concedere legislator, super 
hoc distinguendum, puto, de potentia absoluta et ordinata.’, 3120 fol. 139vb: ‘Dico ergo 
de legislatore, qui est homo purus potens peccare et malum agere, quod de potentia 
absoluta bene potest statuere vel privilegium concedere ad quod sequitur secundo modo 
inconveniens predictum. Et hoc ideo quid in antecendente non statim apparet 
inconveniens, cuiusmodi, ut puto, est privilegium fratrum secundum eorum intellectum.’   
 
318 Henry of Ghent, Bibliotheque Nationale, Manuscript Latin 3120 fol. 139va: ‘Statutum 
… ordinata. Licet enim circa Deum non contingat distinguere inter potentiam absolutam 
et ordinatam; Deus enim, eo quod peccare non potest, nichil potest de potentia absoluta 
nisi illud possit de potentia ordinata. Omnis enim potentia sua quocumque modo vadit in 
actum ordinata [est].’     
 
319 Henry of Ghent, Bibliotheque Nationale, Manuscript Latin 3120 fol. 140ra: ‘De hoc 
enim videtur loqui beatus Bernardus, libro III ad Eugenium Papam, sic inconveniens: 
Erras, si ut summam ita et solam institutam a Deo existimas tuam apostolicam 
dignitatem. Non tua potestas sola est a Domino sed et mediocres sunt et inferiores. Idem 
in eodem. Honor [um] et dignitatum gradus et ordines quibuscumque suos servare positi 
estis. Nunc autem subtrahuntur abbates episcopis, episcopi archiepiscopis, etc. Bonane 
species hec? Nimirum si excusari queat opus. Sicut facitando probatis vos habere 
plenitudinem potestatis, sed iusticie forte non ita. Facitis hoc, quia potestis; sed utrum et 
debeatis, questio est. Ecce plana distinctio inter potentiam absolutam et ordinatam circa 
dominum papam. Quando beatus Bernardus aliquid factitando ostendit se habere 




324 John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 44, q. unica, n. 3, vol. VI, Vatican edition, 363-9, 
‘In omni agente per intellectum et voluntatem, potente conformiter agere legi rectae et 
tamen non necessario conformiter agere legi rectae, est distinguere potentiam ordinatem 
a potentia absoluta; et ratio huius est, quia potest agere conformiter illi legi rectae, et 
tunc secundum potentiam ordinatem (ordinata enim est in quantum est principium 
exsequendi aliqua conformiter legi rectae), et potest agere praeter illam legem vel contra 
eam, et in hoc est potentia absoluta, excedens potentiam ordinatem. Et ideo non tantum 
in Deo, sed in omni agente libere – quipotest agere secundum dictamen legis rectae et 
praeter talem legem vel contra eam – est distinguere inter potentiam ordinatam et 
absolutam; ideo dicunt iuristae quod aliquis hoc potest facere de facto, hoc est de potentia 
sua absoluta, - vel de iure, hoc est de potentia ordinata secundum iura.’   
 
327 John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 44, q. unica: ‘Sed quando in potestate agentis est 
lex ex rectitudo legis, ita quod non est recta nisi quia statuta, tunc potest aliter agens ex 
libertate sua ordinare quam lex illa recta dictet; et tamen cum hoc potest ordinata agere, 
quia potest statuere aliam legem rectam secundum quam agat ordinate. Nec tunc potentia 
sua absoluta simpliciter excedit potentiam ordinatam, quia esset ordinata secundum 
aliam legum sicut secundum priorem; tamen excedit potentiam ordinatam praecise 
secundum priorem legem, contra quam vel praeter quam facit. Ita posset exemplificari 
de principe et subditis, et lege positiva.’ In Opera Omnia, 6: 364-5, II. 20-8. 
 
328 John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 44, q. un: ‘Unde dico quod multa alia potest agere 
ordinate; et multa alia posse fieri ordinate, ab illis quae fiunt conformiter illis legibus, 
non includit contradictionem quando rectitudo huiusmodi legis – secundum quam dicitur 
quis recte et ordinate agere - est in potestate ipsius agentis. Ideo sicut potest aliter agere, 
ita potest aliam legem rectam statuere, - quae si statueretur a Deo, recta esset, quia nulla 
lex est recta nisi quatenus a voluntate divina acceptante est statuta; et tunc potentia eius 
absoluta ad aliquid, non se extendit ad aliud quam ad illud quod ordinate fieret, si fieret: 
non quidem fieret ordinate secundum istum ordinem, sed fieret ordinate secundum alium 
ordinem, quem ordinem ita posset voluntas divina statuere sicut potest agere.’ In Opera 
Omnia 6: 366, II. 8-19.    
 
330 John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 44, q. un: ‘Advertendum etiam est quod aliquid esse 
ordinatum et ordinate fieri, hoc contingit dupliciter: Uno modo, ordine universali, - quod 
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pertinet ad legem communem, sicut ordinatum est secundum legem communem “omnem 
finaliter peccatorem esse damnandum” (ut si rex statuat quod omnis homicida moriatur). 
Secundo modo, ordine particulari, - secundum hoc iudicium, ad quod non pertinet lex in 
universali, quia lex est de universalibus causis; de causa autem particulari non est lex, 
sed iudicium secundum legem, eius quod est contra legem (ut quod iste homicida 
moriatur).  
Dico ergo quod Deus non solum potest agere aliter quam ordinatum est ordine 
particulari, sed aliter quam ordinatum est ordine universali.’  
 
332 John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 44, q. un.: ‘Potentia tamen ordinata non dicitur nisi 
secundum ordinem legis rectae de aliquo particulari. Quod apparet ex hoc quod possibile 
est Deum salvare quem non salvat, qui tamen morietur in peccato finaliter et damnabitur, 
- non autem conceditur ipsum posse salvare. Iudam iam damnatum (nec tamen hoc est 
impossibile potentia absoluta Dei, quia non includit contradictionem); ergo istud, scilicet 
“salvare Iudam,” eo modo est impossibile quo modo possibile est salvare istum: ergo 
istum potest salvare de potentia ordinata (quod verum est), et illum non … Staret enim 
cum illa “quod finaliter malus damnabitur” (quae est lex praefixa de damnandis), quia 
iste adhuc non est finaliter peccator, sed potest esse non peccator (maxime dum est in 
via), quia potest Deus eum gratia sua praevenire… Non autem staret, cum illa particulari 
lege, quod Iudam salvaret; Iudam enim potest praescire salvandum de potentia ordinata, 
sed non isto modo ordinata sed absoluta ab isto modo, et alio modo ordinata secundum 
aliquem alium ordinem, quia secundum alium ordinem tunc possibilem institui.’ In Opera 
Omnia 6: 366, I. 20-368, I. 14.   
 
353 Gerard of Saint Victor, Vat. Lat. 1086 fol. 224v: ‘Utrum potestas ordinaria sit a 
Christo vel a papa. Videtur quod a papa. quia est capud. Contra: papa est sponsus 
Christi. Dicendum quod potestas est duplex, scilicet ordinis et iurisdictionis. tunc dico 
quod illud quod homo consequitur per istas est a Christo. credo tamen quod sit una 
potestas habens diversa officia. habens tamen ordinem sacerdotalem potest exire in 
actum. Sed quantum ad iurisdictionem. requeritur aliud. dicendum. tamen quod utruque 
Potestas est a Christo. quia fuit data petro et aliis. ut patet super illud “tu es petrus” per 
glossam expressam. Licet videatur data (or dare) Uni quia per hoc notabat unitatem 
ecclesiae. (e)t glossa Rabani (Rabanus Manus) super illud missit alias (Etc?)  Sed 
quantum ad limitationem restrigendo habet papa et hoc expediens fuit propter bonum 
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commune et in causa rationabili. Ad argumentum patet quia Christus est capud 
principaliter.’ 
 
386 Peter Abelard, Introductio ad Theologiam III, 5 (PL 178, col. 1103-4; CCCM 13,527): 
‘Denique, si more hominum dicamus eum etiam aliquid posse uno tempore quod alio non 
possit, propter hoc videlicet solum quod ei convenit uno tempore id facere quod alio non 
convenit, nulla in hoc eius impotentia vel potentiae diminutio est intelligenda, cum ad 
potentiam cuiuslibet minime pertineat quod ei nullatenus convenit ut inde commendari 
possit, immo econtrario, eius derogaret dignitati.’    
 
iii. Comparison: Eckhart Q6 vs. Thomas Aquinas 
 
As the commentary section presents, notions of omnipotence reflect both similarities and 
differences between these two Meisters. Many of the parallels naturally come with the 
Thomas’ Quaestiones disputatae De potentia which is a more substantial work than 
Question six. These links have been supplemented by other passages from Thomas which 
bear close resemblence to the text of the question.  
 
Table 4: Parallel texts. 
 
Meister Eckhart Q6 Thomas Aquinas 
Utrum 
omnipotentia, que 










is in God should be 
considered as 
absolute power or 
as directed power? 
 
  











because it should 
be related [to the 
things] that are 
Now God is act 
both pure and 
primary, wherefore 
it is most befitting 
to him to act and 
communicate his 
likeness to other 
Q.d. De potentia, 
q. 1, a. 1, r: ‘Deo 
autem convenit 
esse actum purum 
et primum; unde 
ipsi convenit 
maxime agere, et 
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fitting for God to 
do and [the things] 
it is possible for 





power is most 









To the first, it must 
be said that it is 
impossible that 
God should do 
something, and that 
this be unfitting. 
However, He is 
able to make it so 
that something 
which is unfitting 
according to one 
ordination is made 
fitting according to 
another ordination. 
 
Scriptum Sent. III, 






Deus, et hoc sit 
inconveniens; sed 
tamen potest 
facere ut illud 








n. 2 Contra: 
Omnipotentia 
respicit omnia que 
non implicant 
contradictionem, 








does not involve a 
contradiction, and 
this is more than 





considered in itself, 
extends to all such 
objects as do not 
imply a 
contradiction. 
Q.d. De potentia, q. 
1. a. 7, r: 
‘Potentia Dei, 
quantum est de se, 
ad omnia illa 




n. 3 Hic primo 
ostenditur, quod 
potentia est in 
Deo. Nam 
It has to be shown 
first that [this] 
power is in God. 
For, potentiality is 
The question 
before us concerns 
God’s power: the 
first point of 
inquiry is whether 
Q.d.. De potentia, 
q. 1, a. 1: ‘Et 
primo quaeritur 




potentia dicitur in 




spoken of with 
regard to actuality.  
 
 





Sed duplex est 
actus: scilicet 







Et hec est in Deo: 
tum quia, ubi est 
operatio 
intrinseca et 
extrinseca, ibi est 
potentia. Sed in 













But actuality is 
two-fold: 
The first actuality, 
which is the form 
[of something], 
relates to passive 
potentiality and 
[the second 
actuality which is] 




is power].   
And this is in God: 
Both because 
where there is 
intrinsic or 
extrinsic action, 
then there is power 
[to bring it about]. 
But in God there is 
intrinsic and 
extrinsic action. 
[Therefore God has 
power for intrinsic 
and extrinsic 
action]. And,  
because according 
to Avicenna, power 
is firstly found in 
men because they 
have the strength to 
overcome.  
 
I answer that to 
make the point at 
issue clear we must 
observe that we 
speak of power in 
relation to act. Now 
act is twofold; the 
first act which is a 
form, and the 
second act which is 
operation... 
Wherefore in like 




that act which is 
operation—and 
seemingly it was in 
this sense that the 
word ‘power’ was 
first employed:— 
and passive power, 
corresponding to 
the first act or the 
form,—to which 
seemingly the 




Q.d. De potentia, 




potentia dicitur ab 
actu: actus autem 
est duplex: scilicet 
primus, qui est 
forma; et 
secundus, qui est 
operatio…  





qui est operatio; 







primus, qui est 







Sed Deus non 
potest pati ab 
But God cannot 
suffer [at the hands 
of] anything, 
Now, just as 
nothing suffers 
save by reason of a 
Q. d. De potentia, q. 








therefore God is 
active potentiality 
of the highest 
degree. [Power in 
action].     
passive power, so 
nothing acts except 
by reason of the 





passivae, ita nihil 
agit nisi ratione 
actus primi, qui 
est forma.’ 
 
Whence it most 
fittingly belongs to 
Him to be an active 
principle, and in no 
way whatsoever to 
be passive. On the 
other hand, the 
notion of active 
principle is 
consistent with 
active power. For 
active 
power is the 
principle of acting 
upon something 
else; whereas 
passive power is 
the principle of 
being acted upon 
by something else, 
as the Philosopher 
says (Metaph. v, 
17). It remains, 
therefore, 
that in God there is 
active power in the 
highest degree. 




activum, et nullo 







in aliud, potentia 
vero passiva est 
principium 
patiendi ab alio, 
ut philosophus 
dicit, V Metaphys. 
Relinquitur ergo 
quod in Deo 
maxime sit 
potentia activa.’  
 
n. 4 Sed dices: 
quomodo ponitur 
ista potentia in 
Deo?  
 
But you will then 
ask, ‘How is this 




n. 5 Dicendum, 
quod secundum 
quod invenitur in 
creaturis, amota 
The answer has to 
be: as that which is 
found in creatures 
as ultimate 
For these names 
express God, so far 
as our intellects 
know Him. Now 
S.Th. I, q. 13, a. 2, 
r: Significant 







Item dico, quod 
ista potentia est 




Item, essentia est 
principium 
emanationum 
omnium, et ipsa 












I say also, in reality 
there is only one 
power, because it is 
said that all things 




essence is [the] 
principle [origin] of 
all emanations, and 
itself [this essence] 
is one. Therefore 
and so forth. 
 
since our intellect 
knows God from 
creatures, it knows 




Himself all the 
perfections of 
creatures, being 




Him, and is like 
Him so far as it 
possesses some 
perfection; yet it 
represents Him not 
as something of the 
same species or 
genus, but as the 
excelling principle 
of whose form the 
effects fall short, 
although they 
derive some kind 
of likeness thereto, 
even as the forms 
of inferior bodies 
represent the power 
of the sun. 
Therefore the 
aforesaid names 
signify the divine 
substance, but in an 
imperfect manner, 









autem noster, cum 
cognoscat Deum 



















non tamen ita 
quod repraesentet 
eum sicut aliquid 
eiusdem speciei 

















exists in God," and 
in a more excellent 










sicut et creaturae 
imperfecte eam 
repraesentant. 




praeexistit in Deo, 






 We must also 
observe that our 
mind strives to 
describe God as a 
most perfect being. 
And seeing that it 
is unable to get at 
him save by 
likening him to his 
effects, while it 
fails to find any 
creature so 
supremely perfect 





describe him as 
possessing the 
various perfections 
it discovers in 
creatures, although 
each of those 
perfections is in 
Q.d. De potentia, 
q. 1, a. 1, r: ‘Sed 






Et quia in ipsum 
devenire non 
potest nisi ex 
effectuum 
similitudine; 














some way at fault, 
yet so as to 


















a Deo amoveatur. 
 
Another and a 
better reply is that 
there is a twofold 
relation in God. 
One is real, that 
namely, by which 





the divine persons 
would be distinct 




other kind of 
relation is logical, 
and is indicated 
when we say that 
the divine 
operation comes 
from the divine 
essence, or that 
God works by his 
essence: for 
prepositions 
indicate some kind 
of relationship. 
This is because 
when we attribute 
Q.d. De potentia, 
q. 1, a. 1, r: ‘Vel 
dicendum, et 
melius, quod in 
divinis invenitur 
duplex relatio. 








non realiter sed 
ratione 
distinguerentur, 





operatio divina est 
ab essentia divina, 














attribute to him 
also the 
relationship of that 
which derives its 
existence from a 
principle, 
wherefore such 





does not: hence, 
although the divine 
essence has no 
principle, neither 
really nor logically, 
yet the divine 
operation has a 
principle in our 









ei relatio existentis 
a principio, unde 
ista relatio non est 
nisi rationis 








divina non habeat 
aliquod 
principium neque 













et ordinata. Nam 
quando aliquid 
attribuuntur Deo 




Second, it is to be 
enquired how this 
distinction between 






attributed to God 
[insofar as he is 
God], these pertain 
to absolute power. 
When something is 
ascribed to the 
power of God, 
therefore, one must 
consider whether it 
is attributed to his 
power considered 
in itself, or in its 
order to his 
wisdom and 
foreknowledge and 
will. If the former, 
then he is said to be 
Scriptum Sent. III, 








enim dicitur posse 
illud de potentia 
absoluta: vel 
attribuatur sibi in 
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But when some 
properties are 
attributed with 
respect to his 
intellect and 
wisdom, then these 
pertain to directed 
power.  
 
able from his 
absolute power; if 
the latter, then he is 
said to be able from 









tunc enim dicitur 
posse illud de 
potentia 



















Now thirdly, to this 
question we say 
what the Master in 
his Sentences, with 
the [authoritative] 
sayings of the 
saints, determined, 
and it seems that, 
according to him, 
[God’s 
omnipotence] is to 
be considered as 
both. [as absolute 
and as directed 
power]. 
  
n. 8 Quidam 
tamen dicunt, 
quod ex hoc est 
omnipotens, quia 
potest facere 
quidquid vult per 
se et a se.  
 
Some others say, 
however, that he is 
omnipotent 
because he can do 
everything he wills 
by himself and of 
himself.   
 
 
And some said that 
he is called 
almighty because 
he can do 
whatsoever he 
wills, and this by 
nature and 
essentially; but this 
regards the way in 
which he has 
power.      
 
Q.d. De potentia, 
q. 1, a. 7, r: ‘quia 
potest quidquid 
vult; et hoc habet 
a se et per se; 
quod pertinet ad 
modum habendi 
potentiam. 





argument:  This 







[the way in which] 
power works.  
 







secundum quod se 
potest extendere 
ad omnia que non 
implicant 
contradictionem, 










Therefore I say it 
[God’s power] is to 
be considered 
rather as absolute 
power because it 
should be 
considered insofar 
as it extends to all 
things which do not 
involve a 
contradiction, 
because it is 
considered as 
referring to 
everything that is 
possible.  
Also, the power of 
God would 
otherwise be 
limited if we 
considered it as 
relating to 




Two things that are 
in mutual 
contradiction 
cannot be in God. 
Now the absolute 
and the conditional 
are in mutual 
contradiction, since 
the absolute is that 
which is considered 





should not place in 
God an absolute 
and a conditional 
power 
 
Q.d. De potentia q. 
1, a. 5: ‘in Deo 
duo 
contradictoria 







quod secundum se 
consideratur; 
illud vero quod 
regulatur, 
ordinem ad aliud 
habet. Ergo in 










 God always works 
with the whole of 
his power. But his 
effect is limited 
according to the 
determination of 
his will and the 




Q.d. De potentia, 
q. 1, a. 2, r. arg. 
13: ‘quod Deus 
semper agit tota 








Item sicut scientia 
dicitur Dei omnia 
Likewise, when we  




scientem, quia scit 









knowledge, we say 
that God is 
omniscient because 
he knows 
everything [and] it 
is also the same 
when referring to 
power. [He is 
omnipotent 
because he is able 
to do everything].  
 







Now, why is it not 




If God is called 
almighty and all-
knowing, why is he 




Q.d. De potentia, 

















In response I say 
that he only wills 
those things to 
which he applies 
his knowledge or 
power. 
in voluntary 
actions, power and 
knowledge (as 
stated in Metaph. 
ix, 2, 5) are brought 
into action by the 
will: wherefore in 
God power and 
knowledge are 
described in 
universal terms as 
being without limit, 
as when we say 
that God is all-
knowing and 
almighty: whereas 
the will, seeing that 
it is the 
determining force, 
cannot cover all 
things, but only 
those to which it 
Q.d. De potentia, 
q.  1, a. 7, r. 5: ‘in 
his quae aguntur 







ideo scientia et 



















eorum tantum ad 
quae potentiam et 
scientiam 
determinat; et 
ideo Deus non 
potest dici 
omnivolens 
Et nota quod non 
dicitur 
omnipotens, quia 
in eo sit omnis 





And notice that he 
is not said to be 
omnipotent 
because in him 
would be power to 
do everything, but 
because he is able 
to do everything 
that is possible 
It would seem that 
the reason is 
because he can 
simply do all 
things. For he is 
called almighty in 
the same way as he 
is called 
omniscient. Now 
he is called 
omniscient because 
he simply knows 
all things. 
Therefore he is 
called almighty 
because he can 




Q.d. De potentia, 
q. 1, art. 7, arg. 4: 




























God always works 
with the whole of 
his power. But his 
effect is limited 
according to the 
determination of 
his will and the 




Q.d. De potentia, 
q. 1, a. 2, resp. 13: 
‘quod Deus 
semper agit tota 








n. 11 Ad 
argumentum 
To this [first] 
argument it must 
To the first, it must 
be said that it is 
Scriptum Sent. III, 




Deus de potentia 
absoluta potest 
Deus facere que 
nunc non sunt 
decentia. Si essent 
tamen facta, 
essent decentia et 
iusta.  
 
be said that out of 
[his] absolute 
power God can do 
things that are not 
decent now. But if 
they were done, 
then they would be 
decent and just. 
 
impossible that 
God should do 
something, and that 
this be unfitting. 
However, He is 
able to make it so 
that something 
which is unfitting 
according to one 
ordination is made 










Deus, et hoc sit 
inconveniens; sed 
tamen potest 
facere ut illud 













 God has done 
whatever is 
actually just not 
whatever is just 
potentially: since 
he is able to do that 
which at present is 
not just through not 
being in existence; 
yet if it were, what 
he does would be 
just. 
 
Q.d. De potentia, 
q. 1, a. 5, r. 7: 
‘quod Deus fecit 
quidquid est 






facere quod nunc 
non est iustum, 
quia non est: 
tamen si esset, 
faceret iustum.’ 
 
n. 12 Sed dicis: 
‘non potest nisi 
que previdit?’ 
Dicendum quod, 
si referatur ad 
actum, scilicet 
‘nisi’, tunc est 
vera, quia 
quidquid facit 
But you [may] ask 
[against this], ‘Can 
he only do 
something, if he 
has foreseen it?’ 
To this it should be 
said that, if this ‘if ’ 
refers to the things 
he has actually 
When you say that 
God is not able to 
do except what he 
has foreseen that he 
would do, the 




Q.d. De potentia, 
q. 1, a. 5, r. 1: 
‘quod haec 
locutio, Deus non 
potest facere nisi 






previdit. Sed si 
referatur ad 
potentiam, tunc 






done, then this is 
true. Because he 
has foreseen 
anything he has 
done. [does]. 
But if this ‘if’ 
refers to what he is 
able to do, then it is 
false.    
 
negative may refer 
either to the power 
signified in the 
word able, or to the 
act signified in the 
word do. In the 
former case the 
statement is false: 
since God is able to 
do other things 
besides those that 
he foresees he will 
do, and it is in this 
sense that the 
objection runs. In 
the latter case the 
statement is true, 
the sense being that 
it is impossible for 
God to do anything 
that was not 
foreknown by him. 
In this sense the 





importatur per ly 
potest, vel ad 
actum, qui 
importatur per ly 
facere. Si primo 
modo, tunc locutio 
est falsa. Plura 
enim potest facere 
quam praesciat se 
facturum; et in 
hoc sensu ratio 
procedebat. Si 
autem secundo 
modo, sic locutio 
est vera; et est 
sensus, quod non 
potest esse quod 
aliquid fiat a Deo, 
et non sit a Deo 
praescitum. Sed 







 God cannot do 
otherwise than 
what he foresees 
that he will do. 
 
 
Q.d. De potentia, 
q. 1, art. 5, arg. 1: 
‘Deus non potest 
facere nisi quod 
praescit se 
facturum’ 





“potest   
quidquid vult”, 
non quia potest 
omnia.’ 
 
But you [may] say 
[against this] that 
Augustine in 
‘Enchiridion’ states 
that, ‘he [God] is 
omnipotent 
because “he can do 
everything he 
wills”, not because 
“he can do 
everything”.’  
It would seem that 
he is called 
almighty because 
he can do 
whatsoever he 
wills. For 
Augustine says: He 
is called almighty 
for no other reason 
but that he can do 
Q.d. De potentia, 




potest omnia quae 
vult: dicit enim 
Augustinus in 
Enchiridion: non 




n. 14 Dicendum, 
quod Augustinus 
ex hoc <habet> 
‘vult’, quia inter 
‘omnia’ 
includuntur mala, 
que Deus non 
potest. Ideo sic 
loquitur.   
To this it should be 
said that Augustine 
says ‘wills’ because 
by ‘everything’ he 
also understood to 
include the evil 
things that God is 
not able to do.  
And that is why he 
[Augustine] spoke 
in this way.    
whatsoever he 
wills. 
quia quidquid 
vult, potest.’ 
 
